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MDHIAN 1267
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FM UKMIS NEW YORK he
TO DESKBY 220730Z FCO à
TELNO 1445 : fines
OF 220555Z APRIL 94 Mn
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALA, ROME, DHAKAR, ACCRA
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ADDIS ABABA, DAR-ES--SALAAM
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA, SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS, ACTOR
ET DE
MY TELNO 1434: RWANDA
Sunmary
1, Security Council adopts resolution 912: (1994) authorising a
reduction în the strength of UNAMIR to some 270 personnel with a
mandate to act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt
to secure a ceasefire, to assist in the resumption of humanitarian
relief operations to the extent feasible and to monitor and report
on developments. The situation in Rwanda is to be kept under
constant review and any new recommendations on UNAMIR in the Light
Of developments on the ground are to be promptly considered,
2. Nigeria, Oman, Djibouti, Rwanda and France speak îin the Council
meeting.
Detail
3. The Secretary-General's report on the situation in Rwanda
finally emerged Late în the morning of 21 April (text already faxed
to UND and AD(CE)). It presented three options to the Council. The
first was’ for an expansion of the force by several thousand troops
and a change în the mandate to enable it to enforce a ceasefire,
probably acting under Chapter VII. The second was a reduction in
the force to a strength of some 270 personnel essentially to
support and protect the Force Commander and the Spetial
Representative in their mediation role. The third was complete
wWithdrawal of UNAMIR. The Secretary-General recommended against
option III but did not express a preference between I and Il.
4. The report was taken up in informal consultations of the
Security Council Later on 21 April, Gembari (Nigeria), speaking on
behalf of the NAM caucus,
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It was clear from the report that UNAMIR had been fulfilling B.
useful role in Rwanda and the preference of the NAM caucus was
therefore for an option which was not in fact in:the report: the
maintenance of a larger force with a mandate to help create the
conditions for a ceasefire and the resumption of the peace process
as well as to offer assistance to the civilian population. As far
as the options în the report were concerned, there was neither the
political will nor the resources to implement option I. Option III
was also unacceptable. Terminating UNAMIR's mandate would imply
the Council had different standards for Africa. There had been no
similar talk of terminating UNPROFOR's mandate. But given. the
reality, with no ceasefire, the increasing nervousness of troop
contributing countries and absence of commitments from other troop
contributing countries to provide additional or replacement troops,
the NAM caucus could agree to option II. But this must be linked
to the prospect of returning to the force Level originally
authorised. Efforts were beïng made by neïghbouring countries to
restart the Arusha peace process. If these efforts bore fruit then
option II was merely a stop gap until the old force Level could be
restored.
5. Ladsous (France) also rejected options I and III. He supported
option II as a stop gap but would be prepared to reconsider the
issue at any time. Chen (China) also expressed support for option
Il. I expressed our disappoïintment that there had again been no
clear recommendation from the Secretary-General, The Security
Council was not as good a forum as that of the Force Commander and
the Secretary-General to make such a choice. However we had been
given a reasonably clear cut series of options. I agreed with the
Nigerian Ambassador on option III. I also agreed with him that
option I was not on the cards. But we should be careful not to
assume that the only reason for this was impracticability. .Whether
or not troops were available to reinforce UNAMIR, we should think
back to our experiences in Somalia as well as to what was happening
on the ground in Rwanda and ask what mandate an increased force
could be given. -
? Option I would entail taking over the
whole country and dealing by force with two heavily armed opposing
groups. Option I was therefore neîther practical nor feasible. I
agreed option II was not especially attractive. It was nejther a
permanent nor a Lasting solution but it was a transitional phase.
We should keep the force Level under constant review, until the
question of UNAMIR's Long-term future was clearer.
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6. Argentina, the US, Brazil, Russia and Spain all spoke along
similar Lines. , Option II was the only one realistically possible.
But the Council should retain flexibility on the.future size of the
operation depending on devetopments on the ground, Al-Khussaiby
(Oman) asked whether -UNAMIR had control of the airport. Could a
withdrawal, if authorised by the Council, actually take place în
safety? Baril (Secretary-General's Military Adviser) saîd that the
Force Commander had plans for the immediate evacuation of up to a
thousand troops from first Light on the date of departure. This
would Leave 500-600 who would be deployed at the airport, at the
stadium and at the headquarters. This figure would draw down
gradually, with troops at the aîrport the Last to go. He
underlined the need for the Force Commander to be given some
flexibility in terms of timing for achieving the 270 strong force
provided for în option 2. He also underlined the need for à
decision as soon as possible, The troops had now been put on alert
to move and stood down three nights running. This was beginning
serfously to affect morale. The Force. Commander needed a decision
as soon as possible on whether the bulk of his force would stay or
Leave. I said that in the Light of Baril's comments we should aim
to adopt the resolution on 21 April.
6. A working group then convened to Look at the draft text. The
“group focussed on the paragraphs which had been contentious in the
earlier version. These were the mandate paragraph (now 0P8), the
provision for future changes to the mandate (OP9) and the
references to neïighbouring countries (0P11). OP8 caused few
problems given the near unanimity in informal consultations that
option 2 was the only practical solution. However, OP9 was more
difficult. The NAM caucus wanted the wording to imply the
Council's willingness to increase the force if developments on the
ground warranted ît. The Americans could not agree to a reference
to an increase without a balancing reference to the possibility of
ae further decrease. We suggested the compromise Language îin OP9
which was eventually accepted. There was also some discussion
about the role of neighbouring countries. We underLined the
importance, in the Light of the initiatives currently underway, of
recognising and supporting the Leaders of the sub-region in their
efforts to bring about a sotution. We therefore proposed the
Language în 0P11 to replace the previous Language. However,
Rwanda, Rd, insiste d on some reference to other
countries refraining from action which might exacerbate the
situation. The eventual compromise reached.was to Leave our
wording as 0P11 and to add a new PPK stressing the need for all
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“Countries to avoid any action which might exacerbate the situation
in Rwanda. |
8. On this basis, Council members agreed the text and a short
Council meeting took place Late on 21 April (during a suspension in
the Council's meeting on Bosnia.
9. At the formal session, Nigeria, Oman, Djibouti and Rwanda spoke
before the vote. Ayewah saïd that an enforcement mandate would not
meet the security and political challenges in Rwanda, But
Withdrawal would be defeatist and would seriously damage the
credibility of the Security Council. Nigeria therefore reluctantly
“Supported the reduction of the force Level with a possibility of an
increase if a ceasefire was Later established. He wondered,
however, whether the international community had done enough în the
face of the carnage and violence în Rwanda. In the coming days and
months the UN would have to face the choice on whether to turn its
back on Rwanda or to do more. This was not a political but a moral
question which hit at the heart of the credibility of the United
Nations.
10. Al-Khussaiby (Oman) said it was most appropriate for the time
being for the force to be reduced to a minimum. However the UN
presence must be maintaîned to allow continued mediation. If
conditions improved it would be-sensible to review the mandate.
11. Olhaye (Djibouti) said he would have preférred an option
between I and II: a larger force which did not have a mandate to
enforce a cessefire but instead one to ensure the safety of
innocent civilians who had taken refuge with UNAMIR. It should
also continue to play a role in the delivery of humanitarian aid.
But Djibouti accepted that option II at the moment was the only one
which was really workable. He underlined the need for a return to
the Arusha Peace Process. The problems of Rwanda would only be
solved in the long-term through a Government of national'unity and
national reconciliation. |
12. Bizimana (Rwanda) said that since the death of President
Habyarimana, Rwanda had been experiencing the most critical period
în îts history. But the response of the international community
had been rather selective. The Rwandan people felt abandoned.
Although of course it was Legitimate for there to be concern about
the safety of foreign nationsls, there had been far too much
emphasis on this issue. Some of the attention paid to the
PAGE 4
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151256
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evecuation should have been given to increasing the staff of UNAMIR
to allow it to achieve a ceasefire and the conditions for an end to
violence, The humanitarian agencies and NGOs could then have
provided aîd to the population. The Security Council could thereby
have served as a tool in the service of peace. However the. Council
had a double-edged policy. In some places, if the security
situation deteriorated, the Council reacted by enhancing the
military and Logistic means at the disposal of the UN operation
deployed there. Elsewhere, even a small deterioration in the
security situation, meant the UN would Leave. ïn the resolution
about to be adopted, the Council had expressed its concern about
the violence and killings in Rwanda. But the option chosen, to
reduce the Level of troops, was not a proper response to this
crisis. No measure was beîng envisaged to help the people of
Rwanda who hoped that the Council would eventually realise it had a
duty to help them. He was associating himself with the vote
because of îts calls for a ceasefire and the return to the
political process. He also hoped that the request to all countries
not to undertake any action which would exacerbate the situation
would be respected. UNOMUR's operations on the Uganda border
should be continued.
13. The resolution in MIFT was then adopted unanimously as SCR 712
(1994) of 21 April 1994.
14. Ladsous (France) spoke after the vote. France had been
dismayed at the scope of violence in Rwanda. He paid tribute to
the Belgian soldiers who had Lost theïr Lives. He stressed that no
military solution to the problems in Rwanda was feasible. The
Arusha Agreement remaîned the best framework for achieving à
durable political settlement. . The UN was committed to helping
Rwanda achieve this solution but the continued absence of a
ceasefire had made it necessary to reconsider the current presence
Of UNAMIR. ‘ALL the parties should heed the call in the resolution
for cessation of hostilities.
Comment
15. Pressure had been building throughout the week to take a
substantive decision on Rwanda following the delay. and confusion at
the end of Last week. The Nigertans and other members of the NAM
caucus would probably have preferred to Leave the status quo in
place a Little longer to see whether the Arusha meeting on 23 April
could achieve any kind of agreement. However, General Baril's
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151256 :
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forceful intervention on the need for the Council to take a
decision for -the sake of the troops on the ground, tipped the
balance in favour of a decision on 21 April. SSSR
EE,
But the key was
to take the decision as soon as possible. This has now been done,
and to our satisfaction.
15. See MIFT.
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