Citation
UNCLASSIFIED
United States Department o
Washington, D.C. 20520 •
July 26, 1993
RELEASED IN FULL
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL:OADR
TO:
AF/FO - DAS Bushnell
FROM:
AF/RA - LTC Anthony Marley
AF/C - Kevin Aiston
SUBJECT:
Preliminary Peacekeeping Force Options for Rwanda
This memorandum is only a preliminary examination of
peacekeeping force options in Rwanda. Its purpose is to serve
as a basis for further discussion and analysis. The stated
costs for each option are rough estimates only, and assume
reimbursement of OAU forces at UN rates.
Background. The Government of Rwanda and the rebel Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) are soon expected to sign peace accords
ending nearly three years of civil war in that central African
country. The proposed peace agreement calls for a "Neutral
International Force" (NIF) to act as a peacekeeping force
during the transitional period. The actual size of the NIF
will be dependent on the outcome of a planning survey; current
estimates among Arusha participants range up to 2,500
personnel. The costs of the NIF will largely depend on the
ultimate size of the force.
The NIF's mandate will include supervision of the
encampment and disarming of combatant forces, supervision of
the demobilization of excess military forces, monitoring of the
integration of forces into the new national army and
gendarmerie, and monitoring of internal security to permit the
return of up to 1.5 million displaced persons and refugees.
The NIF's geographic span of control will encompass the
entirety of Rwanda (10;169 square miles, approximately the size
of Maryland). NIF peacekeepers would be required for
approximately 10-12 months, while observers could expect to
remain in Rwanda for the 22 month transition.
The Rwandan Government, the RPF, and the Organization of
African Unity have all indicated that they look to the United
Nations to provide the NIF peacekeeping force. The Rwandan
Government has also indicated that "the people" need to see
non-African participation in the peacekeeping force and has
made clear that it does not trust the OAU, which it regards as
pro-RPF.
CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN L. MILLS
DATE/CASE ID: 12 FEB 2003 200101636
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CONFIDENTIAL
-2There are currently 50 OAU Neutral Military Observer Group
(NMOG) monitors in Rwanda acting as an interpositional force in
the buffer zone. The NMOG may be expanded to a force of 240
personnel in the near future, but its essential mandate is not
expected to change. NMOG is charged with monitoring of
military activities by the two sides to ensure that they do not
conduct offensive military activities, reinforce forward units,
or move additional weapons or munitions in the vicinity of the
neutral buffer zone.
Options. Six options are currently being considered for a
peacekeeping force for Rwanda:
- UN-only Peacekeeping Operation. (OAU personnel
Option
could form an important part of a UN force, both numerically
and in command positions.)
Force composed of approximately 2500 peacekeepers would cost
approximately $2.5 million per month in reimbursable salaries,
plus $375,000 per month in operating costs, plus an estimated
$3 million in round-trip transport costs, or about $37.5
million for one year. If a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda
were conducted on an assessed basis, the estimated cost to the
U.S. would be roughly $11 million for one year.
• Advantages•
- The only force trusted by all parties
- The UN is the most experienced international peacekeeping
organization
- Has a PKO planning and management directorate within the
Secretariat
- Bureaucratic funding mechanisms exist to finance UN
peacekeeping operation& (both within USG and other countries)
- Could provide an easy, needed success to UN peacekeeping
efforts
- Canada, among others, has reportedly informally indicated
a willingness to provide troops for an UN operation in Rwanda
- Would satisfy UN SYG Boutros-Ghaliss earlier insistence
that if the UN were involved in an operation, it must be in
command of the entire operation
- Would, allow France to withdraw its troops froM Kigali
(approximately 350 soldiers to ensure the security of the
capital) without losing face
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-3- Might allow training of OAU Secretariat personnel through
seconding them to the UN operation as deputies
- A UN PKO is cost effective when compared to the cost of
caring for the displaced population. A successful PKO would
allow the displaced to return home, thereby significantly
reducing current humanitarian relief costs (estimated at $100
million this year, with the U.S. pledged to contribute over $34
million) and obviating the need for future relief.
- Supports USG policy (per PRD-13) of emphasizing the UN as
the primary body to conduct peacekeeping
•
Disadvantaces:
- Russia (and possibly UK) may oppose and possibly veto an
assessed UN operation due to financial constraints (neither
contributes significantly to the humanitarian aid bill)
- Finding enough contributions for a voluntary UN operation
would be problematic
- UN peacekeeping management directorate is already
stretched exceedingly thin due to the abundance of current UN
peacekeeping efforts worldwide
- May prove difficult to find enough states willing to
provide military forces to participate in the operation
- UN peacekeepers could not be in place and operational for
an estimated 4-6 months
- DoD does not want to risk having to provide its own
resources, as might be required by a UN operation
- Ignores USG policy to promote regional peacekeeping
institutions
Option 2 - OAU-only Peacekeeping Operation
An OAU force composed of approximately 2500 personnel,
operating independently of the UN, could be expected to cost
the international community at least the same amount as a UN
operation (approximately $2.5 million per month reimbursed to
donating countries plus $375,000 per month in operating costs),
as it is unlikely that African countries will be willing to
provide significant numbers of military troops to the OAU on a
continuing basis without being reimbursed at UN rates. Cost
for a one year operation, including estimated round-trip
transport costs of $3 million, would be $37.5 million.
•
Advantages:
- Avoids adding another peacekeeping operation to the
heavily committed United Nations
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-4- Avoids risking Russian Security Council opposition
- If the operation succeeded, it would, provide a confidence
building experience to the OAU as an international institution
- Would demonstrate that the OAU and its member states are
serious about taking responsibility for solving Africa's
problems
- Supports USG policy goal to promote regional peacekeeping
institutions (although at perhaps too rapid a pace)
• Disadvantages:
- The Rwandan Government thinks the NMOG is pro-RPF and
therefore it opposes an OAU-only force
- The OAU SYG Salim Salim has stated that the OAU will not
undertake a peacekeeping mission
- African states will need massive external assistance
(materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they
could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- The OAU lacks experience in planning large peacekeeping
efforts
- The OAU Secretariat is not staffed to supervise/manage
major peacekeeping operations
- The OAU lacks the communications equipment required to
manage such an operation (Satcom communications, HF radios)
- The OAU is severely resource-constrained and lacks
funding mechanisms to support such a major endeavor; funding
would be ad hoc, on a bilateral and uncertain basis
- May well lead to a collapse of the peace in Rwanda
Option 3 - Hybrid UN-OAU Peacekeeping Operation (UN Observer
Force and OAU Peacekeeping Force)
Estimated costs to the international community of approximately
$3 million per month (70 UN observers at a per diem rate of
$120 per day equals $252,000; 2400 peacekeepers reimbursed at
approximately $2.4 million per month, plus $375,000 per month
for operating costs), plus estimated round-trip transport of $3
million. Estimated cost for a one year operation would be $39
million.
• Advant-ges:
- Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the
Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- A small number of UN observers could probably be deployed
more quickly than a full UN peacekeeping operation, and at
least a small OAU force would already be on the ground
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-5- Would provide UN planning expertise to the OAU
- Might minimize Russian opposition (especially if it is
conducted as a voluntary rather than an assessed operation)
- Provides the OAU a UN-supervised peatekeeping learning
experience and possible peacekeeping success
- Active UN involvement, and participation of non-African
observers, would probably make this acceptable to both Rwandan
parties
- UN involvement would provide a face saving way for the
French to withdraw their forces from Rwanda
- Would demonstrate the OAU's acceptance of responsibility
for addressing Africa's problems
- Supports USG policy goal of promoting regional
peacekeeping institutions
•
picadvantages:
- Might not be trusted by the Government of Rwanda
- The UN has indicated to the OAU that if the UN were
involved in a peacekeeping operation, the UN must be in command
of the entire operation
- OAU SYG Salim Salim has indicated that the OAU does not
support the concept of a "dual command," and would defer to
the UN for operational command.
- African states will need massive external assistance
(materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they
could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- The OAU is not currently staffed to manage a large
peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (no military or peacekeeping
directorate)
- The OAU Headquarters lacks the communications equipment
necessary to manage a major peacekeeping operation in Rwanda
Option 4 - Hybrid UN-OAU-Franco-Belgian Force
Combined forces would consist of a 750 man OAU force in the
buffer zone augmented by 250 UN troops, paid Eor through a
voluntary fund; retention of the 81 man UN force on the
Uganda-Rwanda border which is paid through UN assessments; and
an 800 man "International Force" consisting of one Belgian and
one French battalion whose costs would be borne directly by the
contributors. The costs to the international community would
be approximately $1.1 million per month in reimbursable
salaries (for UN and OAU forces), $225,000 in operating costs
per month, and $1.2 million in UN and OAU round-trip transport,
for an estimated total of $17.1 million for a one year
operation. (Note - this option has a total of 1881 personnel
rather than 2500, which also has a direct impact on costs.)
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-6• Advantages:
- Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the
Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- Requires a greatly reduced manpower requirement on the
United Nations (331 peacekeepers versus up to 2500 peacekeepers)
- Would provide UN planning expertise to the OAU
- Bureaucratic funding mechanisms exist to support the UN,
which could serve as a conduit to provide funding for the
operation
- Might minimize Russian opposition
- Provides the OAU a UN-supervised peacekeeping learning
experience and a probable peacekeeping success
- Active UN involvement and participation of non-African
observers would probably make this acceptable to the Government
of Rwanda
- Supports USG policy goal of promoting regional
peacekeeping institutions
•
pisadvantaaes:
- Would probably be rejected by the Rwandan Patriotic
Front, which considers France an ally of the Government
- France and Belgium might object on fiscal grounds
- France has indicated that it cannot provide voluntary
contributions to UN peacekeeping operations
- France has indicated its desire to withdraw its troops
from Rwanda
- Belgium has expressed its reluctance to contribute troops
to a Rwandan peacekeeping operation due to its colonial
association with Rwanda
- African states will need massive external assistance
(materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they
could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- The OAU is not currently staffed to manage a large
peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (no military or peacekeeping
directorate)
- The OAU might object to the bilateral aspect of the
Franco-Belgian force participating in the operation
- The OAU has been reluctant to accept the peacekeeping role
- OAU SYG Salim Salim has indicated that the OAU does not
support the concept of a "dual command"
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-7Option 5 - Small UN NIF in Kigali/Expanded NMOG in DMZ
Two separate forces: A small UN force of about 300 men to
assure security in Kigali for the installation of the joint
transitional government and an expanded NMOG of about 240 men
with a broader mandate to act as an effective buffer force and
provide security in the DMZ. The total cost is estimated at
$620,000 per month, plus round-trip transport of approximately
$725,000, or roughly $8, million per year.
• Advantages
- Is roughly one-fifth the cost of the other force options
actively being considered
- Would allow the post-peace coalition transitional
government to begin functioning. If the coalition government
works out, the parties' confidence may be high enough to allow
force integration without additional deployment of peacekeepers.
- Does not require any command relationship between the UN
and OAU, thereby avoiding the bureaucratic resistance of both
organizations.
- An expanded NMOG could provide the security necessary
for holding of local joint elections in the DMZ and for a
gradual return of the displaced to their homes.
- Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the
Rwandan PKO, thereby significantly boosting confidence levels
- Could probably be deployed more quickly that a
full-scale UN PRO
- Requires far less manpower from the UN
- The small UN force on the ground could evaluate the need
for a larger force for the cantonment/disarmament/force
integration/demobilization stage of the PKO
- Would allow the OAU to consult with the UN force and
benefit from its PKO expertise
- Would probably minimize Russian opposition (particularly
if conducted as a voluntary operation)
- Active UN involvement and participation of non-African
forces would make this option more acceptable to the Rwandan
government.
- UN involvement would provide a face-saving way for the
French to withdraw their forces, as the RPF has demanded.
- Would demonstrate the OAU's acceptance of responsibility
for addressing Africa's problems.
- Advances the USG's goal of promoting regional PKOs
- Canada, among others, has informally indicated a
willingness to provide troops for a UN PKO in Rwanda
- Despite the OAU's limited PKO experience, they may have
the capability to fulfill the modest role required of the NMOG
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-8•
Disadvantages
- Deployment of additional peacekeeping forces sometime in
the future might well be required to complete the cantonment/
disarmament/force integration/demobilization stage.
- The OAU may not have the funding on hand to expand the
NMOG and, if additional funding is required, it would have to
be on an ad hoc, bilateral basis.
- Even for an operation this small, funding of the UN
portion could prove problematic.
- It may be impractical to include troops from more than
one country in a UN force this small, and it could prove
difficult to find one country willing to accept the
responsibility of contributing all 300 UN troops.
- The UN peacekeeping management directorate is already
stretched exceedingly thin due to the abundance of current UN
PROs
Option 6 - Conduct No International Peacekeeping Operation:
There would be no cost to the international community for
peacekeepers or observers, but humanitarian aid costs would
probably continue at or above current high levels (at least
$100 million this year, with the USG pledged to provide $34
million in humanitarian aid).
• Advantage:
- Reduces peacekeeping costs to international community
• Disadvantages:
- Will perpetuate massive relief costs, which in Rwanda are
approximately 3 times higher than the cost of a 2500-man PKO
- Will most likely lead to the collapse of the peace in
Rwanda, which risks regional destabilization
- International inaction would highlight the
marginalization of Africa
- Would set a bad precedent; other countries in conflict
might prove unwilling to accept a negotiated settlement if the
international community is unwilling to provide peacekeeping
support
- Ignores USG policy goals of conflict resolution and
democratization (in Rwanda, the latter is wholly dependent on a
successful end to the civil war)
- Nullifies the US investment in resolution of the Rwandan
civil war, including more than one year of diplomatic effort
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