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0 121840Z SEP 94
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8919
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
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USUN N 03783 01 OF 02 121933Z
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003783
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR J5
SECDEF FOR OSD/PKPE, OSD/ISA, RWANDA TASK FORCE
STATE FOR A/S MOOSE
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, RW, UN,
SUBJECT: RWANDA: GEN DALLAIRE ADDRESSES TROOP
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L DARTS
DATE/CASE ID: 01 JUN 2005 200501974
UNCLASSIFIED
CONTRIBUTORS
1.
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL.
2. SUMMARY. FORMER UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER, GENERAL
DALLAIRE, ASSESSED UNAMIR OPERATIONS AT A MEETING OF THE
TROOP CONTRIBUTORS. HE DELINEATED 4 PHASES DURING HIS
TENURE AS COMMANDER AND ASSESSED EACH. IN PARTICULAR,
HE BELIEVED THAT IF UNAMIR HAD HAD BETTER EQUIPPED
TROOPS AND A MORE ROBUST MANDATE, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN
ABLE TO SAVE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF LIVES. HE
REPEATEDLY URGED THAT UNAMIR BE GIVEN THE MANDATE AND
RESOURCES TO SECURE THE CAMPS AND MOVE THE REFUGEES BACK
TO RWANDA. HE ALSO URGED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO
PROVIDE THE AID AND INFRASTRUCTURE WITHIN RWANDA
NECESSARY TO DRAW PEOPLE BACK.
3. INTRODUCTION. ON 8 SEPTEMBER, FORMER UNAMIR FORCE
COMMANDER, GENERAL DALLAIRE ADDRESSED UNAMIR TROOP
CONTRIBUTORS. HE ASSESSED UNAMIR OPERATIONS TO DATE
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DELINEATING 4 PHASES OF OPERATIONS. DALLAIRE OPENED BY
PRAISING THE DEDICATION OF UNAMIR FORCES AND EXPRESSING
HIS PERSONAL ESTEEM FOR THE DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER.
PHASE ONE
4. DALLAIRE CHARACTERIZED THE PRE-WAR PHASE AS LONG AND
DRAWN OUT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ARUSHA ACCORDS SET
AN AMBITIOUS TIMELINE, BUT CONCLUDED THAT THE UN DID NOT
EVEN COME CLOSE TO MEETING IT. AS A RESULT, CONDITIONS
ON THE GROUND CONTINUED TO CHANGE AS TROOPS WERE
DEPLOYING. IN THE END, THE INABILITY TO DEPLOY QUICKLY
CONTRIBUTED TO THE POLITICAL DETERIORATION.
5. BY THE TIME THE WAR BROKE OUT, UNAMIR HAD JUST
REACHED FULL STRENGTH (2500), BUT DID NOT HAVE
SUFFICIENT EQUIPMENT. THIS LACK OF EQUIPMENT CREATED
SIGNIFICANT RISKS, AND IN SOME CASES THE ILLEQUIPPED
TROOPS BECAME A LIABILITY.
PHASE TWO
6. DALLAIRE DESCRIBED THE PERIOD FROM 6 APRIL TO 8 JUNE
AS "ONE OF THE DARKEST PERIODS IN MODERN HISTORY."
HAVING WITNESSED THE EVENTS OF THIS PERIOD, HE IS NOW
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
DEEPLY DISTURBED TO SEE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE UN DEBATES
DURING THAT TIME.
PHASE THREE
7. THE PERIOD FROM 8 JUNE TO THE GOMA EXPLOSION SAW
UNAMIR REINFORCED. HE PRAISED THE TIMELINESS OF THE
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ETHIOPIAN DEPLOYMENT. TROOPS FROM SENEGAL AND THE CONGO
CONTINUED TO UNDERTAKE VERY DELICATE OPERATIONS EVEN
THOUGH THEY TOOK CASUALTIES. DALLAIRE HAS ONLY THE
HIGHEST PRAISE FOR THE FRENCH OPERATION, EVEN THOUGH
THAT INITIATIVE PUT UNAMIR FORCES AT CONSIDERABLE RISK
AND FORCED THEM TO COMPLETELY RESTRUCTURE THEIR COMMAND,
CONTROL AND LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS. COORDINATION AMONG
UNAMIR AND THE FRENCH FORCES WAS OUTSTANDING. IN
DALLAIRE'S ESTIMATION OPERATION TURQUIOSE ACHIEVED ITS
AIM AND SAVED LIVES.
B. ALTHOUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MOUNTED A HUGE
OPERATION IN GOMA, HE POINTED OUT THAT NO HUMANITARIAN
SUPPORT WAS PROVIDED IN THE SOUTHWEST OR IN THE REST OF
RWANDA. AS A RESULT, THE ONLY OPTION FOR THOSE SEEKING
HELP WAS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY.
PHASE FOUR
9. THE PERIOD FROM GOMA TO THE PRESENT HAS SEEN THE
STABILIZATION, AND EVEN ENTRENCHMENT, OF REFUGEE CAMPS.
THE ORIGINAL PLAN WAS TO DRAW REFUGEES BACK BY CREATING
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ACTION AF-01
USUN N
INFO
AID-01
EUR-01
NEA-01
PRS-01
STR-01
DRL-09
LOG-00
EB-01
ADS-00
PM-00
SS-00
PRME-01
03783
02 OF 02
ARA-01
H-01
NSAE-00
P-01
TRSE-00
G-00
121933Z
CIAE-00 SMEC-00 OASY-00
TEDE-00 INR-00
10-16
01C-02
01G-04
OMB-01
SNP-00
SP-00
SR-00
T-00
USIE-00 SA-01
/047W
715C84 121934Z /38
EAP-01
L-01
PA-01
SSO-00
PM8-00
O 121840Z SEP 94
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8920
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
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USUN N 03783 02 OF 02 121933Z
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003783
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR J5
SECDEF FOR OSD/PKPE, OSD/ISA, RWANDA TASK FORCE
STATE FOR A/S MOOSE
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARK, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, RW, UN,
SUBJECT: RWANDA: GEN DALLAIRE ADDRESSES TROOP
CONTRIBUTORS
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
A NETWORK OF WAY STATIONS AND NODAL POINTS INSIDE
RWANDA. THIS HAS NOT BEEN ACHIEVED AND THERE IS NO
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR SUCH AN OPERATION.
10. DALLAIRE STRESSED THAT IN ORDER TO SOLVE THE
PROBLEM UNAMIR MUST GO INTO THE CAMPS AND CREATE A SENSE
OF SECURITY BY SECURING THE BORDER AREAS; BY COMING INTO
THE CAMPS WITH OVERWHELMING FORCE; BY IDENTIFYING AND
SEGREGATING THOSE WHO ARE INTIMIDATING REFUGEES; BY
BROADCASTING THE UN MESSAGE VIA RADIO; AND BY PROVIDING
A LARGE FLEET OF VEHICLES THAT CAN TRANSPORT PEOPLE
BACK. IN ADDITION, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST
WORK TO PROVIDE STABILITY INSIDE RWANDA THROUGH AID AND
INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS.
11. UNAMIR MUST NOT SIT INSIDE THE BORDER WHILE FORMER
GOVERNMENT SOLDIERS AND LEADERS DESTABILIZE RWANDA.
DALLAIRE BELIEVES THAT IF WE DON'T DEAL WITH THE
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PROBLEM, THE RPA ULTIMATELY WILL. HOWEVER, DEALING WITH
THE PROBLEM WILL MEAN MORE SOLDIERS, ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT,
AND A ROBUST MANDATE.
ALTERNATIVE VIEWS
12. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH BENIN AND GHANA
CAUTIONED AGAINST TAKING ACTIONS THAT WOULD ALLY THE UN
WITH ONE SIDE AND AGAINST THE OTHER. THE GHANA REP
NOTED THAT MOST NATIONS REPRESENTED ON THE SECURITY
COUNCIL WERE NOT WILLING TO PUT THEIR OWN TROOPS AT
RISK. THEREFORE A TRULY PEACEFUL SOLUTION MUST BE
FOUND. FRANCE FELT THAT THE REAL ISSUE WAS SEPARATING
SOLDIERS FROM REFUGEES, AND THAT THE UN SHOULD LOOK FOR
SOLUTIONS WITHIN THE EXISTING MANDATE.
RIZA'S RESPONSE
13. A/SYG RIZA GENTLY COUNTERED DALLAIR'S ACTIVISM BY
CHARACTERIZING HIS PERSPECTIVE AS THAT OF A FORMER
COMMANDER AND A PRO-ACTIVE MAN WHO HAD SEEN HORRORS
FIRST HAND. HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT IT WAS FIRST THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NATIONS HOUSING REFUGEE CAMPS TO
SECURE THE CAMPS AND THEREBY ENCOURAGE RETURNS. THIS
WOULD BE THE FOCUS OF THE KHAN MISSION TO ZAIRE. IF
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
KHAN DOES NOT SUCCEED THEN OTHER ARRANGMENT'S WILL HAVE
TO BE CONSIDERED.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
ALBRIGHT
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