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P 141356Z DEC 92
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2510
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 01 OF 04 KIGALI 05147
CORRECTED
COPY(TEXT)
PARIS FOR PERLOW AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY COHEN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, RW
SUBJECT: DEMARCHES TO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER
REFS: (A) KIGALI 5119, (B) KIGALI 5058,
(C) KIGALI 5027
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1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. INTRODUCTION: ON DECEMBER 10, THE PAPAL NUNCIO
AND THE AMBASSADORS OF BELGIUM, FRANCE, GERMANY AND
THE UNITED STATES MET WITH PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA FOR
OVER TWO AND ONE-HALF HOURS. AS A FOLLOWUP, WE MET
WITH THE PRIME MINISTER DECEMBER 11. REFTELS COVER
THE ESSENTIAL POINTS FROM THESE MEETINGS; THIS
TELEGRAM PROVIDES DETAILS OF THE CONVERSATIONS FOR A
SMALL AND SELECT AUDIENCE. END INTRODUCTION.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY. CHARLES L DARIS
DATE/CASE ID: 15 DEC 2005 200103014
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
DEMARCHE TO PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA
3. IN OUR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, THE PAPAL
NUNCIO ELABORATED ON THE TALKING POINTS REPORTED
REFTEL C, POSING THE BASIC QUESTION WHETHER THE
PRESIDENT SAW AN INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND HIS OWN
SPEECH OF DECEMBER 1. BOTTOM LINE WAS THAT THE
PRESIDENT REFUSED TO BE PINNED DOWN THE SPECIFIC
POINT, BUT IN A VARIETY WAYS INSISTED THAT WHAT WAS
NEEDED NOW WAS A CONSENSUS ON INTERNAL MATTERS.
4. IN HIS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, THE PRESIDENT SAID
HE WELCOMED THE ROLE THE WESTERN OBSERVERS HAVE
PLAYED IN THE ARUSHA NEGOTIATIONS, HE RECOGNIZED THE
ROLE THAT WE HAVE PLAYED IN FORMING THE CURRENT
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND SAID THAT DURING THIS
DIFFICULT MOMENT, RWANDA NEEDS THE HELP OF ITS
WESTERN FRIENDS. THE PRESIDENT THEN WENT ON TO
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KIGALI 05147 01 OF 04 252121Z
DEFINE THE PROBLEM WHICH IS BLOCKING THE RESOLUTION
AS A CONFLICT FOR POWER FROM THE LOWEST LEVEL TO THE
TOP. HE SAID THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM IS THE
OPPOSITION'S UNWILLINGNESS TO GO TO ELECTIONS FOR
BOURGEMESTRES, LEAVING A SENSE OF NEAR ANARCHY IN THE
COUNTRY AND A CONTINUING DETERIORATION OF THE
SITUATION. HE SAID THAT ARUSHA CANNOT SOLVE THIS
PROBLEM.
5. ON ARUSHA ITSELF, HE SAID THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM
IS THE HEAD OF THE DELEGATION, THAT IS, HIS FOREIGN
MINISTER, WHO ALTHOUGH HE SEEMED CAPABLE OF
REPRESENTING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY DURING THE FIRST
PHASES OF THE ARUSHA PROCESS, SINCE THE SECOND PART
OF THE ARUSHA III HE HAS BECOME ONLY A SERVANT OF THE
RPF AND THE PARTIES FOR CHANGE. THE PRESIDENT FEELS
THESE PARTIES ARE GANGING UP AGAINST HIM, WITH THE
ONLY PURPOSE "TO GET RID OF HABYARIMANA" AND THE MRND
AS WAS SPELLED OUT IN THE BRUSSELS COMMUNIQUE ON
JUNE 3.
6. ASKED AGAIN IF HE ACCEPTED THE PROPOSALS OF THE
CLERICS, THE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT HIS SPEECH OF
DECEMBER 1 WAS QUITE CLEAR. IT CONTAINED: (1)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
AGREEMENT ON AN APPOINTED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY; (2)
AGREEMENT ON A SHORT TRANSITION PERIOD; (3) AGREEMENT
ON A LEGALIZING PROCESS FOR THE ARUSHA ACCORDS;
UNLIKE THE FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO BELIEVED THAT A
SIGNATURE AT ARUSHA WOULD SUFFICE, HABYARIMANA
INSISTS THAT NEITHER THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S SIGNATURE
NOR THAT OF THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE ADEQUATE TO GIVE
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KIGALI 05147 01 OF 04 252121Z
LEGAL IMPACT TO AN AGREEMENT. (4) HE ACCEPTED THE
OCTOBER 30 PROTOCOL AS IT IS, BUT WILL MAKE IT MORE
ACCEPTABLE THROUGH THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION; (5)
HE AGREED WITH THE BISHOPS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO
CLEAR WINNERS OR CLEAR LOSERS PERMANENTLY. ON THIS
POINT, THE PRESIDENT WENT ON AT GREAT LENGTH ABOUT
THE PROCESS THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAD USED IN COMING
UP WITH FIRST THEIR 35 PERCENT FOR THE MRND PROPOSAL
AND THEN THEIR FINAL PROPOSAL WHICH DROPPED THE MRND
TO THREE SEATS IN THE CABINET. AT THIS STAGE THE
PRESIDENT SAYS THAT HIS ANALYSIS IS THAT THE LATEST
BISHOPS' PROPOSAL WOULD CONFLICT WITH THE PRINCIPLE
OF NO PERMANENT WINNERS OR LOSERS.
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CONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 04 KIGALI 05147
CORRECTED COPY(TEXT)
PARIS FOR PERLOW AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY COHEN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, RW
SUBJECT: DEMARCHES TO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER
7. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR CHALLENGED THE PRESIDENT ON
THIS POINT, GIVING HIS OPINION THAT THE 35 PERCENT
FORMULA WOULD, IN FACT, CREATE A PERMANENT BLOCKING
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MINORITY, WHEREAS THE BISHOPS' FINAL PROPOSALS WOULD
NOT CREATE A PERMANENT MAJORITY AND WOULD NOT EXCLUDE
THE POSSIBILITY OF A BLOCKING THIRD IN THE MINORITY.
AMBASSADOR MARTRES SAID THAT THERE IS A BASIC
DIFFERENCE; THE FOREIGN MINISTER SEEMED TO BELIEVE
THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO RECONCILE THE CLERICS'
PROPOSITIONS AND THE LETTER SENT BY THE PRESIDENCY TO
THE PRIME MINISTER. IF THE PRESIDENT REJECTS THE
POSSIBILITY OF RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THESE VIEWS, HE
SEEMS TO BE REJECTING THE MORAL AUTHORITY OF THE
CHURCH. IF THAT IS THE CASE, ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR
MARTRES, THERE IS NO PLACE TO GO, FOR RWANDA HAS NO
OTHER RECOURSE THAN TO LISTEN TO THE MORAL AUTHORITY
OF THE CHURCH.
8. THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR, WHO HAD JUST RETURNED
FROM ARUSHA, PRAISED THE ROLE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER
IN ARUSHA, SAYING THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER BELIEVED
THAT HE HAD A LEGAL DECISION, BUT THAT IT WAS
IMPORTANT FOR HIM TO RESPECT ALSO THE POLITICAL
PROBLEMS THAT EXISTED. ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
SWINNEN, THE FOREIGN MINISTER DID A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE
JOB IN PRAISING THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AND THE LETTER
FROM THE PRESIDENCY, AND CONCLUDED THAT A COMPROMISE
FORMULA SHOULD BE WORKED OUT IN KIGALI.
9. THE PRESIDENT REITERATED HIS STATEMENT THAT THE
PROBLEM WAS A FOREIGN MINISTER IN ARUSHA WHO WAS
PLAYING HIS PARTY'S GAME. HE SAID TANZANIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER DIRIA AND OAU SECRETARY GENERAL SALIM SALIM
BOTH HAD SUGGESTED TO HABYARIMANA THAT HE EITHER
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REPLACE THE FOREIGN MINISTER AS HEAD OF HIS
DELEGATION OR APPOINT AN ASSISTANT OR DEPUTY CHIEF OF
THE DELEGATION TO REPRESENT THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS.
WE ALSO EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL.
10. THE PRESIDENT THEN SAID THE KEY ISSUE IS WHETHER
THE TRANSITION PERIOD SHOULD BE USED FOR A TRANSFER
OF POWER TO OTHERS, OR A SHARING OF POWER IN THE
TRANSITION PERIOD. HE ASKED THE WESTERN AMBASSADORS
IF WE THOUGHT THE TRANSITION SHOULD BE A TIME FOR THE
TRANSFER OF POWER FROM THE PRESIDENCY. WE SAID THAT
WE AGREED THAT THE TRANSITION WAS NOT DESIGNED TO BE
A TRANSFER OF POWER, BUT A PREPARATION FOR A
LONG-TERM SOLUTION. I SAID THAT WE BELIEVED THAT
COMPROMISES WERE POSSIBLE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CLERGY AND THE PRESIDENT'S
LETTER. I URGED THE PRESIDENT TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, AND I ADDED
THAT I THOUGHT THAT THE POSITION OF THE FOREIGN
MINISTER IN ARUSHA WAS AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION,
EXPECTED TO REPRESENT TWO DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED VIEWS
IN KIGALI. THE BELGIAN AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS
SUPPORTED THIS INTERVENTION.
11. THE PRESIDENT THEN SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THEY
COULD USE TECHNICIANS AS HAD BEEN USED IN THE PAST TO
DEMONSTRATE A RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES FOR A
CONSENSUS. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WOULD
HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO SUCH A METHOD, BUT THAT IT MUST
BE QUICK, BECAUSE TIME WAS RUNNING OUT.
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12. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTER DIRIA
HAD SEEMED CONTENT WHEN HE LEFT, AND ASKED ENOCH
RUHIGIRA TO GIVE A SUMMARY OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S
POSITION. RUHIGIRA REPORTED THAT DIRIA HAD TOLD HIM
THAT HE HAD RECEIVED WORD FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
THAT THERE WAS SOME POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT ON
PORTFOLIOS AND THAT DIRIA HAD ALSO SUGGESTED THAT
THEY MIGHT USE THE JPMC TO DEAL WITH DIFFICULT
POLITICAL PROBLEMS. HE ADDED THAT THE TANZANIAN
FOREIGN MINISTER TRIED TO SEPARATE THE INTERNAL
POLITICAL PROBLEMS FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
RPF. DIRIA HAD URGED THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
PRESIDENT TO GET TOGETHER TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM.
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FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2512
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 04 KIGALI 05147
UNCLASSIFIED
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CORRECTED COPY (TEXT PARA 19)
PARIS FOR PERLOW AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY COHEN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, RW
SUBJECT: DEMARCHES TO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER
13. AT THIS POINT THE,NONCE REPEATED ONCE AGAIN OUR
QUESTION ABOUT THE COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE
PRESIDENT'S POSITION AND THAT OF THE BISHOPS. THE
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KIGALI 05147 03 OF 04 271456Z
PRESIDENT AGAIN REPEATED HIS STATEMENT THAT THE
OBJECTIVE IS TO ACHIEVE A NATIONAL CONSENSUS. HE
EXPRESSED ADMIRATION AND AFFECTION FOR THE CHURCH
LEADERS BUT EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE CHURCH
SHOULD NOT PRESENT ITS PROPOSAL ON A TAKE IT OR LEAVE
IT BASIS, BUT RATHER THAT THEY SHOULD CONTINUE TO TRY
TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS.
14. IN THE END, THE PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD MEET WITH
THE PRIME MINISTER ON FRIDAY AND HE WOULD ESTABLISH A
GROUP OF EXPERTS TO DEVELOP SENARIOS FOR NEGOTIATIONS
WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, AND HE ENCOURAGED THE PAPAL
NUNCIO TO TELL THE BISHOPS THAT THEIR JOB IS NOT
COMPLETED AND THEY SHOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO SEEK A
CONSENSUS.
DEMARCHE TO PRIME MINISTER
15. IN OUR MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, THE
PAPAL NUNCIO DESCRIBED THE INTEREST OF THE HOLY SEE
AND THE FOUR COUNTRIES REPRESENTED IN SEEING A
PROCESS TOWARD PEACE, AND EMPHASIZED HIS INTEREST IN
SUPPORTING THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE CATHOLIC CLERGY.
THE NONCE POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD REQUESTED THAT
JOINT INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME
MINISTER BE SENT TO ARUSHA AND EMPHASIZED THE
SHORTNESS OF TIME. THE NONCE SAID WE BELIEVED THAT
THE PRESIDENT HAD ACCEPTED THE PROPOSALS OF THE
CLERGY AS A POINT OF BEGINNING FOR FINDING A NEW
CONSENSUS, AND DID NOT REJECT DIALOGUE WITH THE PRIME
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KIGALI 05147 03 OF 04 271456Z
MINISTER, BUT PREFERRED TO DO IT VIA A SMALL
COMMITTEE.
16. THE PRIME MINISTER GAVE HIS INTERPRETATION OF THE
TASK THE CLERGY HAD BEEN ASKED TO UNDERTAKE, AND
NOTED THAT THE CLERGY HAD CONCLUDED THAT ARTICLE 14
OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS WAS MEANT TO BE AN OPENING, AND
THAT THE DIVISION OF PORTFOLIOS SHOULD BE EQUITABLE.
HE ALSO SAID THAT FRIDAY THE 27TH OF NOVEMBER, WHEN
HE AND THE PRESIDENT HAD MET WITH THE CLERGY, THEY
HAD ASKED THE CLERGY TO PUT TOGETHER A FINAL PROPOSAL
WITH THE PRIMARY REQUEST THAT THEY FORMULATE THE
PROPOSAL SO THAT NO ONE BLOC WOULD HAVE EITHER AN
AUTOMATIC ONE -THIRD OR AN AUTOMATIC TWO-THIRDS VOTE
IN THE CABINET.
17. ACCORDING TO THE PRIME MINISTER, THE PRESIDENT
SAID NEITHER YES NOR NO TO THE FINAL PROPOSITIONS OF
THE CLERGY, BUT WENT TO DAR ES SALAAM SEEKING TO
INVOLVE THE TANZANIANS AS A MEDIATOR BETWEEN THE
PRESIDENT AND THE OPPOSITION PARTIES IN KIGALI.
THUS, WHEN FOREIGN MINISTER DIRIA CAME TO KIGALI AND
TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER HE SHOULD TALK WITH THE
PRESIDENT, THE PRIME MINISTER REJECTED HIS ADVICE AS
HE HAD ALREADY MET WITH THE PRESIDENT SO MANY TIMES
WITH NO RESULT.
18. THE PRIME MINISTER THEN TOLD US THAT HE REJECTS
THE CONCEPT OF A TECHNICAL GROUP ALSO. HE SAID IT
WOULD BE A DANGEROUS REPUDIATION OF THE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CLERGY.
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19. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR INTERRUPTED TO SUGGEST THAT
THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE WOULD NOT BE A CHALLENGE TO
THE CLERGY OR REPETITION OF THEIR WORK, BUT COULD BE
ASKED TO WORK ON FINDING NEUTRAL PARTICIPANTS FOR THE
GOVERNMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE CLERGY'S PROPOSAL.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
20. THE PRIME MINISTER THEN ASKED AGAIN IF WE
BELIEVED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS WILLING TO TAKE THE
CLERGY RECOMMENDATIONS AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE.
SPEAKING FOR ALL OF US, THE NONCE SAID WE BELIEVED
THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD USE THE RECOMMENDATIONS AS A
POINT OF DEPARTURE, ALTHOUGH HE MIGHT ALSO WISH TO
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AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 04 OF 04 KIGALI 05147
C O R R E C T E D COPY- CHANGE MRN 05147 VICE 05142
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, RW
SUBJECT: DEMARCHES TO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER
HAVE A TECHNICAL TEAM APPROACH THE CONSENSUS ISSUE
FROM OTHER POINTS OF DEPARTURE ALSO.
UNCLASSIFIED
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21. RECOGNIZING THAT HIS ESSENTIALLY NEGATIVE
PRESENTATION TO DATE WAS NOT CONVINCING, THE PRIME
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MINISTER SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS ON THE BASIS OF THEIR
RECOMMENDATION, THE CLERGY COULD SEEK TO FIND
INDEPENDENT PERSONS TO FILL THE MINISTRIES LABELED
"OTHER". HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REASSURE THE
PEOPLE THAT THE PROCESS IS CONTINUING. HE THEN
OFFERED TO CONTACT THE CLERGY AGAIN. HE ASKED THE
NONCE TO DO THE SAME. BUT, THE PRIME MINISTER
WARNED, EVEN IF AN INTERNAL CONSENSUS IS DEVELOPED,
IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO SELL IT TO THE RPF IN ARUSHA,
AND THE RPF WILL NOT ENTER THE GOVERNMENT IF THEY
BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A PERMANENT ONE-THIRD BLOCKING
VOTE BY THE MEND.
22. THE PRIME MINISTER CONCEDED THAT THE TANZANIAN
FACILITATOR WAS AWAITING A CONSENSUS IN RWANDA BEFORE
PURSUING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN ARUSHA. BUT THE PRIME
MINISTER SEEMED TO THINK THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO GO
AHEAD WITH DISCUSSIONS OF GENERAL MATTERS, INCLUDING
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY EVEN WITHOUT THE TYPE OF
INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE TANZANIANS AND WE WERE ASKING.
23. ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY PARTICULAR PARTIES WHICH
WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE IN A FUTURE GOVERNMENT, THE
PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THE CDR WOULD NOT BE A
PROBLEM FOR HIM, BUT HE NOTED THAT IT WAS A MAJOR
PROBLEM FOR THE RPF. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR POINTED
OUT THAT THE CDR HAS A REAL FOLLOWING WITHIN THE
COUNTRY AND IF ONE IS GOING TO SEEK RECONCILIATION OF
ALL RWANDANS IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO EXCLUDE A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE CDR.
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24. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR THEN SUGGESTED THAT ONE
MIGHT DISCUSS INDEPENDENT PERSONS INSTEAD OF PARTIES
AS THE NEUTRAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE GOVERNMENT. THE
PRIME MINISTER DID NOT EXCLUDE THIS POSSIBILITY.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
25. COMMENT: THE IDEA OF PERSONS RATHER THAN PARTIES
AS THE NEUTRAL MEMBERS IN THE GOVERNMENT WAS RAISED
WITH AMBASSADOR MARTRES AND WITH THE PAPAL NUNCIO
LATE ON DECEMBER 10. APPARENTLY THE SUGGESTION WAS
MADE BY PL LEADER MUGENZI AND WAS REPEATED BY PL
MINISTER LANDO TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR THE NIGHT OF
DECEMBER 10. EARLIER ON DECEMBER 10, MUGENZI HAD
PROPOSED TO ME THAT I GET THE PRESIDENCY TO PROPOSE
TO THE OTHER PARTIES A COMPROMISE IN WHICH THE
NEUTRAL MEMBERS WOULD BE MADE UP FROM SMALL PARTIES,
PERHAPS THE PD, THE PDI, AND THE RTD. THIS PROPOSAL
WAS NOT MADE TO THE PRESIDENCY AFTER OUR CONVERSATION
ABOUT ITS POTENTIAL WITHIN THE WESTERN AMBASSADORS
GROUP. BUT IT IS AN IDEA WHICH WE HAVE DISCUSSED
FREQUENTLY WITH THE MRND AND THE OTHER PARTIES DURING
THE COURSE OF THE PAST TWO OR THREE WEEKS. BOTH
IDEAS ARE NOW IN PLAY: INDEPENDENT PARTIES AND
NEUTRAL INDIVIDUALS. CHURCH LEADERS HAVE THEIR
CHOICE, AND MAY EVEN COMBINE THE TWO APPROACHES TO
PUSH THE PROCESS ONE MORE STEP.
26. IN CLOSING THE MEETING, THE PRIME MINISTER
COMMITTED HIMSELF TO US TO CONTACT THE PRESIDENCY AND
TO CONTACT THE CLERGY TO SEEK A WAY TO PUT TOGETHER
CANDIDACYS FOR THE NEUTRAL MINISTRIES ON THE BASIS OF
THE CLERGY PROPOSAL. HE COMMITTED HIMSELF TO KEEPING
US INFORMED IF THERE WAS PROGRESS. END COMMENT.
FLATEN
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