Citation
1
Database France Genocide Tutsi
https://francegenocidetutsi.org
Information Letter no 4, April 6, 2024
The France Genocide Tutsi (FGT)
database contains over 17,000 documents relating primarily to France’s role in the Tutsi genocide
in Rwanda in 1994. It can be
consulted via a website https:
//francegenocidetutsi.org updated monthly (backup in http://
francegenocidetutsi.ddns.net). A
search engine allows you to search by
date, author, title, personal names,
place names and gives access to the
text extracted from the document. It
is available at the following three addresses :
- https://francegenocidetutsi.
fr
- https://francegenocidetutsi.
com
- http://francegenocidetutsi.
ddns.net
New archives
The publication of the report
to the French President by the
commission chaired by Vincent Duclert (Duclert, 26/03/2021) has been
followed by the opening of the
archives consulted. The following
have been published two inventories of documents cited or consulted (Douat, 26/3/2021), a statement
of sources (Duclert, 10/05/2021) and
a methodological statement (Duclert,
07/04/2021). Some documents from
these archives have been uploaded to
FGT.
The Muse report (19/04/2021) in
English, commissioned by the Rwandan government, was toned down to
allow Emmanuel Macron’s visit to
Kigali (27/05/2021). However, published shortly after the Duclert report, he criticizes it for failing to take
a position on the real responsibility
of the French state. It asserts that
the French government bears significant responsibility for enabling a foreseeable genocide. This report was not
accompanied by the publication of archives.
The French judicial investigation
into the attack of April 6, 1994, which
caused the death of the Rwandan and
Burundi presidents ended with a dismissal (Herbaut, 21/12/2018) in favor of the Rwandans incriminated by
judge Bruguière (17/11/2006). Documents from this case are available on
FGT.
in 1993-1994, the reports being archived at Fort de Vincennes. DGSE documentalists would have denied the
existence of such archives. On the
hiring of mercenaries to carry out
an indirect strategy during the genocide (Quesnot, 06/05/1994), Duclert makes up for it in his 2024
book by analyzing the Rwabalinda’s
report on his visit to General Huchon on May 9, 1994 (Rwabalinda,
16/05/1994). He does not dispute its
authenticity (Duclert, 2024, pp. 421426). One of the most important aspects of Duclert’s report was to untie
tongues. For example, Colonel Galinié
opened his personal archives. Some
archives are missing or very incomplete, such as that of the état-major
Duclert’s report
particulier. Some faxes are labelled to
The Duclert commission produced be destroyed after reading (Huchon,
a voluminous report which conclu- 10/27/1990). Pierre Joxe tried to put
ded on a “set of heavy and damning an end to the practice of “orders by
responsibilities” for France (Duclert, voice”, which leaves no paper trail
26/03/2021, p. 973). The Élysée Pa- (Duclert, 26/03/2021, p. 737). Hubert
lace and especially the état-major par- Védrine would not give this note to
ticulier are suspected. Following this the President “for fear to displease”
enormous work, continued in a book (Joxe, February 1993).
by Vincent Duclert, La France face au
génocide des Tutsi (Duclert, 2024), a
number of questions arise. Was there Antoine Anfré
complicity in the genocide ? “If that
means a willingness to join in the
The direct consequences of the
genocidal enterprise,” writes the re- Duclert Commission are political :
port on page 971, “there is nothing the Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Kiin the archives to demonstrate that”. gali (Macron, 27/5/2021) and the apDid the commission have access to all pointment of Antoine Anfré as amthe archives ? It was limited to the bassador. This young diplomat in
French archives. In its methodologi- Kampala and then in Quai d’Orsay
cal statement, it acknowledges the li- as Rwanda editor was a little too
mits of its work. It did not have en- lucid. He was dismissed for notes
ough time to work on the role of Paul that displeased Paul Dijoud (Duclert,
Barril (Duclert, 07/04/2021, p. 36). 26/3/2021, pp. 844-850) and the ruThe Direction générale de la Sécu- ling left, not free of colonial and
rité Extérieure (DGSE) listened to racist clichés. On the guestbook of
Paul Barril’s phone communications the Gisozi memorial, Anfré writes :
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“The Tutsi genocide would not have
happened if we had a different policy” (Anfré, 19/07/2021). That says
it all. In front of Rwandan television, Anfré goes back over his career
troubles (Nsengimana, 17/09/2022).
The French press made no mention of
it.
Inability to think about genocide ?
Genocide, i.e. the elimination of
the Tutsis, was already announced
as early as October 1990 (Martres,
10/15/1990 ; Galinié 10/24/1990).
Blindness in the face of massacres
and the declared intention to liquidate the Tutsis proved profitable for
France, since Belgium, more concerned about human rights, withdrew its
troops. France thus took the place
of the former colonial power and
became the regime’s main support.
The text published by the Chief of
Staff of the Rwandan governmental
army (RGF) defining the Tutsi as the
enemy (Nsabimana, 09/21/1992), certainly known to the French military
officers as it was written in French, is treated to quickly by the commission (Duclert, 26/03/2021, pp.~911, 950). It is not to be found in French archives ! Yet this text, known since the
international commission of inquiry
in January 1993 (FIDH, 08/03/1993),
will lead to the conclusion of the UN
Human Rights Commission that genocide had been committed (Degni-Ségui, 06/28/1994). The meaning of this text is emphasized later (Duclert, 2024, pp.
214-215). Long before Alain Juppé
publicly acknowledged the genocide
of the Tutsis (05/18/1994) and refrained from drawing any consequences,
the Amaryllis operation order referred to the elimination of the Tutsi
(Germanos, 08/04/1994), the DGSE,
the massacre of all Tutsi (DGSE
n° 18502/N, 04/11/1994) and the
Direction du renseignement militaire
(DRM) (military intelligence), the
RGF, which indiscriminately attacks
the Tutsi part of the population. It’s
not a question of an inability to think
about genocide but a deliberate refusal to talk about genocide. At the
UN, Ambassador Mérimée prevents
the word from being mentioned in the
Security Council presidential statement on April 30. He emphasizes that
the responsibility for the massacres
is shared by the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF), but he is unable to
provide proof (Kovanda, Pres. Statement., 28-29/04/1994 ; Quesnot,
02/05/1994). Contempt, indifference
to the massacres and racism dominate political thinking. François Mitterrand, for example, confided to his
son : “In this type of conflict, don’t
search for good guys and bad guys,
there are only potential killers” (J.C. Mitterrand, Mémoire meurtrie,
p. 154).
Habyarimana
trial
feared
President Habyarimana hinted
that he might renounce the presidency, but would like to be sure that
he and his family will not be prosecuted (Martres, 03/30/1993 ; Bunel,
26/04/1993). He was determined to
break up the parties he considered to
be favorable to RPF in order to secure
a majority in the National Assembly
(Marlaud, 03/01/1994, 04/02/1994).
Aware of a
coup d’état
possible
The French military knew what
would be the consequence of the Arusha agreement to merge the two armies : “This agreement on the army
is a severe defeat for the government.
I believe that part of the army (the effective part) will not accept it and we
must fear its reactions, which may go
as far as an coup attempt” (Delort,
10/06/1993). “The problem of percentages as accepted by the Rwandan delegation in Arusha might not be accepted by the RGF. They may appear
to be a real provocation and herald a
violent reaction of refusal by the armed forces, or even internal destabilization by military leaders” (DRM,
25/06/1993).
28 years of false accusations
The French justice system has
been unable to demonstrate the
RPF’s involvement in the attack
against President Habyarimana on
April 6, 1994 (Soulard, 15/02/2022).
In view of the order which accused
Paul Kagame and those close to him
(Bruguière, 17/11/2006), it seemed
clear that French justice was used to
cover up a French state crime (Kapler, Morel, “Un juge de connivence”,
05/03/2008).
The central event
On April 2, 1994, when President Habyarimana asked JacquesRoger Booh-Booh to inform the UN
Secretary-General that he was going
to set up the institutions provided for
in the Arusha accords, Joseph Nzirorera told him : “We won’t let it
happen, mister President” (Nshimiyimana, Prélude..., 1996, p. 38). The organizers of the genocide provoked this
attack against Habyarimana’s plane
to block the implementation of the
Arusha peace agreement and blame it
on the Tutsi. One would like to put
aside this question of the perpetrators
of the attack for the good reason that
the genocide of the Tutsi had been
in the planning stage since 1990 and
execution stage since 1992. But the
omission of this event impact deeply
the analysis of responsibility. The historiography of the genocide remains
crippled if it passes over this fact in
silence. A body of evidence implicates
French leaders.
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The DAMI ?
Suspicions about members of the
Detachement Militaire d’Assistance
and Instruction (DAMI) were limited to the questioning of Pascal Estevada (Piwowarczyk, 21/03/2002) and
the investigation of Warrant Officer
Claude Ray, alias Régis, suspected
by Filip Reyntjens (Trois jours...,
02/08/1995) was limited to his service record. Member of the DAMI
he returned to Rwanda (Exec. solde,
03/12/1993) He was based at the RGF
staff (Tel. directory, 03/01/1994).
From April 6 to 12 1994 he looked
after Ltc Maurin’s family (Tauzin,
04/15/1994). The fact that the commander of the 1er RPIMa was awaiting an order for a “probable parachute drop on Kigali” on April 7, suggests a set-up (Tauzin, Je demande
justice..., 2011, p. 91).
Barril,
vier ?
Denard,
Olli-
camp, has also been known since 1994
(DGSE n° 18502/N, 11/04/1994).
The 1998 Parliamentary Information
Mission (MIP) covered up this document. Judge Trévidic’s expert report
confirms it (Oosterlinck, 05/01/2012).
The French military present in the
camp were not aware of the preparation of this attack ? The magistrates
forgot to ask them.
year later, the RGF are unable to
say whether it is SA 7 or SA 16
(FAR, Contribution..., 12/1995). Missile identification provided by Colonel
Bagosora and taken up by the MIP
and the judge Bruguière is therefore
probably false. A fact sheet from the
French Defense Ministry claims the
missiles were SA 16 “according to the
missile debris found at the scene of
the attack” (Fiche Min. Def., 1998 ;
MIP, Appendices, p. 281). These deThe black box in Pa- bris were never presented to justice.
British Experts analyzed traces of the
ris ?
missile head on the plane. They did
The MIP learned that the Fal- not correspond to an SA 16 (Warden,
con presidential plane was equip- 27/2/2009).
ped with two CVR and FDR recorders (Rannou, 06/15/1998) but did
not publish it. The commander de Mistral ?
Saint-Quentin rushed to the scene of
The experts appointed by Judge
the crash with the Rwandan CRAP
Trévidic rule out the Mistral misa few minutes after the explosion
sile because it is not available
(Fiche Min. Def., 07/07/1998). They
for export in 1994 (Oosterlinck,
searched and found the black box
01/05/2012, pp. 137, 172). This is
(DGSE, 07/04/1994 ; Jeune Afrique,
false. France has sold Mistrals to
4/21/1994 ; Smith, 07/29/1994 ; MutSouth Africa via Congo-Brazzaville
sinzi report, 04/20/2009, pp. 53-55).
(Krop, 03/09/1989). The sale has
The Interim Rwandan Government
been discontinued. What happened to
(GIR) promises that the results of the
these missiles paid for but not deliveblack box analysis will be included
red ? France had even already proviin the investigation (Minafet Kigali,
ded Mistral to the apartheid regime
04/15/1994). The black box of the
for testing probably in Angola (DODFalcon would have been sent to PaSANDF, 07/21/1987). According to
ris for analysis (DGSE, 07/04/1994 ;
the US defense attaché, the RwanHaesendonck, 05/05/1994). A black
dan government army, which probox found in the Falcon hangar was
bably shot down the plane of the
found at the UN in New York, it
President, had 15 Mistral missiles
was not the Falcon CVR (Nair, OIOS,
in April (CIA, 07/13/1994). The in2004). It was that of a Concorde plane
formation is transmitted to UNAof Air France (Gautier, 12/15/2004).
MIR (Annan, 01/09/1994 ; MalagarDe Saint-Quentin sent telex which are
dis, 05/31/2012).
not in the archives. Likewise a report on the crash of the Falcon was
made by the French military but ne- Murdered on April 6, 7
ver transmitted to justice (Lefort, 24or 8 ?
31/08/1998).
Although French officials might
have called on mercenaries from the
groups Paul Barril, Bob Denard or Patrick Ollivier (Smith, Ces messieurs
Afrique, p. 91 ; DGSE 14/11/1995),
you can’t just improvise surface-toair missile shooters, and their presence was surely known to the RGF
and their French military advisors,
who were listening all communications (Cohen, Mitterrand et la sortie de la guerre froide, Intervention of
gen. Quesnot, 02/1998). Rather than
being questioned about his presence
in Rwanda at the time of the attack, it was Paul Barril who de facto
led Judge Bruguière’s investigation.
The exposure of the lies of the former No. 2 in the Élysée Palace’s antiterrorist unit did not prompt magistrates to question him further. The Missiles
Rwandan sponsors of the attack are
known from the testimony of Jean BiTwo surface-to-air missile contairara (Artiges, 26/05/1994), and the ners were found by the RGF as
place where the shots were fired, on early as April 7, 1994 (Fiche Rens.,
the edge of the Kanombe military 10/23/1996) and not on 25 April. A
Inconsistencies concerning the
date of the assassination of the gendarmes Didot and Maïer and Didot’s
wife betray the french authorities of
Kigali who had several versions on
the cause of their death. They were
allegedly killed on April 6 (Thomas,
4
04/13/1994), on April 7 April (Cussac, 19/4/1994) or April 8 (Thomas,
13/04/1994 ; Vessière 05-09/07/1994).
This Michel Thomas, military doctor
in Bangui, declared to the judicial
police officer that he is not the author of these certificates (Kaelben,
05/24/2012). These are fakes.
The unspeakable ?
no soldiers in Rwanda at the start
of the genocide. At the UN, Ambassador Mérimée addresses the representative of Belgium by acting as
spokesperson for the representative of
Rwanda (Noterdaeme, 04/08/1994).
In Kigali, Ambassador Marlaud does
the same with his colleague Swinnen (Marlaud, TD 330, 04/09/1994,
TD 343, 345, 04/10/1994 ; Cussac,
04/10/1994). 493 men of the Belgian
paras brigade can finally landing in
Kigali on April 10, 1994 (Op. Silver Back, 04/15/1994). Around 500
others remain in Nairobi (Marchal,
Rwanda : the descent..., 2001, p. 249).
Durin April 11, the Belgian paratroopers will remain stuck at the airport
apart from a single evacuation convoy
to the French school.
Since 1994, the French authorities
are hiding the report about their investigation on the causes of the fall of
President Habyarimana’s plane (Lefort, 31/08/1998) as well as exhibits
that were taken from the crash site
(plane recorders CVR and FDR, missile debris). As long as they don’t
put these documents to justice, the
On April 14, before taking off,
French authorities will only cry crothe C-130 of the french special forces
codile tears.
(COS) is prevented from doing so by
mortar fire on the runway. All testimonies point to the RGF, but french
Not accomplice ?
lieutenant-colonel Maurin will accuse
Despite the Arusha agreements, the Belgians (Maurin, 04/19/1994 ;
Ambassador
Marlaud
organizes Balch, 08/09/1998).
arms deliveries (TD 145-150, 02/1517/1994). According to him, the
French have more to fear from the
RPF than from the presidential guard Intox
(TD 305, 04/07/1994). He meets
the colonel Bagosora instead of the
FGT transcribes the words of
new RGF chief of staff (TD 308,
the 1994 television news concerning
07/04/1994). Several ministers who
Rwanda. We see how the confusion
led the genocide refugee at the French
was maintained in public opinion by
embassy (TD 320, 04/08/1994). The
very often reversing the killers and
new interim government is, according
their victims (Givord, 10/12/2023).
to the French ambassador, the most
possible compliant with the Arusha
Accords (TD 326, 04/08/1994). At
the height of the massacres perpetrated by the RGF and the militias, he Mille Collines Hotel
forwards to Paris a request for military support to the RGF (TD 363,
Thérèse Pujolle’s poignant note to
04/11/1994).
Jean-Marc Simon about the attack on
the refugee convoy at the Hôtel Mille
Collines on May 3 1994 provides eviFranco-Belgian friend- dence that the RGF headquarter is
in contact with its French corresponships
dents, who appear to be Bruno Delaye
The French authorities did every- at the Élysée and French military ofthing to ensure that Belgium send ficers (Pujolle, 03/05/1994).
Turquoise in Kigali
The aim was to land the special
forces in Kigali at three points in
one night. (COS, 16/06/1994). Kigali
was well in the planning (Lanxade,
06/17/1994 ; Janvier, 06/20/1994).
Hutuland
The clumsiness betrays the thinking of France’s top military brass. Of
course, they did not write that the last
Tutsis are to be clered, but that the
area of Rwanda where the French vanguard comes is the “Hutuland” (Germanos, 06/22/1994, 06/26/1994). For
them Tutsis no longer exist. They
have ratified the genocide.
Cynicism
The day Paris pays tribute to the
resistance of the Tutsi in Bisesero
in inaugurating an Aminadabu Birara square (RFI, 05/13/2022), we
learn that the investigation of six complaints from Rwandans against the
French army ends with a dismissal of
the case (10/18/2023).
Not 3 days, but 4
French officers sent to stop the
massacres but who witnessed the massacre of the last Tutsis at Bisesero
for four days are not prosecuted.
Four days, because journalist Sam
Kiley warned Captain Éric Bucquet
on June 26 (Amanpour, 26/06/1994 ;
Saint-Exupéry, 27/06/1994). What
did Captain Bucquet do with this information ? He was promoted general de corps d’armée, director of the
DRSD, former military security, until
2022.
Rosier meets the leaders of the killers
Among the first to disembark, Colonel Rosier, commander of the spe-
5
cial forces detachment, met with the
main organizers of the genocide. Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, in charge
of the “ratissage” of the Tutsis at Bisesero (Rosier, 06/23/1994), the interim
Defense minister, Augustin Bizimana,
and Foreign Affairs minister, Jérôme
Bicamumpaka (Rosier, 06/25/1994),
the Prefect of Kibuye, who organized
the massacres (Rosier, 06/26/1994).
Rosier refuses to rescue
the Tutsis
On June 27, Lieutenant-Colonel
Jean-Rémy Duval, alias Diego, informed by nuns in Kibuye, met Tutsis in
Bisesero who were under attack. They
asked him for protection. He left them
but made his report by telephone
and fax to Rosier (Duval, 27/06/1994 ;
Saint-Exupéry, 06/29/1994). In the
archives, his fax is dated the 29th.
A fax from Turquoise headquarter on
the 27th announced that Tutsis were
being attacked in the Bisesero region
(PCIAT, 06/27/1994). Rosier and Lafourcade claim that Duval did not inform them, although Rosier had sent
a transmitter Rosier had sent a transmitter, Sergeant Combette, to follow
Duval. We now learn that Duval’s
fax machine was out of order (Duclert, 2004, p. 298). Rosier declares
that his mission is not to disarm
the militiamen as they slaughter the
Tutsis (Smith, “Dialogue difficile...”,
27/06/1994).
ters rather than the Tutsis from Bisesero, even though they were protected by Duval’s detachment. Sergeant Meynier tells Rosier about the
previous day’s reconnaissance at Bisesero, but Rosier remains impassive
(Seriacouty, 28/06/1994).
A special forces intelligence report dated June 28 refers to information received from LieutenantColonel Nsengiyumva. The FAR operation of the previous day was interrupted [by Duval’s reconnaissance]. It
was postponed until next day, June
29, the day of Minister François Léotard”s visit. While Léotard was inspecting the French troops, gunfire
shots were heard in the mountains
(Lesnes, 01/07/1994). The massacres
continued, in full view of the French.
On June 30, journalist Sam Kiley, accompanied by Michel Peyrard
and Benoît Gysembergh from Paris Match led captain Olivier Dunant and Thierry Prungnaud to the
killing fields of Bisesero, while Gillier,
their chief, had passed by in the morning without seeing anything (Kiley,
06/2019).
Sartre spits in the soup
In his July 1st operations order,
Colonel Sartre, commander of the
Nord Turquoise operation, wrote that
elements of the special forces had encountered Tutsis in the Bisesero region (Sartre 01/07/1994). Lafourcade
and Rosier deny this until this day. In
2021, Sartre decides to break his silence (Sartre, 30/03/2021, 12/2021).
Rosier makes people
believe that the Tutsis
are RPF fighters
Rwandans thrown from
On the evening of June 27, Rosier helicopters
told journalists that 2 000 RPF fighters had arrived on the heights overlooking Lake Kivu (this is Bisesero),
which will cut the government zone in
two (Amar, France 2, 06/27/1994).
On the 28th, he decided to evacuate the Kibuye Sisters by helicop-
In a CRQ (daily report) to Romuald (Colonel Rosier), we read :
“Following a bad HM [military helicopter] drop, the prisoners left in the
NYUNGWE forest have been reported by farmers and in GIKONGORO
it is said that the French are throwing the Rwandans from helicopters”
(COS, 07/07/1994). The Mucyo report was not affabulation.
RGF disarmament ?
Government forces (RGF) withdraw to Zaire with arms and luggage (Quesnot, 18/07/1994). Numerous armed Rwandan forces pass
through Goma (Gérard, 07/18/1994).
14 000 FAR soldiers withdrew to Bukavu with a few helicopters, a dozen
AMLs, cannons and mortars (DGSE,
28/07/1994). In Goma, an agreement
with the Zairian authorities allowed
the passage of 20,000 armed RGF soldiers (Reucherain, 08/08/1994).
Mercenaries
As part of the indirect strategy
proposed by Gen. Quesnot, French
mercenaries were mobilized to come
to rescue the RGF. The accusations
against Paul Barril were confirmed by
the search ordered by Judge Trévidic (GPB, 06/05/1994). He had signed a contract with the GIR (Barril, 05/28/1994). The identification
of Robert Martin with Bob Denard
provided proof that he had intervened in Rwanda (Crétolier, 02/2018).
He made no secret of it (Denard,
Corsaire de la République, 1998,
p. 422) and judge Bruguière had JeanMarie Dessales as a witness (Bruguière, 17/11/2006), who accompanied Denard to the Comoros in 1995.
The DGSE informed the highest authorities (“Les Mercenaires Invisibles”, 24/03/2022). Who says Denard
says Foccart. Mitterrand’s entourage,
which included Barril, communicated
with those of Jacques Foccart and
Chirac. This agreement imposed by
geopolitics should lead us to reconsider the list of the sponsors of these
secret actions in Rwanda during the
Tutsi genocide.
