Citation
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135163
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FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1374
OF 160432Z APRIL 94
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALA, ROME
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DAR ES SALAAM, ADDIS ABABA
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA, SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS
INFO PRIORITY ACTOR
UP 2/50
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MY TELNO 1364 AND YOUR TELNO 557: RWANDA
PART 1 OF 2
= ed
L me marie
SUMMARY i "+ :
ent
1. Belgian hyperactivity irritates Council members. Ghana and
Bangladesh indicate readiness to maïintaîn their contingents.
NAM want UNAMIR to remain in place at its current strength.
Americans refuse to countenance any Council decision other than
withdrawal, but acknowledge that for the moment the NAM's
preferred outcome does not require such a decision as UNAMIR is
already authorised. NAM and most other Council members feel
strongly that the Council should nonetheless take 8 decision in
the matter, to resolve uncertainty and send an appropriate
political signal. I suggest suspension of UNAMIR's deployment
and retention of the Secretary-General's Special Representative
in the field, with appropriate support, to continue efforts to
secure à cease-fire. Key players (US, France, Nigeris) agree
to my suggestion. But Nigerians fail to persuade all of the
rest of the non-aligned, and Secretariat indicate that it would
be difficult for a scaled down UN presence to remain without a
cease-fire,. After Long discussion attempt to reach a decision
îs abandoned, which means UNAMIR stays for the moment, minus
the Belgian contingent. Agreement to Presidential statement to
the press that its mandate and force levels will be kept under
constant review. How long solution by stealth holds will
depend on developments on the ground.
2 Secretariat report that small Italian force has Landed at
Kigali airport and been asked to Leave by UNAMIR.
DETAIL
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)
3. Keating (New Zealand, Council President) opened informal
consultations of the Security Council on 15 April by drawing
Council members' attention to a letter he had received from the
Foreign Minister of Belgium outlining his concern at the risk
to UNAMIR in staying on in Rwanda. The Belgian contingent
would be withdrawn over the weekend. For any UN personnel to
remaîn after Sunday risked very grave consequences for their
safety and security. Claes had also telephoned Keating to make
the same point. The Belgian Mission had Lobbied this and other
missions heavily in the same sense during the course of the
morning.
&. Riza (CASG, DPK0) gave an update on the current situation.
The Level of fighting was fluctuating. The Force Commander and
Special Representative (SRSG) were continuing their efforts to
negotiate a cease-fire,. The Force Commander was moving to
establish a strong presence at the airport in advance of
Belgian withdrawal. The Belgian evacuation force would Leave
on 16 April and their UNAMIR contingent within 48-72 hours, A
small Italian ermed company had arrived without notice at the
airport, where they remaïned. , This was a worrying development
since it had Led to allegations that mercenaries were arriving.
The* Force Commander had asked them to Leave.
5. Rizs said, in commenting on the previous night's suggestion
that the Council set a period of five days to see whether a
ceasefire was established before reaching a decision on
UNAMIR's future, that the Force Commander and the SRSG
preferred that any timeframe for achieving a cease-fire be set
by themselves, and not the Council. A public ultimatum would
be unhelpful. They had also said that any message from the
Council should address both the parties, and not single out one
for blame.
6. Gambari (Nigeria, speaking for the NAM ceucus) saiîd the
time had come for the Council to take a decision. He
understood the concerns of the Belgians. The NAM caucus deeply
regretted the Loss of Life suffered by their contingent, He
also recognised the special relationship which had existed and
continued to exist between Belgium and Rwanda. But however
important Belgian views on the future of 4ANAMIR, they could not
tell the Council how to respond to events îin Rwanda. The
Council should not be planning a withdrawal at this stage.
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Both sîdes wanted UNAMIR to stay. It was playing a stabilising
role în a chaotic situation. Except for the perfectly
understandable Belgian decision, no other troop contributors
wanted to go. (Keating subsequently confirmed that he had had
discussions with Bangladeshis and the Ghanaïans and both were
content to stay on in Rwanda). The Level of fighting was Low.
UNAMIR was encouraging the parties to agree a cease-fire. The
OAU had offered to play a pro-active role in trying to relaunch
the peace process and had called for UNAMIR to remaîn. The NAM
caucus would be sending a message to the OAU Secretary-General
asking him to use his good offices together with Leaders from
neighbouring states, in particular Mwinyi and Museveni.
Neither the Secretary-General nor his Special Representative
wanted UNAMIR to Leave. The question therefore was what tasks
were appropriate for UNAMIR îin current cireumstances, and what
force Level would be best to carry them out. Gambari
identified the tasks as being to help the civilian population
of Rwanda: to help obtaïn a cease-fire;: to promote the creation
of a climate conducive to achieving a peaceful settlement; and
to Liaisen with the OAU. A cease-fire was obviously critical
to the success of the UN presence în Rwanda. The NAM believed
a cease-fire was possible. Their preference was a modified
version of Option 1 (para 5 of first TUR). The modification
was that the force level should be what it was before the
Belgians Left, i.e. there should be a replacement contingent.
They were flexible as to how Long this option should be allowed
to run to see if ea solution could be achieved.
7. Walker CUS) said that the US believed the Rwandan armed
parties bore full responsibility for the continued violence and
instability. The US did not believe that there was a role now
in Rwanda for a United Nations peacekeeping force. They
supported the decision of the Belgian Government to withdraw
immediately, given the unique circumstances facing their
contingent. The US did not believe the warring parties in
Rwanda were Likely to respect UNAMIR's mandate, or capable of
guaranteeïng the safety of UN peacekeeping personnel in Rwanda.
There might be a role for the UN îin facilitating negotiations
among the warring parties, but that was for the SRSG not
UNAMIR. The US would support a political initiative by the
Secretary-General to promote reconciliation among the parties.
But experience suggested that any serious negotiations amongst
the parties would take place outside Rwanda. UN security
forces would not be required. Walker underlined that US
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opposition to retaining a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda under
current conditions was firm. It was based on a conviction that
the Security Council had an obligation to ensure that
peacekeeping operations were viable and capable of fulfilling
their mandates, and that peacekeeping personnel were not
knowingly put in an untenable situation. When the parties
demonstrated that they were willing and able to work towards a
peaceful settlement the US would be willing to reconsider
whether renewed UN peacekeeping could facilitate Lasting peace.
8. After Walker's intervention Gambari called for suspension
of the meeting. His suggestion was not however immediately
taken up, and a Long and inconclusive discussion ensued.
Keating pointed out that, if no decision was taken to withdraw
the force then the status quo would continue, giving the Force
Commander a Little longer to see what he could do. At the end
of the discussion I said that failing to take a decision would
keep UNAMIR on the ground in a dangerous situation when we
already knew ît could not carry out its mandate,. Furthermore
we would be giving no signal to the parties or guidance to the
Force Commander. A decision might be difficult to achieve
given the NAM preference for the Secretary-General's option 1
and US insistence, that if a decision were to be taken today,
it should be for total withdrawal. I thought it unlikely that
UNAMIR was sustaïnable on the ground over time without the
Belgians. If there was to be a withdrawal, it was essential
that it should be an orderly one. Option 1 was most unlikely
to prove a durable one. Option 2, on the other hand, should be
sustainable. Careful consideration should again be given to
the option of suspension of UNAMIR's mandate, Leaving the
Special Representative plus support and protection personnel in
place. Vorontsov (Russia) agreed.
9. After the informal consultations Keating invited Gambari,
Albright CUS), Ladsous (France) and myself to discuss the way
forward. Albright said that the US had been convinced by the
Belgians. But they were also concerned that a wrong turn now
in Rwanda would put an end'to any possibility of US support for
expanded peacekeeping elsewhere in Africa, particularly after
the Somali experience. I srgued again for a downsized
presence, essentially to protect the SRSG. I circulated
Language which would have provided for the suspension of
UNAMIR's deployment and maintenance of an interim UN presence,
headed by the SRSG and including sufficient UN military
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personnel to ensure îts protection, to continue UN efforts in
collaboration with the COAU and neighbouring states to resolve
the Rwandan crisis in the framework of the Arusha Peace
Agreement. I also proposed (and secured agreement to)
Language, based on the OAU statement, to replace those parts of
the resolution which tilted against the RPF. Gambari confirmed
that Nigeria wanted a resolution. He did not want the day to
end without Council action. He undertook to commend my "middle
way" to the NAM caucus. Ladsous said that he too could support
it, though he would want it to be understood that the
“suspended" UNAMIR might be deployed to a neighbouring country
temporarily rather than being dispersed altogether.,. Albright
spoke to Christopher, and indicated that she too could go along
with it, Gambari however Later told Keating and myself that he
had been unable to convince all of his NAM colleagues (Djibouti
and Rwanda itself are the hardest Line în the caucus) to do so.
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135164
MDHIAN 0572
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TEENO 1374
OF 1604327 APRIL 94
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALA, ROME
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DAR ES SALAAM, ADDIS ABABA
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA, SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS
INFO PRIORITY ACTOR
PART 2 OF 2
10. Informal consultations finally resumed agaîn late on 15
April. Riza reiterated the Secretary-General's view that an
abrupt and total withdrawal of UNAMIR was neîïther feasible nor
advisable. It was important to consider the impact on the
ground if such a decision were taken. He also argued that both
of the options for UNAMIR put forward by the Secretary-General
had been predicated on à cease-fire. If the Council announced
the suspension of UNAMIR's mandate ît might set off panic and
renewed military action. Both parties would scramble to seize
the strategic positions currently held by UNAMIR, notably the
airport. Riza said that a first meeting had taken place today
face to face between the parties who had exchanged ideas. This
was a positive stép. He urged the Council to consider the
Secretary-General's "third option", which was to agree option
1, with a deadline which, if not met, would Lead to option 2.
This would give time for the force to prepare withdrawal.
11. Keating saîd that the informal contacts he had held
earlier in the afternoon had demonstrated there was still a
wide divergence of opinion. We now had the advice of the
Secretary-General, which was at odds with the views of a number
of Council members. I said it was true that we had not reached
a clear-cut conclusion on the question of force levels and
mandate. But we had managed to agree on almost all of the rest
of the resolution. It contained a (much needed) political
statement of the Council's views on the need to return to the
Arusha peace process. I suggested we adopt the text as agreed,
simply noting that the force Level and mandate would be kept
under review. Walker CUS) said he would be unable to get
agreement on the adoption of such a resolution without
overnight consultations with Washington.
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12, Keating then circulated a non paper, for possible use as
the basis for remarks by him in his capacity as President to
the press, He believed that it was essential - if there was to
be no Council decision - for there to be at the very least a
press statement, given the Length of time the Council had spent
discussing the issue. After further discussion ît was agreed
that the Council would postpone a decision on Rwanda. This
would give more time for the situation on the ground to
stabilise and allow the Force Commander and SRSG to continue
their efforts to bring about a cease-fire building on contacts
already made. Keating's text was agreed, with some amendments
(see MIFT) He spoke to the press on the basis of it.
COMMENT Go)
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HANNAY
NETT
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