Citation
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REPUBULIC OF RWANDA
| MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
COMMUNIQUE
Report of the Independent National Commission responsible for collection of
evidence indicating the role of the French State in the genocide against the Tutsi
that was perpetrated in Rwanda in 1994, which was released on the 16/11/2007.
Between October 1990 and August 1994, France supported the administration of
President Habyarimana in the commission of the genocide carried out between the
following periods: October 1990 and March 1993, April and July 1994 and latter had a
hand in the destabilisation of Rwanda using elements based in the former Zaire. France’s
role was political, military, diplomatic and logistical.
There is no evidence whatsoever to show that political or military policy makers in
France tried to use their influence on the then Government to stop the planned
extermination of Tutsi’s, a plan that was masterminded in 1990.
The persistence and magnitude of France’s assistance to the murderous regime, various
ways of France’s direct involvement in the abuse of Tutsi’s based on their ethnic
background are all indicators showing that both France’s political and military policy
makers were accomplices in both the preparation and execution of the 1994 genocide of
Tutsis.
1/France knew that a genocide was being planned
Besides France knowing that from October 1990, Habyarimana’s Government may
commit genocide; it also knew that preparations of mass massacres were in place.
Between October 1990 until April 1990, there was presence of French army officers in all
security organs of the country. From 1991 until at least December, there was presence of
a high number of French military advisors in the national army (FAR), Gendarmerie,
National intelligence (CRCD) and in other special organs including the Presidential
guard.
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French military advisers were in various military positions at the army headquarters and
in other decision-making positions. In most cases, French military advisors took charge
of high-level meetings planning the course of war, and those concerned with maintaining
of peace and order of the Kigali City. At the front-line, the French military commanded
the war.
Until April 1994, there was heavy presence of French military advisors at the army
headquarters, Gendarmerie headquarters and in Para commando Battalion, a force well
known to have had a great role in the beginning of genocide. Besides presence of the
French military in almost all security organs of the country, they also played a primary
key role in the management of those institutions.
As clearly stated by General Dallaire, since the French military involvement with the
national army (FAR) was evident just immediately before the genocide, it logically
follows that the French were in possession of adequate information to the effect that a
great massacre was being planned.
2/ The Primary role of France in the preparation of the genocide.
a/ Ideological complicity.
In the political sense, the French Government greatly helped Habyarimana’s regime to
prepare the course of the genocide. In the communication sector, the French took charge
of all matters relating to Rwanda between the period 1991 and 1993 clearly portraying
the Rwanda issue as purely ethnic. Among the French officials who towed this line of
ethnicity was President Mitterrand who categorically stated that the issue was between
the majority Hutus and a certain minority group of nilo-hamites, Tutsis. On 22nd June
1994, President Mitterrand before his cabinet made the following remarks in trying to
explain the genocide, “that Rwanda like Burundi is numerically dominated by Hutus. In
that sense, it is common knowledge that most of the population is behind President
Habyarimana. Should the country be ruled by the minority Tutsi who are now based in
Uganda where most wish to establish a “Tutsi land” including not only Uganda, but also
Rwanda and Burundi, certainly the track of democracy shall be interrupted”.
From October 1990, France took a radical decision to the effect that ethnicity was the
issue in Rwanda and thus openly started supporting the then Kigali Government.
Towards the end of the Arusha peace negotiations, a major obstacle that arose was the
refusal by RPF and other Hutu factions who did not support the then government to let
CDR a seat in the broad based coalition Government. At this juncture, the French
diplomats greatly asserted pressure on the negotiators to allow this ethnicity inclined
party, a party that was castigating the killing of Tutsis and other people who did not
support the then government to be given a seat in the in order to allow this party that
based on ethnicity, that was calling upon people to kill Tutsis and other people who did
not support the then Government to be given a seat in the broad based coalition
government!
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b/ France’s role in the creation of the Hutu-power, the architects of the genocide.
On the 28/02/1993, France’s minister in charge of cooperation and development, Marcel
Debarge came to Kigali. During his visit, he called upon all opposition parties to the then
government to form a common front and fight RPF. Political leaders of the then period
and other people interviewed by the commission when pressed to comment on the
comments of Marcel Debarge, as cited by the French historian, all were of the view that
“although it’s understandable that Paris wishes Hutus to cooperate and fight RPF, what
was surprising were the words of the Minister. In such a period of instability, after
killings in that occurred in the last few weeks, such a remark calling upon people to
cooperate based on ethnicity is tantamount to calling upon people to wage a war”
Colette Braeckman, a Belgian journalist who was based in Rwanda _ during
Habyarimana’s regime told the commission that although the French showed interest in
the Arusha peace talks, the truth was the reverse. “that in secrecy, the French officials
praise themselves for having divided all political opponents to Habyarimana using
ethnicity as a factor and that all attributes of the Hutu- Power to the effect that a
genocide must be implemented was greatly appreciated by the French ”.
c/ Offering open support to the Rwandan National Army (FAR), even though the
army was greatly inclined to commit genocide.
France supported the national army in every possible way, they organised them, trained
them and even armed them. France also actively participated in the war and several times
fought side by side with the Rwandan National Army: In October 1990, in January 1991,
in June 1992 and in February 1993; the army also had plans to commit genocide since
there was a section of the civilian population who were considered as enemies, and they
executed the plans when the gendarmerie and members of the presidential guard killed
civilians in Bugesera in 1992. The French army manned road blocks in different parts of
the country, particularly in Kigali, where they checked individual identity cards with the
purpose of checking for the ethnicity of those who crossed the road blocks and stopped
those whose identity cards indicated that they were Tutsi.
Some of those who were identified as Tutsi were killed and tortured in the presence of
members of the French army who also participated in those acts of murder and torture.
d/ Conceptualisation and initiation of the civil defence program, a program that
turned out to be a mechanism for executing Genocide.
Officers of the French army in Rwanda played an active role in the preparation and
planning of the civil defence program which was supposed to be an avenue for the
execution of the Genocide. One can note that, that was the program aimed at military
training and giving arms to civilians, a program which was headed by leaders of the local
administration. It was the very program that enabled the widespread of the Genocide
which was overseen by the Interim Government. The program differs from the
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interahamwe organisation even though it was the basis of its creation. In his final report
after investigating the armies that were on the frontline in February 1991, Lieutenant-
Colonel Gilbert Canovas advised members of the Rwandan Army “To place
clandestine individuals among the civilian population in areas where they can ambush
and kill the morale of rebel forces (RPF)”. This is the idea of using the army
clandestinely or using civilians in acts of war.
In February 1992, the civil defense program begun in the north and ended in the east. The
program had over a period of time been a subject of discussion among Rwandans before
its launch. The head of the French Army in Kigali, Colonel Cussac, closely monitored the
program. A committee of French parliamentarians which was put into place in order for it
to study the role of France in the Genocide (Mission d’information parlementaire
francaise) publicized a section of the letter(telex diplomatique) of 22nd January 1992 in
which Colonel Cussac explained in detail the program to supply civilians with arms as
mentioned above. He mentioned the respective regions, the method of choosing those
who shall be part of the program, and also emphasizing the number of arms: 300. He also
mentioned that most of the arms were MAS 36 and he also indicated his reservations on
the possible outcome of the program. Varying independent witnesses firmly affirmed that
the French army requested burgomasters for volunteers in order to train them; they
agreed to supply them with arms for future groupings; they agreed to supply logistics, to
supervise the training and to also conduct some of the trainings.
e/ Training Interahamwe in the five military barracks where the French army were
residing.
The French army trained and even assisted in the military training of the Interahamwe
between 1992 and what was regarded as “operation Noroit” which lasted until December
1993. The trainings were conducted in five (5) military barracks where the French army
was residing. After the killings in Bugesera, which was closely monitored by
Lieutenant- Colonel Michel Robardey, the French army was aware that the training
that was being rendered to the Interahamwe was aimed at the Tutsi and this also
manifested itself over a period of time. In a television interview of 22 April 2005 on
French Television titled “France Culture”, a military police in the French Army Thierry
Prungnaud confirmed in detail how the French Army actually conducted the training of
the Interahamwe. “There were also trainings conducted for civilians during the time I
was training new recruits; I saw members of the French army training French civilians
how to use rifles. That occurred several times but I actually saw them undergoing the
rifle training in Akagera National Park.” The French army played a clear role in
increasing the training of the Interahamwe in the last quarter of 1993. That affirms the
claim that this was all part of the general preparation of the Genocide.
f/ The role of expertly preparing lists of suspected Tutsi and others who are opposed
to the government.
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The French gendarmes played an active role in preparing expertly lists of suspected Tutsi
and others who were opposed to the government. The French military police worked
closely with the government department for investigations where they introduced
advanced methods of keeping information especially information regarding persons who
were supposed to be traced and investigated (Personnes A Rechercher et Surveiller —
PRAS) On 14th October 1992, Lieutenant- Colonel Michel Robardey wrote to the
Chief of staff of the Gendarmerie Colonel Augustin NDINDILIYIMANA in the
following words: according to your directive, I have the honour to submit to you an
electronic filing system where you will easily trace people meant to be investigated. This
project was prepared and carried out by a task force involving the Gendarmes working
together with the national intelligence service (CRCD).This computer system is now
operational and the personnel to manage it have been trained. It will no longer be
necessary for a single soldier to carry out the laborious task looking for files. This system
shall enable you to be in direct contact with solders at the battle field. What remains is
your authorisation to enable us start the system. Colonel Ndidiliyimana responded to this
letter on October 28 1992, with the following words: “//Following Lt-Col ROBARDEY
Letter dated October 14, 1992 informing me that what remains for the computerised
system to commence is my authorisation; I hereby inform you that the authorisation is
given.
2/ I request you to train the personnel in the Judicial Police and other military camps in
order to exploit this system. »?! General Jean Varret, who was in charge of co-
operation in the army between October 1990 and April 1993 is the one who initiated this
project wherein France considerably helped the National Intelligence Service. When
summoned in 1998 before the Committee of Deputies in charge of the investigating the
role of France in the Rwandan genocide, he affirmed that he was convinced that French
gendarmes were helping the National Intelligence Service of Rwanda in preparation of
the lists of Tutsis to be killed.
On the question raised by Deputy Bernard Cazeneuve to General Jean Varret whether
it was true that the gaol of the Rwandan Government in training senior legal police
officers was to prepare a list of Tutsis, the General replied that he was convinced to that
effect and further informed the committee that he had done everything in his means to
stop that military co-operation with the Rwandan gendarmerie (...) » 4
Before April 1994, many people were selected and later on killed while others were
arrested from their residences or at road blocks. At the beginning of the genocide,
Rwandan soldiers moved from house to house killing political opponents and
distinguished Tutsis who had been enrolled on the computerised lists. The gendarmerie,
as an institution, had sent many of its personnel to the countryside and equipped them
with necessary logistics to collect information. Additionally, it had a computer program
prepared and given to them by the French gendarmes. A former agent of the Central
Intelligence Service of Rwanda affirmed to the Rwandan Commission that never had his
institution reached the degree of organization in comparison to that the gendarmerie had
due to the French cooperation. Thus, there is a strong possibility that the lists that were
used in the beginning of the genocide were drawn up with the assistance of the computer
system.
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3/ France’s role in the execution of the genocide
a/ Appointment of Colonel Bagosora as the successor to President Habyarimana.
On April 7th, 1994 the French ambassador in Rwanda Marlaud together with Colonel
Jean-Jacques Maurin went to met Colonel Bagosora and asked him to take charge of the
situation. During this time of crisis, the French ambassador had so much influence on
Rwanda’s politics to the extent that he would install or remove anyone.
However, it should be remembered that one year before replacing Habyarimana, Colonel
Bagosora had remarked that he is going to “prepare an apocalypse”. After the installation
of the interim government, a coalition that was based on Hutu-power, the French
ambassador went further and gave it blessings.
Besides, what was well known about Colonel Bagosora and most of the coalition
members was their zeal to eliminate what they referred to as accomplices to RPF in the
country, all Tutsis and Hutus who did not believe in the Hutu-power ideology.
Colonel Bagosora was regarded as an architect of the genocide while the interim
government was an avenue to implement the genocide. Colonel Bagosora and many
others who composed the interim government have since been convicted or are
undergoing trial at the ICTR. Their positions were well known even before the genocide.
b/ Diplomatic and military support to the interim government while openly
committing genocide.
At all times during the genocide, France diplomatically and militarily assisted the interim
government which planned and implemented the genocide to the watch of the whole
world. On April 27, 1994, i.e. three weeks after the start of the genocide, two delegates of
that interim government, Jerome Bicamumpaka, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, one of the CDR leaders, were hosted in Paris at the Champs
Elysées(President’s office) and Matignon (Foreign Ministry’s office), while countries like
the United States and Belgium had refused to grant them visas", They had discussions
with high French officials, in particular Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, Foreign
Affairs Minister Alain Juppé, and Bruno Delaye, the Head of the African Unit at the
President’s office!™!
On May 9th 1994, General Huchon hosted Lieutenant-Colonel Ephrem Rwabalinda,
adviser to the chief of staff of ex- FAR. During their talks, the two officers discussed
urgent matters that needed “priority” in implementation: « - the support to Rwanda by
France in the field of international politics; - the physical presence of French soldiers in
Rwanda [...] for help and assistance in the framework of co-operation; - the possibility of
indirect use of foreign troops; [...], »*2!s
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General Huchon committed France to provide ammunition in the category of 105mm,
individual arms and other ammunition as well as communication equipment to facilitate
secret communication with General Augustin Bizimungu, commander in chief of the ex-
FAR. This aimed at facilitating a direct military intervention of France in Rwanda.
c/ Delivery of arms and ammunition to the interim government during the genocide
by France,
The first evidence to the effect that the French government was militarily supporting the
Rwandan government became very evident at the beginning of the genocide during what
referred to as the Amaryllis operation wherein the French soldiers came to Rwanda under
the guise of evacuating their nationals and foreigners. Belgian Colonel Luc Marshall,
who was heading a unit of UNAMIR in some parts of Kigali, confirmed this information
to Le Monde newspaper in the following terms:
“We were informed, on 8th [April 1994], that French planes would land on the following
day around 6 a.m. Actually, they arrived at 3:45a.m. It is evident that there was
coordination between the French and the Rwandans. The vehicles which had blocked the
runway were removed in the night. Personally, I was not at the airport, but I had
observers there from fifteen different nationalities. They were trained soldiers, who had
no doubt in what they were saying: Cases of ammunition - probably 5 tons - were
discharged from a plane and were transported by vehicles of the Rwandan army to
Kanombe barrack which was used as the base for the presidential guard. »4#
Other information indicating that France was militarily helping Rwanda during the
genocide could be gathered from Goma airport, in the former Zaire, a town barely five
kilometres away from the Rwandan border. Here is some principal information about the
question:
Philippe Jehanne, former agent of the secret service serving in the office of the
minister of Co-operation, declared on May 19", 1994 to Gerard Prunier: « We
deliver ammunition to the FAR while passing by Goma. But of course we will deny it
if you quote me in the press "1,
« In May, more than one month after the beginning of massacres and whereas 10.000
people had been killed in Gisenyi [very close to Goma], the French unloaded a
cargo plane full of arms in Goma, former Zaire. Whereas there was a stench of smell
of corpses from a mass grave near the border which could reach the airport, it was
surprising that weapons for murderers were being piled up on the runway. French
Consul at Goma said that he was not in the position to intervene since the matter was
a private contract executed before the embargo to sell weapons to Rwanda was
imposed. 46
On May 31th, 1994, Humanity newspaper wrote an article referring to a letter written
on May 25th 1994 from the Rwandan embassy in Cairo addressed to the Rwandan
Minister of Defense, Augustin Bizimana, informing him that there was a cachet of
weapons sent by France to the Rwandan National Army to be delivered through the
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former Zaire and the letter further stressed that a guise was made in the transaction to
imply that those arms were meant for the former Zaire.
On June 4th, 1994, Stephen Smith clarified that a Boeing 707 delivered arms to
Goma airport three times at the expense of France.
« From the beginning of the Rwandan tragedy, Goma airport was used as the
backing base for Rwanda. It is from there that weapons meant for forces that
prepared the genocide came from for the last ten days. Since the defeat of the
Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) in Kigali, on Sunday May 22nd, “special flights” to
Goma indeed ceased. Previously, a 707 Boeing landed at Goma airport five times,
three times during day and two times during night time while its registration number
was carefully crafted off. At each landing, it had about 18 tons of arms and
ammunition from Serbia as many claimed, or according to others such arms and
ammunition were from Bulgaria as evidenced from markings on the boxes. At least
once, witnesses affirm to have identified South-African pilots. In spite of
contradicting information, information from many people including the French
La Lettre du Continent newspaper published on June 16, 1994 indicated that: “ On
June 21st, 1994 [...] A few days earlier, Colonel Good Domenica, military attaché in
the France embassy based in Kinshasa, has more or less recognized that deliveries
of weapons to the ex-FAR did not cease and that they were passing through the
Goma airport, and it was embarrassing since the airport was supposed to serve a
humanitarian purpose.»
The Human Rights Watch organization which conducted an investigation into the
delivery of weapons to the genocide perpetrators also interviewed the French Consul at
Goma, Jean-Claude Urbano, also echoed the same information as in the preceding
paragraph. Human Rights Watch recalls that any export of weapons from France must
receive a governmental approval!®!,
During the genocide, General Huchon received Lieutenant-colonel Cyprien
Kayumba on several occasions at the military Cooperation Mission. He stayed for 27
days in Paris. His mission was “to try and accelerate the supplies of weapons and
ammunition to the Rwandan army '*!y, Kayumba occupied the post of chief of
logistics services in the Rwandan Ministry of Defense and specifically was in charge
of the purchase of weapons and ammunition. He was a member of the crisis
committee set up by Bagosora on April 7”, 1994. From the Rwandan embassy in
Paris, Kayumba carried out negotiations on transfers and purchases of weapons to
supply the FAR. In July 1994, Kayumba drafted a report of his mission in France
which he transmitted to his hierarchical seniors, via the Rwandan embassy in Paris.
He mentioned six deliveries of weapons. of an amount of 5.454.395 dollars, organized
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with the assistance from two companies, DLY-Invest (France) and Millet-tec (the
United Kingdom) between April 19 and July 18, 1994 (20),
After the defeat of the FAR, Kayumba was suspected to have embezzled the said
money, but in his explanation letter addressed to Theodore Sindikubwabo, he
revealed to have loaded six (6) planes to Rwanda, which is 240 Tons of
ammunition?!”
Lastly, there were documents found in the Mugunga refugee camp after the flight of
the Rwandan refugees following the attack of the camp by the new Rwandan
governmental troops involving two French companies in purchase orders of weapons.
These companies were SOFREMAS and Luchaire. They delivered weapons to the
ex-FAR during the genocide after the embargo had been put in place by the UN
Security Council.(22)
Part of the weapons was directly delivered to Interahamwe in Gisenyi, Kibuye and
Cyangugu to massacre civilian Tutsis far away from the military operations area.
4/ The French Army occupation, led to further massacres in the “Humanitarian
Safe Zone”
In June 1994, when the FAR were about to be defeated by the RPF, President Mitterrand
decided to intervene militarily in Rwanda through launching the Turquoise operation.
The first objective of this intervention was to divide the country in two starting from
Kigali, to stop the advancing of RPF and to oblige it to negotiate the power-sharing with
the genocide government. But when Turquoise arrived in Rwanda at the end of June
1994, it was too late because RPF had far advanced.
In France, on the occasion of pre-deployment “briefing”, the French military
commanding reversed the reality of the genocide by explaining to its soldiers that it was
the Tutsis who massacred the Hutus. The gendarme Thierry Prugnaud explained that
“The mission in the beginning was to intervene on the basis that Tutsis were massacring
Hutus, but upon arriving, we realized after some fifteen days that it was completely the
opposite, it was the Hutus killing the Tutsis. »
a/ Continuation of political and logistical collaboration with the administration
committing genocide even in the Turquoise Zone.
Facts and analysis clearly show that Colonel Rosier, chief of the first phase of
deployment of Turquoise in Rwanda deliberately did not intervene to protect survivors of
Bisesero yet he well knew that they were being intensively massacred between the 27 and
30 of June, 1994. The Bisesero case was not only terrible but also highlighted the global
strategy of the Turquoise Operation. The analysis of the Turquoise work in the three
prefectures it covered, namely Cyangugu, Kibuye and Gikongoro clearly showed their
policy.
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Upon their arrival, French soldiers hastened to secure certain enclaves like camps of
genocide survivors at Nyarushishi, Murambi with great publicity. In addition, in other
areas, they collaborated with prefecture, commune and local administrative authorities
who organized the Tutsi population extermination. They left in place the genocide
infrastructures, namely road blocks held by Interahamwe. They clearly requested
Interahamwe to continue patrolling these road blocks and to kill Tutsis moving around.
They also clearly requested to have Tutsis who had infiltrated displaced population
camps to be brought to them and would call the Interahamwe to kill them. At different
places in the three prefectures, they let Interahamwe kill Tutsi under their watchful eyes.
Lastly, French soldiers themselves directly were involved in assassinations of Tutsis and
Hutus accused of hiding Tutsis. French soldiers committed many rapes, specifically with
Tutsi women. To many, such acts were seen as being part of the French policy. The
deplorable living conditions, particularly lack of food which the genocide survivors went
through in camps of Bisesero, Nyarushishi or Murambi, which were under the French
protection, forced some people to go out to seek for food but this was a trick to let them
fall in the hands of Interahamwe who killed them. There were also refusal of medical care
to women and girls at Kibuye and Cyangugu by certain French army medical officers, as
well as abusive amputations at Goma. These facts show that there was aggression of
French soldiers against unarmed Tutsi survivors, on ground of their ethnicity. All these
occurrences were during the period of the Turquoise operation, i.e. June 23" to August
22nd 1994,
b/ Encouraging people to massively leave the country.
Be it at Gikongoro, Kibuye or Cyangugu, during the last days, French soldiers practised
the scorched earth policy. They simultaneously ordered the local authorities in the three
prefectures to encourage the Hutu population to flee massively to Zaire. French senior
officers holding commanding positions held public meetings inciting the population to
flee the country. Colonel Sartre organized a great public meeting on July 13", 1994 at
Rubengera during which he strongly encouraged the population to flee to Zaire by
promising the assistance of France for a very urgent armed return to Rwanda. This
French stimulus to massively flee the country is the origin of a terrible humanitarian
crisis which struck Rwandan refugees in Zaire in July 1994,
Lastly, during the last days of their mission, French soldiers encouraged plundering and
destruction of public infrastructures; they also took part in it. French soldiers
accompanied the ex-FAR and Interahamwe in Zaire where they immediately assisted
them, by military trainings and deliveries of arms and ammunition, to prepare an armed
return to Rwanda.
c/ The French Army was responsible for massacres committed in its “humanitarian
safe zone”.
During the Turquoise operation, the assumption of responsibility of the genocide project
by French decision makers was more directly visible. When on July 6", 1994, France was
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granted the mandate by the United Nations Secretary General to create the “Humanitarian
Safe Zone” (SZ, it became an occupying power in that zone, and thus was the only one
holding authority. The HSZ was in fact meant to be a “zone of safety”, a portion of
territory placed “under the proper authority of a belligerent or under the authority of the
opposing party or allied, on which all armed activities are prohibited and which is
intended to shelter threatened people or people at risk. »'*! These safety zones are
envisaged by Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols. By creating
the HSZ, the French Army assumed the full exercise of authority, excluding any other
institution. While deciding to keep and collaborate with the political and administrative
personnel, with the henchmen and their infrastructures who had perpetrated the genocide
during the preceding two and half months, in asking them and/or letting them continue
killings of Tutsis which in that context constituted the crime of genocide, often under
their watchful eyes, the Turquoise French soldiers and their silent partners fully had in
hand the genocide project.
Considering the gravity of the alleged facts, the Rwandan Government enjoins
competent authorities to undertake all necessary actions in order to bring the
French political and military accused leaders to answer for their acts before justice.
5/ French Political and Military leaders who were involved in the 1994 genocide
a/ Political leaders
1) Francois Mitterrand: President of the Republic of France (1981-1995)
2) Alain Juppé: Minister for Foreign Affairs (1993-1995)
3) Francois Léotard: Minister of Defense (1993-1995)
4) Marcel Debarge: Minister of Cooperation (1992-1993).
5) Hubert Védrine: Secretary General in the President’s Office (1991-1995).
6) Edouard Balladur: Prime Minister (1993-1995)
7) Bruno Delaye: Presidential Advisor (1992-1995)
8) Jean-Christophe Mitterrand: Presidential Advisor (1986-1992)
9) Paul Dijoud: Head of Africa and Madagascra Unit in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(1991-1992)
10) Dominique De Villepin: Assistant Head of Africa and Madagascar Unit (1991-1992)
11) Georges Martres: French Ambassador to Rwanda (1989-1993)
12) Jean-Michel Marlaud: French Ambassador to Rwanda (1993-1994)
13) Jean-Bernard Mérimée: French Ambassador to the UN (1991-1995)
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b/ Military leaders
1) Amiral Jacques Lanxade: Personal Chief of Staff of the President of the Republic
(1989-1991), then Army Chief of Staff (1991-1995).
2) Gén. Christian Quesnot : Personal Chief of Staff of the President of the Republic
(1991-1995).
3) Gén. Jean-Pierre Huchon : Head of Military Cooperation (1993-1995).
4) Gén. Raymond Germanos : Deputy Chief of Operations in the Army Head quarters
(mai 1994-septembre 1995).
5) Col. Didier Tauzin alias Thibault : Military advisor to the President of the Republic
of Rwanda from 1990 to end 1993, Chief of Dami Panda and Chimere Operations (22
février — 28 mars 1993) then Commander of Turquoise Gikongoro
6) Col. Gilles Chollet: Chief of DAMI from March 1991 to February 1992. From
February 1992, he combined that position with that of Military advisor to the President of
Republic , commander in chief of FAR, and advisor to the Chief of Staff of FAR
7) Col. Bernard Cussac : Military Attaché in the French embassy in Rwanda and Head
of Military Cooperation Mission Guly 1991-april 1994), commander of Noroit operation
of july 1991-december 1993, excluding february and march 1993.
8) Lt. col. Jean-Jacques Maurin : Deputy Chief of Operations to the Defense Attaché
(1992- 1994).
9) Col. Gilbert Canovas: october to november 1990, Deputy chief in charge of
operations to the Defense Attaché and Advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie.
10) Col. René Galinié: Defense Attaché and Head of Military assistance Mission in
Rwanda (August 1988-july i991), Noroit Operation commander (october 1990-july
1991).
11) Col. Jacques Rosier : Noroft operation Commander including DAMI from june to
november 1992, Head of the COS Turquoise Unit (Special Operations Commander) from
22 june to 30 july 1994),
12) Cpt. Grégoire De Saint Quentin: Technical Advisor to the Commander of Para
Commando Batallion and Instructor Officer for Airport Guard Troops (august 1992- april
1994),
13) Maj. Michel Robardey: technical Advisor to the National Gendarmerie (Criminal
Investigation Department) from 1990 to 1993.
14) Maj. Denis Roux: Technical Advisor to the Presidential Guard Commander from
June 199]-april 1994.
15) Cpt. Etienne Joubert: Head of DAMI Panda Operation from 23 december 1992 to
18 may 1993, then Intelligence Officer , then Head of Turquoise Operation in Gikongoro
16) Col. Patrice Sartre: Head of Northern Turquoise Unit (Kibuye) from 22 june to 21
august 1994.
17) Cpt. de frégate Marin Gillier: responsible of the Turquoise Detachment at Gishyita
(Kibuye).
18) Lt. col. Eric De Stabenrath: commander of Turquoise Gikongoro from 16 july to 22
august 1994.
19) Col. Jacques Hogard: Head of Southern Turquoise Unit (Cyangugu) end june-22
august 1994.
** Page 13 **
13
20) Gén. Jean-Claude Lafourcade : Commander in chief of Turquoise.
Released by the Ministry of Justice on behalf of the Government of the Republic
of Rwanda
Kigali on 05/08/2008.
Minister of Justice/ Attorney General
Tharcisse KARUGARAMA
This communiqué can also be found on the following websites:
Wwww.minijust.gov.rw
WWW.gov.rw
