Résumé
Paris' decision to create a secure humanitarian zone creates a de-facto interpositionary force. In order not to lead to a conflict with RPF forces this area must be small and not include areas occupied by RGF forces and known militia concentrations. Any report of Hutu atrocities must be pursued. The Hutu radios must be countered.
Citation
UNCLASSIFIED
MEHORANDIDS
CONFIDENTIAL
July 5, 1994
RELEASED IN PART
Bl, 1.5(D)
To:
Ambassador Inderfurth
Thru:
POL - Cameron Hu
:From:
POL - P e
,Subject:
Political strategy for Rwanda; SC Informals on
Rwanda, July 6, 11am
romuih, Laurie Sites
Summary
Paris' decision to establish a secure humanitarian zone in
the contested area of southwestern Rwanda creates a de-facto
'interpositionarY force.
Council review of French intervention will occur today
1
llam and again tomorrow. While this morning's media coverage
at
suggests France is already acting to reduce chances of conflict
with the RPF by limiting the size of the safe area, recommend you
seek opportunity to draw out Merimee or Ladsous on their
political/withdrawal strategy and plans for hand-off to UNAMIR.
You may want to draw on the following points as appropriate.
' points
agree with France that the short term goal is to create
* We
secure conditions permitting French withdrawal in favor of a
reconstituted UNAMIR.
understand your decision to establish a safe humanitarian
* We
zone in southwestern Rwanda, consistent with resolutions 929
and 924 (pare 4-b).
* We are anxious to assure that this does not lead to conflict
with RPF forces. If this were to occur it could reduce the
willingness of the Council to approve, or troop contributors
to support, a reconstituted UNAMIR.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE SELLIN
DATE/CASE ID: 11 OCT 2002 200000294
CLASSIFICATION:CONFIDENTIALREASON: 1 .6(6 )UNCLASSIFIED
DECLASSFYAFTER:5JUL2019
B1
UNCLASSIFIED
-2-
• To avoid such a result and to hasten establishment of
conditions for transfer of responsibilities to UNAMIR we
believe several steps would be useful to build confidence and
underscore the strictly' humanitarian character of the safe
area.
• For example, we suggest that the safe area not be
geographically larger than that required to safely accomodate
Hutu refugees, and that it not include areas occupied by the
RGF, its forces or known militia concentrations.
• Within the safe area an important confidence-builder with the
RPF would be a policy to pursue aggressively any report of
Hutu atrocities.
• Once the area is secure, a dramatically expanded
international humanitarian presence would be extremely
helpful practically and politically.
* It is also necessary to counter the inflammatory effect of
Hutu radio broadcasts by direct or indirect means. A
substantial humanitarian presence among the main
concentrations of Hutu refugees would make such scare-tactics
less effective.
* Finally, once the SYG's Special Representative, Tanzania,
other countries and the parties revive a process of
negotiation based upon the Arusha principles, this will
provide a stronger basis for an enlarged UNAMIR, which could
be helpful in facilitating French withdrawal from the safe
area.
UNCLASSIFIED
