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37A8E5 040940Z /38
0 040932Z MAR 94
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6126
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-SAAA// PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 01 OF 02 KIGALI 01459
KAMPALA FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE
AND AMBASSADOR CARSON
E.O. 12356: DECL OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, RW
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SUBJECT: A VISIT WITH HABYARIMANA
REF: KIGALI 01458
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA ASKED ME TO SEE
HIM SATURDAY MORNING, 4/2; HE HAD FOUR THINGS ON HIS
MIND: THE POLITICAL IMPASSE, PATRIOTIC FRONT'S
TERRORISM, THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE UNDER THE ACCORD, AND
THE U.S. VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON PEACEKEEPING
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 03 MAY 2005 200103014
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
IN RWANDA. I REVIEWED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S
POSITION ON INSTALLING INSTITUTIONS, WAS AGNOSTIC ON
SOURCES OF INTERNAL POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND DID NOT
COMFORT THE PRESIDENT ON THE U.S. VOTE. END SUMMARY.
3. THE PRESIDENT WONDERED HOW THE PATRIOTIC FRONT
(RPF) COULD INSIST ON KEEPING THE CDR PARTY OUT OF
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WHEN ALL INTERNAL POLITICAL
PARTIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THOUGHT THAT
THE CDR SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN TRANSITION INSTITUTIONS
FROM THE START. THE PROBLEM, IN HIS VIEW, WAS
RELATED TO RPF'S ULTIMATE INTENTIONS: THEY WERE A
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION SEEKING TO TAKE POWER BY
FORCE. INITIALLY THEY TRIED A CLASSIC MILITARY
ATTACK, THEN THEY TRIED GUERRILLA WARFARE, AND WHEN
THEY FAILED TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVE, THEY PULLED
OUT THEIR THIRD BATTLE PLAN--NEGOTIATIONS ACCOMPANIED
BY POLITICAL ASSASSINATION TO DESTABILIZE THE
INTERNAL POLITICAL ORDER.
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4. REVERSING THE COINAGE, HABYARIMANA THEN RAISED
THE WAY IN WHICH THE OPPOSITION AND RPF TRIED TO
UNDERMINE THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, WHICH STILL HAD A
FUNCTIONAL, STABILIZING ROLE TO PLAY UNDER THE ARUSHA
ACCORD. HE MENTIONED RPF COMMUNIQUES WHICH HAD
CALLED HIM TRAITOR AND ASSASSIN, BUT OBVIOUSLY ALSO
HAD IN MIND RECENT HARSH WORDS WHICH PRIME MINISTER
UWILINGIYIMANA HAD DIRECTED TOWARD HIM. THERE HAD TO
BE AN ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL RESPECT AMONGST POLITICAL
LEADERSHIP IF THE ARUSHA ACCORD WERE EVER TO WORK.
5. TOWARD THE END OF OUR HOUR-LONG COVNERSATION, THE
PRESIDENT UNVEILED THE OBVIOUS REASON FOR CONVOKING
ME--HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE U.S. VOTE FOR RENEWAL OF
THE UN PEACEKEEPING MANDATE. THE UN PRESENCE WAS
ESSENTIAL IF RWANDA WERE EVER TO GET OUT OF ITS
CURRENT TROUBLES. HE RECOGNIZED THAT RWANDA HAD
GIVEN THE UNITED STATES FEW REASONS TO SUPPORT THEIR
CASE, BUT, IN FACT, REAL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN
PLANNING DEMOBILIZATION, IN RESOLVING OUTSTANDING
POLITICAL ISSUES REGARDING THE BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT
AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND, IN ESTABLISHING AN
EFFECTIVE UN PRESENCE ACROSS THE COUNTRY. RWANDA
NEEDED A BIT MORE TIME. WOULD I PLEAD WITH ASSISTANT
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SECRETARY MOOSE AND OTHER AUTHORITIES IN WASHINGTON
FOR A POSITIVE VOTE ON EXTENSION?
6. I REMINDED THE PRESIDENT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY'S POSITION ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL
BLOCKAGES HAD THREE ELEMENTS: EQUITY IN THE
TREATMENT OF ALL RECOGNIZED PARTIES (NOT SUPPORT AS
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SUCH FOR ANY PARTICULAR PARTY), FORMATION AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE OF A WATCHDOG NATIONAL COMMISSION TO MAKE
SURE PARTIES KEPT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ACCORD,
AND A CONCLUSION THAT NO INTRAPARTY ISSUE SHOULD,
HENCEFORTH, BE PERMITTED TO STALL INSTALLATION OF THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNMENT. FOR THAT SINGLE
CEREMONY TO SUCCEED, ALL MAJOR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
(PRESIDENCY, PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, HIGH COURT) AS
WELL AS MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES AND RPF HAD TO BE
PRESENT. THE PRESIDENT PROTESTED THAT HE HAD THREE
TIMES TRIED TO SET UP SUCH A CEREMONY AND OTHERS DID
NOT SHOW UP. I POINTED OUT THAT THE LAST TIME HE HAD
SUBMITTED TO THE PRIME MINISTER A LIST OF DEPUTIES
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ACTION AF-01
INFO
LOG-00
HA-09
NSAE-00
P-01
RPE-01
KIGALI
CIAE-00
H-01
NSCE-00
SNP-00
PMB-00
01459
02 OF 02
C-01
TEDE-00
01C-02
SP-00
/037W
OASY-00
INR-00
OMB-01
SS-00
040941Z
DODE-00
10-16
PA-01
TRSE-00
DOEE-00
L-01
PM-00
T-00
UNCLASSIFIED
EUR-01
ADS-00
PRS-01
USIE-00
UNCLASSIFIED
37A90B 040941Z /38
O 040932Z MAR 94
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6127
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4 SAAA// PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
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CONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 02 KIGALI 01459
KAMPALA FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE
AND AMBASSADOR CARSON
E.O. 12356: DECL OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, RW
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SUBJECT: A VISIT WITH HABYARIMANA
DIFFERENT THAN HERS ON THE EVE OF THE CEREMONY, AND
THAT AFTER HE HAD ASSURED A PROMINENT AMERICAN
VISITOR (DASD IRVIN) THAT THE CEREMONIES WOULD GO
FORWARD. OPERATIONALLY, POLITICAL ACTORS MUST AGREE
ON A SINGLE LIST OF DEPUTIES AND MINISTERS BEFORE THE
CEREMONY BEGINS, OR IT WILL NEVER GET OFF THE
GROUND. I ENCOURAGED HIM TO ENGAGE DIRECTLY WITH THE
PRIME MINISTER, PRIME MINISTER-DESIGNATE AND RPF TO
SECURE SUCH A LIST. IN THE VIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY, THE CDR ISSUE WAS THE LAST POSSIBLE POINT
OF CONTENTION; ALL OTHER ISSUES COULD BE DEALT WITH
AFTER THE INSTITUTIONS WERE IN PLACE.
7. AS REGARDS TERRORISM, I HAD HEARD BOTH RPF AND
CDR, WITHIN THE LAST WEEK, ACCUSE EACH OTHER OF BEING
THE SOURCE OF ALL VIOLENCE IN THIS COUNTRY. THE
CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM CIVIL WAR WERE FAIRLY EASY
TO DETERMINE. BUT ABSENT INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE, I
WAS NOT IN POSITION TO SAY WHO MIGHT BE RESPONSIBLE
UNCLASSIFIED
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FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL VIOLENCE; VIRTUALLY EVERY
POLITICAL FORCE IN RWANDA HAD LOST A PROMINENT
PERSONALITY TO SUCH VIOLENCE; MY ONLY CONCLUSION WAS
THAT SOME GROUP DOES NOT WANT THE ARUSHA ACCORD TO
SUCCEED AND SABOTAGES IT AT CRITICAL MOMENTS. THE
ANSWER TO SUCH SABOTAGE WAS TO PUT THE INSTITUTIONS
IN PLAE AND LET THE UNITED NATIONS WORK WITH LAW
ENFORCEMENT SERVICES TO FIND OUT WHO PERPETRATED
THESE ACTS AND STOP THEM. I RECALLED THAT TARGETED,
PERSONALIZED POLITICAL KILLINGS IN THE LATE 80'S HAD
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BROUGHT ABOUT POLITICAL REVOLT AND STATE
DISINTEGRATION IN LIBERIA. POLITICALLYMOTIVATED VIOLENCE UNDERMINED THE VERY ESSENCE OF THE
NATION. I ENDED WITH A PLEA THAT THE PRESIDENT DO
EVERYTHING IN HIS POWER TO KEEP KIGALI CALM IN THIS
TENUOUS TIME AS WE ALL TRIED TO HURDLE THE LAST
OBSTACLE TO SETTING UP GOVERNMENT.
8. ON THE QUESTION OF UN MANDATE, I REMINDED THE
PRESIDENT THAT DAS BUSHNELL HAD MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR
TO RWANDAN AUTHORITIES ON HER RECENT VISIT THE DEGREE
OF SKEPTICISM IN WASHINGTON REGARDING SUCCESS OF THE
UN MISSION. SHE HAD ASKED FOR ACTIONS, NOT WORDS, TO
JUSTIFY U.S. SUPPORT. THOSE ACTIONS HAD NOT BEEN
FORTHCOMING. THE PRESIDENT HAD, NO DOUBT, SEEN THE
SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT CALLING FOR A SIX-MONTH
EXTENSION BUT WITH REVIEW IN TWO MONTHS. I HAD
DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT DESK
ON FRIDAY NIGHT AND WASHINGTON WAS STILL DEBATING
WHAT ITS POSITION WOULD BE ON 4/5. I WOULD OBVIOUSLY
COMMUNICATE HIS PLEA TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE,
WHO WAS TO BE IN KAMPALA 4/3-5, AND TO OTHERS AT THE
STATE DEPARTMENT.
9. COMMENT: OTHER THAN REAFFIRMING OUR SUPPORT FOR
THE PRESIDENCY AS AN INSTITUTION WITHIN THE ARUSHA
ACCORD, I CHOSE NOT TO BELABOR HABYARIMANA'S CONCERN
ABOUT "MUTUAL RESPECT." POLITICAL EMOTIONS ARE TOO
TAUNT AT THE MOMENT TO INDUCE CONFIDENCE BUILDING BY
ANY INITIATIVE OTHER THAN AN EARNEST, HONEST EFFORT
ON ALL SIDES TO PUT THE INSTITUTIONS IN PLACE. NOR
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KIGALI 01459 02 OF 02 040941Z
DID I TRY TO COMFORT THE PRESIDENT OVER OUR POSITION
ON THE UN VOTE. IT WILL NOT HURT TO LET HIM WORRY;
HE MUST NOT SEE U.S. SUPPORT AS A GIVEN. I CREDIT
HABYARIMANA'S ASSURANCE THAT HE WILL NOT PUT FORWARD
ANY PRECONDITION FOR SWEARING IN THE INSTITUTIONS
OTHER THAN THAT THE CDR HAVE ITS PLACE IN THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. BUT WE CAN USE THE LEVERAGE OF
OUR HESITANT SUPPORT TO KEEP HIM TO HIS WORD. END
COMMENT. RAWSON
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