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2687DD 171417Z /38
R 171259Z FEB 94
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5759
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USDAO YAOUNDE
USDAO PARIS
DIA WASHDC//CH-4//
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-SAA//
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
NAVJUSTSCOL NEWPORT RI//ITD//
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 01 OF 05 KIGALI 00750
DEPT FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PHO
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KIGALI 00750 01 OF 05 171332Z
NEWPORT FOR ASELTINE, HINKLEY, O'HARE AND DONLEY
VAIHINGEN FOR LT. COL JEANES
E.O. 12356:OADR:DECL.
TAGS: MOPS, KSPR, PGOV, PREL, PINS, RW
SUBJECT: THE MILITARY AND THE TRANSITION TO PEACE
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L DARIS
DATE/CASE ID: 28 MAR 2006 200103014
UNCLASSIFIED
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2. THIS CABLE FULFILLS A DESIRABLESREPRTING
REQUIREMENT.
3. SUMMARY. MILITARY ATTITUDES TOWARD THE TRANSITION
PROCESS AND DEMOCRACY VARY THROUGH THE RANKS; MID-LEVEL
OFFICERS' SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IS STRONGEST. BOTH THE
RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES (RGF) AND THE RWANDAN
PATRIOTIC FRONT ARMY (RPA) BLAME POLITICIANS FOR THE
CURRENT IMPASSE. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE
UPCOMING TRANSITION INCLUDING COMMANDSJRD CONTROL ISSUES
REMAIN UNDEFINED FOR BOTH THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN
ELEMENT. ETHNIC PREJUDICES ON BOTH SIDES PERSIST AND
WILL HAVE TO BE OVERCOME DURING INTEGRATED TRAINING.
PROPER HANDLING OF FORCE INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION
IS THE KEY TO SECURING MILITARY SUPPORT OF THE
TRANSITION TO PEACE. END SUMMARY.
MILITARY ATTITUDES VARY ON THE TRANSITION PROCESS
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4. THE MILITARY IS NO LONGER A MONOLITHIC ONE PARTY
INSTITUTION, WITH CONSISTENT ATTITUDES THROUGHOUT THE
RANKS ON THE TRANSITION PROCESS. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME
SENIOR OFFICERS STILL SEE THEIR DESTINY TIED TO THE
PRESIDENT AND HIS PARTY. MANY HAVE NOISY SKELETONS IN
THEIR CLOSETS AND FEAR PROSECUTION FOR PAST CORRUPTION
AND INCOMPETENCE WITH THE RPF JOINING THEIR RANKS.
5. AMONG THE MID-LEVEL OFFICERS, THERE ARE TWO DISTINCT
CAMPS. THERE ARE THE MRND LOYALISTS WHO BELIEVE THE
OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE IN CAHOOTS WITH THE RPF, WORKING
FOR THE OUSTER OF THE PRESIDENT. THE CURRENT POLITICAL
IMPASSE FOR THEM ONLY REFLECTS THE RPF AND OPPOSITION
EFFORTS TO ENSURE A MAJORITY IN THE TRANSITION
GOVERNMENT TO IMPEACH HABYARIMANA. THE OTHER CAMP WITHIN
THE MID LEVELS SEEMS TO REALIZE THAT CHANGE IS
INEVITABLE AND SUPPORTS THE MOVE TOWARD MULTIPARTY
DEMOCRACY.
6. AT THE ENLISTED LEVEL, MAMY EQUATE MULTIPARTYISM AND
THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT WITH THEIR IMMINENT
DEMOBILIZATION SINCE MOST OF THE DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS
WILL COME FROM THE ENLISTED RANKS. THEIR BIGGEST
CONCERNS ARE GETTING ADEQUATE TRAINING AND COMPENSATION
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
ONCE THEY LEAVE THE MILITARY.
BOTH THE RGF AND RPA FRUSTRATED BY THE CURRENT IMPASSE
7. AT A RECENT NAVAL SCHOOL OF JUSTICE (NSJ) CONFERENCE
HELD IN KIGALI IN JANUARY 1994 ON THE ROLE OF THE
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MILITARY IN A DEMOCRACY, MILITARY PARTICIPANTS FROM BOTH
THE RPA AND RGF EXPRESSED THEIR FRUSTRATION WITH THE
CURRENT POLITICAL IMPASSE. RPF AND RGF OFFICERS
BELIEVED THAT THE POLITICIANS WERE HOLDING UP THE PEACE
PROCESS FOR SELF-INTERESTED REASONS AND IGNORING THE
NEEDS OF THE NATION.
8. THE MILITARY ON BOTH SIDES BOASTED ABOUT THEIR
ABILITY TO RESOLVE DIFFICULTIES QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY,
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USDA() YAOUNDE
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DIA WASHDC//CH-4//
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-SAA//
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
NAVJUSTSCOL NEWPORT RWITD//
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 05 KIGALI 00750
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KIGALI 00750 02 OF 05 171328Z
NEWPORT FOR ASELTINE, HINKLEY, O'HARE AND DONLEY
VAIHINGEN FOR LT. COL JEANES
E.O. 12356:0ADR:DECL.
TAGS: MOPS, KSPR, PGOV, PREL, PINS, RW
SUBJECT: THE MILITARY AND THE TRANSITION TO PEACE
UNLIKE THEIR POLITICAL COUNTERPARTS. CONFERENCE
PARTICIPANTS POINTED AS AN EXAMPLE TO THE EASE WITH
WHICH THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, THE GENDARMERIE CHIEF OF
STAFF, AND THE RPF FORCE COMMANDER AGREED ON THE MODE OF
OPERATION WITHIN THE KIGALI WEAPONS SAFE AREA
ESTABLISHED BY UNAMIR (UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION
IN RWANDA).
9. ALTHOUGH, THERE HAVE BEEN NO MAJOR OBSTACLES PUT UP
BY EITHER THE RGF OR RGF IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE
PEACE PROCESS, COL. KARENZI, THE RPF LIAISON OFFICER TO
UNAMIR, BELIEVES THAT THE MILITARY'S WILLINGNESS TO
IMPLEMENT THE ARUSHA ACCORDS HAS NOT REALLY BEEN TESTED.
THE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS INVOLVING FORCE INTEGRATION AND
DEMOBILIZATION HAVE YET TO BE DISCUSSED AND MAY RESULT
IN SOME OF THE SANE TYPES OF IMPASSES CURRENTLY SEEN ON
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
THE POLITICAL FRONT.
CHANGING ROLES, UNCERTAIN IDENTITY FOR THE MILITARY
10. THE PRINCIPAL AIM OF THE JANUARY NSJ CONFERENCE WAS
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TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN A
DEMOCRACY. THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AUGUSTIN BIZIMANA,
THE RPA COMMANDER GENERAL KAGANE AND THE FOREIGN
MINISTER ANASTASE GASANA ALL EXPRESSED THEIR GRATITUDE
FOR THE EMBASSY'S SPONSORSHIP OF THIS CONFERENCE. ALL
FELT THAT IT CREATED A BETTER UNDERSTANDING AMONG BOTH
CIVILIANS AND THE MILITARY AS TO THE ROLE THE ARMED
FORCES SHOULD PLAY DURING THIS TRANSITION PERIOD AND
AFTER THE ELECTIONS, SCHEDULED FOR 1995. THE LESSONS
LEARNED DURING THE CONFERENCE WERE IMPORTANT IN MAKING
THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE MILITARY'S PAST ROLE
AND ITS CURRENT ONE.
11. DURING THE PERIOD 1973-1990, THE ARMED FORCES WERE
AN ORGAN OF THE ONE-PARTY STATE. THE ROLE OF THE
MILITARY WAS TO PROTECT THAT STATE, THE MRND PARTY AND
ITS PRESIDENT, MAJOR GENERAL JUVENAL HABYARIMANA. THE
PRESIDENT ALSO HELD THE FUNCTIONS OF MINISTER OF
DEFENSE, AND CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY AND GENDARMERIE.
DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS WERE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE
DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF. ARMY OFFICERS HELD MINISTERIAL
POSITIONS, WERE ELECTED AS DEPUTIES, AND WERE APPOINTED
TO OTHER CIVILIAN JOBS.
12. WITH THE JUNE 1991 CONSTITUTION, POLITICAL PARTIES
WERE LEGALIZED. AN IMPORTANT CAVEAT IN THE POLITICAL
PARTIES LAW MADE PARTY MEMBERSHIP ILLEGAL FOR MEMBERS OF
THE ARMED FORCES. LATER, A CIVILIAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE
WAS APPOINTED BY THE FIRST MULTIPARTY TRANSITION
GOVERNMENT IN APRIL 1992. WITH THE ACCEPTANCE OF
MULTIPARTYISM IN GOVERNMENT, THE ARMY'S ROLE CHANGED
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FROM THAT OF SUPPORT AND PROTECTION OF HABYARIMANA AND
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
THE MRND TO APOLITICAL PROTECTOR OF A MULTIPARTY STATE.
YET AS THE NSJ CONFERENCE SHOWED THIS NEW ROLE WAS NEVER
WELL DEFINED FOR THE MILITARY OR ITS CIVILIAN MASTERS.
COMMAND AND CONTROL QUESTIONS AT ISSUE FOR THE MILITARY
13. DURING THE NSJ CONFERENCE, BOTH RGF AND RPA OFFICERS
ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT IT MEANT FOR THE ARMY TO
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INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
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DIA WASHDC//CH-4//
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-SAA//
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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NAVJUSTSCOL NEWPORT RI//ITD//
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CONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 05 KIGALI 00750
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KIGALI 00750 03 OF 05 171333Z
NEWPORT FOR ASELTINE, HINKLEY, O'HARE AND DONLEY
VAIHINGEN FOR LT. COL JEANES
E.O. 12356:OADR:DECL.
TAGS: MOPS, KSPR, PGOV, PREL, PINS, RW
SUBJECT: THE MILITARY AND THE TRANSITION TO PEACE
SUPPORT DEMOCRACY AND BE UNDER CIVILIAN CONTROL. RGF
OFPICERS SPECIFICALLY ASKED IF DEMOCRACY EQUALLED THE
GOVERNMENT, AND IF SO DID THEY GIVE THEIR LOYALTY AND
FOLLOW ORDERS FROM THE PRESIDENT, THE MINISTER OF
DEFENSE, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OR THE PEOPLE. RGF
OFFICERS IN DEFENSE OF THE MILITARY CLAIMED THAT THEY
HAD FOUGHT IN SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY DURING THE PAST THREE
YEARS AND HAD BEEN UNDER CIVILIAN/DEMOCRATIC CONTROL AT
LEAST SINCE 1991 WITH THE NEW CONSTITUTION, TAKING
ORDERS FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THE CIVILIAN MINISTER OF
DEFENSE.
14. THE RPF AS WELL AS SOME OF THE CIVILIAN PARTICIPANTS
IN THE CONFERENCE BEGGED TO DIFFER WITH THIS
INTERPRETATION OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE ARMY. THE RPF
POINTED TO THE NUMEROUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
COMMITTED BY THE MILITARY, ALLEGEDLY UNDER ORDERS FROM
THE PRESIDENT AND SOME OF HIS CIVILIAN PREFETS. ACTIONS
SUCH AS THESE, SAID THE RPF, WERE CLEARLY NOT ACTIONS IN
SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY.
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THIS
DISCUSSION
LED TO QUESTIONS SUCH AS WHAT
15.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
ACTIONS WERE PROPER AND IMPROPER FOR THE ARMY TO TAKE IN
SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY? THE NSJ TRAINERS RESPONDED THAT
THE ARMY WAS TASKED TO UPHOLD THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES
EMBODIED IN THE CONSTITUTION AND ENSURE THE PROTECTION
OF HUMAM RIGHTS. BOTH RGF AND RPF OFFICERS AGREED THAT
THIS WOULD BE THEIR TASK IN RWANDA'S NEW MULTIPARTY
DEMOCRACY. THE RPF'S LINGERING CONCERN, THOUGH, IS THAT
BOTH THE MILITARY AND CIVILIANS RECEIVE SUFFICIENT
POLITICAL/CIVIC EDUCATION TO BE ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE
CONCEPT OF RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HOW THIS APPLIES
TO THE MINORITY.
MILITARY VIEWS ON ETHNICITY AND FORCE INTEGRATION
16. INTEGRATION OF THE TWO ARMIES (ESSENTIALLY
INTEGRATION OF GOVERNMENT HUTU AND RPF TUTSI FORCES) IS
SCHEDULED TO BEGIN 90 DAYS AFTER A BROAD BASED
TRANSITION GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED. SINCE
INDEPENDENCE, THE RWANDAN ARMED FORCES HAVE BEEN
DOMINATED BY THE HUTU ETHNIC GROUP. WHILE SOME TUTSIS
DID ENTER THE MILITARY, AND A FEW MADE IT INTO THE
OFFICER CORPS, THE OUTBREAK OF WAR SAW MANY OF THEM
ARRESTED AS COLLABORATORS OR FORCED INTO RESERVE STATUS.
THE WAR ITSELF FOR MOST MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES WAS
A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE HUTU ARMY AND THE TUTSI INVADERS.
RGF OFFICERS BELIEVE, THEREFORE, THAT ETHNICITY MAY
INITIALLY POSE A PROBVQDUFRHINOEGRAYION.
17. FOR EXAMPLE, ECONOFF SPOKE TO RGF HIGH COMMAND
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OFFICERS WHO ARE STILL WARY OF THE "TUTSI RPF". IN
PARTICULAR, THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, MAJOR GENERAL
NSABIMANA, STILL THINKS THAT THE TUTSI AIM REMAINS
UNCHANGED -- TOTAL POWER. ACCORDING TO NSABIMANA, RPF
OFFICERS IN THE HIGH COMMAND WILL ACT AS INFILTRATORS,
ASSISTING THE RPF POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE PLANNING OF A
COUP FROM WITHIN, AND THUS ACCOMPLISHING THE ULTIMATE
GOAL OF TOTAL POWER. IN HIS ASSESSMENT, THE TIMING FOR
SUCH A COUP WILL COME AFTER AN RPF LOSS IN THE ELECTIONS
AFTER THE UN MANDATE IS OVER AND UN TROOPS HAVE
WITHDRAWN. (NOTE: MGEN NSABIMANA HAS BEEN NAMED BY THE
GOVNRNMENT SIDE TO CONTINUE IN HIS ROLE AS ARMY CHIEF OF
UNCLASSIFIED
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5762
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USDAO YAOUNDE
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DIA WASHDC//CH-4//
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-SAA//
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
NAVJUSTSCOL NEWPORT RI//ITD//
cONFIDENTIALSECTIoN 04 OF 05 KIGALI 00750
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KIGALI 00750 04 OF 05 171332Z
NEWPORT FOR ASELTINE, HINKLEY, O'HARE AND DONLEY
VAIHINGEN FOR LT. COL JEANES
E.O. 12356:OADR:DECL.
TAGS: MOPS, KSPR, PGOV, PREL, PINS, RW
SUBJECT: THE MILITARY AND THE TRANSITION TO PEACE
STAFF OF THE INTEGRATED FORCES.)
18. FOR OFFICERS AT THE MID LEVEL, HOWEVER, THE ETHNIC
TENSIONS ARE NOT SO PRONOUNCED. THE GOODWILL DISPLAYED
AT THE NSJ CONFERENCE BETWEEN RGF AND RPA OFFICERS
SUGGESTED THAT ANIMOSITY BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES COULD BE
SHORT LIVED IN THE NEWLY INTEGRATED ARMY. BY THE SECOND
DAY OF THE CONFERENCE, RGF AND RPF OFFICERS WERE TALKING
AMONG THEMSELVES LIKE LONG-LOST BROTHERS. ONE REMARKABLE
INCIDENT DURING THE CONFERENCE WAS SEEING AN RPF AND AN
RGF OFFICER LEAVING THE MESS HALL TOGETHER HAND-IN-HAND.
(HAND HOLDING AMONG MEN IN RWANDA IS AN ACCEPTABLE
CUSTOM, DENOTING FRIENDSHIP.)
19. IN THE ENLISTED RANKS, THE RPF SOLDIERS WERE
PROVIDED POLITICAL EDUCATION IN THE FIELD. ALL WERE
TAUGHT THE RPF POLITICAL PROGRAMME THAT THE NATURE OF
THE THREE YEAR CONFLICT WAS NOT ETHNIC BUT RATHER ONE OF
FIGHTING AGAINST A DICTATORIAL REGIME FOR THE RIGHTS OF
ALL RWANDANS. BY COMPARISON, MOST OF THE RGF ENLISTED
WERE GIVEN VERY LITTLE TRAINING AND TAUGHT THAT TUTSIS
WERE THEIR ENEMY. INTEGRATED TRAINING OF THE ENLISTED
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WILL HAVE TO FOCUS ON THE ETHNIC
BRING TO THEIR PLATOONS. "ENEMY"
REDEFINED AND DISASSOCIATED FROM
OF 05 171332Z
PREJUDICES MANY WILL
WILL HAVE TO BE
"TUTSI" OR "HUTU".
SCENARIOS FOR UPCOMING DEMOBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION
20. ENTERING INTO THE THIRD PHASE OF THE PEACE PROCESS
IN WHICH UNAMIR WILL OVERSEE DISARMAMENT, FORCE
INTEGRATION, AND DEMOBILIZATION, THE MILITARY COULD
RESPOND TO THESE CHANGES IN THREE POSSIBLE WAYS. FIRST
IS THAT WHICH ALL WOULD HOPE FOR: TMAT THE MILITARY
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
ADJUSTS TO AND ACCEPTS ITS NEW ROLE IN SUPPORT OF THE
PEACE PROCESS, THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY, AND THE
OUTCOME OF ELECTIONS IN 1995.
21. A SECOND POSSIBLE RESPONSE COULD BE A MUTINY AMONG
LOWER-LEVEL OFFICERS, WITHOUT THE OBJECTIVE OF TAKING
POLITICAL POWER, IN WHICH UNDISCIPLINED SOLDIERS TAKE
MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT
LEADERSHIP FROM THE OFFICER CORPS. SUCH A MUTINY COULD
BE TRIGGERED BY FEARS OF DEMOBILIZATION WITHOUT
SUFFICIENT COMPENSATION OR TRAINING OR BY THE ERUPTION
OF CONFLICT BETWEEN INTEGRATED RGF AND RPF UNITS.
22. A THIRD POSSIBILITY IS A COUP EITHER BY THOSE IN
SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT SHOULD THERE BE AN IMPEACHMENT
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ATTEMPT OR IN THE NEAR TERM BY THOSE FROM THE OPPOSITION
INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY WHO WANT CHANGE AND
ARE FRUSTRATED WITH THE POLITICAL IMPASSE (WHICH THEY
BLAME OH THE PRESIDENT). AN RPF COUP, USED AS A TACTIC
TO SHIFT THE POLITICAL BALANCE, STRATEGICALLY SIMILAR TO
THE FEBRUARY 1993 OFFENSIVE, IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY
RAISED BY THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF.
23. GENERAL DALLAIRE, THE UN FORCE COMMANDER HAS
CONSIDERED EACH OF THESE SCENARIOS, AND ADJUSTED HIS
FORCE STRATEGY AND DEPLOYMENT TO COVER "WEAK FLANKS IN
THE SOUTHERN SECTORS. FEARS OF A COUP FROM THE PRO-HUTU
RIGHT CONTINUE WITH RUMORS OF INTERMANME (RWANDAN,
PRO-HUTU EXTREMISTS) AND PALIPEHUTU (BURUNDI, PRO-HUTU
EXTREMISTS) TRAINING IN BURUNDI REFUGEE CAMPS ALONG THE
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5763
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USDAO YAOUNDE
USDA() PARIS
DIA WASHDC//CH-4//
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-SAA//
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
NAVJUSTSCOL NEWPORT RI//ITD//
C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 05 OF 05 KIGALI 00750
DEPT FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PHO
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KIGALI 00750 05 OF 05 171333Z
NEWPORT FOR ASELTINE, HINKLEY, O'HARE AND DONLEY
VAIHINGEN FOR LT. :9) '3-,3:
E.O. 12356:OADR:DECL.
TAGS: MOPS, KSPR, PGOV, PREL, PINS, RW
UNCLASSIFIED
EUR-01
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UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: THE MILITARY AND THE TRANSITION TO PEACE
SOUTHERN BORDER. CONCERNS ABOUT A PRO-RPF COUP FROM THE
LEFT STILL LINGER WITH THE UNEASE IN BURUNDI AMD THE
POSSIBILITY THAT THE BURUNDI TUTSI-DOMINATED ARMY COULD
TURN TO THE NORTH TO HELP ITS RPF BRETHREN SEIZE POWER.
THE RESULTS OF ANY COUP WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC AND COULD
RESULT IN ETHNIC BACKLASH THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRYSIDE
SIMILAR TO THAT WITNESSED IN BURUNDI.
24. AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO SERIOUS EVIDENCE
THAT A COUP D'ETAT OF ANY KIND IS IN THE CARD
)39,
FROM BURUNDI WOULD COUNSEL AGAINST SUCH ACTIONS.
LEADERSHIP FOR A COUP IS LACKING AS WELL. AND GIVEN THE
DIVISIONS ALREADY IN THE MILITARY, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT
THE WHOLE OF THE ARMED FORCES COULD BE COUNTED ON TO
SUPPORT SUCH ACTIONS NO MATTER WHO THE LEADER OR WHAT
THE OBJECTIVES WERE.
COMMENT:
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25. WHETHER THERE IS A CRITICAL MASS IN THE ARMED FORCES
FOR POSITIVE CHANGE IN SUPPORT OF THE TRANSITION TO
PEACE IS UNCERTAIN. LTCOL KARENZI AND LTCOL RWABALINDA,
RPA AND RGF LIAISON OFFICERS TO UNAMIR, BOTH CONTEND
THAT THE LEADERS AT THE TOP ARE ONLY PAYING LIP SERVICE
TO THE PROCESS BUT DON'T REALLY SUPPORT ITS
IMPLEMENTATION IF IT AFFECTS THEIR POWER BASE. IF THIS
IS TRUE, DEMOBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED
FORCES
WILL BE CRITICAL TO MILITARY SUPPORT (OUTSIDE THE HIGH
COMMAND) FOR THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY IN
GENERAL. IMPROPERLY HANDLED, DEMOBILIZATION AND FORCE
INTEGRATION COULD BE THE WILD CARDS IN THE TRANSITION TO
PEACE IN RWANDA. RAWSON
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
