Citation
The Path ofa•
The Rwanda ~ir(
from Uganda to laire
Howard Adelman &A~tri
~uhrke
edited by
Nordhka Afrikaimtitutet, al~pU
~
First published in the US 1999 by
Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey
T
•
-o
tenns
Conflicts
Genocide
Diplomacy
Peace keeping
Massmedia
Rwanda
Uganda
Zaire
UN
OAU
© 1999 by Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey
ISBN 91-7106-432-X
Printed in the United States of America
Acknowledgments
Preface
Text ofJmmary 11, 1994 Cable
Maps
1.
2.
3.
4.
S.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Part I: The Movement Towards Genocide
Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda
Ogenga Otunnu
An Historical Analysis of the Invasion
by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA)
Ogenga Otunnu
The Role of Zaire in the Rwandese Conflict
Shally B. Gachuruzi
The Development and Consolidation of
Extremist Forces in Rwanda
Joan Kakwenzire and Dixon Kamukama
Hate Radio in Rwanda
Frank Chalk
Part II: Preventive
The OAU: Conflict Prevention, Management,
and Resolution
Amare Tekle
The Arusha Peace Process
Bruce Jones
French Policy in Rwanda
Agnes Callamard
Canadian Policy in Rwanda
Howard Adelman
Rwanda: U.S. Policy and Television Coverage
Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus
vu
IX
XXI
XX111
3
31
SI
61
93
111
131
157
185
209
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Part III: Peacekeeping
U.N. Peacekeeping in Rwanda
Turid Laegreid
Dilemmas of Proteetion: The Log of the Kiga1i Battalion
Astri Suhrke
In Search of a New Cease-Fire (April-July 1994)
Jacques Castonguay
Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape
from a Political Dead End
Gerard Prunier
Protection and Humanitarian Assistance in the
Refugee Camps in Zaire: The Problem of Security
Kate Halvorsen
The Rwandan Genocide and the Collapse
ofMobutu's Kleptocracy
Abbas H. Gnamo
Glossaries
Contributors
Bibliography
Index
231
253
271
281
307
321
351
385
389
405
Acknowledgments
This book developed out of an evaluation study initiated in 1995 by
the Nordic countries, eventually sponsored by nineteen countries and
eighteen international agencies, to assess international emergency assistance to Rwanda during and after the genocide of 1994. The sponsors of the study wanted to understand the role of the international
community in managing the conflict and what knowledge was available beforehand of the impending genocide. The editors of this volume
were requested to write the latter study, which was published as: Early
Warning and Conflict Management: Genocide in Rwanda (henceforth,
the Report), which constituted Study II of the five volume Evaluation
of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (Copenhagen 1996). Without the
assistance of numerous persons in governments, NGOs, international
agencies, and academia around the world, neither the report nor this
book would have been possible.
The core of this volume consists of a selection from the set of specialized studies that were commissioned and used as resource materials for the 1996 Report. The studies contain a wealth of valuable
information which could not be included in the Report, but which deserve publication in their own right, particularly in light of the continuing and justified focus on the genocide as evidenced by the genocide
trials, the 1997 Belgian and 1998 French inquiries, and continuing media
attention. Most of the authors of those studies kindly agreed to revise
their manuscripts for this published volume. New chapters were added
as the Central African disaster unfolded.
To help contributors keep up with the rapidly developing events and
weld their different perspectives into a coherent volume, the United
States Institute of Peace provided financial assistance to hold a conference in December of 1996. This meeting brought together most of the
chapter authors for the first time, while additional experts and policymakers served as commentators. The U.S. Committee for Refugees
kindly made its meeting facilities in Washington available, and research
staff at the York University Centre for Refugee Studies, especially two
vii
viii
The Path of a Genocide
post-doctoral fellows, Susanne Schmeidl and Kurt Mills, organized the
workshop. Graduate students at York University, funded by a grant from
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canadaparticularly Tammy Stone and Gerry Butts-helped prepare the glossaries, bibliography, and the manuscript for publication.
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which co-sponsored the
original evaluation, provided additional assistance to develop the book
manuscript and enable the two editors to have a long working session
on an island in Pointe au Baril, Ontario during the summer of 1997. As
initiator and principal sponsor of the Rwanda evaluation, the Danish
Foreign Ministry provided financial assistance to enable copies of this
volume to be distributed widely in Africa. We are particularly grateful
to Niels Dabelstein of DANIDA for his patience, good humor, and sustained support.
Finally, we wish to repeat the acknowledgment given to our families
in our 1996 Report: "We would like to thank our spouses and children
who had to put up with an intense travelling schedule, and our absence
even when physically present as we struggled to dispassionately dissect a human catastrophe."
H.A.,A.S.
Toronto and Bergen
1998
Howard Adelman
Astri Suhrke
Dramatic changes that carry hope as weIl as despair have unfolded
in sub-Sahara Africa in the 1990s. In the richest and largest country,
South Africa, Nelson Mandela came to power in 1994; apartheid ended
just as the genocide in Rwanda was underway. In 1997, in the second
largest country of Africa, rich in mineral wealth, a thirty-two-year-old
kleptocracy was overthrown in Zaire. 1 In the north, there are new rulers
and signs of enduring peace in Ethiopia and Eritrea.
This book focuses on the Great Lakes region ofAfrica, where events
have been swift and at times devastating. After a decade of war, repression, and the most horrific genocide in the latter half of this century,2
new and laosely aHied regimes have replaced old-style dictatorships.
But they have all come to power with--or on-waves of violence. The
change of regime in Zaire was, in many ways, the last spasm of a conflict in which the Rwanda genocide three years earlier was the centerpiece. Since the genocide, dramatic changes have taken place: the
continuation of the genocide against the Banyarwanda in Zaire by the
ex-FAR and Interahamwe who controlled the camps in Zaire;3 the
1996 coup in Burundi; the outbreak of civil war in Zaire, initiaUy targeting the ex-FAR and Interahamwe; the subsequent mass repatriation
of refugees from Zaire in November 1996 triggered by that conflict,
and the mass repatriation of refugees from Tanzania in December; the
aborted Canadian-led humanitarian peacekeeping mission on behalf of
the refugees during that same period; the defeat by the Laurent-Dsin~
Kabila-led AHiance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du
Congo-Zaire (AFDL) and the creation of the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) as the successor state to the Mobutu-led government of
Zaire that feH. This manuscript was completed before the current
Rwandese govemment involvement in Zaire/Congo had been estabix
x
The Path of a Genocide
lished and before the issue of the number and extent of massacres of
Hutu in Zaire/Congo had been sorted out.
The genocide itself had roots in an earlier conflict that began in
Uganda in a now-farniliar pattem. Refugees became agents as weIl as
victims of violence; the refugee warriors 4 sought security for themselves by resorting to military means to attain power and to secure their
membership in the state. In their quest, civilian members of that community were targeted by other eommunities that felt threatened. Violenee, onee initiated, generated reprisals against "the other" side. In
Rwanda, those reprisals and the response to perceived and actual threats
reached a totally different order when extremists within the Hutu community targeted the whole of the Tutsi population in Rwanda for extermination. The genocidists won the war against the civilian population,
but lost against the invading Tutsi-dominated refugee army. They themselves became refugees in Zaire.
An effort was made to begin the cycle again as the defeated army
and militias from refugee camps in Zaire targeted civilian members of
the loeal society and eondueted raids back into Rwanda. 5 With the backing of the new governments in Rwanda and Uganda, groups in the local
populations rose up and drove out the militants. By the spring of 1998,
the cycle of violenee had yet to mn its course in Burundi or, for that
matter, in Rwanda or Uganda. For example, the violence continues with
extremist terrorist attacks in the Gisenyi and Ruhengeri prefectures,
and sometimes overzealous respanses by the overwhelmingly Tutsidominated Rwandese army. Indeed, the most critical question in the
Great Lakes Region at present is whether the governments and their
adversaries can break free from this heritage. Otherwise the new leaders in Uganda, Rwanda, and the DRC will continue to be confronted by
dissident communities and militant refugees, disaffected by regimes
which they do not believe represent them. The dissidents will seek revenge, security and power by using violent means to overthrow those
regimes. When that quest is matched by repression and targeted killings, a new cycle in the spiral of violence begins.
By examining the decade (1986-1997) of conflict which brackets
the Rwanda crisis, this book provides important background to CUfrent conflicts in the region. First and foremost, however, it is a study
of the international involvement and respanses to the genocide. The
contributors include a collection of specialist scholars from Uganda,
Rwanda, Zaire (DRC), Ethiopia, Norway, Britain, France, Canada,
and the United States. They provide detailed background and analy-
Preface
xi
sis of regional forces that fueled the Rwanda conflict. They also document how and why the international community failed to stop or significantly mitigate the genocide.
The genesis of this study originated in the dilemma of the international community providing development and relief assistance only to
witness a new spiral of violenee and larger refugee flows. Soon after
the genocide, nineteen donor countries and seventeen multilateral organizations, international agencies, and international NGOs6 pooled their
efforts in an unprecedented effort to sponsor an in-depth study that
went beyond the relatively straightforward task of evaluating whether
aid was delivered effectively and efficiently. The study looked at the
history of the violence and what the international community knew in
advance, as weIl as what action had been taken to prevent the crisis.
In the preparation of that report, a number of original, in-depth studies were comrnissioned from scholars to exarnine various aspects of
the problem. With the completion of the Rwanda study, the Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA) requested a foIlow-up study
by Howard Adelman and his colleagues at York University on early
warning and conflict management in Zaire. Further, Astri Suhrke was
asked to testify for the parliamentary inquiry in Belgium which provided additional access to documentation. Based on both the original
and additional material, this enabled the best of the specialized studies
undertaken in preparation for both reports to be selected and edited,
with additional material added to provide a regional focus for this volume narrating over a decade of horror culrninating in genocide as weIl
as radical change.
The quality and originality of the research included in the general
narrative is sufficient in itself to have justified this volume and to make
the material available to scholars of the region. However, no account
covering such a large area and so many players could be expected to be
comprehensive. While each study in this volume focuses on one dimension of the Rwanda conflict, together they progressively tell the
story of how the genocide unfolded and how the world responded. For
example, although chapter 10 by Livingston and Eachus, "Rwanda:
U.S. Policy and Television Coverage," focuses on the role of television
in shaping U.S. public opinion and foreign policy, other significant inputs into that policy-the shadow of Somalia, for example-are assumed rather than exarnined and analyzed, and the marginal status of
Rwanda in American foreign policy during most of this period is referred to in other chapters.
xii
The Paih of Il.Genodde
In addition to omissions, in telling a story with different chapters
written by different authors, inevitably there will be overlap and redundancy. We have edited the contributions to eliminate redundancy where
it was mere1y repetitive. However, when the analysis was central to
that section of the tale, we have allowed for repetition, as would have
happened even if a single author had written the entire book. For example, Jones inc1udes coverage of the role of the GAU in the chapter
on the Arusha Accords, while Tekle in the previous chapter has already
described the role of the GAU in the overall crisis. The difference is
that Jones exarnines Arusha from a global angle and the perspective of
a case study of preventive diplomacy, while Tekle's analysis was more
about the role of regional institutions, in this case an intergovemmental
organization dealing with all of Africa. Similarly, Jones mentions and
summarizes the French role at Arusha, while Callamard in the following chapter documents it in detail. Thus, we have permitted overlap
where different perspectives fill out or were crucial to the story, but
eliminated it where it is simply repetitive. This process was helped by
the generous contribution of the United States Institute for Peace, which
allowed most of the aUthors to come together in Washington to discuss
their different contributions and then re-edit their material to take into
account the comments received and the perceptions of others.
Nevertheless, the present collection of studies, we believe, has significance beyond the region and the specialized areas on which the
original Rwanda study focused. Together they provide a narrative of a
period which has witnessed not only a seismic change in central Africa, but also a radical reexamination of the involvement of states and
international actors in humanitarian issues. After all, the U.N. Security
Council accepted a responsibility to assist in protecting civilians in
Rwanda, but withdrew most of its peace keepers shortly after the genocide began. When the U.N. reversed itse1f, the new forces were deployed so tardily that the genocide was completed before the arrival of
the peace keepers.
This volume is also relevant in light of the fact that France withdrew
its support for the 1966 Report after examining the draft, and the U.N.
Secretariat surprisingly attacked the factual accuracy of the final report
(surprising in light of the numerous opportunities to offer corrections
to drafts provided to the Secretariat). More particularly, the then Secretary-General, through his spokesperson, argued that the information
about the planned genocide was passed onto the Security CounciI,7 contrary to the conc1usions of our study. Full publication of the scholarship
Preface
xiii
behind the report is necessary to allow independent scholars to determine for themselves the quality of the work. The chapters on France
and on peacekeeping are, therefore, not only relevant to depicting the
French and U.N. roles in Rwanda, but as a corrective to the U.N. official account of its role prior to and during the genocide as depicted (we
allege misleadingly) in the U.N. publication, The United Nations and
Rwanda 1993-1996 (New York: U.N. Publications, 1996).
The analyses of the deeper roots of the genocide in this collection
are valuable for comparative studies of genocide and ethnic violence
as weIl. The volume also offers a diachronically broad perspective in
contrast to the tendency in political science to treat the conc1usion of a
peace agreement as the end of a conflict. This case study demonstrates
that peace accords may be just a stage in the cyc1e of violence, and a
very fragile one at that. In fact, the peace agreement may itself become
a catalyst for violence for those who reject the peace, as happened in
Rwanda.
This collection also attempts to overcome the dichotomy prevalent
in the social sciences between domestic and foreign affairs, between
intemal and externai forces. Though the focus of the volume is the role
of international actors in a region of conflict, the local context and the
close interaction between intemal and external forces are critical to
understanding the role of the latter. Moreover, as refugees and political
actors move across national borders but remain active players in their
home country-a feature that continues to characterize conflict in the
Great Lakes region-new alliances develop. The distinction between
"external" and "internal" is further blurred. 8 On another level, local
developments can be critically affected even by the expectations of
externai assistance, or failure to render such aid, as was evident in
Rwanda on the eve of the genocide.
Though we are boastful about the value and importance of this
volume, based on the studies themselves, we are no longer sanguine
about the prospects that we can learn from the past in order to chart a
more peaceful future. The studies themselves have made us far more
cautious about the ability to translate scholarship into effective action. Too many times even the conc1usions of studies are simply used
to reinforce the preconceptions of policy makers already in place.
The most we can hope is that this in-depth analysis will add to the
entire spectrum of studies of both successes and failures in international affairs, and, further, that some policy makers might draw valuable lessons from it.
xiv
The Path of a Genocide
With all the bravura about the breadth and depth of this volume and its
value as scholarship, as weIl as some degree of modesty about its utility
for policy makers, it is the past that hangs as a very heavy cloud over
what is put forth as detached scholarship; the genocide in Rwanda dominates the volume. The centrality of that genocide makes detached scholarship difficult, and almost impossible for those directly affected by the
genocide. The chapter on extremism in Rwanda by Joan Kakwenzire and
Dixon Kamukama was self-consciously written by a partnership of a
Thtsi and a Bairu, the Ugandan equivalent of a Hutu, with direct input
from two other local scholars, a Thtsi and a Bairu, respectively, in an
effort to ensure objectivity in spite of the pain suffered by the Thtsi authors by the loss of many relatives. Similarly, the deeply conflicting and
impassioned views held by French observers and policy makers on
France's role cannot help but be reflected in the analysis of Agnes
Callamard and Gerard Prunier in their respective chapters.
The methodology and approach of this volume raises other issues.
Conventionai wisdom holds that the end of the Cold War represented a
watershed in world affairs. Without underestimating the importance of
the fall of the Berlin Wall, particularly for Europe, this volume suggests that the changes ostensibly brought about by the end of the Cold
War and its importance to global events were overrated. Rwanda was
strategically marginal to the superpower rivalry during the Cold War,
and remained of marginal significance to the lone superpower afterwards. The point emerges starkly because the acute phase of the conflict-set off by the RPF invasion of Rwanda-started shortly after the
fall of the Berlin Wall, although the timing was coincidenta1.
In reality, conflict in the Great Lakes Region was influenced by the
externallogic of older rivalries, especially competition between erstwhile European imperial allies. That rivalry was barely submerged during the Cold War and subsequently resurfaced. Often referred to as "the
Fashoda syndrome" in France (see Prunier's chapter), the contest was
over language and culturai domination. As it turned out, the attempt to
protect and promote French culture in the region against the advancing
Anglophone sphere not only failed, but the old, client regimes of France
were replaced by leaders who converted the internationallanguage of
their countries from unilingual French states to bilingual EnglishIFrench
states. The language conversion in Rwanda and Zaire reflected not simply dependency on English-speaking Uganda by the RPF in Rwanda,
and dependency on Rwanda by the Alliance in the DRC. The new leaders are relatively effident, rational, and pragmatic in comparison to
Preface
xv
their predecessors. With that realism, they accepted English as the language of technology and global communication. The new regimes represent a breed of African "post post-independence" leaders who are not
being primarily indebted to extra-regional states in achieving power.
Mrican governments, for better or worse, have become the prime agents
of change in the region.
The new leaders combine the loyalty of an ethnic cohort with a rhetorical dedicatian to state rather than ethnic nationalism. This pragmatic
rationality fits wel1 with their acceptance of market force economics, in
spite of the Marxist rhetoric in their past. But the new modernism still
has to deal with the conundrum of multiethnic states where it is difficult
to repress ethnicity in favour of a renewed national identity, particularly
when the minority ethnic group holds most positions of power.
It is hard to envision how these regimes will overeorne their access
to power through violenee and the grasping of the levers of power by
groups disproportionately dominated by members of one ethnic group
when they achieved victory. Power sharing based on ethnicity does not
seem to be a meaningful term to the new victors. How can power seized
through violence establish a government subject to the rule of law?
Further, in these conditions, how can a political culture develop that is
accountable to the people as sovereign? Both processes are a prerequisite for building a demoeratic state. An effort is being made to define
everyone as primarily a citizen of the state-as Ugandans, Rwandans,
Congolese. But everyone is conscious of their own ethnie membership
and the fact that the governments in the respective countries are not
representative of the various ethnic cultures in the country. The challenge is particularly acute for the minority rulers of Rwanda who cannot forget-nor should they be expected to forget-the trauma of the
genocide committed against their people and moderate Hutu.
Given these developments and the relative autonomy of the actions
that brought about the present situation, talk of devolution of responsibility for humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping seems ironic,
for devolution presumes that power and authority originally reside at
the centre and are delegated down to the regions. In the dramatic events
from Uganda through Rwanda to Conga in the last deeade of this century, power exercised locally was the primary determinant of the results, even though outside assistanee was provided to the different sides
throughout the confliet. More importantly, the international community emerged as a paper tiger even in the faee of ill-equipped and relatively poorly trained loeal forees.
xvi
The Path of aGenodde
The examination of that paper tiger is the main focus of the book. In
the current context of discussions of early warning, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace building, this collection of essays constitutes a detailed case study of the worst case of international failure in
the 1990s. Ii is essential to understand why the international community fails to act when needed, mandated, and required by international
norms and agreements. In the current inability of the U.N. or even regional states to stop the accelerating number of massacres in Burundi,
this text should be required reading by scholars, peace keepers, and
policy makers concerned with these issues. Similarly, all the policy
dilemmas raised by the Rwandan case-from early warning to humanitarian assistance-have a Zairean or Congo sequel.
For example, the original study that we undertook on early warning
and conflict management in Rwanda recommended improvements in
the early warning system as an important ingredient for prevention. In
the Zaire crisis, there were ample warnings that if the international
community did not disarm the ex-FAR and militias encamped in eastern Zaire, a new round of violence would result. Further, in contrast to
the distorted and inadequate media coverage of the build-up and execution of the Rwandan genocide, coverage on Zaire was relatively
well-informed, assisted enormously by the information provided by the
U.N. IRIN service that was established after the genocide. But the necessary actions were not taken. When decisions were made in late 1996
to intervene, it was only to provide the refugees with humanitarian aid,
and even this was pre-empted by local forces and lack of cooperation
from Rwanda. For some, this purportedly proves that one aspect of the
problem is not a failure in early warning.
But early warning is not just the provision of accurate and critical
information. It is the analysis of that information to enable strategic
choices to be made. Often, however, strategic choices are made axiomatically on the basis of key political values, with inadequate intelligence data being brought in during the early stages of decision-making.
Fuller information is collected only afterwards when the policy has to
be implemented. This seems to have been the case with the Canadian
decision to launch a humanitarian mission to Zaire in November 1996.
The initiative was caught between the competing views of the Americans and the French, the former resisting any intervention and advocating (and supporting?) the rebels, while the latter allegedly hoped that a
humanitarian intervention would use the guise of humanitarianism to
place foreign troops in a position to effectively block the rebel advance.
Preface
xvii
Without early waming in this broader sense, that is early warning which
is not just information and the setting off of alarms, but which allows
facts to be analysed within a policy context to develop coherent and
realistic policy options, the policy lacked an adequate foundation for
decision-making. As a result, well-intentioned humanitarian missions
are misconceived and have to be aborted. In fact, it was the rebel-Alliance attacks on the camps which separated the militants from the rest
of the refugees and provided the catalyst for large-scale repatriation
which the international community had heretofore failed to bring off.
Another recurrent theme during this decade of conflict is exile refugee communities transforming themselves into "refugee warnors," invading their home countries using the host country as a base and setting
a pattern of violence. In the worst case, a state which was attacked
responded with massacres of civilians and eventually a genocide. For
the international community, the activities of "refugee warrior" communities pose operationaI and legal-moral questions that have become
intertwined.
The UNHCR has both a moral and a legal responsibility to assist and
proteet refugees, and to promote durable solutions, the foremost being
repatriation. But in the face of the fears of the refugees about returning,
and the intimidation by the militants who also fostered those fears, the
UNHCR was unable to facilitate significant repatriation. Further, the aid
agencies have to provide assistance and aid in the refugee camps in a
situation in which refugees have used their camps as military bases and
skimmed part of donor proceeds to finance their military operations.
Refugee camps have been used as sanctuaries for armed units, including
genocidai killers, launching attacks against local populations and across
the border. When those camps are attacked, the international community
in general, and U.N. agencies in particular, have been unable to protect
the refugees or even manage to ensure the supply of humanitarian assistance for women and children who typically constitute the majority in
such camps. All the painful dilemmas raised by these kinds of situations
have been experienced by aid agencies operating in the Great Lakes region during the last decade of conflict. When large-scale repatriation of
Rwandese (Hutu) from eastern Zaire took place in late 1996 to bring
about a permanent solution, it was largely as a result of action by local
players and, to some degree, in opposition to the policies advocated by
many international humanitarian organizations.
Though the issues of refugee warnors, refugee protection and repatriation, early warning, humanitarian intervention and conflict man-
xviii
The Path of a Genocide
agement are all themes in this volume, the genocide in Rwanda remains the centrepiece. The authors' goal is not to east blarne, but to
explain the international failure of the international cornmunity to intervene and prevent or mitigate the genocide in a situation in which the
forces perpetrating the genocide were relatively weak and ill-equipped
with the tools ofviolence. The U.N. had been invited to playarole, had
agreed to do so, and had readyaccess to the area of conflict. (U.N.
peace keepers controlled the airport in Kigali throughout the whole
Rwandese massacre.) Nevertheless a genocide occurred in which the
vast majority of the resident Thtsi and moderate Hutu population of
Rwanda, usually estirnated at 800,000 but perhaps a million or more,
were slaughtered by low-tech means, mainly machetes, in a three month
centrally organized operation that proceeded with twice the efficiency
of the Nazi Holocaust of the Jews. This occurred while people in North
America and Europe were watching Schindler's List on their movie
screens and leaving the theatre profoundly moved, vowing that such
genocides should never again occur.
After the genocide was over in Rwanda, the killings did not stop.
The locale merely shifted to Zaire. The genocidists who had fled to
Zaire expanded their murderous mayhem targeting the Banyamulenge
in Zaire, triggering the civil war in that country. In the process of the
rebels defeating both the genocidists and overthrowing the dictatorship
of Mobutu, they massacred Hutu refugees. Throughout, the rebels were
strongly supported by the RPF government in Rwanda, dominated by
the Thtsi community which had turned from victirn to power-broker.
What can we leam about the seeds of exc1usion, extremism and genocide from such horrendous cyc1es of violenee and revenge, and what
can be done to prevent their recurrence? This is the central question
posed by this volume.
Notes
l. The name "Zaire" will be used when referring to the country when it was called
by that name; otherwise its new name, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
will be used.
2. The editors were privileged to have been selected to write the second report:
Early Wanling and Conjlict Management: Genocide in Rwanda (Copenhagen:
DANIDA, 1996) which constituted Study II of The Evaluatian of Emergency
Assistance to Rwanda, which was sponsored by nineteen countries and eighteen
international agencies and NGOs.
3. Some reputable scholars argue that the fights between the genocidists and the
Banymulenge or Banyarwanda in Zaire are but part of a long history of feuds
between local politicians and the Banyamulenge, including residents of Tutsi
Preface
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
xix
origin and Rwandese refugees from the 1959-1962 revolution and struggle for
independence in Rwanda. We have a different interpretation of the massacres at
Masisi. They are not simply the continuation of past disputes over who or who
is not Zairean, but a continuation of the genocide led by the ex-FAR and
interahamwe from Rwanda living in refugee camps in Zaire. These conc1usions
are drawn from interviews with some of the 4000 Masisi who crossed into Rwanda
on 13 April 1996, and another 4,000 who were waiting to cross. The conc1usions
were confirmed when another 2,000 prepared to cross on 29 April 1996. This
does not mean that the local Hunde were not involved, but the instigators and
main perpetrators were the extremist Hutus from Rwanda.
For a more detailed analysis of the conception ofrefugee warriors and the problems and solutions in various settings, cf. Zolberg, Ari, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio
Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conjlict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. For additional elaborations of the problem, cf. Astri Suhrke, "A Crisis Diminished: Refugees in the
Developing World," International Journal, XLVIII:2, Spring 1993, 215-39;
Howard Adelman, "Refugees, the Right of Return and the Peace Process," Economics ofPeace in the Middle East, Bashir Al Khadra, ed., Yarmouk University,
1995; Howard Adelman, "Modernity, Globalization, Refugees and Displacement," in Alastair Ager, ed., Refugees, Contemporary Perspectives on the Experience of Forced Migration, London: Cassell Publishers, 1998; and Howard
Adelman, "Crimes of Government as Causes of Mass Migration," in Alex P.
Schrnid, ed., Migration and Crime, Milan: ISPAC, 1997.
There were more than raids. On 3 March 1996, mortar attacks were launched on
the central market of Cyangugu in the first use of heavy weapons since the end
of the war in Rwanda in 1994.
The countries of the OECD were actually represented by their nineteen bilateral
donor agencies, who, with the European Commission and the secretariat of the
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, nine multilateral agencies
and U.N. departments, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(IFRC), and five international NGOs and NGO umbrella organizations, formed
a Steering Committee to supervise the research and writing of the report. The
report emerged in five volumes published by DANIDA in Copenhagen in 1996.
Unsuccessful1y, "(T)he chair of the Steering Committee sought c1arification (in
the event unsuccessfully) of the 'factualinaccuracies' alleged by the U.N. Spakesperson and the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs." The Joint
Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda: A Review of Follow-up and
Impact Fifteen Months After Publication, Copenhagen: DANIDA, June 12, 1997,
8-9.
Cf. Marie Bernard-Meunier, Assistant Deputy Minister for Global Issues in the
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in Ottawa,
Canada, in her Foreword to the Proceedings-Conjlict Prevention: African Perspective, for the International Francophone Meeting, Ottawa, September, 1995.
Perhaps unintentionally, she confused the contrast between inter- and intrastate
conflicts with the conc1usion that intrastate conflicts are confined within the
boundaries of a single state. She said: "The fact that these conflicts occur within
single states distinguishes them from the interstate confrontations in the Cold
war era." (p. 8) This slip was made even though the conference itself noted that,
"in Africa, in addition to creating problems within countries, tension and conflict contribute to regional instability because of the porous nature of boundaries." Summary of Proceedings, 11.
Text of the January 11, 1994 Cable
lO
OlJTGOING CODE CABLE
1 1994
DATE: 11 JANUARY 1994
TO:
BARIL\OPKO\UNATIONS
NEW 'lORI<
FAX NO:MOST IKMEDIATE-COOE
CABLE-212-963-9852
INMARSAT:
SUBJECT:REQUEST FOR PROTECTION FOR INFORMANT
ATTN: MGEN BARIL
ROOM NO.2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF 'l'RANSMITTEO PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE:
~
l.
FORCE COMMANDER PUT IN CONTACT WITH INFOR.MAl!T BY VERY VERY
IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT POLITICIAN. INFORMANT IS A TOP LEVEL
TRAINER IN THE CADRE OF INTERHAKWE-ARKED MILITIA OF MRND.
2.
HE INFORMED US HE WAS IN CHARGE OF LAST SATUROAiS
DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH AlMS WERE TO TARGET DEPUTIES or OPPOSITION
PARTIES COMING TO CEREKONIES AND 8ELGIAN SOLOIERS. TH!Y HOPED TO
PROVOKE THE RPF 19N TO ENGAGE {SEIMG FIRE!) uroN} THE DEHONSTAATORS
AND PROVOKE A CIVIL WAR. DEI?UTIES WER! TO BE ASSASSINATED UPON
ENTRY OR EXIT FROM PARLIAMENT. BELGIAN 'l'ROOPS MER!: TO BE
PROVOKED AND IF BELGIANS SOLDIERS RESORTED TO FORCE A NUMBER or
THEM WERE TO BE KILLED AND THUS GUARANTEE BELGIAN WI'l'HDAAWAL FROM
RWANDA.
:3.
INFORMANT CONFIRMED
GENDARHERIB PARTICIPATED
48 Rar PARA COO AND A 'EN MEMBERS OF THE
IN DEMONSTRATIONS IN PLAIN CLOTHES.
ALSO AT LIAST ONE MINISTER or THE KRND AND THE SOUS-PREFECT or
KIGALI WERS IN THE DEMONSTRATION.
RGF AND INTERHAMWE PROVIDED
RADIO COMMUNlCATIONS.
4.
INFORMANT IS A fORMER SECURITY KEMBER OF THE PRESIDENT.
ME
ALSO STATED HR IS PAltI RF150,OOO PER MONTH BY THE MRND PARTY TO
TRAIN INTERHAHWI!:. DIRECT LINK IS TO CHIEF OF STAFF RGF AND
PRESIDENT OF THE KRND FOR FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT.
5.
INTERHAMWE HAS TRAINED 1700 MEM IN RGr MILITARY CAMPS
OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL. THE 1100 ARE SCATTERED IN GROUPS OF 40
THROUGHOUT KIGALI. SINCE UNAMIR DEPLOVED liE HAS TRAINED 300
PERSONNEL IN THREE WEEK TRAINING SESSIONS AT Rar CAMPS. TRAINING
xxi
Text of the January 11, 1994 Cable
FOCUS WAS DISCIPLINE, WEAPONS,
TACTICS.
xxii
EXPLOSIVES, CLOSE COMBAT AND
6.
PRINCIPAL AlM OF INTErofAMWE IN THE PAST WAS TO PROTECT
KIGALI FROM RPF. SINCE UNAMIR MANDATE liE HAS BEEN ORDERE!) TO
REGISTER ALL TUTSI IN KIGALI.
liE SUSPECTS 1'1' IS FOR THEIR
EXT!RMINATION.
EXAMPLE liE GAVE WAS '1'HAT IN 20 HINUTES HIS
PERSONNEL COULO lULL UP TO 1000 TUTSIS •
1.
INFORMANT STATES HE OISAGREES WITH ANTI-TUTSI EXTERMINATION.
ME SUPPORTS OPPOSITION TO RPF BUT CANNO'l' SUPPORT KILLING OF
INNOCENT PERSONS.
HE ALSO STATED THAT HE BELlEVES THE PRESIDENT
OOES NOT HAVE FULL CONTROL OVER ALL ELEMENTS OF HIS OLD
PARTY\FACTION.
8.
INFORMANT IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE LOCATION OF KAJOR WEAPONS
HE ALREADY HAS DISTRIBUTED 110
CACHE WITH AT LEAST 135 WEAPONS.
WEAPONS INCLUDING 35 WITH AMMUNITION AND· CAN GIV! US DETAlLS OF
THEIR LOCATION.
TYPE or WEAPONS ARE GJ AND AK41 PROVIDl!:D BY RGF.
HE WAS READY TO GO TO THE A.RMS CACHE TONIGHT-IF WE GAVE HIK THE
FOLLOWING GUARANTEE.
HE REOUESTS THAT HE AND HIS FAMILY (HIS
WIFE AND FOUR CHILDREN) BE PLACED UNDER
PROTECTION.
mm
9.
1'1' IS OUR INTENTION TO TAKE ACTION WITHIN THE NEXT 36 KOVRS
INFORMANT
WITH A POSSIBLE H HR OF WEDNESDAY AT DAWN (LOCAL).
STATES THAT HOSTILlTIES MAY COMMENCE AGAIN IF POLITICAL DEADLOCK
ENDS.
VIOLENCE COULD TAKE PLACE DAY OF THE CEREHONIES OR THE DAY
AFTER.
THEREFORll: WEDKESDAY WILL GlVE GREATEST CHANCI OF SUCCESS
AND ALSO BE MOST TIMELY TO PROVID! SIGNIFlCANT INPUT TO ON-GOING
POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS.
10.
1'1' IS RECOKMENDED THE INFORMANT BE GRANTED PROTECTION AND
THIS HO OOES NOT HAVE PREVIOUS UH
EVACUATED OUT OF RWANDA.
EXPERIENCE IN SUCH MATTERS AND URGENTLY REQUESTS GUlDANCE.
NO
CONTACT HAS AS VET BEEN MADE TO .MY EMBASSY IN ORDER TO INQUIRE
IF TH!Y ARE PREPARBD TO. PROTECT HIK FOR A PERIOD OF TIK!: BY
GRANTING DIPLOMATIC IMMUNIT\' IN THEIR EHBASSY IH KIGALI BEFORE
MOVIKG MIH AMD HIS FAMILY OUT OF THE COUNTRY.
11. FORCE COHHANDER WILL BE HEETING WITH THE VERY VERY IMPORTANT
POLITICAL PERSON TOMORROW HOP-NING IN ORDER 'ro ENSURE THAT THIS
INDIVIDUAL IS CONSClOUS OF ALL PAR.AHETERS or lUS I!NOLVEHENT.
FORCE ~ER
DOBS HAVE CERTAlN RESERVATIONS ON THE SUDDENNESS
OF THI!: <::HMG! OF HEART OF THE INFORMANT TO COME CLEAN WITH THIS
INFOrot\TIOK.
RECCB OF ARMED CACHE AND DETAlLED PLANNING OF RAII)
TO GO ON LATE TOKORROW.
POSSIBILITY OF A '!'RAp NOT FULLY
EXCLUDED, AS THIS MAY BE A SET-UP AGAIIl'ST THE VERY VERY INPORTANT
POLITICAL PERSON.
FORCE COMMANDER TO INFORH SRSG FIRST THING IN
MORNING TO ENSURE KIS SUPPORT.
13.
PEUX CE OUE VEUX.
ALLaNS-Y.
MAP 1
Great Lakes Region
(
)
GREAT LAKES
REGION
l'
I
/
(
ANKOLE
DA
UG
,
,,,
"
,,
,r-' ~
\,
KIGEZI
",,-/
,/" ' -' ' ~ La: ,B1!Jeri
Masisi.
/ ,"(
.. ....... ,~
•
R~hengir
"
\__ l~
Gisenyi
~0AND}
,
ZA I R E
~'-
\., .. _"
./
~ Gitarama ~
,
eShangugu\\
'-J' - " -'"
,f
.}
c
,
\..-
"
,;
Butare El
@
,l.
•
."
(
\~
"i'·""'" "" ,'"
. ' .....,
I
}
L:?
I
.........
\''''
\
.
)
I
~
Klbungo
....
'",
\"
(
~
Kigali \
)
r"-"""-"\ • Gi~:
- . . '\
\-_.1Gikongoro
.(
~
Victoria
(
,
'~.
L Mugesera l·
I
Bukavu
Lake
• Byumba
./'_1
Kibuye.
r J
-'
'-'1
Cankuzo
BURUNOI
\
TANZANIA
,/
I
N
j
f'
I
./
)
I
"
,
25
I
25
50
,
1
5 0 mi.
MAP 2
Rwanda: Reful!:ee and Disolaced Pooulations. 31 March 1995
Uganda
Total: 1,070,000
"'\"
: Kltolt
_ ,t\
K4hlnda:
lo Goma
vlclolty:
740,000
~
Total: 4,000
Zaire
~.
RuhenQort
il:
"V
iJ\)
A1
.BVUmbe
In Karagwe
vlclnlty:
146,000
0(~f
\
00
Total displaced
persons: 800,000
~
~/
*KJGAU
~
-Gltarama
r
J,
'1~
~
-Kibw\go
In Ngara
vlclnlty:
B'RI',o. 450,000
':Ki'undo
lukolo.:
.u.wn..1
r.a..SMoooI
'--'f_o
Tanzania
Total: 596,000
Burundi
Total: 240,000
\
1
Rwandese Refugees and
Immigrants in Uganda
Ogenga Otunnu
This chapter analyzes the politics of exile and the treatment of
Rwandese immigrants and refugees in Uganda. The first part sketches
the ethnic connections between the peoples of Rwanda and Uganda
from the pre-colonial period until German colonial rule and then traces
the movement of Rwandese immigrants into Uganda and their reception up to the pre-independence period in Rwanda. The second part
examines the movement of refugees from Rwanda into Uganda and
their reception during the first Obote regime. The third part extends the
analysis into the Idi Amin and second Obote regimes until Museveni
achieved power in Uganda in 1984.
Prje-lndeplenliellce Rwandese Immigration
Uganda
The Tutsi in Rwanda had an historical relationship with Banyarwanda
and related peoples in Uganda. Between the sixteenth and nineteenth
centuries, a number of centralized states emerged in the region, including Mpororo, inhabited mainly by the Bahororo, and encompassing most
of the counties of Western Ankole and most of Kigezi district in contemporary Uganda and a portion of northern Rwanda. The ruling house
of the Mpororo had elose culturaI and kinship ties with the ruling houses
of Ankole (Hima). and Rwanda (Tutsi). When Mpororo disintegrated,
some of its principalities were subsequently annexed by the Ankole
state and the Rwanda state, and the rest were later forcibly merged into
the Ankole and Kigezi districts of Uganda by the British colonial
regime. 1
3
4
The Path of a Genocide
Between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, another centralized state in the region, Rwanda, extended its sphere of political influence to a portion ofAnkole in Uganda based on the pre-existing kinship
networks between the ruling houses of the two states, and intennarriages between the two politically relevant ethnic groups in Rwanda
and Ankole: the Tutsi and the Hima. In the nineteenth century, Rwanda
extended its nominal hegemony to Bufumbira, most of the present day
Kabale (Kigezi). and Kisoro (Bufumbira). districts ofUganda. Rwanda's
hegemony was nominal in these areas because the Chiga, who were
numerically the dominant group in Kigezi, put up a determined and
protracted resistance against centralized autocracy and foreign rule. The
extended distance from the citadel of imperial power made it difficult
to directly and effectively administer the territories from Rwanda (Edel
1957, 1-5; Mateke 1970; Hopkins 1970; Brazier 1968; Rutanga 1983,
229-49).
The territorial expansion of the pre-colonial states of Mpororo,
Ankole, and Rwanda had encouraged ethnic alliances, especiaIly between the Tutsi (Rwanda). and the Rima (Ankole), as weIl as ethnic
counter alliances among the politically subservient ethnic groups, especially between the Hutu (Rwanda). and the Hiru (Ankole). [also
called Bairu-editors]. These alliances blurred ethnic differences
between the Tutsi and the Hima, on the one hand, and between the
Hutu and the Hiru, on the other. They also increased conflict and
confrontation between members of the two camps. Secondly, although
the shirting frontiers of the pre-colonial territorial states remained
porous, the frontiers cut across some re1ated families, compounds,
and nationalities, complicating the question of national identity, national aIlegiance and citizenship.
Pre-colonial alliances and conflicts were greatly exacerbated during
European colonial rule when Rwanda and Burundi came under the ambit
of German colonial hegemony, Uganda became a possession of
British, and the Congo (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), was
colonized by the
delimitation of national boundaries
of available toposhifted from time to
depending on the
graphical information, administrative,
and economie imperatives, and cut across some
and ethnic groups. For ex:unI)le,
Anglo-Belgian
of 14
1914, brcluQ:lllt
Mufumbiro region
(Kabale),
the B,myar'iVarlda, found themrule so that the BaJt"urrlbira,
2
selves in Uganda, 1:{\\landa,
'L-u'UlS'v.
Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda
:;
After the Pirst World War, when Gennan colonial controi was replaced by the Belgium trusteeship under the League of Nations, the
economic policy of the new administration increasingly emphasized
the production of cash crops and state conscripted labor for developing
infrastructure, and imposed relatively heavy taxation. This policy led
to loss of fertile land to cash erop produetion, food scarcity, and conflict over the unevenly distrlbuted and scarce land. These problems,
exacerbated by high human and cattle population density, led to waves
of mass migration of Rwandese to Uganda from the 1920s to the 1950s.
The overwhelming majority of the immigrants, numbering some
200;000, were Hutu. They settled in Buganda, Kigezi, Ankole, Busoga,
and Bunyoro, where they worked in agrieulture, construction, loeal
governments, industries, ginning, brick works, cattle keeping, forestry,
and fishing (Richards 1952, 17-118; Essack 1993, 23; Mamdani 1977,
149, 154, 155).
The Initial Rwandese Refugee Movements into Uganda
Between 1952 and 1959, when the Belgian political refonns threatened the intermediary position of the Tutsi oligarchy in the colonial
state and provided some limited autonomous political space to the Hutu,
which challenged the privileged position of the Tutsi, political violence
between the Tutsi and the Hutu escalated (Lemarchand 1970,81, 83,
146,149,150-54, 157-63, 167-71, 173, 177-78, 192). When, in September 1961, the Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu
(PARMEHUTU), the political party of the Mouvement Democratique
Rwandis, won a landslide victory in the U.N.-supervised legislative
elections, another wave of political violence followed that claimed many
lives and forced hundreds of thousands of Tutsi and their cattle to seek
refuge in Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and Congo.
At the time that some of them arrived in
and Ankole, the
colonial government in Uganda had been attempting a number of initiatives to address acute problems: contain the political violence and
political instability in many parts of Uganda, especially in Buganda,
Bugishu, Bukedi, and Toro (the Bakonjo and Baamba territorles);3 control cattle disease in the country;4 complete the program to eradicate
tsetse flies from western Uganda; and controi the effects of the Mau
Mau revolt spilling from Kenya into Uganda implementing the 1954
ordinance against the Mau Mau. s
Given these problems, the colonial
initially declared
6
The Path of a Genocide
that Rwandese refugees in Kigezi and Ankole districts were illegal
immigrants. When the government received information from the Belgians that tens of thousands of Tutsi, with thousands of cattle, were
contemplating fleeing to Uganda, the government hastily enacted roles
which specifically prohibited the Tutsi from entering Uganda. 6 Those
refugees that had arrived between November and 3 December 1959
were either confined to the quarantine area near the border or were
forcibly repatriated. 7
These measures infuriated someAfrican members of the Legislative
Council so much that they demanded that the government explain the
rationale of the policy of refugee deterrence. The government offered
the following reasons: there was no political persecution in Rwanda;
the Tutsi who were fleeing Rwanda were either misinformed about the
political situation or were political criminals; it was impossible to accommodate such a large number of illegal immigrants with their cattle
anywhere in the country, particularly since western Uganda was already overstocked, over grazed, lacked water, and had not been totally
rec1aimed from the tsetse fly; and that the cattle that the Tutsi brought
with them were diseased and would spread cattle disease in the country. 8
This policy received the backing of some African members of the
Legislative Council from Kigezi and Ankole. 9 They pointed out to the
government that it was morally unacceptable for a regime that itself
had a profound legitimization crisis to deny asylum to the Tutsi when,
without consulting Ugandans, it resettled some Polish, Italian, German, Austrian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Yugoslav refugees in the country during and after the Second World War. 10 Thus, 11 on
29 February 1960, A. M. Obote introduced a motion in the Council:
"Revocation of the Batutsi Immigrants Rule," explaining:
The reign of tenor was so bad that the people of Ruanda wanted to seek safety
somewhere. A number of them decided to seek refuge in Uganda. But I wish the
House to know that they did not come as ordinary immigrants; they were running
away from acts of violence which were the rule of the day in their country. They
thought that peace could be obtained in Uganda and that the people would welcome them. Indeed, these people are kinsmen of the people of Ankole, of Uganda,
and the only thing that any one of them could do was to go to a fellow brother to
seek for his safety.... And this time there seems to be no reason whatsoever why
the Government of Uganda should not have sympathized with the case of the
Batutsi.. .. I am pleading for the whole of the Batutsi tribe [sic] who came to
Uganda to seek for safety. I am pleading for the principle of offering asylum to
people in need of it; and I am pleading for the case of people who are now being
ruled by another race. I am pleading on behalf of the people of Uganda.... I ask
the Uganda Government not to think very much of what other evidence they have
Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda
1
received from the Belgian Government. ... I want the door to be opened to these
people to come to Uganda. 12
However, the majority of the Mrican members of the Council opposed it. The motion was defeated. 13
When Uganda obtained se1f-government in 1961, more Tutsi refugees fled to the country and other neighboring states (Lemarchand 1970,
150-51, 160, 196). Some of the refugees who registered with the government were immediate1y resettled in two reception centers: Kamwezi
in Rukiga county (Kigezi District) and Kizinga in Rwampara county
(Ankole district). Most of the refugees, however, settled spontaneous1y
with relatives and friends in Kigezi and Ankole (Uganda Protectorate
1961, especially: 1-23).
While more Tutsi refugees were fleeing to Uganda, a group ofTutsi
refugee warriors, the !nyenzi, invaded Rwanda in July 1961 and May
1962. The invasions generated political instability in Western Uganda,
and prompted the government in May of 1962 to wam the refugees
against using the country as a military hase to attack Rwanda.
Firm discipline is absolutely necessary if these refugees are to be made to behave
in a manner which does not prejudice relations between Uganda and her neighbors. It is important that the Uganda government should begin to look outside her
boundaries and not take decisions based only on possible political repercussions
within Uganda itself.. .even though... the government mayalienate certain sections of the community within Uganda. (cited in Lemarchand 1970, 208)
The government followed the warning with action; it expelled twentyfour Tutsi refugees for their involvement in !nyenzi arrned invasions.
In a further attempt to contain the insecurity caused hy the refugee
warriors near the Uganda-Rwanda border, the government relocated
the refugees from Nakivale to the Ibuga refugee settlement. Despite
these measures, refugee warriors, including those from Conga and
Sudan, continued to carry out cross-border invasions against their home
countries. In July 1963, the activities ofthe refugee warriors forced the
Prime Minister, Obote, to warn them against cross-border invasions:
I wish to make it clear that I will not tolerate this sort of activity.... We have no
intention within the context of the Addis Ababa spirit and Charter of allowing
Uganda to be used as a base for any attacks or subversion against any African
state.... If [our) hospitality is abused, and refugees use or attempt to use Uganda
as a base to attack our neighbors, we shall have no alternative but to withdraw the
protection we granted to these people. (Lemarchand 1970,208)
Rwandese refugee warriors were not the only target. The government issued a warning that was directed specifically at Sudanese refu-
8
The Path of a Genocide
gee warriors: "If the Sudanese wish to settle down in a new life here
they are welcome. But if they come here merely to use Uganda as a
springboard for attacks and subversion against a friendly neighboring
government, they are jeopardizing our international relations and reputation. We are not going to allow that to happen." (Weekly News, Dar es
Salaam, 8 November, 1963:3, cited in Sekiki 1972, 11-12). This was
followed by the arrest of some leaders of the southern Sudanese refugees, including J. H. Oduho of the Sudanese African National Union
(SAND), and the relocation of some of the refugees from Moyo to
Ibuga. 14
The invasions by the Tutsi refugee warriors, however, continued, and
they provoked the largest backlash at the same time as more anti-Tutsi
political violence erupted in Rwanda. As a result, more Tutsi fled to
Dganda. According to the Minister of Community Development, L.
Kalule-Settala, 7,652 Rwandese refugees arrived in the country between
May and September 1962. These refugees, together with those who had
preceded them, were resettled in Ankole District: 8,000 cattle owners
were resettled south of Lake Nakivali; 11,000 non-cattle owners were
resettled in the Oruchinga Valley; and 4,000 non-cattle owners were kept
in the Oruchinga Relief Camp awaiting resettlement in the Oruchinga
Valley. At that time, the number of Rwandese refugees who had registered with the government was 23,000. An estimated 10,000 unregistered Rwandese refugees had settled spontaneously with relatives and
friends in the Kigezi and Ankole Districts (Dganda Protectorate, 1962,
438-39). According to the 1962/1963 Govemment's Annual Report, some
10,000 Rwandese refugees crossed into Dganda, bringing the total number of registered Rwandese refugees to about 40,000. The report also
indicated that "of all the Rwanda refugees in the country more than half
were women and children. About a third of the refugees are cattle-owners and a total of approximately 30,000 head of cattle were brought in
Dganda by these refugees" (Dganda Government 1964,32).
As many more refugees fled to Uganda, the government established
more reception centers: Nakivale Refugee Settlement in Ishingiro
county, Ankole (1962); Oruchinga Valley refugee Settlement near
Nakivale (1963); the Ibunga Refugee Settlement in Bunyagabu county,
Toro district (1963); Kahunge, Rwamwanja, and Kaka settlements in
Toro district (1964); and the Kyangwali Refugee settlement in Bunyoro
district (1966). (See tabIes 1,2 and 3.)15
The presence of such a Iarge number of refugees presented a considerabIe humanitarian responsibility for the government. Initially, the
Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda
l)
TABLE 1.1
Total Number of Refugees Living in Uganda
January l, 1966 to January 1, 1967
Group of refugees
Number on
Numberon
Area of settlement
1.1.1966
1.1.1967
1. Rwandese
a). Oruchinga
b). Nakivale
c). Kahunge
d). Ibuga
e). Rwamanja
f). Kyaka
g). Kinyara
12,500
6,500
5,500
800
2,600
2,000
3,500
11,500
8,009
6,793
717
2,500
1,956
2,820
Sub-Total
33,400
34,295
2. Sudanese
3. Congolese
17,050
3,100
10,981
1,576
Total
53,560
46,852
B. Outside Settlements.
1. Rwandese
2. Sudanese
3. Congolese
32,000
27,000
25,000
34,000
44,000
32,000
Total
84,000
110,000
SOllrce: Progress Report 011 Refugee Situatioll iII Ugallda. March, 1967 (deposited at the Refugee
Studies Programme, Oxford University).
TABLE 1.2
Number of Refugees in Uganda in 1969 and 1970
Year
Number
Rwandese
1969
1970
70500
71000
Sudanese
1969
1970
71500
71500
Zaireans
1969
1970
34000
34500
SOllrce: US Committee for Refugees.
10
The Path of a Genocide
TABLE 1.3
Size of Settlements and AUocation of Land in 1969
Settlement
Sq. Miles
Acres per Family
Kahunge
72
10
Rwamwanja
54
10
*Ibuga
16
10
Oruchinga
13
10
**Kyangwali
50
10
Nakivale
40
10
Kyaka
Source: World Alliance of YMCA, "Report of visits to the Refugee Settlements of Uganda
made by the YMCAAfrican Refugee Secretary, 27/11/1969" (deposited at the Refugee Studies
Programme, Oxford University).
* The total land was 24 sq. miles. Out of this, 8 sq. miles were allocated to the National Youth
Service.
** When Kinyara was closed down, the refugees were transferred to Kyangwali.
government was quite generous to the refugees because it thought that
they would not stay in the country for long. However, when it became
clear that most of the refugees were going to stay in the country indefinitely, hospitality fatigue set in and generosity gradually turned into
hostility. This change of attitude towards the refugees was partly influenced by the financial, security, and political problems resulting from
the presenee and activities of the refugees. Thus, commenting on the
challenges of meeting the needs of the refugees, Dorothea Hunter of
Oxfam made the following observations in her report of August-September, 1968:
My observations concern only refugees in Uganda, whose total number is now
163,000, an enormous burden for a country of only 7.9 million people.... Last
year I had the impression that Government still hoped that many, if not most of
them would return home. However, despite the setting up of the Special Fund For
Voluntary Repatriation, the provisions for which were to be executed between all
the Governments concerned, the obvious lack of enthusiasm in taking up this
opportunity among the refugees themselves has now convinced Government that
the majority of them are determined to remain in the country if they possibly can.
This conc1usion has been reached only now, at a time when the UNHCR's responsibility for the refugees is beginning to be phased out. Government is therefore
now faced with the responsibility for some 50,000 refugees spread about in 12
settlements, quite apart from any problem which might arise among the remaining 113,000 understood to be living outside the camps.16
Other related factors also contributed to the compassion fatigue-
Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda
11
the growing economic crisis in the country as weIl as the growing hostility from the host communities that stemmed from the perception that
the government was able to help the refugees but could not meet the
basic socioeconomic needs of its own people.
The growing hostility towards the refugees and the government, and
the inability of the international community to share adequately the
responsibility of assisting the refugees, forced the government to threaten
mass expulsion of the refugees. For example, as earlyas March 1964,
the Minister ofInformation, Nekyon, told the OAU conference in Lagos
that "Uganda has no alternative...but to send some of these people
away, uniess Uganda received help" (Africa Research Bulletin, March
1964:37A). He also c1aimed that most of the assistance that the government provided to Rwandese refugees "had been spent... on the purchase of arms. Refugees were even selling the food given to them.. .in
order to send money to their King. They had abused Uganda's hospitality by forming groups to invade Rwanda to overthrow the Government"
(ibid). The government also complained that some of the refugees were
using refugee camps to recruit rebels to attack their home governments.
Such activities, it insisted, made it extremely difficult to provide securitY to the host communities and innocent refugees (Uganda Government 1964, 32-33).
The threat to expel the refugees prompted some international organizations and agencies, such as the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, the Red Cross, Save the Children Fund, YMCA, Oxfam, and the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to provide more assistance to the refugees. The organizations, especiaIly
Oxfam, also contempiated initiating an integrated rural community development program to provide common services to both the refugee
and the host community. The program was also expected to integrate
the refugees into the host communities and reduce anti-refugee sentiments. However, both the assistance and the proposed community development program failed to relieve the government from providing
most of the basic needs of the refugees. It also failed to reduce the
growing anti-refugee sentiments in the country and the crisis of legitimacy of the regime that resulted from the hostility.
During this period, relations between the government and Tutsi refugees further deteriorated. This was caused by the political activities of
President and Kabaka (King) E. Mutesa and the deposed Umwami
(King) of Rwanda, Kigeri IV. To begin with, when the latter was deposed after the elections in Rwanda, he fled to Buganda, where he was
12
The Path of a Genocide
Mutesa's guest. Relations between the two leaders were strengthened
by the elose colIaboration between their parties: Mutesa's Kabaka Yekka
(Kabaka Alone) and Kigeri's Abadehemuka. This colIaboration-which
grew during the period of violent conflict over land (the Lost Counties
referendum) in Buganda, the collapse of the alliance between Obote's
Uganda People's Congress (UPC), and Mutesa's Kabaka Yekka, and
the Cold War in the Congo (the Congo Crisis) that destabilized Ugandasuggested to Obote that the two "kings" and their parties were conspiring to topple him. Furthermore, the collaboration between Mutesa and
Kigeri encouraged insurgency activities by Tutsi refugee warriors against
Rwanda. Since the insurgencies were sponsored from Uganda with the
tacit approval of Mutesa, Uganda was in direct violation of the Charter
of the OAU which prohibited a member state from supporting subversive activities against another member state. l?
Another factor that accounted for the deterioration of relations between the government and Tutsi refugees was the pressure exerted on the
former by Hutu immigrants. The immigrants demanded that the government stop Tutsi refugee warriors from causing political instability in
Uganda and Rwanda. This demand could not be ignored because the
immigrants constituted the overwhelming majority of the 378,656
Rwandese immigrants and refugees in Uganda in 1964 (V ganda Government 1965,18-19). Some Tutsi refugees, who were highly placed in
Obote's government, ineluding Frank Kalimuzo, joined the Hutu to pressure the regime to elamp down on the refugees (Lemarchand 1970, 20607). This pressure, compounded by the insecurity caused by the refugees,
forced the government to expel the deposed Umwarni, Kigeri IV, from
the country (Lemarchand 1970, 209). It also prompted the government to
amend the law on aliens. This law made it an offense for anyone to harbor a refugee without the permission of the government, required refugees to stay in designated refugee settlements, and gave the Director of
Refugees the power to deport any refugee who violated the law or did not
meet the refugee determination criteria (Africa Research Bulletin,
December 1964: 203C-204A; Kiapi, 1993:10-13).
During this period, the UNHCR also exerted pressure on the states
hosting Tutsi refugees to controI the political and military activities of
the refugee warriors. This measure was intended to prevent the refugee
warriors from provoking more violence against the Tutsi in Rwanda. If
the Hutu-dominated government in Kigali was not provoked by the
refugee warriors, the UNHCR seemed to reason, no more Tutsi would
flee the country. Such a development would make it a bit easier for
Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda
13
agency and the host countries to protect and assist the refugees
(Lemarchand 1970, 209-27; Essack 1993, 6). In fact, it had become
impossible for the UNHCR and the host countries to protect the refugees because of the insecurity that the refugee warriors caused in the
host communities; the host communities in all the neighboring countries were attacking the refugees for taking land, jobs, and social services from the indigenous population. The growing anti-Thtsi sentiments
in the host communities further suggested to the UNHCR the need to
prevent more Thtsi from becoming refugees. For the UNHCR, the best
way to do so was to prevent the refugee warriors from invading their
country of origin. (Richards 1952, 196).
This measure, however, did not reduce the growing anti-Rwandese
sentiments in Uganda. In Buganda, for example, many Baganda peasants complained bitterly that immigrants and refugees took their land
and demanded the expulsion of the refugees and immigrants. Similarly,
Rwandese refugees continued to face discrimination and violence in
Ankole. To begin with, in the 1920s, the majority of Hutu immigrants
were accommodated in Ankole by their cousins, the Bairu. This was fo1lowed by the arriva1 oftens ofthousands of Thtsi refugees. The presence
of the Thtsi, however, provoked anti-Thtsi sentiments in the area. Anumber of factors accounted for this development. First, the Thtsi had oppressed and exploited the cousins of the Bairu, the Hutu, for centuries.
The Bairu, as such, did not want the persecutors of their cousins to settle
in Ankole. Secondly, the arrival of Thtsi refugees in the 1950s and 1960s
coincided with increased power struggles between the Hima and Bairu
in Ankole (Karugire 1993, 73-74). One of the strategies the Hima employed to maintain their waning hegemony over the Bairu was to recruit
their cousins, the Thtsi, to swell their ranks. This strategy brought Thtsi
refugees into the power struggles in Ankole. Thirdly, the alliance between the predominantly Catholic Thtsi and the Catholic-dominated
Democratic Party (DP) in Ankole turned some Banyankole members of
the UPC, who were predominantly Protestants, against the Thtsi. These
factors pressured the local UPC establishment in Ankole to ask the government to enforce the law of the land by keeping the refugees out of
local and national politics. Some Banyanko1e, both Hima and Bairu, also
demanded that the refugees be relocated from Ankole because they were
taking away land, jobs, and social services from the host communities
(Helle-valle 1989, 145-46, 155).
This pressure coincided with the growing political vio1ence and economic crisis in the country: mass unemp10yment, the imposition of the
14
The Path of a Genocide
state of emergency in Buganda and in the Baamba-Bakonjo territories
of Toro, the death of Mutesa in exile in England, the abortive assassination of Obote on 9 December 1969, the detention of hundreds of
Obote's political opponents, the imposition of a one-party state, and
the unveiling of Obote's Common Man's Charter which, among other
things, advocated a policy of Ugandanization of employment and land
ownership. This meant that refugees could not be legally employed or
own land. To keep the refugees out of both the local and national politics, the government proposed to provide them with identity cards.
However, this policy was overtaken by the Amin coup of January 1971.
Despite the fact that the policy was never implemented, Tutsi refugees
considered Obote and the UPC-though both had vigorously advocated
for the fights of the refugees to asylum and protection in Uganda during the period of decolonization-enemies (International Commission
of Jurists 1977,5; Otunnu 1994,3-14; Nabuguzi 1993,25).
Rwandese Refugees under Idi Amin
and the Restored Obote Regimes
After Idi Amin came to power, relations between the Amin regime
and the refugee population, Rwandese refugees inc1uded, were very
cordial. This reflected the fact that the regime needed some refugees to
join the army and the death squads (drawn from the State Research
Bureau, the Public Safety Unit, the Marines, and Military Police AntiCorruption and the Anti-Smuggling Units) because it had become quite
skeptical about the loyalty and dedication ofUgandans in the army and
death squads. To encourage the refugees to join the forces, Amin invited the deposed Umwami of Rwanda, Kigeri IV, to Uganda. The presenee of the Umwani and the close ties Amin developed with him
encouraged more Tutsi refugees to join the forces. Tutsi refugees, like
refugees from southern Sudan and eastern Zaire (the Democratic Republic of Congo), also joined the forces to secure good jobs, acquire
wealth, and receive security.
Being loyal and dedicated to the regime of terror meant terrorizing,
raping, detaining, and murdering perceived opponents of the government. Accumulating wealth in the lawless, violent, and chronically
underdeveloped society also meant that the refugees had to do what
many Ugandans were doing to acquire wealth and land: unleash terror
against segments of the society. The result was that the terrorized and
chronically poor Ugandans turned more decidedly against the refugee
Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda
15
population. Hostility towards the refugees also escalated because many
Ugandans felt that they were being treated as second-class citizens in
their own country. For example, when some of the Sudanese refugees,
who had not repatriated following the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement,
continued to grab land and terrorize people in East Acoli in 1976 and
1977, the people of Mucwini and Madi Opei massacred some of them.
This massacre, which highlighted the growing anti-refugee sentiments
throughout the country, was carried out with the support of some highranking Ugandan soldiers who were opposed to the presence of the
refugees in the forces. 18
The regime also promoted anti-refugee sentiments in the country by
publicly blaming the refugees for the prevailing economic and political
crises, in 1978, blaming refugees from Rwanda, Zaire, Somalia, Kenya,
Burundi, Sudan, and Ethiopia for sabotaging government efforts to address economic and political problems. The refugees were then ordered
to register with the government, remain confined to designated camps,
and refrain from supporting insurgency activities. 19 The orders were
never carried out because the pronouncements were intended to achieve
a number of related objectives: suggest to the majority of Ugandans
that the regime shared their disapproval of the brutality of the refugees,
erroneously implying that the regime was not the principal author of
the terror; provide a popular and vulnerable scapegoat that could be
blarned for the severe socioeconomic and political crises in the country, thereby allowing the refugees to join the long lists of individuals
and groups that were being blamed-Obote, the Asians, the insurgents,
Zionists, Britain, Tanzania, and the apartheid regime in southern Africa; prevent the refugees from employing unsanctioned terror against
the population; and to maintain contact with, and receive international
assistance from, the international community through agencies such as
the UNHCR, Oxfam, YMCA, the Red Cross, and the International
University Exchange Fund. 20 These contacts and the assistance were
particularly important because the regime faced a severe economic crisis at home and a profound legitimization deficit on the international
front.
Immediately after the overthrow of the Amin regime, anti-Rwandese
sentiments escalated partiyas a result of the presence of same refugees
in the Uganda Liberation Army (UNLA) who formed an important
part of the 10,000 soldiers who were recruited by the Minister of Defense, Yoweri, Museveni. 21 The refugees joined the army primarily to
acquire adequate military training for a future war against the Hutu-
16
The Patn of a Genocide
dominated regime in Rwanda. The recruitment of Tutsi refugees for
the purpose of attacking Rwanda was encouraged by the Rwanda Alliance for National Unity (RANU). which was formed in June 1979.
Many Tutsi refugees in the UNLA, including those who would later
become leading members of the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA), Chris
Bunyenyezi, Sam Kaka, Fred Rwigyema, Dr. Peter Bayingana, and Paul
Kagame, belonged to RAND. Some of the refugees joined the UNLA
to proteet their people against reprisals for the activities of those refugees who worked for the Amin regime. There were those who, like
many Ugandans, joined the army to earn a living. The only way the
refugees could stay in the army was by disguising their national identity. This was not extremely difficult because many of them were bom
in Uganda and had acquired Kiganda, Kiga, and Banyankole names.
Furthermore, the refugees had the physica1 features of the indigenous
Banyarwanda, Banyankole, and the Bakiga. Staying in the army also
required them to protect and enhance the power of their leader,
Museveni. 22
Some of the refugees, like other members ofMuseveni's and Obote's
armies in Ankole, unleashed terror against the Muslims in the area. The
objective of the terror was to punish those Muslims who prevented
Museveni's Front for National Salvation (Fronasa) and Obote's Kikosi
Maalum armed groups from gaining support in the area during the uncoordinated and hastily executed invasions against the Amin regime. 23
The refugees, as a part of the Fronasa, also waged a war of supremacy
against Obote's Kikosi Maalum faction of the UNLA in Ankole. For
example, the massacre of many people in Ankole, including over 100
Muslims in Busenyi in June 1979, was attributed in part to the power
struggle between Museveni's Fronasa and Obote's Kikosi Maalum factions of the UNLA. The involvement of the refugees these clashes
provoked more hostility towards them.
Anti-Rwandese sentiments further escalated during the 1980 election when political opponents of Museveni, in Ankole and elsewhere in
the country, constantly referred to him as a Rwandese refugee, and the
Uganda Patriotic Movement (Museveni's party) and the Fronasa as
Rwandese organizations. 24 Hostility toward the refugees also grew following the involvement of some Tutsi refugees in the armed struggle
against the Obote regime. For example, the refugees were involved in
the raid on the Kabamba Army Training School on 16 March 1981; the
ambush of the military convoy that killed 70 UNLA soldiers at Kawanda
on 16 March 1981; and the ambush of a civilian bus, twenty-six miles
Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda
17
from Kampala on Bombo road, in which fortY unarmed civilians were
killed. 25 These incidents, among others, induced the regime and UPC
functionaries to target Rwandese refugees in the army and elsewhere
for reprisals. The more the Popular Resistance Army (PRA, later the
National Resistance Army-NRA) intensified its armed struggle, the
more the regime and the UPC functionaries terrorized Rwandese refugees. The more the refugees were persecuted, the more they fled and
joined the NRA. The more they joined the NRA, the more their increased presenee in the NRA tended to confirm the c1aim that the NRA
was a Tutsi organization. 26
In the Luwero Triangle (Luwero, Mukono and Mpigi districts),
Rwandese refugees were also persecuted because some Baganda, who
had always blamed immigrants and refugees for grabbing their land
since the colonial era, felt that Museveni and his "fel10w" Rwandese
had brought untold sufferings upon them by waging armed insurgencies from the areaY According to these Baganda, Museveni waged the
war from the Luwero Triangle because of the presence of Tutsi refugees in the area, the strategic and topographicallocation of the area,
and the socioeconomic and political significance of the area to the country (Helle-Valle 1989, 133; Watson 1991, 6).
Some Baganda turned against the refugees because of the terror tactics that the NRA employed to recruit the Baganda into its ranks, and to
eliminate opposition to its presence in the Luwero Triangle. For instance, Lance-Sera Muwanga claimed that some members of the NRA,
disguised in army and polke uniforms, terrorized and murdered many
Baganda in order to drive them into its camp (Muwanga 1983, 20-22;
Muwanga and Gombya 1986, 20). Lance-Sera Muwanga and H.
Gombya highlighted another factor that increased anti-Rwandese sentiment in Buganda: the atrocities committed by the NRA's death squad
or the "Black Bombers" against the Baganda commanders of the NRA,
such as Seguya Bona and Kaggwa Bandi, who were regarded as potentiaiopponents of Museveni. 28
Another factor that sustained anti-Rwandese sentiment in Luwero
was the flight of the Rwandese "labarers" inta the NRA. The flight
meant the loss of cheap labor in the area. The situation got worse when
the former laborers, as same Baganda referred to the refugees, retumed
and violently demanded food and unpaid service from their former
employers. The demand the refugees placed on their former hosts was
particularly annoying to the Baganda who regarded the refugees as inferior to them. 29
18
The Path of a Genocide
The violent territorial rivalries between the two main insurgency
groups in Buganda, the predominantly Baganda Uganda FreedomArmy
(UFA) and the Banyankole-Rwandese NRA, took the form ofboth an
"ethnic" war and a war between the leaders of the two groups. For
example, the leader of the UFA, Dr. A. Kayira, reported that after the
UFA attacked Lubiri barracks in February 1982, it was ambushed and
disarmed by the NRA. Later when Museveni invited the leadership of
UFA to the NRA command post in Luwero, Kayira claimed, "There
were no less than 50 fresh heads at a quick count. We found Museveni
and the NRA soldiers inside the ring of human heads. He told us while
pointing at the heads: 'You see those heads? That is how I deal with
those who do not agree with me. "'30
Throughout this period, political violence against the refugees was
largely concentrated in Ankole, primarilya direct outcome of decades of
conflict over land, jobs, and social services between the host communities and the refugees. The situation got worse when the UPM, including
its leader, lost the elections and subsequently launched a guerrilla war
against the Obote regime in 1981. According to the Banyankole, the refugees stole cattle from the host communities to feed the insurgents. 3l
Another factor that contributed to the persecution of Tutsi refugees
in Ankole was the pressure exerted on the Banyankole to publiely denounce the NRA. This pressure came mainly from two prominent
Banyankole ministers and very elose associates of Obote: Chris
Rwakasisi and Major Edward Rurangaranga. 32 The pressure was intended to reduce the limited support the NRA enjoyed in Ankole. It
was also aimed at suggesting to the country and the rest of the world
that the NRA enjoyed only the support of Rwandese refugees, not the
support ofUgandans (Clay n.d.,l, 3).
Internai rivalries between two UPC camps in Ankole, the "scientists" and the "syndicate," also contributed to the persecution of the
refugees. The former comprised highly educated, soft-spoken, and diplomatic leaders of UPC. The most prominent members of this camp
were three government ministers: Dr. Adonia Tiberonda, Dr. E.
Rwanyarare, and E. Kamutu. This camp believed that the best way to
protect the Banyankole from being treated as bandits or terrorists was
to isolate and condemn Museveni and the armed refugees for the ensuing political violence in Buganda (Clay n.d., 7).
The "syndicate," on the other hand, was led by two powerful, ruthless and ambitious Banyankole cabinet ministers: Rwakasisi and
Rurangaranga. This group was engaged in power rivalry with the sci-
Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda
19
entists over the future leadership of UPC. In order to prove its unwavering loyalty to Obote and increase its limited support in Ankole, the
group advocated the eviction of Rwandese refugees from Ankole. This
proposition was presented by the two ministers-who had been in violent conflict with Museveni since the 1978-1979 war against the Amin
regime (V ganda Government 1994, 31) -as an extension of the counterinsurgency against the NRA. The eviction was also expected to free
some land and property which the camp could distribute to enlarge its
political support in Ankole. 33
The decision by the syndicate to evict the refugees was strengthened
by the growing anti-Rwandese sentiments in Ankole and the intensification of insurgencies in Buganda which induced Obote to issue a warning to the refugees on January 11, 1982:
Most atrocities during Amin's era were committed by refugees.... [M]any refugees voted in the December 1980 general e1ections.... Refugees have been found
to flirt with terrorists in the Luwero District and are responsible for the unrest
there.... Some refugees have proved a liability to the nation.... If refugees, particularly those from Rwanda, do not reciprocate our hospitality ... Ugandans may
order their government to build camps for thern.... Alternatively, we shall tell
them to gO ... 34
A month later, the Minister of Culture and Community Development began to enforce the Control Alien Refugee Act (Chapter 64 of
the Laws of V ganda, 1964) that required refugees to live in designated
refugee settlements. 35 Next, in October 1982, the Mbarara District Council, which was closely allied to the syndicate, issued a memorandum to
the govemment urging the eviction of the refugees, or, in its language
"regrouping" the refugees in designated settlements. It also accused
the refugees of the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Committing atrocities against Ugandans during the Amin regime;
thwarting the liberation efforts in 1972;
exterminating innocent and prominent traders out of business jealousy;
grabbing land from (and sometimes at pain of death of) citizens;
perpetrating cattle thefts and the killings of the owners of the cattle, especially after the general elections in 1980;
killing innumerable head of cattle even as late as the second half of October 1982;
collaborating with Amin's forces against the liberation forces in 1979;
campaigning, registering and voting in the 1980 elections;
joining Museveni's camp in the bush immediately after the elections. (Clay
n.d.51)
20
The Path of a Genocide
These developments set the stage for the massacre and evictions of
Rwandese refugees which began irnmediately after the memorandum
was circulated in October 1982. The areas which were gripped by this
terror were Mbarara, Rakai, and Masaka. 36 By November 1982, an estimated 40,000 Rwandese refugees had been evicted from the southern
part of Mbarara district. The refugees fled to Rwanda. An estimated
4,000 refugees were trapped at Marema Hill, on the Uganda side of the
Uganda-Rwanda border. During the evictions, some thirty-seven refugees were reported to have been kil1ed by some Banyankole UPC
functionaries and National Security Agency (NASA). officers. It was
estimated that some 45,000 head of cattle were confiscated from the
refugees. In December 1983, an estimated 19,000 Rwandese refugees
were evicted from Rakai District, east of Mbarara District. Some of the
refugees sought refuge in Mbarara town and in the less turbulent refugee camps, including the Nakivale. During the campaign against the
refugees, a few Ugandans who were declared "Rwandese refugees" by
their local opponents in Ankole were also evicted from their homes.J1
A number of possible explanations may be advanced for the discrepancy. First, far fewer refugees fled Uganda. Second, most of those who
TABLE 1.4
Refugees in Uganda, 1981-1985
Number
Year
of
1981
Rwanda
Sudan
Zaire
80,000
500
32,000
1982
Rwanda
Sudan
Zaire
80,000
500
32,000
1983
Rwanda
Sudan
Zaire
80,350
590
31,350
1984
Rwanda
Sudan
Zaire
80,350
590
31,350
1985
Rwanda
Sudan
Zaire
118,000
590
31,350
Sources: UNHCR. Refugees. 1981-1985.
Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda
21
TABLE 1.5
Ugandan Refugees, 1981-1985
Year
Country of Asylum
Number
1981
Kenya
Zaire
Sudan
1,050
115,000
110,000
1982
Kenya
Zaire
Sudan
Rwanda (Banyarwanda)
1,800
60,000
170,000
44,000
1983
Kenya
Zaire
Sudan
Tanzania (Banyarwanda)
Rwanda (Banyarwanda)
2,354
270,000
200,000
10,000
31,000
1984
Kenya
Zaire
Sudan
Tanzania (Banyarwanda)
Rwanda (Banyarwanda)
3,875
30,800
200,000
2,500
30,400
1985
Kenya
Zaire
Sudan
Rwanda (Banyarwanda)
4,158
17,000
250,000
3,200
Sources: UNHCR, Refugees, 1981-1985; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Report 011 UNHCR Assistallce Activities, 1981-1985.
fled were V gandan Banyarwanda. The problem with this explanation
is that existing evidence, inc1uding that offered by Nabuguzi, suggests
that those who c1aimed to be V gandan Banyarwanda were Rwandese
refugees who made the claim in order to avoid persecution in Rwanda.
Third, there were at least 40,000 unregistered Rwandese refugees in
Vganda. In this instance, those who fled were unregistered Rwandese
refugees. Finally, the VNHCR and the VS Committee for Refugees did
not adjust the number of Rwandese refugees who did not flee V ganda.
It is important to bear in mind that the numbers game in refugee studies
depends on why, how, when and by whom the counting was done. It
also depends on who was counted. For example, if the refugees are
counted to attract more international assistance or to embarrass a regime, the number may be deliberately inflated.
22
The Path of a Genocide
The evictions provoked enormous international condemnation.38 In
a desperate attempt to calm the international outcry, the regime denied
any involvement in the persecution of the refugees. It also elaimed that
what had been presented by international human rights organizationsthe VNHCR, the VS Comrnittee for Refugees and Culturai Survivalas persecution of the Banyarwanda, was generallya nonviolent operation
aimed at improving the administration and protection of the refugees.
The limited violence that occurred, it further elairned, resulted from
clashes between the host communities and the refugees over land and
unlawful activities of some of the refugees. The official explanation,
however, did not convince the international community.39
The influx ofTutsi refugees into Rwanda that resulted from the evictionslrefoulement made the Hutu-dominated regime of Juvenal
Habyarimana extremely nervous. A number of reasons accounted for
this reaction. First, the forced repatriation of tens of thousands of the
refugees took the regime by surprise. Secondly, the regime suspected
that the returnees were supporters of RAND and NRA. This perception
was influenced by the fact that some of the leading members ofRANV,
such as Chris Bunyenyezi, Sam Kaka, Fred Rwigyema, Dr. Peter
Bayingana, and Paul Kagame, were also prominent members of the
NRA. 40 Thirdly, it expected the remaining tens of thousands of Tutsi
refugees to join the forced repatriation. Fourthly, the influx undermined
the regime policy that denied the refugees the right to return to their
home country.41 This political anxiety made the Habyarimana regime
confine the returnees to isolated and heavily guarded camps. It also
forced the government to elose the Rwanda-Vganda border. Thereafter, it justified its repatriation deterrence policy by claiming that most
of the refugees were V gandans, not Rwandese. Although the claim was
misleading, it was supported by the Tutsi returnees who were too scared
to admit to the Hutu-dominated regime that they were Rwandese.
Vganda, on the other hand, insisted that those who had fled to Rwanda
and the border area were Rwandese refugees. The unwillingness of the
two governments to recognize their displaced citizens, left the refugees
without asylum and without a state to call their own. 42
The crisis and the international pressure that accompanied the persecution of Tutsi refugees prompted the two governments to hold a
joint ministerial committee meeting from 22-27 October 1982. The
meeting took place at Gabiro in Rwanda. The committee examined:
the root causes of the refugee crisis; measures taken by the two governments to resolve the crisis; the question of nationality of the refugees;
Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda
23
and durable solutions to the refugee crisis. At the end of the meeting,
the parties agreed on the following:
1. The Government of Uganda accepts the responsibility for the Rwandese
people still in Uganda and to keep refugees in designated areas in accordance with recognized internationallaws and procedures;
2. The Governments of Rwanda and Uganda agree to maintain law and order at their common border;
3. The Rwanda Government undertakes to expedite and fully examine applications of Rwandese refugees in Uganda for voluntary repatriation;
4. The two Govemments agree to the necessity of identifying the nationalities of the refugees who have recently arrived in Rwanda. The Rwanda
Government agrees to the reabsorption of those who have been identified
as Rwandese nationals, and the Uganda Government undertakes to examine the possibility of compensating those who might have left their property in Uganda;
5. Uganda Government agrees that the identified Ugandan nationals shall
be recognized as Ugandan refugees in Rwanda and Uganda accepts to
examine their applications for voluntary repatriation in accordance with
intemationallaws applicable to refugees;
6. The joint Rwanda-Uganda ministerial committee recommends that the
two Governments continue direct negotiations relating to the Rwandese
nationals and refugees still in Uganda with a view of finding a permanent
solution; and
7. In view of the urgency and importance of this matter, the joint committee
recommends to the two Governments to implement these recommendations as soon as it is possibleY
The agreement, however, was not implemented in time to re1ieve the
plight of the refugees (Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 J anuary
1983:6699C). The delay prompted another joint ministerial meeting,
organized by the UNHCR from 6 to 8 March 1983. The meeting took
place in Kabale in Uganda. At the meeting, the two government delegations agreed to abide by international conventions and instruments
governing the treatment of refugees in their territories, and to formulate guidelines to determine the status of the affected persons. Thereafter, the governments began to screen the affected population for status. 44
However, as the US Committee for Refugee noted, progress in resolving the crisis remained interminably slow. 45
The political violence against the Rwandese had a number of other
significant implications. First, it eroded the internationallegitimacy of
the Obote regime. Indeed, it was not until December 1984 that the government managed to salvage its international image. The development
24
The Path of a Genocide
of December took place when some of the fleeing members of the NRA
kidnapped some 1,500 Baganda, mostly women and children, and took
them to Kyaka I and Kyaka II refugee camps. Rather than attack the
refugee camps, where the NRA insurgents were hiding, the government discussed the matter with representatives of International Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) which were observing the
screening of those displaced by the evictions. The government also
consulted with Western governments on how to handle the situation.
After the NGOs and Western governments had verified the incident,
theyasked the government to provide a safe passage for the NRA to
leave the camps without causing bloodshed. The government accepted
the advice. By default, the tactic that the NRA employed suggested to
some Western governments that it was quite possible that the evictions
were partly provoked by the NRA to discredit the government. 46
Secondly, it escalated and sustained hostility between the refugees
and the host comrnunities in Ankole and Buganda. Thirdly, it suggested
to some of the refugees that it was less traumatic to join the NRA than
to be persecuted in the camps. The result was that many more refugees
joined the NRA. Finally, the exodus of more refugees into the NRA
reproduced and sustained the image of the NRA as a predorninantly
Rwandese armed opposition group. This image, in tum, generated and
sustained violence against the refugees. 47
A pattern was set in which the refugees, in order to protect themselves, either attempted to return to their home country by force of
arms, or joined military forces in their host country, only to see their
insecurity increased as this act alone aroused the hostility of the host
population. This pattern would reach its culmination when they fused
the two processes and joined the Ugandan rnilitary as a means to launch
a military invasion to return to Rwanda.
Notes
1. Karugire (1989) 44; Lemarchand (1970) 18; Jo Helle-valle (1989) 115. The
former Ankole District comprises three districts: Busenyi, Mbarara, and
Ntungamo. The former Kigezi District is now the Kabale District. See Constitutian of the Republic of Uganda, 1995: 172-73.
2. See, for example, McEwen (1971); Uganda Protectorate (1956) 82-84, 92-96;
Edel (1957); Mateke (1970). On factors that deterrnined how Uganda's borders
were drawn, see Stigand (1968) 230-34; Barber (1965). Mr. A. G. Bazanyamaso,
for example, told the Legislative Council on 29 February 1959, that "when these
boundaries were demarcated they passed through some villages, cutting them
into two halves, one half coming into Uganda and the other half remaining within
Ruanda-Urundi. ef. Uganda Protectorate (1960)169. See also, the statement is-
Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
25
sued by Dr. Obote following the eviction of Banyarwanda in 1982: "[W]e have
five neighbors with whom Ugandahas good relations toa11 ofthem. The Uganda
border was drawn before independence. We inherited a border which cut across
tribes, clans, and even families. It is, therefore, important that when we describe
a person from a border district in terms of a tdbe, that we are extremely careful
in the use of our language. Relatives of Ugandans on both sides of the border
remain relatives despite being citizens of different states. In this age of the rule
of law, any action we take must be in conformity with the law of Uganda, internationallaw, charters and conventions to which Uganda is a party ..." Cited in
Bugingo 4.
See Uganda Protectorate, Report of the Commission of Inquiry inta the Disturbances in Uganda during April 1949, especially: 16-17,21-23,31-65,71-101;
Report of the Commission appointed to Review Boundary between the DistTicts
of Bugishu and Bukedi. Entebbe: Government Printer, 1962; Report of Inquiry
into Disturbances in the Eastern Province, 1960. Entebbe: Government Printer,
March 1962, especially: 14-15; Proceedings ofthe Legislative Council. Entebbe:
Government Printer, September, 1959: 159-72; Uganda Government, Report of
the Commission of Inquiry into the Recent Disturbances Amongst the Baamba
and Bakonjo People of Tora. Entebbe: Government Printer, 1962; Mengo, Department of Information, Buganda's Independence, 1960, Ghai (1970) 755-70.
The policy dated back to 1902 when the government enacted The Cattle Disease Ordinance of 1902. This ordinance was later reinforced by The Cattle Disease (Amendment) Ordinance of 1913 and The Cattle Disease Ordinance (Control
Ordinance) of June 23, 1954. See Uganda Protectorate, The Cattle Disease Ordinance, 1902; The Cattle Disease (Amendment) Ordinance, 1913. CO 612/6.
See Uganda Protectorate, An Ordinance to Make Provision for the Registratian
of Persons of the Kikuyu Tribe of Kenya, 22 February, 1954. CO 684/9. For
useful information on the Mau Mau revolt or revolution see Kitching (1980)
25-311; Kanogo (1987)125-78.
Many of the Tutsi who were fleeing into Uganda were associated with the conservative Tutsi party, the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR), which received
financial and diplomatic support from the Communist countries in the U.N. Trusteeship Council. It is possib1e that the ties that the UNAR had with some Communist states during the Cold War in the 1950s and UNAR's vigorous campaign
for immediate independence influenced the anti-Tutsi policy that was formulated by the colonial regime in Uganda. See Prunier (1995) 47-48. For details
on the rules, cf. The Aliens (Batutsi Immigrants) Rules, 1959 (Legal Notice No.
311 of 1959), Uganda Protectorate, Proceedings of the Legislative Council.
Entebbe: The Government Printer, 29 February 1960: 164, 170. Evolution of
refugee policies is highlighted by the following legislation: Uganda Protectorate, The Refugees (Control and Expulsion) Ordinance, 1947. CO 684/6; Uganda
Protectorate, An Ordinance to make Further and Better Provision for Regulatian of Immigration inta the Protectorate, No. 33 of 1947. CO 684/6; Uganda
Protectorate, An Ordinance to amend the Immigration (Control. Ordinance, 1947,
No. 18 of 1949. CO 684/7; Uganda Protectorate, An Ordinance to providefor
the Registration and Control ofAliens, No. 23 of 1949. CO 68417; Uganda Protectorate, An Ordinance to amend the Immigration (Control) Ordinance, No. 8
of 1953. CO 684/9; Uganda Protectorate, An Ordinance to Amend the Immigration (Control) Ordinance, No. 7 of 1954. CO 684/9. See also Kiapi (1993)1-2.
See contribution to debates on Tutsi immigrants by the Chief Secretary, in Uganda
Protectorate, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 1959. Entebbe: Government Printer, 1960:170-73. See also Kiapi (1993) 9.
26
The Path of a Genocide
8. See the contribution to the debates by the Chief Secretary, Sir Charles Hartwel1,
and the Minister of Natural Resources, A. B. Killick, in Uganda Protectorate,
Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 1959: 170-73, 190-93.
9. They included J. Bikangaga and C. B. Katiti. Obote, W. W. K. Nadiope, J. K.
Babiiha, A. G. Bazsanyamoso and C. J. Obwangor.
10. See contribution to the debates by A. G. Bazanyamaso in Uganda Protectorate,
Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 1959: 170. Some 7,000 Polish refugees,
mainly women and children, were resettled in Nyabyeya (Masindi District) and
Koja (Mpunge, Mukono District) between 1942 and 1945. Italian POWs were
resettled in Jinja and Italian civil internees were resettled in Entebbe. Most of
the Italians were brought from Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somali land. Some Germans, Austrians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Yugoslavs, Hungarians, and stateiess
Jews were settled at the Arapai camps, near Soroti. See Lwanga-Lunyiigo (1993).
11. Obote's contribution on this motion will be cited in detail because it captured
the position of the majority of the African representatives. It also provides a
good background for understanding the political persecution that the Tutsi would
face in Uganda.
12. See contribution to the debates by Obote in Uganda Protectorate, Proceedings
of the Legislative Council, 1959: 164-66.
13. Those who voted for the motion were: A. M. Obote, J. K. Babiiha, A. G.
Bazanyamoso, C. B. Katiti, B. K. Kirya, G. B. K. Magezi, Mrs. M. I. Mitha, Y.
B. Mugoma, W. W. K. Nadiope, M. M. Ngobi, P. L. Oola, C. J. Obwangor, G.
Oda, W. W. Rwetsiba, and J. S. Visana. Those who voted against the motion
were: Lt.-Col. A. A. Baerlin, Mr. T. B. Bazarrabusa, Mr. W. L. Bell, Mr. J.
Bikangaga, Mr. D. V. Broadhead-Williams, Mr. G. D. Cannon, Major. A. S. Din,
Mr. C. R. Donald, Mr. H. P. Foxon, Mrs. W. H. L. Gordon, Mr. I. D. Hunter,
Professor K. Ingham, Mr. H. K. Jaffer, Mr. M.S. Kiingi, the Minister of Works,
Mr. S. w. Kulubya, Mr. J. Lokolimoi, Mrs. F. A. Lubega, Mr. J. W. Lwamfa, Mr.
M. Mugwanya, Mr. D. J. K. Nabeta, Mrs. S. Ntiro, Mr. P. C. Ofwono, Mr. G. W.
Oguli, Mr. A. Opwa, Dr. T. D'Souza, Mr. M. J. Starforth, and Mr. J. V. Wild. rno
members declined to vote: J. M. Madhvani and C. K. Patel. See Uganda Protectorate, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 1959: 195-56.
14. See Sekiki (1972) 12-13; Uganda Protectorate (1962) 515-75; Africa Research
Bulletin, 1-31 August 1968: 1155A; Otunnu (1994):4-5, 7-8.
15. See Helle-Va11e (1989) 138-40; Mushemeza (1993) 21. Details have on1y been
reproduced for the Rwandese refugees.
16. Dorothea Hunter, "Report of Visits in East Africa, August-September 1968,"
(deposited at the Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford University): 1. See also,
Assistant Director of Refugees in the Ministry of Culture and Community Development, S. K. Katenta Apuli, "Proposed Request for Assistance for Refugee
Settlements, 22 May 1969" (deposited at the Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford University): 1-4; The Adviser on Zonal Rural Development, Oxfam, T. F.
Betts, "Request Settlement in Uganda, 18 August 1967" (deposited at the Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford University); L. Capp1el1etti (U.N. Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP), A. T. Nielsen (Representative, UNHCR.). and T.
F. Betts (Adviser on Zonal Rural Deve1opment, Oxfam), "Memorandum:
Sudanese Refugees-Uganda, Kampala, 25 June 1969" (deposited at the Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford University): 1-4; T. F. Betts, "Sudanese Refugees-Northern Uganda, 21 June 1969" (deposited at the Refugee Studies
Programme, Oxford University): 1-2; M. Harper (Field Director, Oxfam), "UGA
16A/8901-Sudanese Refugees in Uganda, 30 May 1969" (deposited at the
Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford University): 1-6; African Refugee Secre-
Rwandese Rel'ugees and Immigrants in Uganda
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
21
tary, World Alliance of YMCA, "Report of Visits to the Refugee Settlements of
Uganda, 27 November 1969" (deposited at the Refugee Studies Programme,
Oxford University); S. K. Katenta Apuli, Ministry of Culture and Community
Development, "Request for Assistance in Refugee Settlements, 23 May 1969"
(deposited at the Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford University).
See Mutesa (1967) 168-70; Mutesa (1966) 10-11; Obote (1970) 35; Lemarchand
(1970):208--09; E. Nabuguzi (1993)18. About the Congo crisis, See, for example,
Hempstone (1962) 3-230; Kabongo (1986) 27-50. The Aims and Principles of
the OAU Charter declare the sovereign equality of all member states; non-interference in the internai affairs of a member state; respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of each member state; and condemn subversive activities on
the part of a member state. See, for example, Ajala (1974) 65.
For opposition to the regime from a section of the army, see Africa Research
Bulletin, 1-31 July 1973:2919AB; Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 August
1973:2958c; Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 December 1973:307C. For a discussion about the Addis Ababa Agreement, see Zolberg, et al (1989). 52-53.
See Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 January 1978:4705C; New York Times, 1
January 1, 1978:6.
For the various assistance that the international organizations and agencies provided, see International University Exchange Fund, "Project No. 71/72 LS UGA.
8 (A): Agreement between UNHCR and lORD. Nairobi, 28 February 1978"
(deposited at the Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford University); Jimmy,
"Transfer of Refugees-Uganda. TFB/JB No. 72/7. Kampala, 8 January 1972"
(deposited at the Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford University); T. B. Betts,
"Evaluation of Sites Proposed for ResettIement of Refugees: Report Prepared
for Uganda Government by Special UNDPIFAOIWHO Mission., February 1972"
(deposited at the Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford University); "Agreement
between the Uganda Government and the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees. Project No. 71-72/LSIUGA. 8(A)" (deposited at the Refugee Studies
Programme, Oxford University).
According to UNLFAnti-Dictatorship, The New Military Dictators. Mbale, 1980:
11, Y. Museveni's army comprised over 8,000 troops in the UNLA by September 1979. In Selected Articles on the Uganda Resistance War. Second Edition.
Kampala: NRM Publication, 1986: 6, Museveni handed over 10,000 of his troops
to the UNLA by June 1979.
Essack (1993) 19, 36, 45; Rwanda Patriotic Front, "Background to Genocide"
(deposited at the Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford University), June 1994:
7-8; Watson (1991) 13; Museveni (1992) 125; Uganda Government (1994) 31.
See, for example, Museveni, SeleetedArticles on the Uganda Resistance War:
4-5; Daily Nation, 12 Friday 1971; Daily Nation, 28 January 1971:1; Daily
Nation, Saturday, 13 February 1971:1; "Sudan: the South and Uganda," Africa
Confidential, 13, 8 (21 April 1972):1-2.
See Essack (1993) 6, 19,45; Rwandese Patriotic Front, "Rwanda: Background
to the Genocide,":7-8; "Colonel 'Cries' as he tells inside story of NRA war,"
The Monitor, Kampala, Wednesday, 25-27 January 1995:1, 28; The Monitor,
Friday, 9 November 1993:13; Uganda Democratic Alliance, "An Open Letterto
His Excellency, Yoweri Museveni, 6 February 1989":4; Uganda People's Front,
"Who is Yoweri Museveni, his attitudes and views?," Kampala, February 1988;
N. Kabukol, "The Challenge of a New Generation: Recolonization of Uganda,"
Kampala, 1991:11-14; "Rwandese Refugee Army overruns Garrison," Weekly
Topic, Kampala, 12 October 1990:1; "RwandalUganda: AViolent Homecoming," Africa Confidential, 31, 20: 12 October 1990; Watson (1991) 9,13; Uganda
28
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
The Path of a Genocide
Democratic Coalition, US Coaxed into Training Rwanda Rebels. 1, l (August
1991):3-4.
See Museveni (1992) 134-36; Uganda Government (1994) 35; Amnesty International, Uganda: Several Hundred Political Prisoners. 21 August 1981:1;
"Uganda," Africa Report (May-June 1981):36; Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31
March 1981:5993C; Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 March 1981 :5998C-59998A;
A. M. Obote, "Notes on Concealment of Genocide in Uganda, 1990":49-59;
"Uganda: Straining at the Edges," Africa Confidential, 31,21 (1990):6; Essack
(1993) 36; Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 March 1981:5998C-5999A.
See Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 January 1983:6712C; New York Times, 25
January 1983:1, 5; "Uganda: Opposition Wins and Losses," Africa Confidential, 24, 7 (30 March 1983): n.p; Watson (1991) 10; Africa Research Bulletin, 131 March 1981:5998C-5999A; Museveni (1992) 122-25, 134-36; Nabuguzi
(1993) 19.
The attitudes of some Baganda towards immigrants and refugees are highlighted
in Richards (1952) 161, 196-97.
According to them, the Black Bombers were led by Matiya Kyaligonza, Patrick
Kalegeya, Pekos Kuteesa, Mark Mugenyi, and Dampa (nicknamed Hitler).
Muwanga and Gombya (1991) 22.
See Muwanga and Gombya (1991) 22; Obote, "Notes on Concealment of Genocide in Uganda": 50; Muwanga (1983) 20-22. For works that discuss Buganda
feelings of superiority towards immigrants and refugees, see Richards (1952)
161.
Muwanga and Gombya (1991) 21. See also, Obote, "Notes onConcealment of
Genocide in Uganda": 51-52; "Uganda: the Opposition Tangle," Africa Confidential, 23, 16 (4 August 1982).
See "Uganda Straining at the Edges," Africa Confidential, 31, 21 (1990): 6;
Helle-Valle (1989) 164-77; Clay (n.d.) 7. Museveni lost the parliamentary election to a DP candidate who was also his brother-in-law, Sam Kutesa.
Obote ("Notes on Concealment of Genocide in Uganda": 20) mentioned the
elose ties between Obote and the two ministers during the 1978-1979 war.
Interviews with some prominent UPC leaders in Mbarara, Kisoro, and Bushenyi,
June 1984 and August, 1993; Clay (n.d.) 164-77.
Uganda Times, Kampala, 11 January 1982, cited in Clay (n.d.) 33. Refugees
have always been blarned for abusing the hospitality of Uganda. For example,
in 1990, the Vice-Chairman of the National Resistance Movement, Moses
Kigongo, did just that. See Essack (1993): 6.
This law is exhaustively discussed by Kiapi (1993) 9-19.
Clay, ibid. This wave of violence erupted while Obote was in Italy, and the
minister in charge of refugees, Dr. James Rwanyarare, was attending an international meeting in Geneva.
See Watson (1991) 10-11; High Commissioner for Refugees, "Uganda," Report
on UNHCR assistance activities in 1982·1983 and proposed voluntary funds
programmes and budgetfor 1984: 129; Clay (n.d.) 34-48. According to Nabuguzi
(1993) 19, the refugees who fled to Rwanda found themselves confined to camps
and only survived persecution by c1aiming to be Ugandan Banyarwanda. According to the data provided by the UNHCR, at least 40,000 Banyarwanda, most
of them Rwandese refugees, fled to Rwanda in 1982. Yet, the same source, as
seen in tables 1.5 and 1.6, do not document any change in the numbers of
Rwandese refugees in Uganda.
See Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 October 1982:6613C-6614A; New York Times,
10 October 1982: 10; New York Times, 12 October 1982: 12.
Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda
29
39. See Clay (n.d.) 36; Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 October 1982:6614A.
40. See Essack (1993) 19,45; "Colonel cries as he tells his story of the NRA war,"
The Monitor, Wednesday, January 25-27, 1995: 1,28.
41. On the violation of the right of the refugees to return to their homeland, see
Amnesty International, Rwanda: Persecution of Tutsi Minority and Repression
ofGovernment Critics, 1990-1992 (May 1992): 4-5; Human Rights Watch (1992)
7; Watson (1991) 13; Museveni (1992) 122-23; "Rwanda Refugee Availed passports," New Vision, Kampala, Thursday, September 2, 1993: 1-2.
42. See, for example, Nabuguzi (1993) 19; Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 October
1982:6614B; High Commissioner for Refugees, Uganda: Report on UNHCR
assistance activities in 1982-1983 and proposed voluntary funds programmes
and budgetfor 1984, 129.
43. Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 October 1982:6614B. See also, High Commissioner for Refugees, "Uganda": Report on UNHCR Assistance: 129; Clay (n.d)
61.
44. High Commissioner for Refugees, "Uganda," Report on UNHCR assistance
activities in 1982-1983 and proposed voluntary funds programmes and budget
for 1984: 129; Clay (n.d.) 61-62.
45. US Comrnillee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey, 1984: 7. See also, Africa
Research Bulletin, 1-31 March 1983: 6762A-C.
46. See "Uganda: the Fall of President Obote," Africa Contemporary Record, 19841985: B 399.
47. See Human Rights Watch Arms Project (1994) Arming Rwanda: 8; Helle-Valle
(1989) 164-77.
2
An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by
the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA)
Ogenga Otunnu
In late 1989, a group of RPArefugee warriors carried out an abortive
armed invasion of Rwanda. After its defeat by the Rwandan army, the
RPA hastily returned to its rnilitary base inside Uganda. On 1 October
1990, an estimated 10,000 well-armed refugee warriors of the RPA, led
by Major General Rwigyema, carried out another invasion of Rwanda.
The overwhelming majority of the invaders were, at least until the invasion, active members of Lieutenant General Museveni's National
Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda. The invasion provoked a protracted
civil war in Rwanda.
What accounted for the emergence of the RPA? How did it develop
into a credible rnilitary force? Why did the warriors invade Rwanda in
1989 and 1990? What role did Uganda play in the 1990 invasion? Could
Uganda have halted the invasion? This chapter examines the RPA's
preparation for the Rwanda invasion following Museveni's victory in
Uganda. It also discusses the factors that inf1uenced the tirning of the
1990 invasion and Ugandans' response to that invasion.
Museveni Victory and the RPA's
Preparation for the Invasion
Immediately after the NRA seized power in Uganda on 25 January
1986, it embarked upon a massive military recruitment campaign that
drew from friendly areas in western and southern Uganda. By 1990,
the NRA comprised over 200,000 soldiers. The recruitment was driven
by the need to secure eastern and northern Uganda, where the regime
31
32
The Path of a Genocide
had a severe legitimacy crisis. It was also an important part of a military preparation designed to allow the regime to withstand the possible
disintegration of its military alliance with combatants from Uganda
and West Nile. The Rwandese refugees saw the recruitment as ameans
to enlist more refugees into the NRA for future armed struggles in
Rwanda (Watson 1991,13; Museveni 1992, 124; Human Rights Watch
Arms Project 1994, 8).
According RPAJNRA leader Major Dr. Bayingana, the recruitment
of refugees had to be carried out without causing suspicion in Rwanda
and Uganda. He explained: "We preferred to have every member of the
RPA in his mother NRA unit from where he or she could join the zero
hour of 'exodus.' ... Besides, we did not want to embarrass President
Museveni, whom many of us greatly admire." Also, he further noted:
"[W]e were very much concemed with the success of the NRA first"
(Essack 1993,20).1
In order to protect the regime, the Rwandese in the NRA participated in the counter-insurgencies in Acholi, Teso, Lango, Kasese, and
West Nile. The refugees viewed these operations as the most practical
military training they could acquire for future armed struggle in Rwanda.
However, their participation generated more anti-Rwandese sentiments
in Uganda. For instance, during the northem and eastem campaigns, a
Muganda NRA officer observed that the Rwandese
are always excited to fight against the rebels. Most of the time they are able to
find and kill hundreds of rebels in areas where there are no rebels.... This is not
necessarily a bad military strategy because it strikes terror among the ordinary
people and discourages them from supporting the rebels. The only problem we
have with these people is that they do not obey our command. For example, a
private does not listen to a major who is not a Rwandese.... They do not trust
us ... they think we will ally with the Acholi. ... This lack of trust explains why
same Baganda who were members of the Uganda Federal Arrny were murdered
by the Rwandese in Lowero and now in Acholi. (Author's interview, Kampala,
1989)
A Verona Father, who taught for many years in Gulu, highlighted
some causes of anti-Rwandese sentiments in the area:
These people (some of them are Ugandans) are quite excited about the armed
conflict in Acholi ... almost anybody they see during their operation they shoot at
or cut with their machetes or bayonets. These Rwandese use the most unacceptable counter-insurgency strategies; they herd women, children and old people
inta houses and set the houses on fire; they rape women in the presence of their
male relatives, and at times, they force the male relatives to sleep with those women
after they [the soldiers] have exhausted their sexual desire.... These people are
deterrnined to spread stim [RIV] to the Acholi. I also witnessed them mutilate
An Historical Analysi!) of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army
33
unarmed people, including school children, from the Holy Rosary primary school.
Some of these people had taken refuge at the Cathedral. ... The irony, however, is
that the surviving victims are often paraded by the soldiers or government functionaries before a group of reporters, and asked to expose those who mutilated
them. Naturally, they say that the rebels did il. The rebels are also involved in
these dirty acts of killing and mutilating people who collaborate with the government. ... People lost all their belongings to these soldiers and the rebels. I have
been told by kind Rwandese officers (and there are many who are better than
Ugandans in the NRA) that thousands of head of cattle confiscated from here will
help them in another war.... Now we hear that Museveni wants to resettIe the
Rwandese in Acholi and Lango. People are worried about the news because they
do not want to share their land with these people. (Author's interview, Gulu, 1988)
Similar counter-insurgency strategies were employed in other insecure areas of Uganda. For example, under the leadership of the Commanding Officer of the 306th Brigade in Teso, Chris Bunyenyezi, and
Brigade Commander, Tom Kyaligonza, hundreds ofunarmed civilians
were massacred. A further estimated 200,000 were kept in what the
Church Times (London) described as "concentration camps" (9 March
1990). In Teso, many cattle were also confiscated by the army.
A number of important observations can be made. First, the majority
of the Rwandese in the NRA received their military training while fighting counter-insurgency wars in Uganda. Afew ofthem, inc1uding Paul
Kagame, were sent by the Museveni regime for military training to
places such as the United States, Britain, North Korea and Canada (New
Vision: Kampala, 6 June, 1994). Second, the atrocities committed by
the NRA during the counter-insurgencies provoked a tornado of antiRwandese sentiment in the country. Ironically, non-Rwandese members of the NRA who committed similar atrocities during the wars were
hardly blarned by those who bitterly complained against the Rwandese
(Watson 1991, 13). Third, the persistent complaints of discrimination
and disappointment by Baganda officers in the NRA promoted antiRwandese sentiment in the NRA. Also, as in Buganda and Ankole,
anti-Rwandese sentiment in the rest of the country resulted from a protracted struggle over land, jobs, social services and political power
(Essack 1993, 6; Monitor: 28 June 1995: 1-9). Fourth, the Rwandese
were able to conceal their military plans because most high-ranking
officers in the NRA held similar positions in the RPA; they were also in
charge of security and inte11igence matters in the country. For example,
the 1eadership of the Rwandese in the NRA inc1uded: Major General
Rwigyema (Deputy Commander of the NRA), the then Deputy Minister of Defence, Major Paul Kagame (Read ofInte11igence and CounterIntelligence), Major Dr. Peter Baingaina (Read of NRA Medical
34
The Path of a Genocide
Services), Major Chris Bunyenzi (Cornrnanding Officer of the NRA's
306th Brigade), Major Sam Kaka (Cornrnanding Officer, MiIitary Police), Lieutenant Colonel Wasswa, Major Stephen Ndugate, Captain
Kitare, and Lieutenant Byegyeka (Watson 1991, 13; Africa Confidential: 12 Oct. 1990). Finally, the growing tension, discrimination and
hostility faced by the refugees in Uganda created further incentives to
launch the invasion and to ogranize public fundraising, hold RANU
(later RPF) conferences at Makere University and other places in
Kampala as earlyas 1987 (Prunier 1995,72-73).
The Timing of the Invasion
A number of closely related factors accounted for the timing of the
invasion. First, the escalation of anti-Rwandese sentiment, especially
from the areas that benefitted most from the overthrow of the UNLA
terror, Buganda and Ankole, sent a clear message to the RPA: mobilize
and invade while you still have access to military, economic, and political resources ofUganda (Watson 1993,9). The new Uganda Investment Code prohibited aliens from owning land and increases the pressure
for an immediate armed struggle against Rwanda (ibid. 14; Monitor:
14-18 Jan. 1994).
Another influential factor was the growing internai power rivalry
and frustration within the RPA. Power rivalry and disagreements over
military strategies split the RPA into two main warring camps. The first
camp was led by Major Dr. Banyingana and included influential officers such as Charles Kabanda and Major Chris Bunyenyezi. This group
maintained that the RPA and its political wing, the Rwanda Patriotic
Front (RPF), should be led by Banyingana, who was better educated
and more articulate than Rwigyema. In an attempt to boost their position, Banyingana embarked on extensive international tours to recruit
Rwandese into the RPF and to mobilize military and financial support
for an armed struggle against Rwanda. During the tours, Banyingana
began to act as the overallleader of the RPF. This camp was so impatient with the protracted peace negotiations between the RPNRPF and
the Rwandan government that it was deterrnined to rush the armed
struggle. Thus, in late 1989, supporters of this camp launched an abortive invasion of Rwanda (Essack 1993, 34-35).
The second, more powerful camp was lead by Major General
Rwigyema, the officialleader of the RPF/RPA. This faction had easy
access to government and private sector resources. It was also sup-
An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army
35
ported by the most powerful RPNNRA officers, including Major
Kagame and Colonel Wasswa. According to C. Watson, the group respond to the challenge of its legitimacy by intimidating and imprisoning any Rwandese in Uganda, including those in the NRAlRPA, who
disagreed with its politics and military strategies:
From November 1989 to June 1990, Banyarwanda refugee Major Paul Kagame
was acting head of the NRA's military intelligence. He is alleged to have used its
resources to intimidate dissenters within the RPF, some of whom wanted and
attempted a small, abortive invasion in 1989, as well as refugees who did not
favor an armed return or who had relations with the Rwandese state. Some were
imprisoned (Watson 1991, 13).
The two camp rivalries became so feverish that each camp contemplated an invasion to enhance its position at its rival's expense. The
rush to forestall any possible military initiative by the other competitor
made the camps realize that further delays would erode the RPA's
strength and expose some of its military strategies to the government in
Kigali. Indeed, it is commonly believed that the violent power rivalry
later led to the mysterious deaths of Rwigyema, Banyingana,
Bunyenyezi, and at least sixty members of the Banyingana camp (Essack
1993,34-35; Watson 1991, 14).2
The timing of the invasion was also influenced by a host of affairs
intemal to Rwanda: conflict between the north and south and power
struggles among the northerners; the effects of the 1980 "Equilibrium
Policy"; the harrowing effects of the Structural Adjustment Policies of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank; famines; increased government crackdown upon opponents; and the flight of some
prominent businessmen and government functionaries into the RPFI
RPA. These crises convinced the RPA that the regime in Kigali was
resting on shallow political soil. If the regime were attacked militarily,
the RPNRPF reasoned, more regime instability and terror would be
provoked. Increased regime terror, in tum, would facilitate the collapse
of the regime under fire. If the armed invasion did not lead to total
disintegration of the beleaguered and disorganized regime, it further
reasoned, it could force President Habyarimana to make a politically
fatal compromise with the armed opposition (Essack 1993,4,9, 18).
The Rwandan government's response to the impending invasion also
influenced the timing. The abortive 1989 RPAinvasion, the visible presence of high-ranking Rwandese in the NRA, and the frantic fund-raising activities by the RPAlRPF in Uganda suggested to the Rwandan
government that an organized invasion was but a matter of time. This
36
The Path of a Genocide
forced the Rwandan government to mobilize military support from its
allies, including Egypt, France, and Zaire. The regime also began to
expand its rnilitia and standing army. These responses sent an unequivocal message to the RPA: invade while you still stand a good chance of
destabilizing the government or stay in Uganda and disintegrate into
oblivion. The RPA chose the former option and moved hastily toward a
military campaign (Essack 1993, 6).
The tirning of the invasion was also influenced by the paraBel strategy
pursued by Kigali: a negotiated settlement with the RPFIRPA, a vigorous campaign to exploit and manipulate anti-Rwandese sentiment in the
NRA, and the rivalry in the RPA.lt thus engaged in a protracted negotiated settlement and sent large sums of money to some NRAlRPA officers. These officers were expected to collaborate with Kigali, intensify
the power struggle in the RPA, and elirninate some of the RPA/NRA
officers; among those targeted were Rwigyema and Banyingana. When
the former learned of the plot, he identified the officers on Kigali's payroll to President Museveni (Essack 33). The news of the plot created
panic in the RPA, which forced contemplation of an early invasion. As
RPA chief Kagame noted, "if the leaders ...like Rwigyema and Banyigana
had died at the hands ofHabyarimana agents in Kampala...then the armed
struggle would have been delayed" (Essack 34).
The slow pace and extended length of the negotiations with
Habyarimana also influenced the timing of the invasion. The regime
reluctantly and gradually became accommodating to RPAlRPF demands
(Watson, 13). However, some members of the RPA, especially those
who subscribed to Museveni's justification of total war against repressive regimes (Prunier 1995, 68), fell the negotiations were taking too
long and that Habyarimana's concessions were inadequate. They felt
the RPA would not meet its political and rnilitary objectives of removing Habyarimana from power. Thus, Kagame noted that the negotiations "needed a long time which we could not survive, given the rate of
intrigues which was being formed by Habyarimana's gang offour
officers" (quoted in Essack, 33).
The result was that the "war party" in the
exerted pressure
for an early invasion, which would induce the Habyarimana regime to
offer better concessions more quickly. These would allow the RPAI
RPF to join, then topple, the government. A section of
war
was a1so determined to launch its own invasion of Rwanda, should the
leadership of the RPA decide to listen to the "peace
pone the invasion (lnterview by author, Toronto, 1991).
An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army
37
The RPA's military training, and the near-dedsive military victory it
scored against the insurgents in the north and east of Uganda also influenced the timing of the invasion. Indeed, as soon as the RPA achieved
most of its counter-insurgency objectives, h began to speed up plans
for the invasion of Rwanda. However, since no one knew how long the
proposed war would take-espedaIly after the decisive loss during the
1989 invasion-and because of the Habyarimana regime's continued
mobilization, the RPA decided to have some of its members remain in
the NRA. This was intended to protect the Museveni regime against its
armed and unarmed political opponents. It was also hoped that those
members of the RPA who would remain in the NRA would provide
vital military and political support for an armed campaign against
Rwanda (Information Digest: March 1995, 2). As Bayingana put h,
after three months of planning, the question was how, not when "to
evacuate" RPA troops from the NRA for the invasion (Watson, 13).
Another factor was Museveni's attempt to demobilize some members of the NRAlRPA. This decision was partly the result of the NRA's
military victory against the insurgents, and the growing domestic and
international pressure to demobilize some ofthe 100,000 soldiers. The
army consumed at least 37 percent of the country's official budget (Information Digest: 2). Among those short-listed for demobilization were
Rwandese refugees, both members and non-members of the RPA.
Though the technical process of demobilization or Reduction-in-Force
(RlF) did not start before 1992, the political rumors associated with the
impending process spread like a wild bush fire. This caused enormous
uncertainty, tension, anxiety, and a feeling ofbetrayal among Rwandese
refugees in the NRA; a situation that was compounded by the rumor
that most marked for demobilization were Ugandans, not Rwandese.
Another version of the rumor had h that the Rwandese to be demobilized were already demobilizing for an armed struggle in Rwanda. This
again meant that the majority demobilized would be Ugandans. AntiRwandese sentiment in the NRA was fired by these rumors. Faced by
this hostility, and the belief that the package for demobilization and reintegration was inadequate, some RPA members exerted more pressure
on the leadership to speed preparation for the invasion. Since these
soldiers had almost unlimited access to NRA military hardware, and
were increasingly restless, the leadership had to respond accordingly
in order to avoid a serious organizational dilemma.
The absence of the strongman, President Habyarimana, from Rwanda
at a time of increased internal instability and uncertainty in the country
38
The Path of a Genocide
also provided bait for the RPA to invade Rwanda while he was away.
According to the RPA, the invasion would easily disorganize the divided
cabinet and the poorly trained Rwandan anny. Museveni's absence also
made it easier to mobilize the RPA/NRA for the invasion, while at the
same time protecting him from criticism, especially from OAV member states, of any direct involvement in the invasion (Watson, 13).
Museveni's attempts to stem antiregime cum anti-Rwandese sentiments in the countryaIso contributed to the timing of the invasion (Africa Confidential: 26 Oct 1990, 4-6). These sentiments logically
responded to the enormous power the regime gave Rwandese refugees
in the NRA, InternaI Security Organization (ISO), ExternaI Security
Organization (ESO), and government. For example, some leading members of the DP from Buganda condemned Museveni, whom they described as a Thtsi refugee, for the Tutsi domination of the country. By
presenting Museveni as a Tutsi refugee, the politicians destroyed any
lingering distinction between antiregime and anti-Rwandese sentiments.
In part, the politicians destroyed the distinction in order to disguise
their opposition to the regime as opposition to arrogance and domination by the refugees (Monitor: 28-30 June 1995,9).
The refugees' rapid accumulation of land also contributed to
antiregime cum antirefugee sentiments. For example, during the August 1990 debate in the National Resistance Council (NRC), Vgandans
of competing political persuasions blarned the government for giving
refugees land and encouraging them to terrorize V gandans . The clashes
between the refugees and the host community at Mowogola ranches in
Ankole, among other, was mentioned as an example of the terror that
the refugees continued to unleash against Vgandans (ibid).
Faced with growing opposition, the regime decided to "remove" some
"visible" Rwandese refugees, including Major General Rwegyema, from
the NRA and govemment. Although these refugees retained their influence and privileges, the regime expected their publicized removal to
vitiate its legitimacy crisis, especially in Buganda, Kigezi, and Ankole.
However, the measure generated its own contradiction: it sent an unintended message to some of the RPA in the NRA that other stakeholders
were capable of forcing Museveni to remove them. This created restlessness, confusion and frustration, which, in tum, generated more pressure to invade before the RPA became a spent force. The measure created
a fUfther problem for the regime insofar as its political opponents insisted that both the government and the army remained in the hands of
Rwandese refugees.
An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army
39
This "removal strategy" raised at least two critical and related questions for the regime: How many should be removed, and at what cost?
These questions were difficult because the removal of a handful of
Rwandese refugees had not stemmed the tide of antiregime cum antiRwandese sentiments in the country. Further, if the govemmentremoved
many refugees, the rest could desert immediately and disorderly, causing serious security and foreign policy problems. Early waming signals also indicated that mass removal would cause anxiety among the
remainder to skyroeket and would possibly result in an immediate and
uncoordinated invasion of Rwanda. In the end, increased restlessness
in the RPA, factional rivalries in the RPAJNRA and the infiltration of
the RPAJNRA by Habyarimana's agents sent a clear message to the
government: the invasion is inevitable and will happen soon. The question then became how to controi and disguise the exodus and impending invasion. It was important to disguise these activities since they
violated the OAU at a time when Museveni sat in the chair. The strategy was now for Museveni to play a double game of "allowing
Rwigyema to build his expeditionary army while professing friendship
with his neighbors" (Africa Confidential: 28 Sept. 1990,4).
Another thesis, however, dismisses these factors as determinants
regarding the timing of the invasion. According to this viewpoint,
Museveni and the leaders of the RPAJRPF in the NRAJNRM and government had been planning the invasion since 1986. One of invasion's
objectives was to end the suffering of the Tutsi, Museveni's ethnic group.
Thus, it was the urgent need to liberate Museveni's people that determined the amount of military, financial, and political support that the
regime devoted to the mission (ibid: 22 March 1991: 6). Despite the
fact that there was an urgent need to end the growing persecution of the
Tutsi in Rwanda, Uganda, and eastem Zaire, it is unclear how much
weight this noble desire exerted on the timing of the invasion.
A related perspective suggests that the timing was based on
Museveni's beliefthat the Rwandan regime was too weak to survive an
organized armed invasion by the seasoned RPAJNRA veterans of the
wars in Luwero, Acholi, West Nile, Teso, and Kasese. According to
this school, the invasion was spurred by Museveni's vaulting ambition
to create a Tutsi dynasty in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire. This
dynasty would allow Museveni to achieve a number of objectives: liberation of his people in the region; hegemony of his people in the region; fulfilment of his promise to the RAND (now RPAlRPF); reward
the Tutsi in Burundi and eastem Zaire for the military, political, and
40
The Path of a Genocide
economic assistance provided during the war against the Obote and
Okello regimes; enable him to stage a comeback to power in Uganda in
the event of a coup or multiparty victory; protect his regime, especially
from the growing opposition in Buganda, Kasese, and Bundibugyo;
and make him kingmaker in the region, partly by destabilizing, if not
overthrowing the regimes in Kenya, Zaire, and Sudan.
Although it was true that Museveni repeatedly tald the regime in
Kigali that the refugee warriors were better trained than the Rwandan
army, it is unclear that this consideration played a prominent role in the
timing of the invasion. Similarly, while it is true that Tutsi in Burundi,
Uganda, and eastem Zaire supported Museveni in the early 1980s in
the hope of receiving some rewards, there is no evidence to suggest
that a Tutsi dynasty was the expected or intended award. Indeed, such a
strategy could not have envisaged the creation of a Tutsi dynasty because Museveni remained diametrically opposed to such a political
system, which would endanger his regime by uniting regional opposition against il. This c1aim seems rather to be based on the fact that the
Tutsi are in power in Rwanda and Burundi; that the Tutsi in Rwanda,
Burundi, Uganda, and Zaire played a leading role in the war against
Mobutu; and the questionable contention that Uganda is ruled by the
Tutsi. Perhaps the perspective is quite persuasive with regard to the
threat Museveni faced, especially in Buganda and from the strategic
but conflict-laden alliance between the UPC and the DP. This threat
could have persuaded Museveni to demobilize the refugee warriors not
only to reduce the threat but also to create a military base which could
be called upon in time of need.
The c1aim that Museveni wants to become a kingmaker in the Great
Lakes region seems based on the following: the assistance he gave the
Tutsi to seize power in Rwanda; the allegatian that the current Rwandan
govemment-which works clasely with Museveni-is opposed to any
form of economic, military, or political embargo against the Tutsi regime
in Burundi; the leading role that the Rwandan and Ugandan (and, to some
degree, Burundi) governments played in Mobutu's overthrow; and the
increased influence and power of the Tutsi in the Laurent Kabila regime
(Democratic Republic of Conga). The c1aim is also based on the fact that
Museveni has provided military and political support to the John Garang
faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Mwakenya
armed opposition group that wants to topple the regime in Kenya. One
major shortcoming of this c1aim is that it refuses to acknowledge the fact
that Kenya, Sudan, and Zaire also provided assistance to anti-Musevem
An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army
41
forces. Yet, like V ganda, the three countries denied supporting such groups.
The assertion further ignores the fact that Museveni's prominence in the
region is partlya result of his unmatched political and military competence (Africa Confidential: 26 Oct 1990: 1).
Yet another perspective maintains that the timing of the invasion
was determined by the reluctance of the international community to
intervene in armed conflict in Africa; this was certainly true after the
Somalia tragedy. According to this view, Museveni and the RPAlRPF
leadership determined that it was better to invade while the international community was suffering from humanitarian fatigue; demonstrating what can be called an insensitivity syndrome; undergoing a
crisis in formulating a coherent, coordinated, and feasible post-Cold
War policy; and suffering from their own legitimacy crises on the domestic front at the same time as the Eastern European crises dominated
the news. This perspective was supported by the RPAJRPF expectation
that western governments would only express concern to Uganda following the planned invasion, particularly since Uganda was being paraded through Africa by the IMF and World Bank as a success story of
the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP). Diplomatic words of concern would be issued only to V ganda because, while Kenya, Malawi,
Zambia, and Zaire were being demonized for violations of human rights
and their unwillingness to practice multiparty democracy, Uganda was
being shielded from such pressure by human rights and refugee advocates, scholars, journalists, and western donors (Africa Confidential:
28 Sept 1990, 2). This interpretation further maintains that Museveni
knew from his close friend, Lynda Chalker (British Minister of Overseas Development), that Britain was relying upon him to kick the French
out of the Great Lakes region of Africa. The perspective concludes that
Museveni also counted on American acquiescence, since the VS was
counting on him to dislodge the regime of terror in Khartoum and to
check the spread of Islamic Fundamentalism in the Great Lakes region
(New Federalist: 9 June, 1997).
In any event, by early 1990, the momentum toward the invasion was
irreversible. It was reported that at least 20,000 Tutsi refugees disappeared from refugee settlements, including Kyaka. By August, there
were numerous reports of cattle confiscation by the RPAlNRA. For
example, some 1,200 head of cattle were reported confiscated at
Mawogola in Ankole by the same group. The cattle reported to be slaughtered, smoked, and preserved to feed the refugee warriors during the
planned invasion (Weekly Topic: 12 Oct 1990,7).
42
The Path of a Genocide
The RPA/RPF purportedly planned the invasion to take place while
both Museveni and Habyarimana were in the USA (Essack, 32-33). It
was also planned to coincide with preparations for independence celebrations in Uganda, which were often accompanied by troop deployments, a good disguise for troop movements toward Rwanda (Africa
Confidential, ibid.). Between July and September 1990, the RPA began
to mobilize for the war. The soldiers were sent to Mbarara and news
about the mobilization circulated freely in Kampala among the general
public, foreign diplomats, and journalists (Arming: 19). A few days
before the invasion, thousands of NRAlNRP soldiers arrived in Mbarara
from places as far as Arua, Gulu, Kitgum, Soroti, Kampala, Entebbe,
and Jinja. In order to contain the growing public anxiety, Rwigyema
told the inquisitive on-lookers at Mbarara that "he was taking the troops
to prepare for celebrations on October 9, Uganda's Independence Day"
(Watson, 14). The explanation, however, was contradicted by some
NRAlRPA soldiers who were so excited that they told the public about
the invasion. On l October, Rwigyema led an estimated 10,000 soldiers into Rwanda (ibid.).
Uganclan Involvement in the Invasion
The incident raised questions about the involvement of Uganda in
the invasion. According to the Habyarimana regime, the invasion was
carried out by Uganda. It supported its position by noting that the invasion was led by the NRA. Furthermore, during and after the invasion
the NRAlRPA moved freely between Uganda and Rwanda. It also
pointed to the presence of non-Rwandese members of the NRA in the
invasion. Thus, the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army, Colonel
Deogratias Nsabimana, told the Human Rights Watch Arms Project
(HRWAP) that "the involvement of Uganda in this conflict is evident.
The attack came from there, and also we know that it was conducted
and led by NRA military officers (HRWAP. 6) The Habyarimana regime also supported its c1aim by presenting some NRA official documents, vehicles, weapons and Prisoners of War (POWs) that it had
captured during the invasion (Essack, 10). The regime further c1aimed
that between 1986 and 1994, the RPA was harbored, trained, financed,
and equipped by Uganda (Monitor: 26 Nov 1991, 11).
The views put forward by the regime in Rwanda regarding Uganda's
roles in the invasion received some support from the Human Rights
Watch Arms Project. For example, it noted that "Uganda provided weap-
An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army
43
ons, munitions and other military supplies to RPF. These inc1uded munitions, automatic rifles, mortars, artillery and Soviet-designed katyusha
multiple rocket system." It further observed that "Uganda allowed the
rebel movement to use its territory as a sanctuary for the planning of
attacks, stockpiling of weapons, raising of funds and movement of
troops" (HRWAP, 6). The HRWAP supported its position by quoting a
senior NRA officer:
A senior NRA operations officer told the Arms Project that Uganda has supported
the RPF throughout the conflict. The officer said that after the failure of the RPF's
October 1990 invasion, the NRA provided even heavier weaponry including artillery. The officer said that throughout the conflict, the NRA provided a steady
stream of ammunition, food and logistical supplies, and that the two armies shared
intelligence information. (ibid.)
The HRWAP reinforced its c1aim by pointing out that the news of
the mobilization was such common knowledge in Uganda that it was
practically impossible for the regime not to have known about il. Also,
the movements of thousands of soldiers with heavy weapons from different parts of the country to Mbarara and the Kabale could have not
taken place without the tacit approval of the regime. Similarly, HRWAP
insisted that the invasion was not a conspiracy by the RPA:
The Arms Project flnds this claim [conspiracy] not credible. Many journalists,
diplomats and other observers told the Arms Project that the fact of the invasion
was common knowledge in Kampala and other locations throughout Uganda, as
thousands of soon-to-be RPA members bid farewell to relatives and friends ....
Moreover, while military intelligence may have been under the controi of the
alleged conspirators, Uganda has a separate Internai Security Organization (ISO)
with several thousand agents that was created precisely to prevent renegade or
conspiratoriai activity within the NRA. That the ISO could have been entirely
uninformed of both the conspiracy and its execution is not credible.... Finally,
movements in preparation for the invasion were efficient, but not especially rapid.
Diplomats and Western military observers say that troops, trucks and weapons
left Kampala together in the local football stadium in Kabale, 300 kilometers southwest of Kampala and 20 kilometers north of Rwandan border. This movement
began on September 29, 1990, two days prior to the October l, invasion. There is
no evidence that any NRA or other Ugandan authorities challenged this alleged
mass defection of troops. (ibid: 19-20)
The participation of the non-Rwandese members of NRA in the invasion also raised questions about Uganda's direct involvement in the
war. Two broad categories ofUgandan NRAmembers participated. The
first group were bodyguards of senior NRNNPA officers who accompanied them under the assumption that they were still active members
44
The Path of a Genocide
of the NRA. Some were so attached to the officers that they would
have chosen to participate in the invasion even if they had been given
the choice to remain in their respective NRA units in Uganda. For many
reasons, the majority of these guards did not return to Uganda (Weekly
Topic: 19 Oct 1990). The second group were Ugandan soldiers who
were given marching orders to an unknown destination, which turned
out to be Mbarara, Kabale, and then Rwanda. One Ugandan sargeant
noted that "it is not uncommon for soldiers, especially those of the
lower ranks, not to know where they are going or what mission they
will be asked to undertake.... In keeping with acceptable rnilitary conduct, we were ordered to fight, and we fought" (author's interview:
Kampala, 1994).
Based on overwhelming evidence linking Uganda to the invasion,
HRWAP conc1uded that it:
finds a high degree of institutionai complicity between the NRA and the RPF. At
the very least, Uganda and its leaders are responsible for allowing military renegades to plan and execute the invasion of a sovereign state with Ugandan weapons, launched from Uganda. The arms project also believes that there is credible
evidence that the Ugandan government allowed the RPF to move arms, logistical
supplies and troops across Ugandan soil, and provided direct military support to
the RPF in the force of arms, ammunition, and military equipment. (HRWAP, 21)
The Uganda government, however, has consistently denied any involvement in the invasion. According to President Museveni:
he first heard of the invasion at 5 a.m. in his hotel in New York when he was
telephoned by Maj. Gen. Mugisha Muntu, the Army Commander, who told him
that perhaps 14 Banyrwanda army officers had deserted. He immediately contacted Habyarimana who was sleeping on the floor below and informed him of
the possible danger. "I would like to make it very c1ear that we did not know about
the desertion of these boys nor would we support it," he said. "If we were asleep,
why did they not also defeat them before they crossed the border? ... We cannot
keep soldiers on standby indefinitely for an unconfirmed report." (New Vision: Il
Oct 1990)3
In his address to Makere University in June 1991, Museveni reinforced his c1aim by suggesting that the mobilization and invasion were
the outcome of a Rwandese conspiracy in the NRA:
in October last year, the Banyarwanda in our army conspired and went into Rwanda
and started to cause trouble there. Same people have asked the question: "How
could so many people go without the government being aware with of it?" But
there is an English word called conspiracy-I think we have all heard of il. The
truth of the matter is that these people conspired, took us by surprise and went to
Rwanda, which was not particularly difficult. (Museveni, 123)
An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army
45
Museveni also denied that his government supported the RPA either
financiallyor militarily. He argued that the RPA stole arms from the NRA:
"[T]hose who were in the army were able to run away with their guns
because each soldier stays with his gun. Other weapons and equipment
were stolen by the deserters" (2). This official line was echoed by many
govemment officials, including the Vice-Chairman of NRM, Moses
Kigongo; who went further and condemned the refugees for abusing the
hospitality they enjoyed in Uganda for three decades (Essack, 6).
The detailed position ofthe Uganda govemment is as follows:
1. The Government ofUganda was not aware of the refugees' intentions to invade
Rwanda. However, there have always been rumors of such plans which the
Government has shared with the Government of Rwanda. The refugees always
denied these rumors.
2. The problem of the Rwandese refugees has been a long-standing one.
3. The President of Uganda informed the President of Rwanda as soon as desertions were detected in the NRA and the two Presidents have since met twice on
this subject.
4. The President of Uganda is still prepared to promote a dialogue between the
Rwandese refugees living in Uganda and the Government of Rwanda. The issue of refugees is not of Uganda's own making.
5. The issue of the Rwandese refugees is not confined to Uganda, but it obtains in
other countries such as Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi.
6. The Government of Uganda regrets these developments but should in no way
be held responsible for what has happened.
7. Meanwhile the following immediate measures have been undertaken by the
Government of Uganda:
(a) All possible entrances and exits of the Uganda-Rwanda border have been
sealed by Uganda troops.;
(b) There will be no assistance to the attackers from the Ugandan side;
(c) The Uganda Government will not allow the refugees to retreat into Uganda;
(d) Those who come back will be arrested, charged and tried in accordance
with their status;
(e) There will be regular meetings of the Heads of State ofUganda and Rwanda;
(f) Intensified efforts will be undertaken by the two Presidents to resolve the
issue of Rwandese refugees politically and peacefully through meetings
between the two Presidents, and through Ministerial CommiUees. 4
Museveni insisted that Uganda's involvement in the Rwanda crisis
was to be seen only in terms of her tireless efforts to persuade the RPA
and Rwandan govemment to resolve their disputes peacefuHy. He also
reminded the international community of his efforts to organize and
attend regional conferences to designed to deal with the Rwandan refugee problem (Essack, 41). Uganda's role in
Rwanda crisis was that
of peace braker, not war monger.
46
The Path of a Genocide
These explanations nonetheless rest on shaky ground. For example,
the public pronouncement that the government would punish returning
NRA deserters was consistently contradicted:
RPF officers who led and organized the conspiracy, including the former head of
the NRA military inteIligence and now top RPF commander Paul Kagame, travelIed frequently and openly to Kampala to meet with foreign diplomats, reporters
and RPF supporters within the NRA. These visits and meetings in Kampala took
place throughout the three year war, as late as 1993. Rather than arrest the organizers of this alleged act of high treason, Ugandan authorities greeted them
repeatediy ... On several occasions throughout the war, journalists, diplomats and
international military observers say that wholesale numbers of RPF troops operating in organized units have crossed back into Uganda, and have camped in border areas for months. Despite their c1aims that ex-NRA soldiers in the RPF would
face charges "punishable by death," Ugandan authorities made no effort to arrest,
deter, or otherwise controi these RPF forces. (HRWAP, 21)5
Responses to the Invasion in Uganda
The Ugandan reactions to the Rwandan invasion were mixed, reflecting the nature of past and present relationships between the
Rwandese and the Ugandans. The reactions can be usefully grouped
into a number of related categories, the first of which comprised those
who were very close to the Rwandese. This group maintained that the
refugees had legitimate and conscionable reasons to return home with
dignity. Accordingly, this group applauded the RPA's victory. There
were, however, some in this group who did not want to see the refugees
repatriated; partly because they continued to benefit from their elose
ties with the refugees. Another section embraced the repatriation because of expected economic benefits to be gained in Rwanda after the
refugees' victory (author's interview of a prominent DP leader, London, April 1994).
The second category comprised those unfriendly to the refugees.
They also applauded the invasion, seeing it as a humane way of getting
rid of "the Rwandese refugees who had become a social and political
scourge... [who] had infiltrated the entire political, social and economic
fabric of the Ugandan community" (Essack, 5). This group demanded
immediate repatriation of the Rwandese after the invasion, and for the
immediate cessation of all diplomatic, economic, and military assistance to the RPFIRPA. This group comprised the majority of Ugandans, who saw repatriation as a viable response to the country's land,
employment, economic, and political problems (Africa Con: 22 March
1991,6).
An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army
47
The third category comprised those unfriendly to the refugees and
the invasion. This group believed the invasion to be financed and largely
supported by the Ugandan government. They felt that the war was not
in Uganda's national interest; that it represented little other than an
expansion of the "Tutsi confederacy" which would entrench the group's
colonization and exploitation of Uganda.
The fourth group initially supported the invasion on the grounds that
it would lead to repatriation of the refugees. However, they became
hostile when some of the refugees were allegedly parachuted in to register and vote in the Assembly elections. The Weekly Topic reported on
26 November:
Tension is mounting in many parts of the country where ethnic Banyarwanda
have settled with more and more local authorities barring them from registering
as voters in the fortheoming Constituent Assembly [elections). The controversy
which started in Kabale last week is spreading to Buganda districts of Masaka
and Mpigi where either side is insisting on their position. At the same time a cross
section of people ... called for the suspension of the registration exercise until the
issue of citizenship has been clarified.
The fifth category comprised those who hated the Rwandese because the invasion, RPA mobiIization and armed confrontation caused
the loss of their peoples' lives and property. Though found throughout
the country, this group was concentrated in Kigezi, where armed engagement occurred. Some tried to get compensation from the government. The Monitor reported in its 28-30 June 1995 issue that "about 82
families, which lost relatives during the RPF war against the Rwandese
government, have appealed to President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni for
assistance" (7).
The final group feared that the growing anti-Rwandese sentiments
stirred by the invasion, coupled with the strong Rwandese presence in
the government, would have deleterious effects for them because they
resembled the Tutsi. This group occupies the Kisoro District (Bufumbira).
In an attempt to avoid persecution, they declared to the country that they
are no longer Banyarwanda, but Bufumbira. A. Ruzinda, who is closely
linked to this group, summarized their predicament:
There is a general belief that every Munyrwanda is either an immigrant alien or
an alien refugee. This has led to the violation of the rights of the Banyarwanda
citizens to the extent that the peop1e of Kisoro District wou1d rather be called
Bufumbira in order to escape the suspicion, persecution, hatred, ridicule and discrimination that quite often goes with being called a Munyarwanda. (New Vision:
14-18 Jan. 1994, 1-2)
48
The Path of a Genocide
Conc1usion
A few observations can be highlighted. First the persistent persecution of the Tutsi in the Great Lakes region since 1959 paved the way for
the formation of the RPA. Second, the RAP's emergence as a dominant
military force was directly related to the military victory and tenure of
the NRAin Uganda; indeed, mostleaders of the RPAheld similarpositions in the NRA. Third, many factors influenced the invasion of
Rwanda, including (though not exclusively): diserimination and alienation in the NRA; factionalism in the RPA; Museveni's political survival strategies; and the prevailing economic, political, and humanitarian
climate in the post-Cold War regional and international arena. Fourth,
there is considerable evidence that the mobilization for the invasion
was public knowledge in Uganda. This in tum suggests that President
Museveni's regime was almost certainly aware of it as well. The existing evidence also indicates that the regime trained, provided sanctuary,
arms, logistical support, political, and diplomatic assistance to the RPA
throughout the period of military engagement in Rwanda.
The invasion intensified anti-Rwandese sentiments in Uganda to their
boiling point. It was thus not surprising that the inhabitants of the Kisoro
district consciously changed their ethnic identification to avoid association with the Rwandese. The legitimacy crisis the invasion caused
for the Museveni regime strongly suggests that Rwandan refugees will
likely face persecution in Uganda when the President loses power. FinaIly, any regime in Uganda that is hostile to the Rwandese willlikely
shorten the life span of the RPAlRPF in Rwanda.
Notes
l. In the same interview, Dr. Bayingana c1aimed that our people "increasingly saw
the need to master military science if we were ever to overthrow the Rwanda
dictatorship. Accordingly, when the NRA launched an armed struggle, for us we
also saw the opportunity for individual training and actually participating in
order to get experience without raising the eyebrows of both the NRA leadership and Rwanda government" (Essack 1993, 19).
2. After Rwigyema's death, Major Paul Kagame, who was in the USA on a joint
Uganda-American military training program, returned to Uganda and proceeded
to northem Rwanda to assume the leadership of the RPA. Since Kagame had
been actively involved in the power struggle, his assumption of leadership did
not eliminate hostility between the camps. Indeed, the Banyigana camp and other
dissenters were effectively, and at times brutally, silenced (see Human Rights
Watch Arms Project 1994,9).
3. In September 1996, at the Kigali conference where the internationally sponsored AdelmanlSuhrke report was discussed, many government representatives
An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army
49
(including the Ugandan ambassador) vociferously denied that Uganda knew of
the invasion. As proof, a Rwandese RPF official testified that he had personally
phoned to tell Museveni of the invasion at 11:00 P.M. This report is conspicuous
for several reasons. First, why would an RPF official phone Museveni in New
York to tell him of the invasion? How would he know where to find Museveni?
Second, he testified to calling at 11:00 P.M.; if this is Ugandan time, it is over
twelve hours before the 5:00 A.M. time when Museveni clairned to learn of the
invasion. Why would Museveni wait so long before informing Habyarimana?
Third, the officer claimed he toId Museveni about the invasion, while Museveni
maintained that he was aware only of the desertions. Finally, the statement directly contradicts Museveni's claim that he learned the news from General Muntu.
4. See briefing given by the Minister of State for Foreign and Regional Affairs,
Hon. David Omara-Atubo to Diplomatic Representatives Resident in Kampala
on 4 October 1990, 1.
5. See also New Vision, 10 October 1994: 28. The paper reported that one of the socalled deserters, the Vice President and Minister of Defence, Paul Kagame, was
Museveni's guest during Uganda's 32nd independence celebration (cf. Sunday
Vision, Vol. m, l, 8 Jan. 1995). The paper illustrated that it has been "established that Rwandese Vice-President Maj. Gen. Paul Kagame and top officials
of the RPF, who left Uganda to attack their country in October 1990, are still
holding Ugandan passports. The passport controi officer, Mr. O.B. Muchandara,
teasingly toId the journalists that 'these people have not yet retumed our guns,
so how do you expect them to surrender the passports? I even don't know which
passport General Kagame used when he visited Uganda last October.... [A]sk
customs agents at the border.... We don't know who has gone back, who is a
Munyarwanda because these people applied for passports as citizens of Uganda. '"
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3
The Role of Zaire in the Rwandese Confliet
Shally B. Gachuruzi
Introduction: Zaire and the Great Lakes Region
The strong influence of Zaire in the Great Lakes Region (Uganda,
Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire) has always been a feature of the political
landscape of the region. These four countries share geographical boundaries, culture, and three of them share a colonial history. Until 1960,
Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire were all under the same colonial administration. Zaire, by far the largest, in fact, the second in size in Africa,
and the richest of the four in natural resources and people, became
independent before Rwanda and Burundi, two of the smallest but most
densely populated countries in Africa. With the independence of Zaire
in 1960, Rwandese and Burundians who were in Za'ire became Zaireans.
For five years, until 1965, Zaire adopted and preached a policy of noninterference in the internai affairs of Rwanda and Burundi, but that did
not last.
When President Mobutu came to power in November 1965, Zaire's
position of noninterference in the internaI affairs of other countries
changed. Mobutu supported the opposition to the Rwandese government and trained the opposition top cadres, such as Bisengimana
Rwema, his former cabinet director. By contrast, he maintained a cordial relationship with the first President of Burundi, Michel Micombero,
who was his personal friend. When Juvenal Habyarimana took power
in Rwanda (1973), President Mobutu supported the new Rwandese regime, but then opposed President Bagaza, who overthrew his cousin,
President Michel Micombero of Burundi, in a 1976 coup.
This chapter depicts the role played by the Zairean government in
the Rwandese crisis, but only after providing the demographic, politi51
52
The Path of a Genocide
cal, and economic background on the Banyarwanda l in Zaire, which
includes both Hutu and Tutsi. The first section examines the demography of the region of Zaire occupied by the Banyarwanda, their nativebom cousins and other ethnie groups. The paper then describes the
political culture of the Banyarwanda and their economic (and political)
role within Zaire. Only then does the chapter return to the relationship
between Zaire and Rwanda until the RPF invasion of Rwanda.
The Demography of the Kivu Region
The Kivu region, located on the Eastern side ofZaire, shares borders
with Rwanda, Burnndi, Uganda, and Tanzania. 2 It is the most overpopulated region in Zaire with 8 million people, representing one-fifth
of the Zairean population, almost the equivalent of the Rwandese population prior to the genocide of 1994.
In addition to Hutu and Tutsi and their ethnic cousins, the North and
South Kivu regions, where the majority ofboth the old Rwandese refugees (1959-1962) and the 1994 more recent mass migration of refugees were sheltered, are oecupied by the following ethnic groups: Nande,
Hunde, Nyanga, Hauw, Shi, Rega, Fulern, Vira, and Bembe. The Hutu
and Tutsi constitute almost 40 percent of the population of the province. The Hutu are the second largest ethnic group in this region and
are mostly farmers. The Tutsi, a minority, are usually cattle herders.
The history of the Banyarwandese migration to Zaire dates back to
the sixteenth century. The King of Rwanda attempted to extend his
power base in the Kivu region, which was already inhabited by indigenous Banyarwanda called Banyabwisha. Having conquered the region,
he planted Bivumu "power trees" and put his representatives in Busanza,
Jomba, Rugari, Gisigari, Kamuronsi, and Gishari. The Rwandese Kingdom thus extended further than the present border in North Kivu. However, the eurrent boundaries became fixed after the First World War in
1926, and the Rwandese Kings lost the region previously conquered in
Zalre.
The Belgian eolonists favored the Rwandan oceupation of Masisi in
North Kivu, arguing that Rwanda was overpopulated and therefore that
the Rwandese needed the extra territory. The eriterion of overpopulation was determined by the size of eattle herds rather than the number
of people living in a particular area. Hutu and Tutsi, totaling about
6,000 families by 1944,3 were sent to Masisi, not only to cultivate the
fertile lands, but also as labor to replace the indigenous population whose
The Role of Zaire in the Rwandese Conflict
53
lands were expropriated by the colonialists. As a result, the indigenous
population not only refused to work for the colonialists, but, with the
exception of their historical cousins, the Banyabwisha, resented the
migration of Banyarwanda, leaving a legacy of suspicion between the
Banyarwanda and the Nande, Hunde, and Nyanga.
Additional migratory waves into Zaire followed, fITSt in 1959, during the Rwandese revolution, and again in 1962, at the time of Rwandese
independence. This last wave comprised more than 50,000 Tutsi refugees who located mainly in Nyamitaba, Goma, Bibwe, Ihura, and
Bugabo. Braeckman (1994,318) wrote,
... at the time of independenee the influx of refugees added, along with past migrations and the Rwandan revolution in 1959-1960, more than 50,000 mostly
Tutsi refugees, that erossed the Zairan frontier.
The Political Situation of the Banyarwanda
During the first republic of Zaire (1960-1965), the political situation of Zaireans of Rwandese extraction was stable. Their representation in the provinciaI govemment was significant: they served as
ministers and members of the provinciaI parliament. However, at the
loeal level, especially in the Masisi district where they constituted a
majority (+85 percent), the Banyarwanda lacked representation.
Then, in 1964, in elections ostensibly held in order to provide representationaI equity in all the important positions at the loeallevel, the
Banyarwanda won in Masisi. The provinciaI govemor, however, canceled these elections because he was antagonistic toward the Banyarwanda. As a result, the "Kanyarwanda," a war between Banyarwanda
and Bahunde, broke out in Masisi in 1964 and lasted until 1965. The
Governor sent a military force to quell the rebellion, and many
Banyarwanda were killed.
Sinee that time, the relationship between the Banyarwanda and the
indigenous population, with the exception ofthe Banyabwisha, has been
characterized by tension ready to explode into a civil war. The hostility
against the Banyarwanda, and against the Tutsi in particular, remained
very strong. The Banyarwanda were accused of usurping power in Za'ire,
and of profiting from the eountry's wealth to agreater degree than the
indigenous population. Aecording to Braeckman,
their relative eeonomie sueeess, dynamism, and sheer numbers weakened the 10eal populations-the Hundes, Nyangas, Nandes-who felt inferior on their own
soil. During the national eonferenee, quite a few grievanees were aired by the
54
The Path of a Genocide
natives, who reproached individuals of questionable nationality (who straddled
the fence and presented themselves as Zairans while all the while supporting the
FPR on the Tutsi issue) and accused them of taking over their best lands. The
Tutsis of Goma withdrew and were blamed for sending their children to rejoin the
Front while the Hutus showed themselves to be more sensitive to the major ethnic
propaganda campaign coming from Kigali. (Braeckman, 1994: 319)
During the fifteen years of the second republic (1965-1980), the political situation in Zaire in general, and in Kivu in particular, remained
calm. Bisengimana Rwema, the Director of the Zairean Presidential cabinet from 1970 to 1980, played an important role in this respect, taking
care of the interests of Tutsi. Even though Banyarwanda occupied important posts at the administrative level, they did not hold senior political
positions. However, during the elections which followed this period of
relative tranquillity, Hunde candidates, who later became members of
parliament, indulged in irregularities and were accused of rigging the
elections. Consequently, the postelection period was characterized by
waves of protests, all of which were quickly but violently quel1ed.
The antagonistic relationship between the Banyarwanda and other
ethnic groups reached a breaking point when, in 1981, Zaireans of
Rwandese extraction lost their Zairean citizenship by the cancel1ation
of the law of 5 January 1972, which had recognized Zairean citizenship
for most Banyarwanda. That law had stated that
"Zairan, are all persons one of whose ancestors is or was a member of one of the
tribes established in the territory of the Republic of Zaire by the very latest 15
November 1908 and as they are modified by later agreements." Article 15 states
that "natives of Rwanda-Urundi who had settled in the province of Kivu prior to
the 1st of January 1960 and who continued to reside since that time in the Republic of Zaire until the time this law takes effect, obtained Zairan nationality on 30
June 1960."
However, on 29 June, 1981, the Zairean parliament passed a law explicitly canceling the citizenship rights for the Banyarwanda in Kivu,
except for the native Banyabwisha. Since then, the Banyarwanda have
not been allowed to vote. Even for the period when they could vote,
they were ineligible to run for political office.
More recent events have both exacerbated, and been the outcome of,
ethnic tensions that have been ongoing since 1964. For example, in
1993, in the Walikale and Masisi zones, North Kivu, in the Eastem part
ofZaire, Nyanga-Hunde launched a surprise attack against the Banyarwanda. After one day of killings, the Banyarwanda stopped the attack
and quickly inflicted a defeat on the aggressors, but not without a large
The Role of Zaire in the Rwandese Conflict
SS
number of deaths (as manyas 7,000, according to Braeckman 1994)
and the creation of many refugees.
Even though many observers c1aim that the major cause of this ethnic conflict arose from the Banyarwanda's disregard of the traditional
authority in trying to put in place their own structures, the real reasons
were that, on the one hand, the indigenous people were jealous of the
Banyarwanda success in business, and, on the other hand, ethnic conflict and violence was stimulated and used by the Zairean regime to
deflect criticism and legitimize its political power. Even though the
Zairean government, in dismissing Kalumbo and Barnwisho, the governor and vice-governor, respectively, of the North Kivu region during
this period, tried to disassociate itself from the ethnic conflict and violence, the government did nothing to punish the vice-governor,
Bamwisho (Nyanga), who was the principal instigator of the attack
against the Banyarwanda. After Bisengimana Rwema retired from office, Tutsi in the 1980s and 1990s no longer occupied major political
positions in Zaire and, what is worse, lacked a powerful protector.
Even though the Banyarwanda won the military battle, at great cost,
they lost the subsequent political war. The battle ended with the violent
repression of Banyarwanda, the same result as the war of Kanyarwanda
discussed earlier. While the President of Zaire may have forsaken assisting the Tutsi to recover power in Rwanda, the Tutsi in Zaire never
forgot the project, hoping that one day they would return home. These
events reinforced that desire. The loss of Zairean citizenship, political
power, rights, and the protection of the state kept reinforcing the motivation of the Tutsi to recover their Rwandese citizenship even though
they wielded economic power in Zaire.
The Economic Power of Zairean Banyarwanda
and the Rwandese Crisis
As already stated, many Banyarwanda, particularly the Tutsi, were
financially successful in business in Zaire. 4 All Zairo-Rwandese entrepreneurs were-and continue to be--engaged in different areas ~isubfo
ness in addition to being cattle breeders. This conforms with Rwandese
tradition: ownership of large herds of cattle and sheep and the employment of hired workers, servants and courtiers are long-standing symbols of prestige and social status.
Even though they themselves could not hold political office, the economic power of these entrepreneurs implicitly conferred upon them a
56
The Path of a Genocide
degree of political power. They had a network of powerful colleagues,
and were called upon for consultations with those who held political
office. Consequently, to some degree, they were able to influence political decisions, particularly in economic matters. Links to political
power are very helpful in succeeding in business in Zaire. Political
support can either allow entrepreneurs to advance, or be a cause of
their failure. Some even argued that political connections were the sine
qua non without which one could not achieve economie success. For
Bayart (1989), the relationship with the govemment allowed individuals to become rich and to acquire social status at the local, regional, and
nationallevels. There certainly tended to be a direct correlation between wealth and political power.
The Tutsi, like other Zairean businessmen, understood the dynamics
of the system. They fostered relationships with Zairean politicians and
acquired access to govemment privileges. Indeed, during the second
republic (since 1965), the symbiotic relationship between the govemment and the business community grew. This was possible due to a
covert network among govemment agents and businessmen. 5
However, it would be a mistake to think that entrepreneurs cannot
achieve success without govemment connections. McGaffey's research
(1987) on Nande traders who succeeded in business without govemment connections supported this conclusion. But once wealth had been
acquired, successful businessmen were "integrated" into the "circles
ofpower."
Even though Braeckman (1994) argued that the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) was supported financially by the Rwandese diaspora in
Canada and the United States, there is evidence that most of the support
came from the Tutsi of Zaire. Further, the Thtsi in Zaire provided recruits. For example, in 1990, Zairo-Rwandese recruited and trained new
Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) soldiers in Bibwe,6 North Kivu, Zaire. In
1993, a ship with a load of weapons, owned by a Zairo-Rwandese and
destined for the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) soldiers, was apprehended
by Zairean security forces; it was later released without explanation.
Conceming financial support by Tutsi in Zaire, Reyntjens (1994: 148)
wrote that
during the first two years of the war, the refugee communities contributed nearly
$2 million and some wealthy sympathizers made considerable individua! efforts.
All these examples provide evidence of the involvement of Zairean
Tutsi in the Rwandese crisis. However, there was one important differ-
The Role of Zaire in the Rwandese Connict
57
ence between the situation among the Banyarwanda in Zaire and those
in Rwanda at this time. In contrast to the atmosphere of hostility between Rwandese Hutu and Tutsi, the Hutu and the Tutsi ofZaire, prior
to the genocide and the flight of Hutu refugees into Zaire, had been
very united. During the 1964 "Kanyarwanda" war between the
Banyarwanda of Zaire and the Bahunde, as well as during the 1993
crisis when the Nyanga and Hunde attacked them, Hutu and Tutsi of
Zaire acted together in fighting the indigenous population. Amongst
the Zairean Banyarwanda could be found an intense spirit of cooperation. For example, traders did not ask for a written statement as testimony of debt; rather they relied on trust. If an abuse of trust occurred,
the abuser was not sent to court. The person would be judged by a
family council which was constituted of both Hutu and Tutsi. AIso,
interethnic marriages flourished between the two groups, and traditionai ceremonies, such as births, funerals, ancestor reverences, and
other communal events, brought Hutu and Tutsi together. There was
ample evidence that the Banyarwanda in Zaire got along weIl and enjoyed a very positive relationship quite separately from their need for a
united front when they faced a hostile indigenous population.
Rwandese-Zairean Relations
However, the economic power, which translated itself into a degree
of political power, and the friendship with the local Hutu were all for
naught when the Rwandese Hutu refugees, led by the well-armed exFAR and interahamwe, arrived in 1994 following the genocide in
Rwanda. The Tutsi in Zaire themselves became targets of violence,
attacks and ethnic cleansing. The Hutu refugees seemed to have the
tacit and probably overt support of the govemment. Even though communal solidarity had become part of everyday existence, and reflected
a consolidation of the socioeconomic structure, ethnic cohesion could
not survive the presence and actions of well-armed extremist Hutu.
The relations between the Hutu extremists from Rwanda and the
govemment of Zaire had a history, for there was a cooperation accord
between Rwanda and Zaire. Claiming to be the guarantor of peace in
the region, in 1979, the Zairean President initiated the creation of the
"Communaute Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs" (CPGL), which
inc1uded Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire. This organization (CPGL), the
creation of which was ratified in 1985 by the three member countries,
was more a political or symbolic arrangement than an economic one. It
58
The Path of a Genocide
purported to prevent military confrontations between member countries, and stood for noninterference in the internal affairs of each of the
members by any other member.
In 1985, Zaire and Rwanda concluded an additional accord which
provided for common security services, the sharing of security information, military cooperation and interdiction of opposition movements
on each other's territory. This accord was used to justify the arrest of
Zaireans in Rwanda. It also explained why the authorities of the former
Rwandese government could find refuge in Zaire after the genocide in
Rwanda.
According to some interpreters, the cooperation went even deeper;
even though Habyarimana seemed to be in control of the political situation in Rwanda during his term in office, important decisions were
actually being made after consulting "big brother," President Mobutu.
Didn't the latter always support and counsel, didn't he also act as "mediator,"
even if he had generally suggested to his neighbor that he present a strong face for
the FPR, and not allow Westerners to strong-arm him? (Braeclcman, 1994: 172)
When, in 1990, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) attacked Rwanda,
in keeping with the military cooperation between Rwanda and Zaire,
the Zairean government sent elite troops to quell the rebellion. The
Zairean army fought beside French7 and Rwandese soldiers; together
they initially stopped the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). The Zairean
army was not paid by either the Zairean government or the Rwandese
government for their involvement in the battle against the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). Zairean soldiers engaged in systematic pillage and
the rape of women and teenagers. Given their propensity for destruction, at the request of Habyarimana, Zairean troops were sent home
after the RPF incursion had been halted. They left Rwanda with trucks
laden with looted goods such as televisions and other electronic and
electrical appliances (Braeekman 1994, 72).
Paradoxically, while Zairean troops were fighting in Rwanda, new
Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) recruits were being trained in Bibwe/
North Kivu. Members of the Zairean parliament denounced Zairean
involvement in the war, arguing also against the President's tacit approval of military training on Zairean terrltory. What seemed initially
to be a defeat suffered by the RPF largely at the hands of the Zairean
troops, was actually the beginning of the end, not only of the government in Rwanda, but of the Mobutu regime itself. The victory of the
Zairean army over the Rwandese rebels in Rwanda in 1990 would be
The Role of Zaire in the Rwandese Conflict
59
the last hattle they would win, in fact, the last hattle in which they acted
as an effective fighting force.
Notes
1. The term Banyartvanda refers to Zairean Hutu and Tutsi who were in Zaire until
30 June, 1960. It also includes Rwandese Tutsi and Burundian Hutu refugees
she1tered in Zai're. This term does not include the Banyabwisha who are Zairean
natives. The Banyarwanda in Africa in 1994 before the genocide were distributed as follows: Burundi-5,831 ,000; Rwanda-7,903,OO; Uganda-l,200,000;
Zaire-4,OOO,OOO for a total Banyarwanda population of 18,934,000 (Cf. Universal World Atlas, Maplewood, New Jersey, 1994).
2. In 1990, the region was split into three distinct provinces: North Kivu, South
Kivu, and Manierna.
3. The numbers that came grew from 354 families in 1937 to 629 in 1938, 1,453 in
1940,1,931 in 1941,2,169 in 1942, 3,718 in 1943, 6,050 in 1944, and 6,173 in
1945 (Jewsiewicki 1984,47).
4. For example, the Bisengimana family during the Mobutu regime came to own
more than half of Idjwi island on Lake Kivu. They engaged in cattle ranching
and also controlIed the Zairean computer market. The millionaire, Maro, controlled the telephone market. Haga bred cattle and owned a large share ofZai're's
hotel business, including one of the most prestigious hotels in Zaire. As well,
Haga also controlled the Zairean automobile market. Kaku, the leader of the
stock breeders organization in Kivu, owned almost half the cattle stock in Masisi.
Zayo, also a stock breeder, was in both the hotel and the coffee business.
5. Alain and Edgar Hazoume (1988, 41) wrote:
The average consumer, totally marginalized, is in no way encouraged to
participate in national economic development. It is not so much his weaker
income that causes him to undertake nothing , but the paralyzing impression that all the economic cogs are selfishly appropriated. This is why Africans think that they cannot make their fortune without being directly or
indirectly served by political power. They are not altogether wrong, because it is difficult to see, since independence, the fortunes that have been
able to accumulate independently of political instances. It seems, on the
contrary, that the best springboard for starting a business .. .is a symbiosis
with political authority.
6. Bibwe is situated in the Masisi zone, North Kivu, where the majority of the
population consists of Rwandan refugees from the 1959-1962 period.
7. See Callamard's chapter and Prunier (1995), who would interpret this description of the French role as an overstatement [eds.].
The Development
Consolidation of
Extremist Forces in Rwanda 1990-1994
Joan Kakwenzire and Dixon Kamukama 1
Political Party Formation
On the eve of the invasion by the RPAJF, Rwanda appeared quiet;
the opposition in the country seemed to have become resigned to being
forever ruled by the Habyarimana party-the MRND-practically the
only political party in the country. The single party system was a product of the history of multypartyism prior to independence and the process of achieving that independence.
The history of political parties in Rwanda exemplifies ethnic cIeavage primarily rather than nationalism or ideology. Parties, prior to independence and after, were formed along "ethnic" lines first and then
ideology or personalities. The independence struggles in Rwanda were
at first marked by the formation of movements aimed at the abolition
of "class" privileges and preferential access to jobs, as weIl as creating
opportunities for education for all and ultimately inaugurating genuine
independence (Amaza, 1995). Gnegoire Kayibanda created MSM, the
Mouvement Social Mahutu. The Tutsi had concentrated their major
political efforts on the royalist party, the National Rwandese Union
(UNAR-Union Nationale Rwandaise), a pro-Monarchist anti-Belgian
political party which emerged in 1959 largely supported by Tutsi to
push for independence.
However, the Belgians misrepresented these struggles to mean that
Tutsi organizations sought to dominate the Hutu majority even though
some of these organizations crisscrossed Hutu-Tutsi cleavages. By 1959,
the Belgians had completely fallen out with the Tutsi. To counter the
61
62
The Path of a Genocide
assertiveness of the UNAR, in 1959 the Be1gians persuaded Gregoire
Kayibanda, who wou1d become the first President of independent
Rwanda, to convert his Hutu movement, MSM, into the Parti du
Mouvement de L'Emancipation de Bahutu (PARMEHUTU).
PARMEHUTU, as its name suggests, was a party which aimed at emancipating the Hutu from the alleged perpetua1 feudal oppression of the
Tutsi. With the formation of the PARMEHUTU, the independence
strugg1e in Rwanda took a new tum and became a Tutsi-Hutu strugg1e.
Other political parties formed during that period a1so had an ethnic
inclination even though two parties tried to rise above ethnicity.
APROSOMA (Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la MasseAssociation for the Social Promotion of the Masses), a primari1y Hutu
political party, was started in the November 1957 by Joseph Gitera.
RADER (la Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais, the Rwandese
Democratic Union) was formed in October of 1959 by Chief
Bwanakweri, supported by moderate Tutsi and backed by Be1gium to
counter the royalist Tutsi independentist UNAR. With political growth
concentrated in ethnic-based political associations, the ground was prepared for subsequent ethnic extremism.
What exacerbated extremism was the hand lent to the Hutu by the
Be1gians to ensure Hutu domination of the Tutsi (Amaza 1995; Africa
Rights 1994). After the mysterious and abrupt death of King Mutara
Rudahigwa III of Rwanda in Burundi in Ju1y 1959, the Be1gians spearheaded the abrupt and vio1ent end of Tutsi ru1e in Rwanda. In the infamous revolution of 1959 which began on l November 1959, thousands
were massacred, thousands more fled the country, and over 20,000 were
displaced internally (Watson 1991, 4). Watson (as well as othersKamukama 1993) recognized that ethnic conflict was aggravated by
the Belgian intervention in Rwanda politics and the subsequent crackdown on Tutsi. By 1960 Be1gian favoritism against the Tutsi was full
b10wn. Watson provides as an example the arrests in November 1959.
After some order had been established following the initial flghting,
919 Tutsi as compared to on1y 312 Hutu were arrested and charged
with causing public disorder.
The ethnic vendetta continued after independence, this time with
exiled Tutsi, mostly nonmonarchist, causing most of the disturbances.
The leftist Tutsi had formed a c1andestine guerillalike organization, the
!nyenzi (cockroaches), which sought to force the government to perrnit
the Tutsi return to Rwanda. Though eventually effectively destroyed
by 1964, between 1961 and 1966, large1y from bases in Burundi,Inyenzi
The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda
63
launched ten fierce attacks against the PARMEHUTU regime (Watson
1991). In the December 1963 surprise attack, when the invaders from
Burundi got almost as far as Kigali, they were not only beaten back,
but a pogrom against Tutsi led to the execution of Prosper Bwanakweri
(leader of RADER), the slaughter of 10,000, and the flight of tens of
thousands of additional Tutsi into exile. Thus, ethnicization of the internal Rwandese political struggles led to a war waged literally by "outsiders" against the "insiders" which then further reverberated on the
insiders in tum. The intemal tension, with its externaI counterpart in
violent conflict, and its reflection in tum in intemal repression, would
be repeated with much greater devastation decades later.
Amaza (1995) noted that the "ethnicization" also opened avenues
for further imperialist repenetration into Rwandan affairs. Since the
Rwandese-in their struggle for independence-failed to rise against
the Belgians on a united front, they allowed colonialists to step in as
arbitrators in post-colonial Rwandan problems. The neocolonialists were
able to exploit this situation. The annihilation policy of the Kayibanda
regime against the Tutsi political elites and the opposition political parties aggravated the situation. Parties, like the UNAR, APROSOMA,
and RADER, were banned, resulting in a one-party dictatorship, even
though the results of the communal elections in June and July of 1960
overwhelmingly favored PARMEHUTU which won 2,390 of the 3, 125
positions, the remaining positions divided almost equally among
APROSOMA, RADER, and independent candidates, with UNAR humiliated with only fifty-six positions. From the new bourgmestres who
had replaced the traditional chiefs as head of the communes in the 1960
elections, 160 in 229 communes were PARMEHUTU. Ahuge majority
was not sufficient; a monopoly was demanded. But this move was not
made immediately.
On 28 January 1961, Kayibanda organized the meeting ofbourgmestres
and municipal councilors in Gitarama to declare a sovereign Democratic
Republic ofRwanda, though independence would not be forrnally granted
until l July 1962. A nationallegislature had to be created. In the 25 September 1991 elections, PARMEHUTU won almost 80 percent ofthe seats,
virtualIy monopolizing Hutu representation since most of the opposition
seats went to UNAR which now became the main representatives of the
Tutsi intemally, thereby fixing the Tutsi-Hutu divide as weIl as forming
the ground for a one party monopoly. As the U.N. Trusteeship Commission Report of March 1961 had described the situation, araciaI dictatorship of one party had been created.
64
The Path of a Genocide
The subsequent annihilation of the opposition Hutu as weIl as Tutsi
parties meant that the single-party dictatorship had to devour its own
insiders-the Hutu. Kayibanda surrounded himself with Hutu supporters mainly from his home base in Gitarama as weIl as the Butare
(Astrida) area. This alienated him from the northem Hutu who felt that
they had been isolated from the system. The political stance shifted
from an "ethnic" to a regional basis for the concentration of power and
the distribution of oppression. In response to his political isolation and
using the massacres ofHutu by the Tutsi leaders in Burundi in the spring
of 1972 as either a catalyst or an excuse, Kayibanda began persecuting
the Tutsi anew, rigidly enforcing the 9 percent quota for Tutsi in higher
education, govemment, or even private employment. The result of this
witch hunt backfired when the "people's" committees began to attack
the authorities as weIl as the Tutsi.
To restore peace, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, a former
Minister of Defense and Head of the National Guard, staged a bIoodless coup on 5 July 1973 in which the northem Hutu conspired and
toppled the Kayibanda establishment (Amaza 1995, 8). The coup in
itself helps to demystify the long standing perception of the Rwanda
crisis as a result of "age-old hatred of the Hutu for Tutsi," since the
1973 coup exhibited a house divided against itself (Hutu against Hutu).
Habyarimana did not help the situation. He simply perpetuated and
consolidated the interethnic and intraethnic divide/divisions in Rwanda.
For instance, like Kayibanda, he established a single party dictatorship
under MRND, a party he helped to found in 1975. The single party
stuck with its extremist policy of equilibre ethnique et regional (ethnic
and regional equilibriurn) which was used as a basis for the distribution
of resources and opportunities. Though Habyarirnana ended the coercive persecution of the Tutsi, the policy continued to operate on a quota
system (ratio) according to the population size of each "tribe" The
MRND also possessed a very strong intelligence system which it used
to further the interests of the Habyarimana regime.
That intelligence system was very useful in aborting the attempted
April 1980 coup of Colone1 Theoneste Lizinde, a Hutu and Security
Chief from the northem district of Bugoyi, the rival to Habyarimana's
horne base in Gisenyi. Lizinde had been used by Habyarimana to kill
dozens associated with the former Kayibanda regime. Arrested with
others and jailed for over a decade, Lizinde was freed in 1991 by the
RPF in the offensive and capture of Ruhengeri. He was then recruited
to join the RPF.
The Development and ConsoUdation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda
65
By the end ofhis role, Habyarimana's regional and later family politics, led to his almost total reliance on "ldnsmen" from the northern
region to perpetuate himself in power. The nucleus of his support was
mainly his home area of Gisenyi. Determined to maintain their power,
they are believed to have eliminated rival allies, such as Colonel
Stanislas Mayuya in 1988, and critical opponents such as the journalist, Father Silvio Sindambiwe, and a member of the opposition in Parliament from Butare, Felecu1a Nyiramutarambira. This explains why
the flrst victims of Hutu extremist genocide in 1994 were mostly Hutu
from Central and Southern Rwanda regions (see Africa Rights, 1994).
By the time of the RPF invasion of Rwanda, the Central Command
in the country had been shaken. The Habyarimana regime, which had
entrenched itself politically through its party, the MRND, found out
that it was not only being challenged by the military invasion of the
RPA, but also by opposition from the newly formed political parties,
journalists, the international community, and other organizations of
groups or individuals. Something had to be done to save the regime. In
the attempt to fortify their hitherto unchallenged social, political, and
economic position, the seeds of extremism developed in the colonial
period in the ethnicization of politics were now being sown in the narrow regional danism that saw all outsiders as threats to their monopoly
on power.
However, on the surface, events seemed more promising. While at
face value, the situation in Rwanda on the eve of the invasion appears
to have been quite normal (the Rwanda National Bank at the time provided flgures that showed that inflation was running at a negligible 1.7
percent), underneath flowed two currents, one a political!military threat
from outside, and the other an economic/political one from within.
The 1986 National Resistance Movement (NRM) takeover in Uganda
was to have important political implications for Rwanda. Most of the
young men and women who had participated in the Uganda guerilla
war were Banyarwanda refugees living in Uganda. Some of them acquired very high ranks and positions in both the government and the
army. This was one of the flrst "shock wave" messages to the rigid
regime of Habyarimana. For the first time, he saw in these young soldiers in Uganda a possible formidable opposition force against him.
This probably explains why on 27 July 1987, the Central Committee of
the MRND issued a declaration announcing that it would not allow the
immigration of large numbers of Rwandan refugees, offering the excuse that the country's economy was incapable of sustaining increased
66
The Path of a Genocide
numbers. The announcement was made at this time because the
Habyarimana regime feared that Rwanda's refugees would want to return home no matter the means and that the Rwanda refugee group in
U ganda would be the first group that would want to return.
Habyarimana's visit to Uganda in February 1988 to discuss the problem of refugees brought him much c10ser to one of the real problems
his regime was facing.
Secondly, political tension was slowly mounting within the country
as weIl. The economic crisis facing the country, to which the President
personally admitted on 16 June 1987 by appointing a management committee for the crisis, added to the pressure on the regime. Coffee prices,
the main export crop which financed the government, collapsed in 1986.
The World Bank and IMF were forcing a SAP, a structural adjustment
program, on Rwanda, severely cutting the dole available to his supporters. The pressure to maintain the monopoly on power thus increased.
At the same time, a few incidents in the early 1990s demonstrated
the increasing political tension as well as the increasing boldness of the
opposition. There were signed petitions by intellectuals in August of
1990 demanding moves towards democratization. On 7 September 1990,
when Pope Paul visited Rwanda, the President dec1ared what could be
seen as graded amnesty for convicted prisoners in the country, graded,
because all but the political prisoners were pardoned. Habyarimana
could not bear the thought of his political opponents being out of prison.
One year later, the situation had changed dramatically internally as
weIl as externally. The RPF had invaded on l actober 1990 which had
spurred the opposition significantly. Though the invasion was initially
followed by a wave of arrests and murders, the opposition in fact became emboldened. The initial reaction of the government was to use
force to counter any move against it. However, pressure from the international community demanded that the Rwanda government open up
the democratic process in the country. So while the government forces
faced externaI politico-military pressure from the RPA and the international community, internaI pressure, especially from the multipartyists,
increased.
Byearly 1991, the Habyarimana government realized the futility of
using force in sorting out the political mess in the country. This partly
explains why the government accepted the process of peace talks and
the many cease fires with the RPF. On the home front, the government
adopted a positive policy towards the opposition. In the first week of
March, for example, the government announced the release of 1,500
The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda
67
prisoners who had been accused of being supporters and sympathizers
with the RPF. Those that had been sentenced to death would not be
executed. On 14 March, President Habyarimana announced the establishment of amnesty centers at Kinigi, Cyanika, Rwempasha, and
Kaniga. RPA fighters were given fifteen days to report to these respective locations.
Though earlier on the President had promised political reforms in
the country as a verbal gesture, on 10 April 1991, a commission, that
had been put in place to prepare a political reform program, actually
recommended that the President institute reforms: modify the 1978
constitution, abolish the single-party system, and create the post ofPrime
Minister. These were presented by the President to his cabinet on 21
April. On 28 April President Habyarimana presented the same political
reform recommendations to his MRND extraordinary congress. At this
meeting, the party changed its name to the Mouvement Republicain
National pour la Democratie et le Developpement (MRNDD) from the
Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement (MRND),
a symbolically important change.
At the same time, political parties were reconstituted or founded
openly: UPR, the Union du Peuple Rwandais, the Rwandan People's
Union, a political party established in Brussels on 9 November 1990 by
Silas Mayjambere; MDR, the Mouvement Democratique Republicain,
the Democratic Republican Movement, founded in March 1991 as the
successor to the first President, Gregoire Kayibanda's MDRPARMAHUTU, which became the main opposition party; PSD, the
Parti Social Democrate, the Social Democratic Party, in AprilJMay
which became the second largest opposition party; PL the Parti Liberal,
the Liberal Party, that same spring led by Justin Mugenzi, the third
largest opposition party with many Tutsi and business-minded members; and PDC, Parti Democrate Chritien, the Christian Democratic
Party, the smallest of the four opposition parties to the Habyarimana
regime, also founded in 1991 and led by Nayinzira Nepomuscen.
The arrest of three editors were, however, the most telling. The editor of !jambo, founded in 1990, Fraw;ois Xavier, was detained in May
and charged with slandering military officers and demoralizing the army.
On 3 July 1991, Vincent Rwabukwisi, an editor of the newly founded
bimonthly newspaper (Kanguka), was arrested on charges of subversion and endangering state security for allegedly working in collusion
with Rwandan refugees living abroad; the government asked that he be
given a sentence of twenty years in prison. Three days later, another
68
The Path of a Genocide
editor, Hassan Ngeze of Kangura, a rabid pro-Hutu paper, was also
arrested on charges of subversion and endangering state security for
threatening relations with Burundi when he wrote in one of his columns that 70 percent of Rwanda's wealth was in the hands of the minority Tutsi. While Ngeze's arrest could be interpreted as a strong point
favoring the Habyarimana regime-indicating fairness in suppressing
both Tutsi and Hutu opposition and a regime that could not reject the
will of the people of Rwanda-the arrest indicated both an intimidation and a public relations exercise. 2 All three editors were let out in
September without even being tried.
Habyarimana's March 1990 promise of a move towards multipartyism
and democracy to mollify the French appeared-but only appearedto be in the process of realization. To understand why it was not fulfil1ed, we have to return to the politicallmilitary threat from outside.
The Extremist Response to InternaI Reforms
and the Invasion by the RPF
The invasion by the RPF on 1 October 1990 did not make the tense
political atmosphere any lighter; the president/government now had to
contain both internai and externai pressures. While the seemingly positive attitude to political reform was taking place, not everyone in the
country was happy about these changes. Probably even those announcing them might not have been committed to them. People, especially
those from the North, and including MRNDD sycophants who had for
long benefitted from the monolithic regime of Habyarimana, were not
happy to see "bread falling from their hands." The army too, was divided, and this resulted in mutiny on 1 May 1991. At the same time, the
beneficiaries of the regime started making maneuvers on how to continue the system even in the face of new political reforms.
On the surface, however, the reforms seemed in the process of institutionalization. On 7 May, the National Assembly discussed the new
political reform recommendations and resolved to develop a new law
on political parties and to write a new constitution reflective of a multiparty system. The President was reported to have warned against formation of parties based on ethnicity, as had been the case in the past,
but eventually the Assembly determined to allow the formation of sectarian parties provided they had an open membership.
President Habyarimana on 10 June 1991, after many consultations
and with mounting pressure from different sides, signed a new consti-
The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda
69
tution legalizing multiple political parties, putting in place the post of a
Prime Minister as head of government business and reducing the powers of the President. At the same time he signed a law that set out rules
by which parties would function. A new chapter appeared to have been
opened in the political history of Rwanda. The practice would show
whether this indeed was a new chapter.
By August 1991, about twelve new political parties were operating
in the country, not only the MDR, the PSD, the PL, the PDC, and the
MRNDD, but also seven smaller parties instigated by Habyarimana as
possibly adeliberate attempt to make a sham of multipartyism. The
most notorious of these small parties was yet to appear on the scene.
The extremist Hutu CDR, Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique,
Coalition for the Defense of the Republic was founded in 1992 and led
by Martin Bukyana.
While the image painted by the political reforms appeared positive,
the reality was different; the political atmosphere was still tense with
fear and suspicion. This was not the flrst time multipartyism operated
in Rwanda. The central question remained whether these parties would
improve the political situation or not. More speciflcally, what role did
they have in acting to check extremism or in the development of the
extremist ideology? A brief examination of the history and performance
of political parties in Rwanda might help throw some light on what the
performance of these new parties would be.
Political Subversion
This was reflected in the preparations which the Habyarimana regime made to defend their political (and economic) power. The strategy with respect to political parties had three tracks. First, this
preparedness included the infIltration of the opposition political parties
by agents of the regime so as to water down the intentions of some of
these parties and create extremist Hutu factions within them: it was no
wonder that some of the parties, that started as formidable opposition
parties, eventually relapsed to the "the old time religion" of worshipping the MRND which had monopolized power since 1975. Secondly,
it involved creating a myriad of small "opposition" parties that were
really alternative fronts for Habyarimana. Thirdly, the CDR (Coalition
For the Defense of the Republic) was a creation of Habyarimana and
his supporters to give an impression that MRNDD was relatively moderate at the same time as the regime justifled the creation of the party as
70
The Path of a Genocide
a testimony to its own dedication to multiparty democracy, though Parliament at one stage rejected this political party because of its ethnic
stance. The party's Manifesto c1early shows (p.S) that this was a sectarian party based on an extremist ideology. Mr. Martin Bucyana, its President, on the occasion of the official acceptance of the party, was reported
to have said, "We are convinced that the unity of the Bahutu will stop
violence and will bring the excess ambitions of the minority Tutsi to
their acceptable leve}" (Human Rights Report act. 1994).
Inculcation of the Philosophy ofExtremism
One general observation about political parties is that most of their
manifestos preached progress and development of Rwanda. However,
as noted above, the CDR preached open hostility towards those prepared to deal with that opposition-be it real or imagined-and branded
them as enernies. The philosophy of extremism was, in fact, rooted in
the MRND and was considered to be the "best" way to face the challenge caused by the rebirth of political party activities in the country
which once again brought into the country the element of opposition
and challenge 10 the repressive and choking decades old authority of
the MRND. While the new political parties did not represent the old
scenario as it was at the time of independence when political party
formations strictly followed ethnic c1eavages, an almost similar pattern was followed by the main opposition party, the MDR. But even
more telling was the regionalism of that and other parties. The MDR
had its base of support in the center and south of the country as did the
PSD which was backed by many involved in inter-marriages. Further,
for the first time, the regime was openly challenged by individuals or
groups of individuals that Habyarimana viewed as a formidable force
against his hitherto unchallenged power. Political party leaders like
Faustin Rucogoza of the MDR, and Fredrick Nsamwambaho of PSD,
were strong personalities that commanded great respect and popularity
countrywide. The Habyarimana regime and its MRND had the greatest
support from the northern parts of the country and itself was riven not
only by moderate and extremist factions, but by those same factions
regionally based in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri respectively. So while the
preindependence political party formations divided the country primarHy along ethnic lines, the new parties of the 1990s divided the country
along regional and personal lines as weIl.
The challenges were met by a strong resistance from the party in
The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda
71
power. Supporters of the regime were determined not to let such new
challenges go by unchecked, preparing the ground for the institutionalizing of extremism initially through the use of propaganda, misinformation, indoctrination, politicization of ethnicity, and the militarization
of politics. With these in place, extremism had taken root. The next
step was to consolidate it.
Consolidation ofExtremism
The invasion of Rwanda by the RPF/A crystallized a process that
had slowly been developing prior to this invasion. On the surface, the
regime was bending to accommodate the internalopposition and the
threats from the invading RPF. But this only reinforced the sense that
extremism was the only force that the regime could employ in order to
save itself from falling.
While there were many different ways in which extremism as a political weapon was consolidated, we can group them under two main
themes: the politicization of ethnicity and the militarization of politics.
As noted above, ethnicity in Rwanda was a weapon that the colonial
regime used to justify its presence in the country. Rwanda was so politicized at the time of independence that the country was split politically into two sharply divided groups of Banyarwanda: Bahutu and
Batutsi. The country went into a civil war because of this ethnic factor
in 1959, and the subsequent regimes of Kayibanda and Habyarimana
did very little to de-ethnicize politics in Rwanda. The result was that at
the time of the RPFIA invasion of the country, erroneous signals regarding the enemy of Rwanda (inyangarwanda) had been sent. Amistaken identification of the problem of Rwanda was made when the
regime of Habyarimana pointed an accusing finger at the Batutsi as the
greatest enemy of the country. Ethnicity was highly politicized. 3
Ethnically based political parties ... failed to conceive of a post-colonial state other
than an ethnically discriminatory one ... either in favor of "Hutu majority" or organized as a "Constitutional Tutsi monarchy." Parties ...capable of organizing on
an anti ethnic basis and of being sites of a democratic prescription in the postcolonial state were overwhelmed by others and circumstances much as the absence
of an independently organized working class movement. (Wamba-Dia-Wamba
1994)
Further, the absence or weakness of civil society organizations incamating emancipatory politics (worker's peoples' committees for political independence, etc.) which would recognize the multiplicity of
72
The Path of a Genocide
the people of Rwanda and weaken the ethnic forces was fatal (Wambadia-Wamba 1994, 13). Thus, ethnicity in the country at the time of independence and after became a political issue. It is no wonder that the
policy of using the ethnic identity cards, that had been introduced by
the colonial administration, continued to be used, especially during the
Habyarimana era.
With the Tutsi out of power at the time of independence, their image
as the "overlords" in Rwanda never 1eft the political scene in Rwanda.
Both the Kayibanda and the Habyarimana regimes used the "Tutsi overlord image" to consolidate power for their own Hutu group. This ethnicity
issue was not only politicized, but rnilitarized and radicalized when the
Tutsi in exile attempted to recapture power by force (the Inyenzi invasions of 1961-66). These invasions not only radicalized politics in
Rwanda, but were used by different regionally-based Hutu groups to compete over which party could be most "purely" the defenders of the Hutu,
thus reinforcing divisions within the Hutu camp while reifying the antiTutsi identity of both. This division took the form of regional divisions
(NOIth versus South), which eventually led to the coup that toppled the
Kayibanda regime (Wamba-Dia-Wamba 1994).
The Habyarimana regime thus made no attempts to redress this ethnic problem. At the level of ideology, racism was propagated among
Rwandan youth at school, through radio and theater. In school, the history syllabus painted the Tutsi as natural enernies of the Hutu, and projected the sectarian PARMEHUTU party as a national salvation force.
This systematic preaching of racial ideology served to keep alive racial
hatred at a time when opportunities existed for national reconciliation.
The post-independence ruling cliques went further than simple indoctrination. Though the Habyarimana regime initially stopped the
pogroms against the Tutsi, it also made their plight worse by enforcing
the policy of ethnic ratios and introducing regional quotas with the
hope of correcting the inherited ethnic and regional imbalance of disproportionate numbers of Tutsi and Hutu southemers in the professions
and higher education. They introduced racism in state organs and made
it official state policy. Based on fictitious statistics, the ruling clique
allocated educational and employment opportunities on a quota system. The Hutu were officially allowed 90 percent of educational and
employment opportunities, while the Tutsi and Twa got only 9 percent
and 1 percent respectively. Further, to "re-balance," a disproportionate
number of the Hutu places went to northemers, and a disproportionate
number of northem spaces went to those from Gisenyi. This was the
The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda
73
system officially called "ethnic balance" (or equilibre ethnique). The
policy, in fact, created much more regional and ethnic animosity than
had ever'been known in the country. This will partly explain why, in
Habyarimana's propaganda machinery, and later on in the killings, his
target groups were both the Batutsi (generally), whom he saw as his
immediate and number one enernies, and members of the opposition,
most of them Bahutu from the South.
Further, to facilitate the operation of this policy of official discrimination, the state continued the colonial practice of ethnic identity cards.
This meant that a person could be identified quickly as a Mututsi or
Muhutu by mere glancing at his or her identity card. However, even if
someone carried a Hutu ethnic identity card, but was known in his 10cal commune as a Tutsi, that individual was treated as a Tutsi since he
could not obtain the required letters for entry into higher education and
hence the professions.
But even this system of "ethnic balance" did not apply in all spheres
of national life. In the armed forces, for example, only Hutu were allowed to serve. After over three decades of post-independence, Rwanda
had only one Tutsi army officer. Further, to maintain the "purity" of the
Rwandan military, no army officer was allowed to marry a Tutsi woman.
Such was the scale of state sponsored racism.
However, before the RPFIA invasion in 1990, the "ethnic thing" had
somehow become less of a political issue. Part of the explanation
emerges from the fact that between 1968 to the mid 1980s the threat of
refugee (Batutsi) invasion had greatly decreased. Hutu extremism, which
had increased when there was the threat from the Batutsi, was for sometime contained, especially with the strong MRND in control. The majority of the party's strong men were men and women from
Habyarimana's family (relatives) in the north, (members of what they
terrned AKAZU, meaning a small house), who, in their attempts to
consolidate their regime, turned to regionalism as their instrument of
political control and cultivated an image of people in the south as the
enerny. The "ethnic thing" had in away created a certain consciousness
which made the Batutsi look at the Bahutu as "the other group" and the
oppressors. This "Otherness", be it from the regional angle of the ethnie factor, was an important factor in the creation and consolidation of
extremism.
The 1990 RPFIA invasion gave the Habyarimana regime the opportunity to reawaken the ethnic consciousness in Rwanda, a consciousness that viewed the invader/the enernyas being the Batutsi. Extremism,
74
The Path of a Genocide
which did not begin with the invasion, was now reinforced and slowly
began to consolidate. The MRND, which had monopolized power for
long time, had never faced asociopolitical crisis as the one brought
about by this invasion; the regime had to ensure that it employed all
manner of political maneuvers to ensure the security of their regime.
One of the methods Habyarimana employed was to strengthen his sectarian policies through an ideology he called "UNION OF THE
BAHUTU" whose aim was to work up the Bahutu against the Batutsi.
Some of the methods employed in their attempts to save the regime
included the use of propaganda, misinformation, assassinations, intimidation which, when put together, formed a strong basis for the consolidation of extremism. Alan Zarembo has made a pertinent observation
that partly explains why most African leaders (and Habyarimana in
particular) were not willing either to be democratic or to relinquish
power.
Colonial regimes taught Africans bad lessons in government. First, people came
to believe that political power is the only source of wealth. The state dictates who
prospers. Second, political entrepreneurs learned that manipulating ethnic identity is an effective way to stay in control. (Zarembo 1994)
These methods of Habyarimana were used to exclude possible challengers to his monolithic regime. As aleader, he had many followers
who believed in him and in whatever he said. His followers had actually
given him the title UMUBYEYI-which literallY means the parent, the
provider and the one above everything. This kind of belief in an individual is dangerous, and was bound to cause problems in the country.
Propaganda and Misinformation as Instruments
in the Consolidation of Extremism
In 1992, a commission set up by the Rwanda Govemment to define
the real enemy of Rwanda, reported on 21 September 1992. The enemy
was defined as:
Tutsi inside or outside Rwanda who are extremist and nostalgic for power... who
want to take power in Rwanda by force. (Minister de la Defend Nationale "Definition et identification de l'ennemi," 21 September 1992)
The signal being sent to all people of Rwanda (read Hutu) was that
the enemy was Tutsi. The report was meant to incite the Hutu, who
now had the backing of the government, to deal a blow to this "enemy."
The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda
75
A program of misinforming the general populace and spreading ethnic
hatred through any means available was set in place.
A few examples can be cited here to show seeds of animosity that
were being sown by MRNDD propagandists while extremism took root.
On 10 December 1990, in its 6th Edition, Kangura, (which literally means
wake them up), a newsletter owned by Habyarimana's principal private
secretary, Co!. Elie Sagatwa, and the army chief of staff, Co!. Serubuga,
issued what they termed ''Ten Commandments." These "Commandments"
were supposed to appeal to and guide the supporters of the Habyarimana
regime in how to deal with their "enemy," the Tutsi. It also provided a
philosophy to justify why those in power should stay in power. Among
those commandments, the following really helped in working up some
elements among the Bahutu into becoming extremists:
l. Every strategic point, be they political, administration, military and security, must be entrusted to Bahutu.
2. The education sector (pupils, students, teachers) must be majority Hutu.
3. Rwandese Armed Forces must be exclusively Hutu; the experience of
October war has taught us a lesson; no military person should marry a
Tutsi woman.
4. The Bahutu should stop having mercy on Batutsi.
5. The Bahutu, wherever they are, must have unity, solidarity and be preoccupied by the fate of their Hutu brothers. The Bahutu, both inside and
outside Rwanda, must constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu
cause, starting with our Hutu brothers, must constantly counteract the
Tutsi propaganda, and must be firm and vigilant against their common
enemy the Batutsi.
6. The 1959 social revolution, the 1961 referendum, and the Hutu Ideology
must be taught to every Muhutu and at all leveis. Every Muhutu must
spread this ideology widely. We shall consider as a traitor any Muhutu
who persecutes his Muhutu brother for having read, spread and taught
this Ideology (Ondoga Ori Amaza 1995).
The pursuit of the policies based on the "Ten Commandments" philosophy eventually paved the way for the massacres that erupted in
Rwanda, especially after Habyarimana's death. People had been fed an
unhealthy diet of an ideology based on ethnicity. Ethnic emotions have
often empowered a people collectively to perform acts of unbelievable
cruelty and savagery.
Another piece of the propaganda literature that transformed peoples'
emotions into extremism was an official pamphlet titled, "The Whole
Truth of the actober 1990 War Imposed Upon Rwanda by Aggressors
76
The Path of a Genocide
from Uganda Armed Forces." This paper, targeted towards the whole
nation, described the motive of the RPF/A invasion as wanting to set
up an extended Tutsi-Hima Kingdom in the Bantu area of the Lake
region, and compared the RPF/A to the historical genocidal regimes of
Hitler of Germany and Pol Pot of Cambodia (Kigali, Afrepadem, and
Leon Mugesera, March 1991).
The psychological preparation of the population of Rwanda towards
extremism continued, especially through newspapers and the radio. Fiery
speeches by prominent persons in society and deliberately organized
meetings prepared for the killings. Rwanda is quite a literate country
with over 69 percent of the people able to read and write. It was, therefore, easy for the propagandist and exponents of ethnicity to reach the
general populace. There were in all about twenty extremist newspapers
that were used as the mouthpieces of the regime, especially beginning
in 1990. Among these, the most notorious ones were: Umurwanashyaka,
Umurangi, Interahamwe, Echo des Mille Collines, Ijambo, Kangura,
La Midaille Nyiramachibiri, and Kangura International.
Another media device that was used by the regime to prepare the
population psychologically was radio. The state-owned radio carried a
message of hatred and extremism, but nothing compared to Radio Television Libre des Mille Collins (RTLM), a privately owned radio whose
directors were mostly members of the AKAZU, licensed for broadcast
on 4 April 1993, and exclusively intended to prepare people's minds
for genocide while it broadcast the most popular music. This FM radio,
which broadcast propaganda and misinformation, had the state as its
patron; for example, the station had an uninterrupted power supply newsprint in a time of shortages, the bills for which were paid for by the
state.
Journalists on RTLM, among them, Gihigi Gaspard, member of CDR,
Habimana Katano, member ofMRND(D), and Bemeriki Valerie, member of CDR, spent all day broadcasting intoxicating propaganda based
on ethnicity. This was an effective tool of preparation for extremism
since it reached all peasants in the country.
Another related example of radio used to propagate the message of
ethnicity and extremism occurred when Ferdinand Nahimana, Director
of the Rwanda Office of Information (ORINFOR), and founder member of CDR and RTLM radio, broadcast a "communique" on Radio
Rwanda, purportedly issued by a Human Rights Activists group based
in Nairobi. This "communique" allegedly issued on March 1992 claimed
that a plot by Tutsi who wanted to kill prominent Hutu in the country
The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda
77
had been unearthed. This broadeast, which was repeated flve times,
was aimed not onIy at creating animosity of the Hutu against the Tutsi,
but was also intended to make the Tutsi in Rwanda feel guilty and intimidated. The effect of such a broadcast was really far reaching; it was
not only heard by the Tutsi, whom it psychologically undermined, but
by the majority Hutu population on whom the effect cannot be mistaken.
In the same theme of psychoIogically working of the population towards extremism, important persons issued statements that ensured that
extremism was indeed consolidated. Among such persons was Leon
Mugesera, a graduate from Rwanda and Canada, Vice-President of the
Gisenyi MRNDD, ideologue of extremism and a man of considerable
repute. In his famous speech of 22 November 1992 at an MRND meeting in Gisenyi, he not only decIared all other political parties, other
than MRND and CDR, accomplices of the enemies of Rwanda, but
advocated extermination of these accomplices of the RPF.
You cell members, work together, watch over intruders in your cell, suppress them.
Do anything you can so that nobody sneaks out. ... The fatal mistake that we made
in 1959 .. .is that we let them (Tutsi) out of the country. Their homeland is Ethiopia through a short-cut, Le., River Nyabarongo. I want to insist on that point; we
must effectively react. .. " (Wilson Rutayisire 1995, 11)
In a similar manner, on 6 December 1990, Kangura pnblished an
articIe written by the Hutu community living abroad entitled, "Appeal
to the Conscience of Bahntn." In its concInsion, the article appealed to
all Bahutu to accept as their own the "Ten Commandments." It continned, "[I]t is high time for ns to wake up, to deepen our consideration
and to be aware of a new ideology, the ideolog y of the Bahutu which
consists of defending all that was granted by the Revolution of 1959
and that of the referendum of the 25 September 1961" (Kangura Vo1.6,
1990).
These messages indeed had the effect they were intended to have.
Taking Leon's message for example: when the massacres started, the
machete was the main implement in the genocide, and bodies were
put in the Kagera River which at one point joins the Nile which flows
towards the north (Ethiopia-"the Tutsi homeland"). The poor peasants had taken in the message; they became a fertile ground for extremism. The speech of Leon Mugesera aIso shows the impunity with
which these perpetrators of crimes carried on their game unimpeded.
Under a sober government, Mugesera would have been convicted for
inciting violence.
78
The Path of a Genocide
M ilitarization
The second phase in the consolidation of extremism that eventually
led to genocide was the militarization of ethnicity. This phase was no
longer one of talking, but of arming and training militia in the name of
saving the regime. In reality, the militia were not only intended to save
the regime, but to be implementers of the racist ideology of Hutu versus Tutsi. The key to this direction was the expansion of the army, reequipping it with more sophisticated killer weapons, the training of
paramilitary groups, and arming some sections of the population.
According to Human Rights Watch (Jan 1994), at the time the RPF
launched their attack in October 1990, Rwanda had an army of only
5,000 men, equipped with light arms including Belgian-made FAL,
German-made G3 and AK automatic rifles. It also had eight 812 mm
mortars, six 57 mm antitank guns, French 83 mm Blindicide rocket
launchers, 12 French AML-60 armored cars, and 16 French M. armored
personnel carriers. By the time the war ended, the army had expanded
to at least 30,000 strong, armed with a wide range of heavier guns and
weaponry. This flood of heavier arms and weapons systems contributed to thousands of civilian casualties and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more. France, Egypt, and South Africa have been
singled out as the suppliers of this arsenal. With all this strength, the
impunity of the armed forces to commit crime increased. Military operations (which were in reality massacre operations), especially those
carried out by the Presidential Guard, became the order of the day. It
was this same army, which was being trained and equipped by the French
that in tum trained the militia and youth wingers of the MRND and
CDR in extremist killer tactics. The Presidential Guard was actually
part of the army that was created after the 1990 invasion. Its composition actually points to its extremist character; it was made up of exclusively Hutu extremists from the home area of Habyarimana and his
wife. It was the regime's most trusted section of the army.
Intensive military training was started in different parts of the country. Among the areas of training were: Nyungwe and Gashwati forests,
Rusumo, Mugesera, and Sake, all in Kibungo Prefecture. Another training camp was at Bugarama in Changungu prefecture. Other significant
ones were at Nyandungu, Mutara, and Gako. In these training camps,
youth wingers, especially the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi--youth
wingers of CDR--received training. The Interahamwe, who were a notorious and most feared civilian terrorist group, was an armed youth
The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda
79
wing of the MRND created in 1992 with the sole aim of terrorizing the
perceived enemies of the regime. They were later joined by the
Impuzamugambi. Interestingly, they-like the arrny-were divided into
sections, each with a particular "assignment" to accomplish. The activities of these militia groups were usually coordinated by the army.
Ironically, the Commander of the Interahamwe, Robert Kajuga, who
tumed out to be a notorious extremist killer, whose targets were Tutsi,
was himself of Tutsi ancestry. His extremism could have been an overreaction to prove to the regime that had him in power, that his was an
unwavering commitment.
In 1993, these groups intensified their terror, often putting up roadblocks to trap their targets. At times they raided homes and staged massive propaganda demonstrations in Kigali streets. It was these groups
that later committed atrocities in the Bugesera and other areas.
Other than the training, there were various secret meetings at which
details of genocide plans were made. Some of these meetings include
those held on 17 November 1993, presided over by the then Chief of
Staff, Col. Deogratius Nsabimana at Byumba. The following day, at
Remera in Kigali, Joseph Nzirorera-then Secretary General of
MRND-convened another meeting whose objective was to map out
ways of eliminating all Batutsi and those opposed to the segregation
ideology. Concrete plans were made to deploy militia in Kigali,
Gitarama, Nyanza, and Bugesera, areas mostly inhabited by Tutsi. Another known meeting was presided over by Habyarimana himself at his
Robero Hotelon 20 November 1993. At this meeting, issues dealing
with logistics to be used by the killers-like the distribution of weapons such as guns, grenades, knives, pangas, axes, and the provision of
transport-were discussed. Extremism was not only consolidating, but
plans were being drawn up to implement that extremist ideology. But
the final stage-that of implementation of these plans-was yet to come.
This stage of the implementation was direct1y linked to the Arusha
Peace talks to which the extremists were opposed. They referred to
them as "jokes." With the diplomatic pressure at Arusha and the readiness and determination of the RPF to bring order in Rwanda (a fact that
Habyarimana was well aware of), it was feared in the extremist circles
that Habyarimana would give in to this pressure. This is why implementation of the final Arusha agreement was delayed. If the agreement
was implemented, the long held genocide plan of the extremists would
never succeed. While the truth of the shooting down of the plane carrying Habyarimana and the President of Burundi on 6 April 1994 has not
80
The Path of a Genocide
yet been established, all accusing fingers point to these extremists as
the ones that decided to get rid of Habyarimana who seemed to be
getting in their way. Extremism had turned on and devoured its own
leader.
The killing of Habyarimana unleashed the wave of killing that saw
thousands massacred within hours of the downing of the plane. The
killings seemed to follow adeliberate pattern designed by the killers
before the incident of 6 April. The killers went after not only Tutsi, but
any other person they thought was against them, be they Hutu or Tutsi.
Top members of opposition parties were especially targeted. Vice President Agatha Uwilingiyimana and her family were merely the most
prominent victims. Within two weeks of the outburst of this blood bath,
about one quarter million people had been killed. The well-worked-out
plan of the extremists had indeed come to fruition.
One cannot help but conclude that extremism and genocide had indeed been planned when one looks at the utterance of Col. Theoneste
Bagosora immediately after the shooting down of the plane. He accused Belgian troops within the U.N. peace keepers as the plotters of
the incident that killed Habyarimana, a diversionary measure not only
to sew confusion but to provide less of a motive for the RPF to make a
concerted push for Kigali and "disturb" their plan. If Bagosora had
pointed an accusing finger at the RPA, the RPF might have descended
on Kigali as quickly as possible, not only to save their counterparts
who had earlier arrived in Kigali under the Arusha Treaty arrangement,
but also to save the Tutsi and other Hutu moderates whom they always
saw as easy targets of the Habyarimana regime.
A lady survivor, Christine, who testified before a conference on Genocide organized in Kigali 5 November 1995 said the plan to wipe out a
section of the people of Rwanda had been hatched a long time before
the plane crash. 4 She testified to the effect that the state-owned radio
station issued announcements immediately after the crash, to the effect
that people should not leave their houses. This made the people easy
targets since they were found in their houses. Her whole family had
been found at home; all her children, husband, and other relatives were
killed. They had been faoled into the carefully laid trap of the extremist
killers. Since misinformation was one of the tools of the killers, they
made il appear--even when massacres had begun in the countrysideas if this was just something small happening only in Kigali and the
surrounding area. They used their propaganda machinery effectively.
This explains why people ran to upcountry areas hoping that they would
The DeveIopment and ConsoIidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda
81
be safe, not knowing of the roadblocks and other terrorist acts that waited
them; they walked into their death traps.
Agnes Mukeshimana (seventeen years old) and Emmanuel
Ntabonvura (fourteen years old), both Tutsi survivors of the genocide
at Mugombwa in Muganza in the southem borders of Rwanda with
Burundi, where 26,000 bodies have been collected, also told stories of
the preparations of the killers. The two young people said they smelled
danger when, weeks before the general massacres began, they started
hearing their neighbors and "friends" referring to them as "snakes."
They also pointed to the fact that their neighbors, mostly Hutu who had
always drunk and eaten with them, had for weeks before the genocide
refused to share anything in conunon with them. 5 Agnes also told us of
suspicious secret meetings restricted to Hutu that were always called
by Emmanuel Ndayambaje, the bourgmestre of the area. Indeed, when
massacres started, she had observed that it was Ndayambaje, now in
prison in Be1gium, who directed the killings.
The massacres did not stop until after the RPF had taken over the
govemment. By then the toll of the extremism numbered about one
million peop1e. Extremism in the genocide in Rwanda was carefully
planned, grew, deve10ped and was consolidated, growing in a culture
of impunity, especially in post-colonial Rwanda. The impunity with
which massacres of innocent people were carried out in 1959 continued in 1963, then in 1973, 1991, and 1992. In all these circumstances,
the perpetrators of these crimes against humanity were not brought
before the law to face justice. So the extremist kil1ers in the 1994 genocide were actually continuing a culture of impunity that started decades ago; they had come to leam that there was nothing wrong with
killing any perceived enemy-after aH, if you did, nothing wou1d happen to you especially since this killing was state engineered and sanctioned. This is the culture that guided the extremism that climaxed in
the genocide of 1994 in Rwanda.
The Role of the Int:enlatilon:al Comlmlmilly
in Fostering Extremism
An important factor to consider in apportioning blame in the genocide is the fact that the responsibility was in some cases direct and in
some cases indirect. The responsibility can be assessed not only by
what one did, but also in terms of what one failed to do. While this is a
subject that has been variously treated in detail elsewhere (see Agnes
82
The Path of a Genocide
Callamard, Ogenga Otunnu, Gerard Prunier, Bruce Jones, and others),
if serves our purposes to highlight some issues on the subject. A few
examples here will suffice.
France in the Carnage
Of all the foreign forces that have been implicated in the creation
and development of extremism in Rwanda, France has particularly been
identified as a country that propped up the dictatorial regime of
Habyarimana; France logistically supported the extremist army of the
regime, directly trained extremists, and in some instances French troops
were accused ofbeing directly involved in the mistreatment and killing
of the citizens of Rwanda (Rwandese Review, Aprill993:5-7). France,
therefore, has a moral and legal responsibility in the genocide.
France's connection with Rwanda goes back to colonial times.
Though France was not the official colonial power in Rwanda, French
presence and influence was felt through their Catholic missionaries in
the country who greatly impacted the making of the official colonial
policies in Rwanda. Eventually, French became the nationallanguage
in Rwanda, and therefore part of Francophone Africa. Overall, there is
a symbolic relation that France nurtures with its former colonies; this
is what leads her to providing military and financial aid to a network of
countries that fall under her direct or indirect influence. In all these
former colonies, especial1y in Francophone Africa, their relationship
with France has been characterized by what John Darnton of New York
Times service has cal1ed "a Faustian bargain": " ... allow in French technocrats to run state enterprises and companies, trade mainly with the
mother country, and sign a military assistance pact and you will be
secure. France will prop up your economy by giving you the African
Franc which is supported by the French treasury, and rush its army to
your side if trouble develops" (New York Times 27/4/94).
That "Faustian bargain" has indeed characterized France's relations
with Rwanda. Her interest and presence in Rwanda did not so much
come to the fore until 1975, two years after Habyarimana took over
power from Kayibanda. Mr. Habyarimana signed a military cooperation agreement with France. Indeed, when the RPF/A started the war
against the regime, France rushed in combat troops, mortars, and artillery to help the government. Although the government of France later
said these forces were for the purpose of protecting French and other
foreign nationals in Rwanda, reports were received of these troops com-
The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda
83
ing into direct combat against the RPF/A advances. In some of their
areas of operation, not a single French citizen lived there, yet the argument advanced bad been that the French Military presence could be
explained by their need to protect their nationals in Rwanda (Human
Rights Watch Arms Project, January 1994). The French also were involved in instructing the militias and the regular army in the use of
some of the arms they brought (Rwandese Review, April 93:5-7).6 This
same source notes that during the days of genocide, while the extremist
militias and government troops hunted down their perceived enemies,
the French troops interrogated those captured just before they met their
death. Some RPA sources also told of how, during the combat, they
were able to eliminate the man operating the artillery gun, a French
Legionnaire (RPF/A anonymous).
The leaders of France and Rwanda also had very elose family tiesMitterand of France and Habyarimana were friends, but their sons, Jean
Christophe Mitterand and Jean Pierre Habyarirnana, were not only eloser
friends, but that friendship was consolidated further by business dealings. The two camps used political power in their countries in order to
boost and protect their respective economic interests. The Rwanda Review (2:3, 1993) ran a letter from Mitterand to Habyarimana, a letter
that was not only both personal and official, but also talked about the
interests of France in Rwanda. There is also an indication that Jean C.
Mitterand was one of the biggest arms dealer in Rwanda. It was therefore in the interest of France that there should be use for the arms France
was ready to supply to Rwanda, arms that eventually ended in the arms
of the hands of the extremist killers.
All these point to the fact that France bears a degree of responsibility for the extremist massacres that befell the country in 1994. Even if
France had not been involved in the arming, training, and indirect combat on the side of the government, the failure of France to denounce
loudly and unequivocally the crimes against humanity in Rwanda is
itself questionable. France had a military presence in Bagesera and
Bagogwe, where the initial massacres took place, yet they never publiely or otherwise denounced these killings, or even chose to investigate them. Quite the reverse-France continued training the regime's
forces in Central Africa and in France.
At the height of the killings, France sent in her troops in an operation code named Operation Turquoise. This was supposed to be a humanitarian operation-a force of intervention to stop the genocide and
save the survivors by creating "safe havens" or "no war" zones. This
84
The Pain of a Genocide
would have been a welcome gesture on the part of France, especially
knowing that they had spent months watching "their students"-the
Rwandese extremists--committing offenses, without France raising a
finger. Though some lives were saved, interestingly, however, the areas under the jurisdiction of Operation Turquoise-Kibuye, Cyangungu,
and Gikongoro--where there was no war fought, were after the war
found to be among the worst hit areas; they were areas with the greatest
physical destruction as weIl as enormous numbers of lives lost. The
biggest question becomes, what happened to these "safe areas"? Were
the French the ones who destroyed them or did they stand by as the
militias and govemment troops wrecked havoc?
Another glaring factor pointing to French complicity in the extremist genocide lies in the fact that after the death of Habyarimana and the
beginning of genocide in Rwanda, a new govemment was announced
in Kigali, a govemment made up of men and women that are mentioned among the 400 or so leaders of the genocide. France knew these
people very weIl. The vast majority of the victims of genocide were
killed after this govemment had come into power, a govemment that
came into power in spite of the Arusha Peace Accords that called for
power sharing, which had not been implemented. While all the world
waited and watched events unfolding in Rwanda, and some condemned
the killings, France became the flrst govemment to recognize the extremist govemment led by Theodor Sindikubwabo (among others)
against the protests from abroad of Faustin Twagiramungu, the Prime
Minister designate under the Arusha Accords, and in spite of
Sindikubwabo's personal instigation of the genocide in Butare.
The greater sense of "French Nationalism" or (Imperialism?) led
France to want to have her Francophone interests protected. After all
the invading RPFIA was largely made up of men and women with an
Anglophone background; their success would mean supplanting the
French in Rwanda. On the other hand, the personal ties between the
Mitterand and Habyarimana families, and the economic dealings that
they had would draw the French into the conflict. Prunier's chapter in
this book, "Operation Turquoise-a Humanitarian escape from a political dead end," dtes Jean C. Mitterand, son of President Mitterand,
after receiving a call in Brussels from Habyarimana wanting to know
whether French troops would come to his help, commenting (in the
presence of the author), "We'll send him a few boys, old man Habyarimana. We' 11 get him out of trouble. In any case, in two, months ii will
all be over." All these point to those strong family ties, standing mili-
The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda
85
tary agreements, as weIl as economic and language interests that brought
France into the conflict.
The Church
One of the institutions that have been implicated in the extremist
killings in Rwanda is the church. Rwanda is a highly religious country;
about 90 percent of the population are Christians. However, some church
leaders-bishops, priests, and nuns-were among those whose hands
are soiled with blood of those that were massacred by the Habyarimana
regime and its even more extremist successor. The killers were overwhelmingly Christians, as are the vast majority of the 80,000 or so
people awaiting trial for the genocide.
The church's involvement in the politics of Rwanda goes back to
colonial times, when church leaders became the vanguards of divisive
politics in the country. Just like the colonial masters did, the churchespecially the Catholic Church-first threw its support behind the Tutsi.
At the time of independence, they switched sides to support the Hutu
and accused the Tutsi of being oppressors. The story of church's involvement in divisive politics in Rwanda is very weIl documented by
Ian Linden (Church and Revolution in Rwanda, 1977). Names of missionaries like Monseigneur Classe, Monsieur Mortehan, and Cardinal
Lavigerie are particularly associated with divisive colonial church politics that sowed the seeds of hatred in Rwanda.
It is against this background that the church's involvement in the
development of extremism in Rwanda in the 1990s can be understood.
However, while we stress the church's involvement--especial1y the
individuals in these churches-we should also note that during this
same period of suffering, there were wonderful acts of heroism, sacrifice, and even martyrdom, performed by some members of the same
church; more than one-hundred church men and women died at the
hands of extremists.
Usually, the church plays an important role in uniting people. It socializes them and intercedes and cares for them in times of need. There
is a bond, therefore, that grows between the leaders of the church and
their followers; this bond entails respect, trust, and reverence for the
church and their foIlowers. The church, therefore, becomes a haven of
peace and protection. Indeed, when the massacres started, the only place
people felt were safe were churches. Thousands of people fled to church
buildings, but unfortunately it was in these same places that thousands
86
The Path of a Genocide
of people met their death. At a church in Mugombwa in Muganza Commune there are 26,000 bodies, some collected from the surroundings
areas, but most of them from the church at Mugombwa. According to
Ntabonvura Emmanuel (a fourteen-year-old boy) interviewed at
Mugombwa on 2 November 1995, many people who had run from different areas had gathered inside the church for proteetion. The extremists did not respect the church; they threw grenades in the crowd inside
the church, and there were virtually no survivors. The church at
Mugombwa is one of many such churches countrywide where thousands perished.
The top church leaders, like the Anglican Bishop of Kigali and his
Catholic counterparts, played a big role in the development of extremism. Bishop Nsthamihigo (Bishop of Kigali) now lives in exile in Nairobi
in spite of the call for all persons living in exile to return. During a visit
of the Archbishop Cary of Canterbury to Rwanda, he informed Bishop
Nsthamihigo that if he knew he did not have any questions to answer
on the genocide, he could safely return home, but the Bishop chose not
to return.
Church leaders were very elose to political power in the Habyarimana
regime. Hugh McCullum, a Canadian journalist, calls the relationship
between the church and the regime, "an umbilical relationship" (New
Vision May 24,1995). He gives the example of the CatholicArchbishop,
Vincent Nsengiyumva, who was a prominent member of the MRND.
Such a Bishop not only participated in and identified with partisan
politics, thus dividing up his own laity, but knowingly identified with
the MRND with all its sectarian and extremist policies. Other senior
Catholic and Anglican priests are known to have had "hot lines" to
Habyarimana's palace, and drove luxurious cars provided by the state.
In return, these leaders of the church dutifully repaid the regime. In
this respect they failed to provide for their people in the hour of need.
They could not preach against the injustice of the regime nor did they
warn the people of the impending danger. The church should have assumed its role as the conscience of the people. Even in the last hours
when the extremists were killing people, these church leaders never let
the people know that the situation was so bad that the walls of the
churches could offer little protection, though, ironically, it was in
Kabgayi that over 90 percent of the refugees were saved, but Archbishop Nsengiyumva, together with two other Bishops (ineluding the
liberal Bishop Thadee Nsengiyumva) and ten priests, were killed in
June 1994 by an irate RPF soldier who accused them of complicity in
The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda
87
the genocide. The soldier purportedly committed the murders out of
anger and grief and not beeause of a poliey of revenge by the RPF. 7 He
was aetually later pursued in order to be brought to justice.
The ehurch involvement in the history of Rwanda has mostly been
negative; the policies of the church during the colonial times were
c1ose1y identified with those of "divide and rule" of the colonial governments. Indeed Monseigneur Classe and Cardinal Lavigerie are remembered in Rwandese historiography as apostles of sectarianism; the
church became the social arm of colonialism. At the time of independence, this church was not decolonized; the new leaders tended to carry
on with the policies of their forerunners. It was no wonder, therefore,
that some of the leaders of the church were involved in the extremist
acts that engulfed Rwanda in April 1994. On the other hand, for the
many that never actively participated in the genocide, the blame leveled against them is that they largely failed to meet their expected role
in society; they never warned the people or they fooled them into thinking they would offer them proteetion.
Belgium
Belgium and France are the two eountries that have been Rwanda's
traditional assistanee providers and trading partners. Belgium took over
from the Germans as the new colonial masters until Rwanda attained
independence. So, the social political and economic policies of Rwanda,
like those of any other former colony, were largely shaped by the Belgians. The indirect rule policy, the policy of "Ethnic" Identity Cards
and many others, were all created by the Belgian colonial authorities.
And for our purposes-and as noted earlier-ethnicization of polities
and, therefore, the polarization of Rwanda society into two camps of
Batutsi and Bahutu, was the architectural work of the Belgians. Their
roIe in the 1959 "Revolution," where thousands of Tutsi were massacred, is well documented (Rutayisire, 1995:5) Wilson Rutayisire continues to observe that in the same "Revolution" when PARMEHUTU
activists started massacrlng people, they were supported by ground and
airborne units of the Belgian anned forces. Their contradictory and
opportunistic policies started the mass bioodIetting in Rwanda. Their
legacy continued in post-colonial Rwanda.
As for their (Belgian) part in the recent extremism, it was only an
indirect one stemming from the Belgian wIe in sewing many of the
seeds of animosity in the country, but continuing in post-colonial
88
The Path of Il Genocide
Rwanda as if nothing wrong had happened. Major General Paul Kagame,
Vice President of Rwanda, in his address to the Conference on Genocide, made a pertinent remark on the role of the international communitY (in general) in the genocide, a comment that could also be applied
to the role of Belgium. Right from the beginning, especially when the
Arusha Peace talks started, there were many signs that preparations
were being made by the Habyarimana regime to exterminate a section
of the Rwandese people. Yet the international community kept quiet,
and, in so doing, in away condoned and abated crime in Rwanda.
Belgium, however, is to be commended for having cut off military
assistance to Rwanda when the conflict flared up in 1990. Further, among
the first few people to be killed after the plane crash on 6 April 1994,
were ten Belgian U.N. peace keepers who had been guarding Agathe
Uwilingiyimana.
Extremism in RPFIRPA
It would be a great omission not to briefly address the question of
whether there was extremism in the RPF camp, which could also have
contributed to the genocide in Rwanda. The bulk of RPF/A was made
of people from one section of the Banyarwanda; the RPF/A was about
98 percentBatutsi. This certainly helped in concretizing Habyarimana's
suspicion that his enemies were the Tutsi. There was also collaboration
between RPF and Tutsi in Rwanda. One needs to note that the possibility of internally Tutsi-Ied uprising against the regime of Habyarimana
was almost impossible. The RPF invasion, therefore, put the Tutsi in
Rwanda at risk. The invasion in away contributed to providing grounds
and a target for extremism in Rwanda; one could call it extremism by
implication.
Homelessness on the part of Rwandese, especially those that had
been living in Uganda, was another possible source of extremism among
the RPF. True, they had lived in the country for many years, and some
of the RPA fighters had actually been bom in Uganda. The leading
figures ofRPAhad actually been key figures in Uganda's NationalAnny,
and some held high office in govemment.
However, they never were fully accepted in Ugandan society; they
were stilllooked at as foreigners in spite of their contribution to National Liberation and development. This feeling of not being wanted in
your host country nor in your own country made these young men and
women a determined lot. This feeling created fearlessness and a determination that did not tolerate anything short of invading and "going
The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda
89
back home" by force. The 1982 expu1sions of Banyarwanda in Anko1e
and later on, the hostility and discrimination that Banyarwanda faced
from among their colleagues in the Uganda National Army, gave them
the determination to go home. In Uganda, Banyarwanda generally were,
in spite of their status, still considered the underdogs in society.
Discrimination and disappointment may have given them not only
an impervious will and determination to fight and go back to where
they felt would at least be home, but the same "blind" determination
could bring about into1erance and fanaticism among the RPFIA ranks.
For example, the RPF/A were suspicious of anybody that had a different view from their conviction that a return cou1d only be achieved
through a military invasion. Those Banyarwanda, who, before the invasion were not actively invo1ved in the preparation for the invasion
were actually b1acklisted as traitors of the RPF cause. A common saying to such peop1e was, "Tusagusazisha"-meaning "we can make you
old"--eliminate you, an expression also used by the Hutu extremists in
Rwanda. Doctrinaire beliefs and into1erance breed extremism.
While circumstances leading to the death of Dr. Banyingana and
Maj. General Fred Rwigyema-the leading commanders of RPF/Ahave not fully been established, indicators point to the fact that there
was disagreement about their route and method of invading Rwanda, a
disagreement that led to their eventual death.
There may have been instances when ordinary RPF soldiers were
also invo1ved in extremist acts. The case of the murder of the Catholic
Archbishop and ten other Bishops is a case in point. However, the difference with the Habyarimana regime is that such acts were not sanctioned by the Front; actually those that committed such crimes often
met justice. So while we observe that because of their history, treatment and determination, the RPF/A were prone to extremism, their leadership on the other hand had a clear ideo10gy that eventually led them
to stopping the extremist acts of the Habyarimana regime. On the whole,
the RPFIA can be said to have been disciplined, with a c1ear mission of
liberating their country from the Habyarimana regime and the AKAZU.
When the besieged 600 soldiers in the RPF were ho1ed up in the Parliament building in Kigali when the coup took place on 6-7 April 1994
and shot their way out, they not on1y managed to save themse1ves but
many other endangered residents of Kiga1i. 8
Conc1usion
It would be be1aboring the point to say that the period 1990-1994
90
The Path of a Genocide
witnessed unprecedented killing in Rwanda. The work of these extremists was not work that started with the Habyarimana plane crash, but
began with the ideology of separating Rwanda on ethnic grounds as a
tool by the colonial masters. The post-colonial masters developed the
ideology further, until the 1990s when it consolidated into genocide.
All pointers that there would be a massacre in Rwanda were there;
however, ignorance of the history of Rwanda and the disinformation of
the extremist regime, helped by some members of the international
community, delayed or blocked any possible intervention to save lives
in Rwanda. Ethnicity, which the colonial masters had used to suit their
convenience, was also used by the post-colonialleaders, who politicized and later militarized an ethnic ideology. Extremism was a deliberate measure to suit one section of the Rwanda society. The massacres
were not a result of the spontaneous response by people who so loved
Habyarimana, and were pained by his death, and therefore acted to
eliminate his killers (as some circles have wanted the world believe).
The genocide was planned and implemented.
Notes
1. A study group, made up of 1ecturers in the Faculty of Arts Makerere University,
Uganda, inc1uded Joan Kakwenzire and Dixon Kamukama, of the Department
of History, the principle authors of this chapter. The others were Dr. Eustance
Rutiba of the Department of Religious Studies, and Mwambutsya-Ndebesa of
the Department of History, whose valuab1e contributions are acknow1edged. This
chapter, an examination of the causes of extremism in Rwanda within a historical context, is the product of a group effort by these four academicians. Those
involved in the study were selected based on their differences in ethnic and
social backgrounds, their previous studies on the problematic areas of Rwandan
history, and their divergent views on African ethnic conflicts in general and the
Rwanda genocide in particular. Dixon Kamukama, a historian and author of
Rwanda Conflict: Its Roots and Regional Implications, has been invo1ved in a
variety of research on Rwanda. Mwambutsya-Ndebesa has been studying the
social relations between the Bairu and Bahima of Anko1e, who are c1ose1y related to the Bahutu and Batutsi of Rwanda respectively. Dr. Rubita has been
involved in research on the church in Rwanda from colonial times to the present.
Mrs Joan Kakwenzire, a historian and human rights activist, has been closely
foIlowing the violations of human rights in Rwanda. She also contributed to the
report on Genocide in Rwanda comrnissioned by the U.S Comrnittee for Refugees. Though Joan Kakwenzire was originally contracted to undertake the study
herself, she decided to make it a group effort, fearing she would not be objective
in the overall analysis of the circumstances that led to the 1994 mass killings of
kith and kin. The study draws heavily on secondary sources as weIl as the experience of the authors as interested parties in the conflict. Primary data was collected related to the separate areas of specialization of the four researchers. Lastiy,
the views were tested on a cross-section of participants at the International Con-
The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
91
ference on Genocide, Impunity and Accountability held in Kigali 1-5 November
1995. Data and some interpretations from a variety of papers presented at this
conference have been incorporated in this study. Interviews with some of the
survivors of the genocide were also conducted at the conference.
Cf. Chalk 1990, chapter 5, and Chr6tien 1995, 40-42 for more details on the
newspaper Kangura.
Of course, this was an integral part of the history of Rwanda. Part of the blame
must be attributed to the colonialists. They never made any effort to find a solution to the problem of ethnicity that had been amplified by the colonial regime.
Political parties that were formed to usher the country to independence were all
ethnically based and, therefore, could not think of a program that would counter
ultranationalism.
An interview at the Genocide Conference.
This interview was conducted at that site of Genocide at Mugombwa. Agnes
told the interviewer that she escaped death by being hidden by her maternaI
Hutu uncle Emmanuel, who vividly remembered exactly what happened; he
was also interviewed at Mugombwa.
Human Rights Watch Arms Project provides an in depth description of France
in the creation and consolidation of extremism in the country. The report notes
that the French were not only involved in arming Rwanda (just as a business for
a few French people), but that French government troops participated not only
in training the extremists, but at times fought side by side with them.
Immediately after the RPF launched its offensive... the number of French
soldiers swelled to 6SD-four companies including paratroopers. Two of these
companies were deployed on main roads north of the capital. The remainder
were deployed in strategic positions in Kigali ... the Arms Project witnessed
first hand French military activities that at the least were tantamount to direct
participation in the war... French soldiers provided artillery for Rwanda infantry troops ..."
7. For a contrary interpretation, cf. Prunier (1995) 270-72 (Eds.).
S. Interview with an RPF soldier (KIKOFERO) who was at the CND building during the last battles for Kigali.
5
Rate Radio in Rwanda 1
Frank Chalk
The Role of Radio
Radio is the premier means of reaching the public with news and
information in countries where most of the population is illiterate and
television sets are rare. But much of the world is not part of an electronic global village when it comes to radio news. Because of its crucial role, many govemments rigorously controi radio news through
govemment-ownership of radio stations and regulations barring the
broadcast of uncensored news by private stations. In these countries,
false news is a staple part of the radio listener's diet. Rwanda, where
hate radio flourished, was only one of the states in which the govemment used radio to mould the opinions of its rural citizens. Consider
just a few examples. In Ethiopia,
the vast majority of Ethiopians outside Addis Ababa have no ready access to the
print media.... The Govemment controis radio, the most infiuential medium in
reaching the rural population [85 percent of the population], as weIl as the sole
television station, and ensures that TGE [the Transitionai Govemment of Ethiopia] policies are reflected in their programrning. (U.S. Congress 1995,78-79,8384)
In Indonesia, a country with about 600 private radio broadcasting
companies, as weIl as a govemment radio network, only the "National
News" produced by the govemment can be broadcast. It is disseminated by private stations and forty-nine regional affiliates of the govemment station. Under Indonesian law, "the private radio stations may
produce only 'light' news, such as human interest stories, and may not
discuss politics" (U.S. Congress 1995,598).
93
94
The Path of a Genocide
In strife-torn Somalia, the warIords prize radio transmitters almost
as highlyas heavy weapons. They established their own low power
radio stations around the country and fought for controI ofthe Mogadishu
radio transmitter, the country's most powerful. Indicative of its importance to them, ear1y in 1991, over 1,000 of General Moharnmed Farah
Aideed's militiamen were killed seizing the radio station from
Mohammed Siad Barre's forces. Aideed still controlled the Mogadishu
radio station in December 1992, when troops of the US-1ed United
Nations Unified Task Force (UNITAF) landed in Somalia. He soon
used it to excoriate the U.N. troops and incite violence against them
(U.N. Department of Public Information 1994,7, 13,43; U.S. Congress, House 1993,34).
U.N. forces retaliated on 12 June 1993, a week after the killing of
twenty-four Pakistani soldiers serving with the U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) and the wounding of another fifty-four. They
launched a series of coordinated air and ground attacks aimed at taking
Radio Mogadishu out of Aideed's hands. A secondary goa1 of the attack was to put his transmitter at the disposal of the United Nations
command. The U.N. troops captured the station, but in the attack they
destroyed the transmitter by mistake. None of the remaining broadcast
transmitters in Mogadishu had the power and the range to reach distant
areas of Somalia. Aideed soon resumed broadcasting in the Mogadishu
area, this time using a low power mobile transmitter. Thus, Somalia's
airwaves were largely left in the hands of the rival warIords (U.N. Department of Public Information 1994,7, 13,43; U.S. Congress, Senate,
and House 1995,230). Developments in Somalia indicated that neither
the United Nations nor the United States was equipped to utilize radio
broadeasting appropriately in its operations.
Messages of Hate
In Rwanda, the encouragement of ethnic hatred on the radio, together with the creation and arming of militias, was one of the clearest
early warning signs of an imminent genocide (U.S. Congress, Senate
1994,46), The dissemination ofhate propaganda, which inc1uded spreading ethnic hatred and inciting ethnocide and genocide, began in earnest
in 1990 with newspaper and magazine articles aimed at convincing
Hutu intellectuals and other literate members of the population (50 percent of those over fifteen; 64 percent of the males and 37 percent of the
females) that their lives were menaced from inside and outside Rwanda
Rate Radio in Rwanda
95
by Tutsi infiltrators and Hutu supporters of democracy (Central Intelligence Agency 1994, 32; La Brosse 1995, 13). The leading disseminator of this message was the bimonthly magazine Kangura, founded in
May 1990 by Hassan Ngeze, who, like President Juvenal Habyarimana,
came from the northwestern prefecture of Gisenyi, a major center of
anti-Tutsi and Hutu power sentiment (Prunier 1995,13; Chretien 1995,
38-44,50). In 1991, Kangura was denounced by the International Commission of Jurists for its vicious incitement of racial hatred, while a
liberal Belgian deputy attacked the publication's "Hitlerian" contents
(La Brosse 1995, 39).
Despite the large number of Rwandese hate publications, the written
press had only limited circulation. The newspapers rarely printed more
than 3,000 copies of an issue and they circulated mainly in Kigali, where
their high prices further limited their readership. With 400,000 to
500,000 AMlFM/short-wave radio receivers in homes and offices, and
seven FM radio relay transmitters providing regular radio service to
most of the country, it was radio that reached a broad public audience,
especially the 90 percent of the population which lived in rural areas
(Chretien 1995,57,66; U.S. Congress, Senate, and House 1994,204).
The messages of hate spread through the airwaves on 3 March 1992,
when Radio Rwanda broadcast all day long false news reports that a
leaflet issued by the Tutsi-based Parti Liberal had been discovered in
Nairobi advocating the terrorist killing of twenty-two leading Hutu
politicians, army officers, civil servants, priests, businessmen, and lawyers (Chretien 1995,57). The next day, following further incitements
to "self-defence" by Radio Rwanda, Interahamwe ("Those who work
together" in Kinyarwanda) militia brought in from Kigali began killing
Tutsi and burning their huts in the Bugesera region of southeastern
Rwanda. The killing led to the deaths of approximately 300 persons
and lasted until 9 March.
When Western ambassadors lodged a stiff protest with the President
of Rwanda, he fired Ferdinand Nahimana, the director of the Rwandese
Information Office (L'Office Rwandais d'Information, known by the
acronym ORINFOR). Nahimana, one of Rwanda's most distinguished
historians. He was then rejected by the German government as counsellor to Rwanda's ambassador to Bonn and returned to his university
post, where he developed the theory that Radio Rwanda had been infiltrated by agents of the Rwanda Patriotic Front, backed by evil foreign
diplomats deterrnined to undermine Hutu self-defence. 2 The Rwandese
civil servants who were discovered to be responsible for the false news
96
The Path of a Genocide
stories were let off by Prime Minister Sylvestre Nsanzimana with an
administrative reprimand. The charges against over 400 persons implicated in the Bugesera massacres were dropped. In the meantime, the
power of radio to mobilize the rural population against its Tutsi neighbors had been dramatically demonstrated (Chretien 1995,56-61; Prunier
1995,19,137).
In the summer of 1993, anti-Tutsi radio propaganda heated up with
the start of radio transmissions by the privately owned RadioTelevision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), aided by the staff and
facilities of Radio Rwanda, the official government-owned station.
RTLM was founded with the assistance of a wealthy businessman,
Felicien Kabuga, whose daughter was married to a son of President
Habyarimana, and by other members of the President's inner cirele,
the AKAZU ("little house" in Kinyarwanda). Prominent in this elite
political group were several relatives of the President's wife, especiaIly her brothers and cousins. 3 Conveniently for RTLM, its broadcasting studios were connected to the e1ectric generators of the
Presidential Palace, directly across the street, permitting it to continue operating in case of a power failure. RTLM was ostensibly
founded to counter Radio Muhabura (Radio Beacon), the Rwanda
Patriotic Front's (RPF) radio station, but no evidence has been found
by Reporters sans frontieres to suggest that the RPF station was guilty
of spreading hate propaganda against the Hutu of Rwanda (La Brosse
1995,34,42-44). Indeed, with the benefit ofhindsight, it seems likely
that RTLM was founded to evade key clauses of the Arusha Peace
Accords of 1993 which barred the Government of Rwanda, as weIl as
the RPF, from incitements to violence, promoting discrimination based
on ethnicity, and issuing propaganda inciting the people to hate
(Republique Rwandaise 1993).
The preamble of RTLM's articles of incorporation represent it as
aspiring to: become a model disseminator of democratic values; contribute to the positive evolution of a pluralist democracy; circulate diverse ideas; strengthen republican institutions; further the hannonious
development of society; and educate the public through the fair and
objective transmission of news. But the Hutu-extremist publication
Kangura came eloser to the truth when it celebrated the establishment
of RTLM as a colleague in the struggle to unite the Hutu, "the majority
people," and to awaken and defend them. Summarizing the actual agenda
of RTLM in its report on human rights in Rwanda for 1994, the U.S.
Department of State observed:
Hate Radio in Rwanda
97
After President Habyarimana's death, Radio Mille Collines broadcast strident antiTutsi and anti-RPF propaganda, which uItimately had alethal effect, caIIing on
the Hutu majority to destroy the Thtsi rninority. Experts cited Mille CoIlines as an
important factor in the spread of genocide in the hours and days foIlowing
Habyarimana's death. (U.S. Congress, Senate, and House 1995,204)
Impact of Radio on the Genodde and Refugee FIows
By African standards, Rwandese enjoyed good access to RTLM and
Radio Rwanda broadcasts. The BBC estimates that the median saturation of radios in sub-Saharan Africa in 1992 was about 13.5 per onehundred persons, while radio ownership in Rwanda is 25 per
one-hundred persons. The United States Information Agency (USlA)
reports that RTLM's broadcasts of four hours per day in Kinyarwanda
and French were clearly heard in the Kigali area, and Reporters sans
frontieres indicates that RTLM's programs were relayed to all parts of
the country via a network of transmitters owned and operated by the
government's Radio Rwanda. 4
To the best of my knowledge, although they were monitored sporadically by the US Foreign Broadcast Information Service, the BBC,
and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR),
no one has published complete transcripts of RTLM's and Radio
Rwanda's broadcasts. However, selections from them have been quoted
in testimony before US Congressional committees, in the reports of
human rights groups, in the Western media generally and in Chretien
1995. As' the following excerpts from and about RTLM and Radio
Rwanda broadcasts show, they played important roles as inciters and
coordinators of the Rwandese genocide: 5
End of 1993
RTLM named individual Tutsi and Hutu opposed to President Habyarimana as
"enemies" or "traitors" who deserved death. In a typical broadcast attack, an RTLM
announcer followed the song "Monique" by declaring: "Monique should be crucified in her front yard and eaten by dogs." The reference to Monique
Mujawamariya, one of Rwanda's leading and most courageous human rights activists, would have been clear to all Rwandese listeners. (Alison DesForges 1995)
March 31, 1994
Radio Rwanda attributed to the RPF an ideology of "ethnic purification." It misleadingly described the Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR), a Hutu
extremist party, as pacifist and realistic because il recognized the ethnic problem
which had been eating away at Rwanda for centuries. It reported that the CDR
had denounced the ideology of ethnic purification advocated by extremist RPF
members and urged the RPF to renounce once and for all its ideology of power
struggle based on vengeance and revenge.
98
The Path of a Genocide
April 7, 1994
RTLM called on Rutu to avenge the death of the Rwandese President. Within
hours, it declared: "The graves are not yet quite full. Who is going to do the good
work and help us fill them completely" (Prunier 1995, 224). The Washington Post
quoted a radio broadcast waming Tutsi in Rwanda: "You cockroaches must know
you are made of flesh! We won't let you kill! We will kill you!"
April 12, 1994
RTLM broadcast that "the International Committee of the Red Cross was saving
the lives of Tutsi only."
April 19, 1994
Theodore Sindikubwabo, a Rutu extremist and "President" of the government of
Rwanda which proclaimed itself after the death of Rabyarimana, replaced JeanBaptiste Rabyarimana (not a relative of the former president), the human rightsoriented prefect of Butare, with Sylvain Nsabimana as civilian administrator, and
Tarcisse Muvunyi, a military man sympathetic to slaughtering Rutu members of
the political opposition and Tutsi. In a radio broadcast the same day, Sindikubwabo
advocated the killing of "accomplices" in Butare. Units of the Presidentiai Guard
then flew into Butare to begin ethnically and politically-based mass killing in that
previously calm prefecture.
April 25, 1994
The Associated Press quoted U.N. spokesman in Kigali as saying, "Radio RTLM
is calling on militias to step up the killing of civilians."
May 29,1994
Radio Rwanda declared that the RPF was cheating people with smooth words
while it was really a wolf which covered itself with a sheep's skin. It asserted that
the RPF was killing Rutu despite RPF lies that it did no harm to them. It falsely
claimed that the Tutsi lnyenzi (cockroaches) had butchered Rutu in Ruhengeri,
Byumba, Kingungu, and Kigali.
June 23, 1994
According to the Reuters news service, Radio RTLM said the French were coming to fight on the side of the (Hutu extremist) interim govemment and were bringing new weapons. 6
Many of the journalists who worked for RTLM came from the ranks
of the Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR) and were
even more extreme in their anti-Tutsi racism than their colleagues in
the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement (et
la Demoeratie), the MRND(D). These true believers were also authentic radio innovators. They revolutionized Rwandese radio broadcasting
by abandoning the tradition of stiff, formal presentations in favour of
more relaxed Western-style "talk radio," punctuated by popular music,
dirty jokes, and lots of street slang. As Gerard Prunier tells us, they
slyly inserted culturally coded incitements into their patter, such as
"soon 'one would have to reach for the top part of the house' (Le., the
Hate Radio in Rwanda
99
place where traditionally weapons were hung)." Like Hassan Ngeze,
the editor of Kangura, who prophesied that President Habyarimana
would die in March 1994, an RTLM broadcast on Sunday, 3 April,
reported by Prunier, hinted that the President was about to die and a
blood bath would follow:
On the 3rd, 4th , and 5th, heads will get heated up. On 6 April, there will be a
respite, but 'little thing' might happen. Then on the 7th and the 8th and the other
days in April, you will see something. (Prunier 1995, 222-23)
The important role of radio disinformation in the killing of neighbour
by neighbour is emphasized by Bill Berkeley, who visited Rwanda twice
in 1994. In an interview given to Berkeley, Pierre-Claver Rwangabo, a
Hutu moderate, emphasized the role of radio broadcasts as an important source of mass participation in the genocide:
I want to insist on the effect of propaganda.... Since the beginning of the war with
the RPF, this propaganda always said that it was the Tutsi coming to attack the
country. All they said all day was that it was the Tutsi coming to take power away
from the Hutus. So when they got finished killing the opposition leaders after the
crash, and the RPF came to protect the people from the massacres, the radio again
said it was the Tutsi who are coming to take power. But they never said on the
radio that the Hutu prime minister was killed. People listening to the radio thought
it was the RPF who started the massacres. 7 (Berkeley 1995, A17)
A twenty-nine-year-old peasant, Alfred Kiruhura, who served with
the Hutu death squads responsible for killing Tutsi, told Berkeley:
I did not believe the Tutsi were coming to kill us ... but when the government radio
continued to broadcast that they were coming to take our land, were coming to
kill the Hutu-when this was repeated over and over-I began to feel some kind
of fear.
The lies broadcast by radio stations affiliated with the Rwandese
government were "the match that started the fire," concludes Berkeley
(Berkeley 1994, 18).
RPF troops drove the Provisional Government and the forces allied
with the AKAZU out of Kigali in July 1994. RTLM went off the air on
3 July, but returned to the airwaves one week later. The makers of the
genocide, resourceful as ever, introduced mobile PM transmitters and
broadcast disinformation from Gisenyi, within the French-occupied
Operation Turquoise zone on the border between Rwanda and Zaire.
This time, their propaganda operation sent millions of Hutu who feared
Tutsi reprisals fleeing toward refugee camps, where they could be re-
100
The Path of a Genocide
grouped and recruited as future fighters. More than two million Hutu
sought refuge in Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi, while roughly two million more abandoned their homes and fled to other parts of Rwanda.
Human Rights Watch/Africa reports that the Hutu refugees
fled in panie about reports that the RPF was approaching their region, not because
they had been attacked or seen others attacked by the incoming troops. They had
been frightened by propaganda broadcast on the radio about supposed RPF atrocities. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1994,52-53; U.S. Congress, Senate, and House 1995,
200)
On 14 and 15 July 1994, Reuters reported that the broadcasts of a
mobile radio station operating in the vicinity of Gisenyi, on the Zaire
border, were urging Rwandese Hutu to escape into Zaire. On 19 July, a
French food relief organization, International Action Against Famine
(AICF) declared that the radio
has prompted general hysteria among peopIe who believe onIy in their Ieaders,
who have made deviIs out of the Rwanda Patriotic Front. PeopIe are scared out of
their wits. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1994, 78-79)
Western Responses
No Western country responded positively to proposals from human
rights and humanitarian groups such as Human Rights Watch and the
United States Committee for Refugees that it shut down or jam the
broadcasts of RTLM and Radio Rwanda. Indeed, one of the first victims of the genocide was Faustin Rucogoza, a Hutu from the MDR (Le
mouvement democratique republicain) who as information minister had
threatened to elose down Radio Television Libre Mille Collines (Hilsum
1994, 14, 16). When Human Rights Watch/Africa protested the broadcasts to Bruno Delaye, Chief Counsellor on Africa to the French Presidency, he responded that "France was willing to stop the broadcasts but
was unable to locate the transmitter." Human Rights Watch/Africa found:
[I]t wholly unbelievable that the French military, which had full controi over the
zone and had elose relations with the FAR [Rwandese Almed Forces], was not in
a position to Iocate this radio transmitter. (Human Rights Watch Arms Project
1995,7)
The United States Committee for Refugees, exasperated, reported that
State Department officiaIs on severaI occasions expressed to USCR that they were
studying the possibility of jamming Radio Mille Collines and the government
Hate Radio in Rwanda
101
radio station in Rwanda-that they were aware of the insidious propaganda power
of the broadcasts-but they ultimately said that various legal and technical possibilities precluded taking action.... Moreover, numerous military personnel and
radio technicians have indicated to USCR that jamrning radio stations--especially
those with weak signals-is not technically difficult. U.S. officials on one occasion said they were prevented from jamming the broadcasts because they were
unable to locate the frequency. USCR responded by informing the State Department that the broadcasts were airing on 94.1 PM. The Administration took no
action. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1994,66-67)
RTLM and Radio Rwanda wove rings around the U.N.'s military
force, Western governments, and the foreign NGOs. Before the genocide was underway, there was no U.N. radio station to counter the incitement of violence against U.N. military personnel (Chretien 1995,
269-73) or to set the record straight when RTLM and Radio Rwanda
claimed the Belgians or the RPF had definitely shot down President
Habaryimana's aeroplane. Once the genocide was underway, there were
no broadcasts by UNAMIR, VOA, BBC, or Radio Deutschewelle to
warn the extremist Hutu forces and those they deluded or intimidated
into helping them that those who committed or abetted mass murder
stood condemned in the eyes of the world and would be brought to
justice. There were no broadcasts by third parties to the conflict urging
Hutu villagers to defend their Tutsi friends and neighbors, to offer them
refuge, or to combat the myth that the RPF was executing a genocide
against Hutu Rwandese. And there were no serious attempts to deploy
armed forces radio jamming specialists from any of the countries whose
governments stood by and wrung their hands as hundreds of thousands
of Tutsi and Hutu opponents of the regime were brutally killed.
Jamming Issue
Major-General Romeo A. Dallaire, commander of the U.N. peace
keepers in Kigali, has declared that "ifhe had been equipped with proper
jamming devices, many lives might have been spared [in Rwanda]"
(Broadbent 1995, B3). But, sadly, the dangerposed by hate radio aroused
little U.N. reaction beyond his Kigali headquarters until August, when
the genocide had been accomplished and the massive flow of Hutu
refugees had been underway for a month. Despite Hs attacks on diplomats in Kigali, many of the Western ambassadors-the American, the
Canadian, and the French-took a benign view of RTLM and its broadcasts, opposing forceful measures to silence il. American Ambassador
David P. Rawson c1aimed it was a good source of infonnation and that
102
The Path of a Genocide
its statements could be interpreted many ways. Canadian Ambassador
Lucie Edwards, acknowledging that everybody listened to RTLM, found
it difficult to take it seriously because "there were so many genuinely
silly things being said on the station, so many obvious lies" (Adelman
and Suhrke 1996,20, endnotes 37, 45).
This was not the view of UNAMIR or its commander, who believed
that the broadcasts undermined Rwandese respect for UNAMIR and
his leadership. After monitoring Radio Rwanda and RTLM broadcasts
inciting violence against UNAMIR troops, Dallaire had protested to
the govemment of Rwanda and lodged several fruitless requests that it
interdict the radio attacks. Then, on 7 April, Rwandan troops murdered
Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and 10 UNAMIR soldiers of
the Belgian contingent guarding her. As the genocide proceeded, RTLM
kept up its attacks on UNAMIR. On 18 April, UNAMIR monitored
RTLM attacks on the U.N. force, "its Belgium crony and its General
whose departure is the wish of everybody." On 29 April, RTLM accused Belgium of downing Habaryimana's airplane and demanded
General Dallaire's resignation because he was allegedly siding with
the RPF. Dallaire's informal requests for authority and special equipment to interdict such broadcasts were buried in the D.N.'s overwhelmed
New York headquarters (Interview, U.N. Senior officials 1995).
It was the tidal wave of Hutu refugees flooding Zaire, not incitement
to genocide or attacks on UNAMIR, that brought the hate broadcasts of
RTLM officially to the attention of the U.N. Security Council. On 3
August, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reported to the Security Council that about 1.5 million Rwandese had fled to Zaire during a two-week period in July. He then went on to note that
the swift RPF advance had the effect of causing large numbers of civilians to take
flight from the areas of combat, but this displacement might weIl have been containable had not panic been caused by deliberately inflamrnatory broadcasts from
radio stations controlled by elements of the former government. (U.N. Department of Public Information 1994, 17)
The next day, Kofi Annan, then still U.N. Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations, forwarded to U.N. Special Representative Shahryar
Khan, a United Kingdom request that the Secretary-General's Special
Representative, the French and the Zairois find the ways and the means
to stop the broadcasts. On 19 August, after two further weeks of RTLM
broadcasts, UNAMIR headquarters in Kigali officially requested that the
U.N. Department ofPeace-keeping Operations ask Canada to provide it
Hate Radio in Rwanda
103
with ajamming capability. Nearly another week later, on 25 August, the
Permanent Mission of Canada at the U.N. in New York sent a message to
Canadian authorities in Ottawa asking them to look into providing such a
capability. On 7 September, Canadian National Defence Headquarters
refused that request on the grounds that UNAMIR was not an enforcement force and therefore had no mandate to engage in offensive operations such as jarnrning (lnterview, Senior officials 1995).
Senior Defence and State Department officials in Washington were
just as disinclined to take the radio broadcasts seriously as their U.N.,
Canadian, and French colleagues. Between the end of April and early
June, American human rights and humanitarian aid specialists, including some at the Pentagon and the State Department, asked the Defence
Department to mobilize an operation against RTLM. On the heels of
their requests, in early June, Senator Edward Kennedy (Dem.-Mass.)
appealed to the Clinton administration, encouraging it to launch ajamming operation. His intervention resulted in a National Security Council query to the Defence Department asking if jamming was feasible.
In the absence of political will in the office of the Secretary of Defence
and a clear order from the President to jam RTLM, risk averse Defence
Department lawyers warned against violating the national sovereignty
of states experiencing domestic conflicts and their citizens' right to
free speech. The lawyers argued that under international law the US
was bound to respect the sovereignty of the Rwandese government as
long as it granted it diplomatic recognition and did not regard it as an
enemy state. Respect for Rwandese sovereignty, in their view, also included non-interference with the First Amendment rights of Rwandese
broadcasters. Defence Department officials also raised questions about
who would reimburse their budget for the nearly $4 million that it estimated the operation would cost (Interview, Senior officials 1995).
Once the marnmoth refugee flow hit Zaire, Washington joined the
list of international players entreating France to put RTLM off the air.
When the French issued their routine refusal, the Defence Department
sparked meetings with the United States Information Agency, urging it
to beam special broadcasts to the Hutu refugees in Zaire. Thus, in August 1994, long after Reporters sans frontieres had established a temporary broadcasting unit transmitting accurate news reports to the
refugees in Zaire, Defense Department officials were just starting talks
with the United States Information Agency about reaching the refugees
with specially designed VOA broadcasts (Interviews, Senior officials
1995; Burkha1ter 1994, 51-52).
104
The Path of a Genocide
Condusion
Not everyone at the State Department agrees that hate broadcasting
played a key role in the genocide in Rwanda or the massive flight of
refugees. Some officials contend that exaggerations of the effect of
hate radio broadcasts hide the greater importance of underlying
sociopolitical c1eavages and that it was the political situation which
largely accounted for the willingness ofHutu peasants to kill their Tutsi
neighbors and for their readiness to flee when the RPF captured Kigali.
These officials argue that if the U.N. had broadcast denials of a Tutsi
conspiracy to annihilate Rwanda's Hutu, the broadcasts would have
been integrated into Hutu conspiracy theories which c1aimed that the
U.N. intended to deliver Rwanda into the hands of the RPF. Some
American officials also argue that equal attention must be paid to the
important role of newspapers and the "bush telegraph" in spreading
hate propaganda. Yet even these critics admit that the broadcasts of
Radio Mille Collines played a large part in coordinating the genocide
(Interviews, Senior officials 1995).
State Department officials with expertise in psychological warfare
agree that when a genocide is imminent or underway, efforts should be
made to knock out the perpetrator's radio transmitters. Given the difficulties of rapidly jarnming transmitters, they recommend sabotage, commando raids, or air attacks to accomplish this task. In their view, successful
assaults on existing facilities would force perpetrators to fall back on low
powered, shorter range PM transmitters, which, they argue, would be
much easier to jam. A jamming force using the experts and the special
technology of the former Western or Eastern blocs would actually find it
easier to put PM jamming equipment quickly into position than to establish a high powered AM broadcasting system to counter the perpetrator's
propaganda. Experts from the advanced industrial countries are far more
skilled atjamming than perpetrators in countries like Rwanda and Somalia. It takes relatively little skill to operate one of the portable PM transmitters available from manufacturers in Canada and Germany, but a great
deal of know-how to make a success of jarnming them. 8
In my view, freedom of speech arguments fail when radio broadcasts directly violate Article III (c) of the U.N. Genocide Convention,
naming "direct and public incitement to commit genocide" as punishable under the Convention. As earlyas 1968, the Governrnent of Canada
took a major step towards implementing the Genocide Convention in
its domestic legislation by outlawing hate propaganda advocating or
Rate Radio in Rwanda
105
promoting genocide against an identifiable group. American law echoes the Canadian precedent in this case. American Defence Department lawyers should have been aware that the Proxmire Act of 1987
provided for a fine of not more than $500,000 or imprisonment for not
more than five years for individuals convicted of inciting others to commit genocide, and that, when passing the Proxmire Act, Congress c1early
signified that the First Amendment does not protect those who advocate genocide "in circumstances under which there is substantiallikelihood of imminently causing such conduct" (Interviews, Senior officials
1995; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990,44-53). In the case of Rwanda, the
imminence of genocide was not an issue; genocide was underway. It
also should have been clear that incitements to hatred such as those
occurring in Rwanda violated the terms of the 1966 U.N. International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Heintze and Frederick 1990, 91-97).
Senior U.S. government officials also expressed fears regarding the
security of nations who cooperate with U.N. or NGO humanitarian
broadcasters by lending them their facilities or permitting them to import their own transmission equipment. These American officials expressed concern that the humanitarian use of borrowed broadcasting
facilities in the countries adjacent to a human rights crisis might increase
international tensions and provoke armed attacks on the offending transmitters. The issue of armed attacks on U.N. and NGO transmitting facilities is a serious one. In the event that there were such attacks, the
U.S. and the U.N. would indeed be challenged to respond. Since the
U.N. has a clear mandate to defend its members against genocide and
international aggression, it seems obvious to me that U.S. officials should
place the burden of responsibility where it properly belongs-on the
shoulders of the perpetrators of such offenses. Attacks on U.N. and
NGO broadcasting equipment and personnel are likely to arouse public
indignation against the attackers and to build support in the West for
swift and powerful retaliatory measures that can only increase support
for further aid to the victims of hate broadcasting. Moreover, the U.S.
and the U.N. should have realized by now that the risks of supporting
human rights broadcasting are far lower than the human and economic
costs of passivity in the face of genocide and gross violations of human
rights.
Since the genocide in Rwanda of April to July 1994, several pioneers of human fights broadcasting in Rwanda and Burundi have blazed
106
The Path of a Genocide
new trails that should inspire emulation by governments and NGOs.
Theyare:
• Philippe Dahinden, reporter for Swiss radio, who founded Radio Muraho
("Hello, How Are You?") which broadcast briefly around Rwanda with
support from Reporters sans frontieres and a group of Rwandese human
rights activists in June 1994, while refusing any financial aid from the French
government (Peronnet 1994, x).
• UNAMIR's own station, Radio Minuar, which finally made it to air in February 1995 (Agence France Presse 1995).
• Studio Ijambo (Crossroads Where Wise Conversation Takes Place in
Kirundi), a radio station in Bujumbura which produces three to four hours
of programming per week for broadcast on Burundi state radio and Radio
Agatashya, a station in Eastern Zaire. Their broadcasts, intended to counteract hate radio and to promote peace and reconciliation in Burundi, are
sponsored by Search for Common Ground, a Washington-based conflict
resolution organization, using funds provided by the U.N., USAID, the
National Endowment for Democracy, the Winston Foundation, and the
Unitarian-Universalist Association (Search for Common Ground 1995).
• Montrealers Gerard Le Chene of Informaction and Rose Ndeyahoze, who
joined with TY5 Afrique, and a technical crew from Television senegalaise
to document in thirty segments the stories of courageous Hutu and Tutsi who
helped each other amidst the horror of Rwanda's genocide. Their series was
broadcast around the world by TY5 in May 1995 (InforrnAction 1995); and
• Radio Amwizero (Hope) of Burundi, funded with $500,000 by the European
Commission at the instigation of Bernard Kouchner. It was licensed in February 1996 "to counteract the effects of 'hate media' and to work for peace..."
at the same time that Radio Democracy, a hardline Hutu radio station which
broadcasts from mobile transmitters in Zaire, came under attack by jammers
broadcasting rock music over its frequency (Jennings 1996).
For too long, proponents of the extension of human rights and democratic development have neglected radio's potential as an inftuential
medium. The architects of hate radio, using Western equipment and
techniques, won the battle ofthe airwaves in Rwanda. Now is the time
for the U.N., the democracies, and human rights NGOs to seize the
initiative by assembling, funding, coordinating, and protecting the essentiai components of democratic radio in all the regions where genocide and gross violations of human rights are present or potentially
imminent (Chalk 1995).
Notes
1. The author would like to acknowledge the help he received in researching this
subject from a number of senior officers of the United States Department of
Hate Radio in Rwanda
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
107
State, Department of Defense, and the United States Information Agency, as
well as various Canadian military researchers and Brian Sawyer, a Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation radio engineer. He is indebted to Edward Kissi and
Patrick Reed for their conscientious and skilled assistance in research. He would
also like to thank for their constructive comments on earlier drafts of this essay
the members of the graduate student and faculty workshop of the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies (MIGS): Karin Bjomson, Mervin
Butovsky, Catherine Chatterlee, Natalie Fingerhut, Nicolas Gauvin, Kurt
Jonassohn, Philip Katz, Edward Kissi, Krisha Starker, and Pat Reed. For any
errors in this essay only the author is responsible.
Ferdinand Nahimana, one of eleven people alleged to be architects of Rwanda's
1994 genocide, was arrested in Yaounde, Cameroon in Apri11996 and held for
hearings to determine if he should be extradited for trial in Rwanda (Associated
Press 1996, Bl).
RTLM's director-in-chief was Gaspard Bahigi, formerly an officer of ORINFOR
in charge of print media, later the director of the Rwanda national radio and a
reporter for Agence France Presse based in Kigali (La Brosse 1995,42; see also
Chretien 1995,72).
Cf. United States Information Agency 1995, 9,111-12; La Brosse 1995,43-44.
South Africans own the largest number of radios in Africa, per person, with
thirty-three radios per one-hundred persons, while Somalis, with five to seven
radios per one-hundred persons, are at the bottom of the list. Research indicates
that the average radio has about five listeners, the size of a small African family
(United States Information Agency 1995,9, 111-12).
For a detailed account ofbroadcasts during the genocide itself, see the contributions by Faustin Kagame of unpublished transcripts of RTLM from April 1994,
which he recorded and which are included in Linda Kirschke, Richard Carver,
and Sandra Coliver, Broadeasting Genocide: Censorship, Propaganda & StateSponsored Violence in Rwanda 1990-1994, London: Article 19, International
Centre Against Censorship, October 1996. There are also extensive quotes
throughout Chretien 1995.
For the above and other quotes and comments, cf. Alison DesForges, Human
Rights Watch/Africa and JeffDrumtra, U.S. Comrnittee for Refugees, Washington, D.C., U.S. Congress, Senate 1994,50-51, 71-73, 77; Berkeley 1994, 18;
Hilsum 1994, 14; African Rights 1994,231-32; Prunier 1995, 240,244; Chretien
1995,337-58 which includes translations of the songs; and especially Kirschke,
et al 1996.
Pierre-Claver Rwangabo was assassinated by unknown assailants on 4 March
1995 (Berkeley 1995, AI7).
Interviews, Ottawa, Senior Officials, 1995. In Somalia, it seems that jamming
was tried by some of the clans, but they could not make it work (Interviews,
Washington, Senior officials, 1995).
Preventive Diplomacy
6
The OAU: Conniet Prevention,
Management and Resolution
Amare Tekle
Introduction
As in much of the rest of its activities, the record of the Organization
ofAfrican Vnity (OAV) in conflict resolution has been largely dismal.
This is a reflection of the structural weaknesses of the organization.
They, in tum, reflect, on the one hand, the nature of the post-colonial
African state and, on the other, the organization's position and role in
the international system during the Cold War.
In fact, the OAV was, by design, intended to be bom stillbom because of the softness of the post-colonial African state. Originally, the
OAV was created as a convenient cover for the bad governance and the
political banalities of the vast majority of African governments as weIl
as a disguise for their elose links with extra-African powers. The principles on which it was based (e.g., nonintervention, noninterference)
and subsequent decisions and resolutions (e.g., the sanctity of colonial
boundaries), as well as the strong abhorrence and outright rejection of
the military aspects of conflict management and resolution, were all
rooted in the underlying premises on which the post-colonial African
state was founded. These had serious implications for the mission it
was expected to fulfi1!.
True, the OAV has, since its inception, been preoccupied with the
management of African conflicts and the creation of appropriate organs for conflict management. 1 To this end, the Heads of State and
Government had, in fact, created the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration, which has been described as the raison d' etre
111
112
The Path of a Genocide
of the OAU itself and the "sole organ of the OAU specijically and
exclusively [my italics] charged with conflict resolution" (Polhemus
1971, 113). However, it is a sad historical fact that the Commission
was stillborn. Several attempts to give it new life were dismal failures.
The Commission was seriously handicapped from the beginning because its jurisdiction was limited to interstate conflicts only (completely
neglecting or ignoring intrastate disputes and conflicts) and because its
sole mission was conflict resolution rather than conflict prevention
(OAU, 1993: Part 1, 3). Further, the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government (AHG), the supreme organ of the OAU, retained primary
responsibility and ultimate authority for the resolution of conflicts and
involved itself in many ways in conflict management, primarilyas a
catalyst for negotiations and private discussions, though it was the
Council of Ministers which was the most active organ of conflict management during the first fourteen years of the OAU, meeting ten times
in extraordinary sessions to consider African conflicts (Polhemus 1971,
81-82). Under the circumstances, the OAU routinely resorted to the
creation of politically inspired ad hac bodies by either the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government or the Council of Ministers (Polhemus
1971,311-12). Forexample, one suchad hac body was created to study
the Rwanda-Burundi conflict in 1968. Ad hac bodies were favored
largely because member states had shown a strong preference for political processes of conflict resolution rather than for judicial means of
settlement [OAU, CMl1767 (LVIII); see also Polhemus 1971,4 and 8].
While this modus aperandi was useful in the initial years of enthusiasm following the creation of the OAU, it had become less and less
usefu1 afterwards, if only because it consumed a lot oftime which neither the Heads of State and Government nor even their Foreign Ministers had.
Thus, it was not until the Chad crisis (1980) that the OAU had the first
realopportunity to attempt a peacekeeping operation [OAU, CMl1767
(LVIII):25], although, prior to that, some African countries had participated in peacekeeping operations sponsored by the U.N. (Cervenka 1977,
101). Previous attempts by the OAU to deploy peacekeeping forces, as
in the Congo (1965) [OAU, CM 1767 (LVIII):25] and Angola (1975)
(Cervenka 1977, 103), had been fruitless. 2 The OAU involvement in Chad
was unique because it was, on the one hand, its first operation and, on the
other, it was a military invo1vement in conflict management.
Despite several failures,3 the thirty-fifth ordinary session of the Council of Ministers, held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, from 18-28 June 1980,
adopted a resolution which recommended one more attempt to find an
The OAU: ConfIict Prevention, Management and Resolution
113
African solution to an African crisis. In particular, it decided to request
African states which were in a position to do so to provide military
contingents to a peacekeeping force at their own expense and in accordance with conditions to be determined by the Summit which was to
follow the Council Session, provided that logistic and operational costs
would be metfrom voluntary contributions [OAU, CM 1767 (LVITI):2627]. As a precautionary measure, it was decided that the U.N. Security
Council would be requested to provide assistance in the event of failure by the OAU to raise the necessary funds. (OAU, CM 1767
(LVIII):27) This was itself a recipe for ensuring failure, and although
Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire volunteered troops, it was not possible to
send such a peacekeeping force to Chad given the insurmountable 10gistical and financial costs.
One year later, the Nairobi summit mandated the then Current Chairman, President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, to contact OAU member
states and otherfriendly countries to raise money for such a fund. France
volunteered to pay the transportation and logistical expenses of 600
Senegalese troops and the U.S. provided US $12 million for logistical
help for the 700 Zairean and 2,000 Nigerian troops [OAU, CM 1767
(LVIII)]. This, however, was not enough. President Moi had to ask the
U.N. Security Council for additional financial, material, and technical
assistance. Declaring that "such an action would be unprecedented,"
the Security Council refused to make such a contribution uniess the
peacekeeping operation was under the direct political and military authority of the Security Council [OAU, CM 1767 (LVIII)]. This condition had a detrimental effect on the morale of the troops and, according
to the OAU, jeopardized the whole operation.
Perhaps for this reason, there was a big debate conceming peacekeeping as opposed to peacemaking functions of the proposed OAU
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution.
While there was almost total acceptance of the conflict resolution (peacemaking) role of the Mechanism,4 there were misgivings about, and indeed strong objections to, its peacekeeping functions. The compromise
that emerged from the lengthy discussions and consultations was that
peacekeeping should be maintained as "a long-term measure" [OAU,
CM 1767 (LVIII):40].
Changes in the OAU
The great events that shook the world in 1989-90 and challenged
existing principles, norms, and values as weIl as state structures and,
114
The Path of a Genocide
consequently, brought significant changes in both domestic and international politics have not been limited to Eastern Europe. Africa too
had its shares of such historic events-some positive, some negative.
Both negative and positive developments challenged the underlying
legal premises and political assumptions on which the OAU had hitherto operated. The OAU was ripe for change. To their credit, most African leaders, and particularly Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim,
recognized the impact of these events and were ready to make the necessary positive arrangements to meet the new challenges.
The Addis Ababa Declaration Of The Assembly of Heads of State
and Government On The Political And Socio-Economic Situation In
Africa And The Fundamental Changes Taking Place In The World,
adopted in July 1990, saw "in the light of the rapid changes taking
place in the world and their impact on Africa" the need "to promate
popular participatian of our peoples in the process of government and
development. ..to guarantee human rights and the observance of law... to
recommit ourselves to the further democratization of our societies,"
and to make the OAU a viable instrument [OAU, AHG/Dec. l (XXVIII)
1990:1]
Two matters, the need for a conflict management mechanism and
the revision ofhope1essly outdated principles and resolutions on which
many a catastrophic OAU decisions or action had been based, became
plainly obvious. Of these, the principles of noninterference and nonintervention had become meaningless-indeed obstructionist-in view
of the difficulties faced in solving African crises. According to the OAU,
the 1990 Addis Ababa declaration was, therefore, "a path-breaking instrument to the extent that it was a manifestation of member states '
broadening consensus on widening the definition of the noninterference principle" and that "it signaled acceptance by member states that
the OAU could concern itself not only with inter-state conflicts but
with internal ones as welZ" [OAU, CM/171O (XVI) 1992:11J.
Accordingly, the OAU Secretary General presented a proposal to
create an OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and
Resolution to the Summit in Dakar, Senegal, in June 1992. By a Declaration made at its twenty-ninth ordinary session which met in Cairo
between 28-30 June 1993, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government established the proposed Mechanism. The Dec1aration prescribed that the primary objective of the Mechanism would be "the
anticipation and prevention of Conflicts ...to undertake peace making
and peace-building functions."5
The OAU: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
115
This gave the OAU the essential opportunity to create a new institutionai dynamism to prevent, manage, or resolve conflicts as speedily
and effectively as possible. For once since its creation, it was being
given a proactive role which required it to go beyond the adoption of
platitudinous resolutions which merely appealed to the goodwill of
conflicting parties to exercise restraint.
The "CentralOrgan," which was the main institution of the Mechanism, was to be composed of the state members of the Bureau of the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government which is elected at every
Summit, thus ensuring rotation. However, the states of the outgoing
chairman and the incoming chairman, when known in advance, were
also to be members, thus ensuring continuity and stability. The Central
Organ was to be answerable to the Assembly.
Presumably, the Declaration also empowered the Secretary General
to respond with speed and decisiveness either to prevent or, at any rate,
to resolve any conflict situation that may arise in the continent [OAU,
CM/17IO (VI) 1992:1].
Thus, the Secretary General was expected to:
• take initiatives in situations of emergency or actual conflicts; play the facilitating role of the neutral party in the management of change (through
elections) within member states;
• research and monitor situations in advance with the objective of getting
and analyzing information and thus establishing an Early Waming System
to prevent conflicts;
• deploy appropriate measures in cases where conflicts have reached an advaneed stage. [GAU, CMJl710 (VI) 1992:4]
In internai conflicts which, in the present political context, were seen
to be the major preoccupation of the OAU, the fact that he was to be
given a "free hand" to take initiatives on his own and "to engage in
dialogue with the parties to such conflicts with a view to opening up
direct diaIogue between/amongst the parties" was regarded as a qualitative change in the roIe of the Secretary General [OAU, CM/17IO
(VI) 1992].
Two precautionary notes must, however, be made. In the flrst place,
in spite of the good will extended to the proposal, there were still lingering doubts about the OAU's role in conflict prevention. The debate
during the Dakar Council of Ministers and Summit Sessions in June
1992, as well as the written responses made by member states to the
OAU inquiries, revealed that while there was a near unanimity on the
116
The Path of a Genocide
OAU's potential role in peacemaking, there was a lack of consensus on
its peacekeeping and prevention roles [OAU, CMfl747 (LVII) 1993:
9]. The ostensible reason given by those who urged the OAU to limit
itself to a peacemaking role and to let the U.N. concentrate on peacekeeping, was "the high cost of such ventures" [OAU, CMf1747 (LVII)
1993:9]. In fact, it was as a "face-saving" device that a compromise
was made to retain the OAU role in peacekeeping and prevention as "a
long-term measure" [OAU, CMf1747 (LVII) 1993]. The realissue was
the old concern of noninterference couched as "constitutional issues"
[OAU, CMf1747 (LVII) 1993] evident from the clear determination of
the sponsors of the Mechanism to convey to all concerned that the principles and norms on which the Mechanism itself was based were: noninterference in the internaI affairs of state; respect of sovereignty and
territorial integrity of each state; peaceful settlement of disputes by
negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration, the inviolability
of colonial borders and consent and cooperation of the parties to the
conflict [OAU, CMfl747 (LVII) 1993:3].
Yet, there was, at the same time, an attempt to diminish the impact
of even this commitment. First, the OAU seems to assert categorically
that intervention may be more easily accepted only when there is a
total breakdown of law and order (Somalia, Liberia) and where a
spillover of human suffering is experienced by neighboring states. In
such a situation, the OAU dec1ares, "intervention may be justified on
humanitarian grounds as weIl as on the need to restore law and order"
[OAU, CMf1710 (XVI) Rev 1:12]. Secondly, it emphasizes that preemptive involvement "should also be permitted even in situations where
tensions evolve to such a pitch that it becomes apparent that a conflict
is in the making" and that "this would transform into real terms the
OAU's expressed comrnitmentto conflict prevention" [OAU, CMf17 10
(XVI) Rev 1:12].
However, outdated principles have not been the only difficulties that
faced the OAU in the fulfillment of its new mission. There were also
"operationalization" difficulties, particularly related to manpower and
finance. The Secretary General had, until recently, no executive power.
From the beginning, the majority of the founding members wanted to
avoid a strong and independently minded (not to mention charismatic)
Secretary General. Until 1977, therefore, his title was Administrative
Secretary General, insisted upon by the majority of the Founding Fathers. At the Librevi1le Summit (1977), when the "Administrative" was
deleted from the title, he was also given competence to participate in
The OAU: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
117
the resolution of disputes-but only for one single time. It was only
after the Cairo Summit (1993), which created the present mechanism,
that the Secretary General was given an important role in the resolution
of confliet. Equally, throughout its history, the OAV faced-and continues to face-critical financial problems which affeet its conflict
management operations.
Paragraph 23 of the Declaration that established the Mechanism had
provided for the establishment of a Special Fund "for the purpose of
providing financial resourees to support exclusively OAU operationai
activities relating to conflict management and resolution (OAV, Central OrganJMEC/AMB. 31REV. 1, 1994:5). An initial amount of VS $1
million was to be made up of financial appropriations from the working capital budget of the OAV and to be supplemented by voluntary
contributions from member states and other sourees withinAfriea (OAV,
Central OrganIMEC/AMB. 31REV. l, 1994:7). This initial budget was
"to be replenished or added to" on an annual basis. On 7 December
1993, the Assembly decided that 5 percent of the OAV regular budget
should be earmarked and transferred into the Peace Fund (OAV, CM!
1805; OAV, Central OrganJMEC/AMB. 31REV. 1, 1994:2). Since the
Mechanism had to be an "essentially African affair," if it were to be
eredible and effective, it was emphasized that the African eomponent
of the funding must always be guaranteed [OAV, Central OrganJMEC/
AMBIRPT (1):26].
The OAV Peace Fund was launched by the Current Chairman of the
OAV Council of Ministers, Foreign Minister Amr Mussa of Egypt, on
18 November 1993. Yet, by 1994, the Afriean component consisted
only of an Algerian contribution of VS $10,000 and Ethiopian Birr
60,000 (about VS $10,000) from the Ambassadors' Wives and other
women in Addis Ababa [OAV, CM!1829 (LX) 1994:3]. On 19 July
1994, when the genocide in Rwanda was almost over, the Namibian
govemment allocated VS $250,000 for the Rwanda operation of the
OAV [OAV, Central OrganINEC/AMB/RPT (VI): 24]. Tunisia gave
medication, tents, and blankets [OAV, Central OrganINEC/AMBIRPT
(VI): 22]. Ethiopia made "a symbolic contribution" of VS $10,000 in
July 199 [OAV, Central OrganINEC/AMBIRPT (VI): 15].
On the other hand, Italy had pledged 300,000,000 Lira (about VS
$200,000) while the VS, China, and Indonesia had each pledged VS
$100,000, VS $50,000, and VS $15,000, respectively [OAV, CM/1829
(LX); OAV, Central OrganINEC/AMB/RPT (VI): 3]. Yet, although the
OAV was in dire need for money, an American offer of an additional
118
The Path of a Genocide
US $1.5 million to the OAU Peace Fund was to become a matter of
intense debate in the meeting of the CentralOrgan of 1994 before it
was accepted [OAU, Central OrganIMEC/AMB/RPT (VI): 7-15]. The
fact is, African funding was not available; the OAU did not have enough
money to finance military operations, specifically the Rwandese one
as we shall see, though advances were made, and the OAU played an
active and creative role in its more traditional involvement in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking.
The OAU Involvement in the Arllsha Accords
The OAU had closely followed the Rwandese conflict since the outbreak of hostilities in October 1990. Encouraged by the adoption of the
Dec/aration On The Political And Socio-Economic Situation In Africa
And The Fundamental Changes Taking Place In The World by the Assembly of Heads of State and Govemment in 1990, the OAU had participated in the N'sele Cease-fire Agreement of 29 March, 1991 and
the Gbadolite meeting of 16 September 1991 which amended the N'sele
Agreement. Although the Secretary General had made himself available for consultations with both parties, the OAU had not been directly
and materially involved in conflict resolution until after the cease-fire
agreement signed in Arusha in July 1992 between the Govemment of
Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), where, after a number of amendments, the N'sele and Gbadolite agreements were signed.
Under Article III (1) of the agreement, it was accepted that "the verification and controi of the cease-fire shall be conducted by the Neutral
Military Observer Group (NMOG) under the supervision of the Secretary General of the OAU," while section (3) of the same artic1e provided that "the Neutral Military Observer Group shall report any
violation of the cease-fire to the Secretary General of the OAU and a
Joint Political Military Commission" (JPMC). The creation of the latter was intended to ensure strict adherence by the two parties to the
cease-fire and to monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement
[OAU, CM/1751 (LVII) 1993:1].
Accordingly, the Secretary General of the OAU appointed the OAU
Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, Dr. M.T. Mapuranga,
as his Special Representative to Rwanda. In addition, a resident Liaison/Political Officer and a commander of the NMOG were also appointed. The former was to monitor political developments in Rwanda,
to follow the negotiation process, to liaise between the Rwandese Gov-
The OAU: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
119
emment and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, and to serve as a link between the NMOG and OAV headquarters. [OAV, CMJ1751 (LVII)
1993:32].
The JPMC was created on 12 July 1992. Hs first meeting, held from
26-28 July 1992 at the headquarters ofthe OAV, was convened by the
Secretary General and attended by high-level representatives of the two
sides as weIl as by observers from the OAV, Burundi, Tanzania, Vganda,
Belgium, France, and the VSA [OAV, CMJ1751 (LVII) 1993:1].
The Secretary General then approached the countries (Nigeria,
Senegal, and Zimbabwe) that had been identified as contributors to
NMOG by the cease free agreement. Mali was also approached by the
Secretary General after consultations with the Rwandese parties to the
conflict and the Facilitator of the peace process, President Muniyi of
Tanzania. Vpon Mali's consent, the contingent of the NMOG was fuIly
deployed in different operational zones in Rwanda by October 1992
[OAV, CMJ1751 (LVII) 1993:4].
The Special Representative of the OAV Secretary General arrived
in Rwanda on 31 July 1992 to "ensure an OAV presence on the eve of
the cease-fire" [OAV, CMJ1751 (LVII) 1993:4]. During this visit, the
Special Representative discussed the cease-fire and the NMOG operation with the President of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana, and other
high-ranking Rwandese political and military officials. He visited various NMOG operational theaters in Northem Rwanda, discussed logistical and otherneeds of the NMOGwith the representatives of Belgium,
France, Germany, and the VS, and briefed the representatives of Burundi,
Tanzania, Vganda, and Zaire on both the conc1usion of the cease-fire
talks and the firstmeeting oftheJPMC [OAV, CMJ1751 (LVII) 1993:4].
This first visit to Rwanda was foIlowed by several others with a view
to consulting the warring parties on matters related "to the cease-fire, the
deployment and operations of the NMOG, as weIl as political negotiations" [OAV, CMJ1751 (LVII) 1993:4]. The Special Representative also
managed to arrange for the release of political and RPF war prisoners
held by the Rwandese Govemment and captured Rwandese Govemment
soldiers held by the RPF [OAV, CMJ1751 (LVII) 1993:5-6].
On the other hand, it was evident during these visits that the NMOG
faced severe logistical and financial shortages. Vnder the circumstances,
the Secretary General had to plead with the Heads of State of the GAV
(with the exception of Liberia, Rwanda and Somalia) for financial contributions to support the NMOG [OAV, CMJ1751 (LVII) 1993:6], but
no favorable response was received. Thus, the OAV had, yet again, to
120
The Path of a Genocide
depend on the assistance of foreign powers, notably Belgium, France,
Germany, and the V.S. [OAV, CMll751 (LVII) 1993:5]. Since the assistance given by these countries was not adequate to cover the NMOG
operation, it was inevitable that the work and mora1e of the Group would
be affected negative1y.
In the meantime, the OAV observer delegation to the Peace Talks
was led by the Secretary General himself. The first phase of the political negotiations following the Cease-fire Agreement of 12 July 1992
convened in Arusha, Tanzania during 10-18 August 1992. The meeting, chaired by Tanzanian Minister for Higher Education, Benjamin
Mkapa, and attended by the Foreign Minister of Rwanda, Boniface
Nuglinzira and the Chairman of the RPF, ColonelAlexis Kanyanengwe,
produced the Protocol on the Rule ofLaw. This meeting was followed
by three other sessions (17-18 September 1992; 5-30 October 1992;
23 November 1992-9 January 1993) devoted to the issue ofpower sharing within the framework of a broad-based transitionai govemment and
to the modalities for the formation of the: (a) Presidency; (b) Cabinet;
(c) TransitionaI Assembly; and (d) Judiciary. The Protocol Agreement
was signed on 9 January 1993.
The peace process was almost scuttled after the RPF launched a
military offensive on 8 February following massacres of Tutsi civilians in January 1993 after the Protocol Agreement had been signed.
The Secretary General held urgent consultations with the delegations
of the Rwandese Govemment and the RPF in Dar-es-Salaam in an
attempt to restore confidence in the peace process and to ensure the
continuation of the cease-fire [OAV, CM/1751 (LVIII) 1993]. This
was followed by a high-Ievel meeting between the Govemment of
Rwanda and the RPF from 5-7 March 1993 under the Chairmanship
of the Tanzanian Prime Minister, John Malecela, and, as usual, full
OAV participation. The two sides signed a joint communique which
provided for the:
• commitment of the two parties to a negotiated settlement within the framework of the Arusha Peace Process;
• consolidatian of the Cease-fire Agreement on the basis of the N'Sele Ceasefire Agreement;
• withdrawal of foreign troops and their replacement by a neutral force organized under the auspices of the GAU;
• acceptance of a new cease-fire, to be started on 9 March;
• acceptance of new cease-fire positions based on the RPF position on 8
February;
The OAV: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
o
•
•
•
•
121
taking of measures against officials who were directly or indirectly involved
in the massacres;
cessation of negative radio and newspaper campaigns against each other;
commitment of the two parties to provide adequate security and protection
to displaced persons;
holding of ajoint meeting on the buffer zone between the two parties under
the auspices of the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG);
working out modalities for the administration of displaced persons. [OAU,
CM/1751 (LVIII) 1993:2]
All the provisions of the Dar-es-Salaam communique, except those
which related to the withdrawal of foreign troops, taking action against
officials involved in the January massacres, and the cessation of negative radio and newspaper campaigns by the Rwandese govemment, were
implemented. The OAV then initiated several concrete steps to accelerate the implementation of the agreement.
Following the Dar-es-Salaam meeting, the OAV made arrangements
with both the Rwandese Govemment and the RPF to obtain a list of
representatives of the Rwandese refugee community. It submitted that
list to the VNHCR with a view to sponsoring the participation of those
representatives in the negotiations on Rwandese refugees to be held in
Arusha soon thereafter [OAV, CM/1751 (LVIII) 1993:7-8].
However, very shortly after, alarming reports of the breakdown of
peace and impending military confrontations forced the OAV Secretary General to meet with leaders of both groups at Kilimanjaro International Airport where he warned them on the folly and consequences
of any contemplated military action and urged them to continue with
the negotiations [OAV, CM/1751 (LVIII) 1993:8]. The Secretary General then sent his Special Representative to Rwanda in mid-April "to
reiterate the position of the OAV with regard to the role of the NMOG
and the peace process in general" [OAV, CM/1751 (LVIII) 1993:9]
shouId hostilities resume. This was followed by a visit to Rwanda by
an OAV military technical mission to assess developments in situ and
to exarnine the possibility of relocating the NMOG headquarters to
Byumbra, Northem Rwanda.
During the Dar-es-Salaam conference, the Secretary General was,
as the superyisor of NMOG, requested by the two sides "to extend the
mandate of the NMOG and to mobilize additional resources to enable
it to fulfill its mission" [OAV, CM/1751 (LVIII) 1993:4]. In view of
the seyere shortage of resources besetting the OAV, the Secretary General determined that a battalion of flye hundred (500) officers and men
122
The Path of a Genocide
would be adequate to monitor the demilitarized zone [OAU, CM/1751
(LVIII) 1993].
The Secretary General then made a formal request to the United
Nations, based on U.N. Resolution 812 (1993) (which the Secretary
General and the African Group at the U.N. had helped formulate), asking that the U.N. Secretary General examine the possibility of a U.N.
contribution to the OAU's effort in Rwanda [OAU, CM/1751 (LVIII)
1993]. However, based on his interpretation of Resolution 812, the U.N.
Secretary General replied that such assistance could be considered by
the U.N. only upon the signing of a peace agreement by the two parties
[OAU, CM/1751 (LVIII) 1993:5]. In spite of the protracted exchange
ofviews between the chief executives of the two organizations, no agreement could be reached on the interpretation of Resolution 812 [OAU,
CM/1751 (LVIII) 1993]. The deployment of the International Neutral
Force (INF) envisaged in the Arusha talks and resolution 812 was also
delayed until the implementation of the Peace Agreement.
Meanwhile, the Secretariat of the OAU had prepared, in cooperation
with the U.N.HCR, a "comprehensive document with appropriate recommendations on the action to be taken in the implementation of the
Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Rwandan refugees" and a Plan ofAction to be presented at a donors' conference [OAU, CM/1751 (LVIII)
1993:7-8].
By 3 August 1993, the Protocol on the formation of a new army and
various related issues was signed. Accordingly, a General Peace Agreement was signed at Arusha on 4 August 1993 to bring the state of war in
Rwanda to an end. Within thirty-seven (37) days, transitionai institutions were to be established-including a broad based Transitionai
Government of National Unity-for twenty two (22) months, that is
until no later than 10 September 1994 [OAU, Central Organ/MEC/AMB/
RPT (1), 1993: 13]. On the same day that the General Peace Agreement
was signed, the OAU Secretary General sent a message to the U.N.
Secretary General urging him to expedite the implementation of the
accord, in particular, the establishment of a International Neutral Force
ofpeacekeepers and monitors for Rwanda [OAU, Central Organ/MEC/
AMB/RPT (1) 1993:14].
From Arusha to 6 April 1994
The Secretary General also approached the governments of the
Congo, Gabon, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe for the
Tbe OAU: ConfJict Prevention, Management and Resolution
123
secondment of new or additional military observers, as the case may
be, to NMOG. Although the reaction of most of the govemments was
more or less favorable, deployment could not take place because of the
lack ofresources. In June 1993, only the fifty (50) original members of
the force were available to fulfill the responsibilities of NMOG. By
September, however, the Secretary General was able to report that a
contingent of sixty (60) Tunisian officers and men had been deployed
to complement Senegalese and Congolese forces in the NMOG contingent that by then consisted of one-hundred twenty-four (124); further,
they were to be joined by an additional fortY (40) officers and men
from Egypt [OAU, Central OrganIMEC/AMBIRPT (1),1993: 16-17].
He then informed the first ordinary session of the CentralOrgan of
the OAU Mechanism For Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which met in Addis Ababa on 13 September 1993, that:
• the mandate of NMOG, which was facing serious logistical problems, was
almost completed since it was the Neutral International Force (NIF) which
must take its place following the peace agreement which has already been
signed;
• he had extended the mandate ofNMOG only up to 31 October 1993 in the
conviction that the NIF will have, by then, been deployed;
• the deployment of the NIF was imperative to ensure the successful implementation of the agreement;
• it was not possible to meet the 10 September deadline to form a transitional government because the deployment of the NIF had encountered
difficulties;
• and that it too should make an urgent appeal to the U.N. Security Council.
[OAU, Central OrganIMEC/AMBIRPT (1), 1993: 17-18]
The Secretary General further informed the CentralOrgan that the
parties to the conflict had made their commitment to the General Agreement clear by deciding to send a joint delegation to the U.N. Security
Council to urge it to deploy the NIF [OAU, Central OrganIMEC/AMB/
RPT (1), 1993: 11]. The CentralOrgan sent messages to both the U.N.
Secretary General and the Secretary Council "to speed up the deployment of the NIF... (and) to act and follow through a successful action
initiated by the OAU and take over the financial burden of "NMOG II"
[OAU, Central OrganIMEC/AMB 2 (1) Rev. 1: 12].
In spite of the creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission for
Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the coordinated efforts of the OAU and the
U.N. to implement the General Peace Agreement, the transitionai institutions provided for in the Arusha Accords-in particular, a broad based
124
The Path of a Genocide
Transitionai Government of National Unity-were not established, in
part because of lack of agreement on representation (in both the Transitional Government and the Transitionai National Assembly), not only
among the different parties, but also within the different parties and
factions within those parties represented in the government.
At the same time, the political and security situation in the country
began to deteriorate steadily with the assassination of politicalleaders;
the massacre of innocent civilians became widespread. The Central Organ of the OAU met in March 1994 and sent an appeal to the leaders of
both the government of Rwanda and the RPF to join hands to arrest the
deteriorating political and security situation and to institute the transitionai institutions as earlyas possible to avert the political and security
collapse of the country (OAU, Press Release, No. 39193, March 24,1994).
After a visit to Rwanda by the Tanzanian Foreign Minister Diria in
March to mediate the dispute, President Muniyi of Tanzania convened
a regional summit of the leaders of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, and
Uganda in Dar-es-Salaam on 6 April 1994 to assess the situation in
both Burundi and Rwanda and to attempt to resolve the crises in these
countries. The OAU Secretary General was present at this meeting.
The Summit issued astatement urging all Rwandese parties concerned
to respect the letter and spirit of the General Peace Agreement and to
establish, without any delay, the transitionai institutions envisaged in
the agreement [OAU, CM/l847 (LX): 2].
Unfortunately, both President Habyarimana of Rwanda and
Ntaryamira of Burundi were killed in a plane crash on the same day on
their way back from the summit. Rwanda was engulfed in total political turmoil. Once again, Rwandese government forces and the RPF
resumed hostilities.
After 6 April 1994
After the death of both Presidents, the CentralOrgan of the OAU
called for the immediate institution of "an independent and impartial
investigation into the circumstances leading to the air crash," condemned
the blood letting, called for the immediate end of massacres, wanton
killings, and senseiess violence in the country," reaffirmed the Arusha
Peace Agreement as the only viable framework for the resolution of the
Rwanda conflict, and appealed to the U.N. Security Council to ensure
the continuous and effective functioning of UNAMIR (OAU, Press
Release, No. 46/94, 14 April 1994).
The OAU: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
125
The OAU Secretary General immediately established contact with
both warring parties in the hope of bringing about an immediate end to
the hostilities and the massacres. He entered into consultations with
the current Chairman of the OAV, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt,
as well as with the leaders of the countries neighboring Rwanda and
the representatives of the observer countries to the Arusha peace process. He also maintained regular contact with U.N. Secretary General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali and appealed to both the Secretary General and
the current President of the Security Council to maintain an increased
and effective United Nations presence in Rwanda.
To his great surprise, on 21 April 1994 the Security Council decided,
against the advice and strong objection of the African Group at the
U.N., the Non-Aligned Movement, and most of the NGOs operating in
Rwanda, and in spite of the escalating hostilities and increased massacres, to reduce the troop complement in U.N.AMIR from 2,500 to 270.
The OAU Secretary General protested this action and ca1led for a reconsideration of the resolution (OAU, CMJ1847 (LX):5).
The U.N. determined to act on Rwanda only after a meeting in Pretoria
(during the inauguration ceremony of South Africa's new President
Mandela) between President Mwinyi of Tanzania, Vice-President Al
Gore of the U.S. and U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.
The OAU Secretary General also attended the meeting. The meeting
produced a consensus that there was an urgent need for both assistance
and for the provision of security for those whose lives were being threatened by the conflict [OAU, CMJ1847 (LX):8].
Thus, on 16 May 1994, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution
918 providing for an expansion ofUNAMIR to 5,500 troops. UNAMIR's
"humanitarian role would be to protect the civilian and displaced population" and the protection of humanitarian and relief supply convoys
inside Rwanda [OAU, CMJ1847 (LX)]. There is no need to repeat the
description of the failure of these troops to be deployed in time to stop
the genocide.
After the Genocide
The UNAMIR II mandate, which expired on 9 December 1994, was
extended. In November, UNAMIR proposed to the Secretary General
and the Security Council The Rondoval Plan which, inter aHa,
• Proposes measures for national reconciliation and the creation of condi-
126
•
•
•
•
The Path of a Genocide
tions for the return of displaced persons to their homes; this plan would
involve regional efforts under the auspices of the OAU;
Impresses upon donors the need to support the Rwandese government;
Ensures respect for human rights through the presence of human rights
monitors;
Ensures the establishment of the International Tribunal to try those alleged
to be responsible for the massacres and genocide in Rwanda;
Supports the government through advice and other means, as weIl as by
the possible establishment of a Lands Commission to get the country back
to normalcy.
Earlier, Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim sent a field mission
to Tanzania and Burundi "to assess the refugee situation in the two
countries as well as the impact of the presenee of such large numbers of
refugees on the socio-economic infrastructure of these countries" [OAU,
CM!1847 (LX) Annex: l]. The OAU Humanitarian Mission to Tanzania and Burundi, as it was known, visited the two countries between 21
May and 1 June 1994 and held extensive discussions with high ranking
officials of the two countries, representatives of the UNHCR and NGOs
in both countries, visited selected refugee camps, and made in situ assessments. Its aim was "to find out how the OAU could be of assistance in the search for durable solutions to the problems" [OAU, CM!
1847 (LX) Annex:2]. Nothing concrete came out ofthis endeavor. Nevertheless, on 15 July 1994, after his own intensive consultations with
the leaders of the countries neighboring Rwanda, the Secretary General called for the convening of an International Humanitarian Conference on Rwanda. At the same time, however, he also took other steps to
convene the Regional Conference on Refugees and Displaced Persons
in the Great Lakes Region on the basis of an OAU resolution passed in
Tunis in June 1994.
Upon the request of the new Rwandese government, the Secretary
General sent an OAU representative to Kigali for an initial three month
period to monitor developments closely and to provide the necessary
information for OAU action regarding the reactivation of the peace
process in Rwanda. The OAU representative worked very closely with
the new government of Rwanda and U.N. agencies and NGOs. Accordingly, the Secretary General was able to report to the Sixty-First Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers, which met in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, from 23-27 January 1995, that, although certain sections of
the General Peace Agreement had been overtaken by events, "the
Rwandese Patriotic Front has attempted to constitute a government
The OAV: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
127
which, to a large extent, took cognizance of the framework of the Arusha
Peace Agreement" [OAU, CM/1861 (LXI) 1995:2]. The Secretary
General's report to the Council certified as broad based the new government formed by the RPF and other Rwandese political parties (but
excluding ex-president Habyarimana's MRND) as well as the seventy
(70) member Transitionai National Assembly in which all the political
parties, except the MRND and the CDR, were represented, accepting
genocide as the reason for excluding the MRND [OAU, CM/1861 (LXI)
1995:2-3].
On the whole, the Secretary General was favorably-though in some
instances critically-disposed toward the new government. He applauded the new government's position on reconciliation, castigated
the military and politicalleaders of the former government for intransigence, informed the Council that it is "to the credit of the CUITent government that there have been no systematic killing of people and armed
robbery," blamed the remnants ofthe old government's army and militia in what was once the French Humanitarian Protection Zone and the
refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania as being the sources of insecurity
"not just to the government but to the UNAMIR," and applauded the
government for taking appropriate action against those of its own soldiers who had comrnitted human rights violations [OAU, CM/1861
(LXI) 1995:3].
Thus, he requested the international community to assist, in concrete terms, the new government in its efforts to establish or reactivate
the institutions of state and administrative structures "needed to meet
the challenges of reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation"
[OAU, CM/1851 (LXI) 1995:10]. However, for good measure, he also
requested "the African Human and People's Rights Commission to have
a presence, however modest, in Rwanda in order to support the efforts
of the Government of Rwanda and the U.N. human rights members in
minimizing human rights violations" [OAU, CM/1861 (LXI): 11]. This
recommendation was perhaps made to allay the misgivings and apprehensians of the donor community, particularly the EU led by France,
which had made the deployment of human rights monitors all over the
country one of the conditions for assistance.
The issue of the presence in the refugee camps of about 30,000 soldiers and militia, led by some cabinet members of the former government of Rwanda who had formed a govemment-in exile, was viewed
as a source of potential destabilization by the international community.
Accordingly, the Secretary General reported that "any delay in resolv-
128
The Patn of a Genocide
ing the problems could bring about renewed fighting" [OAU, CMl1861
(LXI):4] and consequent1y argued for the quick separation of the soldiers and militia from the refugee camps.
The international humanitarian conference, which the Secretary had
called for in July of 1994, was eventually held in Bujumbura in February 1995, and adopted a Plan ofAction and Program ofAssistancefor
Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region. Its ultimate objective was to facilitate the repatriation and resettlement of the refugees and displaced persons [OAU, CMl1861
(LXI):6], particularly Rwandese.
Also, a meeting on Central African Refugees, convened at the OAU
headquarters on 9 September 1994 by the OAU and the U.N. and
jointly chaired by Secretary General Salim A. Salim and the head of
UNHCR, Sadako Ogata, decided to create a Joint Commission on
Repatriation ofRwandese Refugees composed ofthe OAU, the U.N.,
the Government of Rwanda, and representatives of the refugees. The
Commission was inaugurated on December 1994 [OAU, CM/1861
(LXI):6-7].
Conc1usions
The past thirty years of African history testify to the fact that African states have been anything but cohesive, except perhaps in the
struggle against decolonization and Apartheid, although there were some
exceptions even on these issues. Since the decade of independence, the
politics of, and relations between, African states have been wracked by
vast differences (ethnic, religious, ideological, and geopolitical) which
have been the root causes of conflict and tension. It is obvious then that
the OAU, whose major form of operation has been the search for consensus, would be very limited in its role in conflict resolution. It is also
understandable that during the past three decades, the OAU attached
more importance to those other functions which made consensual cooperation possible.
One direct consequence of the differences in, and between, its members, as weIl as the paucity ofresources, is that the OAV does not-and
possibly cannot-have the political, administrative and financial wherewithal to influence the behavior of its members. Yet, the OAU has not
been as totally derelict as almost all authors who have studied conflict
resolution in Africa assume it to have been. The OAU had, particu1arly
in the early years, geared much effort to the resolution of conflicts and
The GAU: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
129
disputes by the actions of its highest bodies, Le. the Assembly and the
Council of Ministers. The annals of its meetings are eloquent testimony to the numerous ad hoc commissions, committees etc. that have
lent their good offices to resolve disputes and conflicts between-if
not within-states, although, it is true that these efforts have been frustrating and almost invariably fruitless.
On the other hand, it is not fair to reproach the OAV or to evaluate and
scrutinize the activities of the organization in the abstract when it is the
member states who decide on its structure, character, functions, and resources. The OAV's attitude to conflict resolution is, in fact, a reflection
of the general characteristics of African international relations and the
disdain that far too many African leaders have for international rules and
principles as they have for 1heir own domestic laws. Thus, although the
OAV is now seemingly empowered institutionally to cape with intra- as
well as interstate conflicts, it is not at all certain whether it will be able to
assume a new relevance and if its centralorgan for conflict management
and resolution will fare better than its predecessor, the Commission of
Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration.
Notes
1. Cf. Organization of Mrican Unity, Charter, May 1963, Addis Ababa, Article 3.
Paragraph 4 in Organization of Afdean Unity, Basic Doeuments and Resolutions, Addis Ababa, 1963.
2. Debate concerning the military aspects of conflict management in Africa started
at about the same time as the creation of the OAU, Kwame Nkrumah referring
to an African High Command during the Founding Conference of the OAU in
May 1963 in conjunction with the proposal for a Continental Union Govemment. During the second ordinary session of the Council of Ministers in 1965,
the Ghanian delegation proposed a peacekeeping force to deal with conDicts
between African countries to police, protect and patrol disputed areas between
African countries (cf. Wolfers, M., Polities in the Organization ofAfriean Unity,
London: Methuen, 92-94). Though there was a consensus during the first meeting of the OAU Defence Commission on the need for a Pan-African force which
would fill an institutionai vacuum in the many crises besetting the continent,
including the Algeria/Morocco conflict and the impending withdrawal of the
United Nations Operations in the Congo (UNOC), the proposal to create an
African defence Organization was rejected at the second meeting. Similar proposals were discussed to death at subsequent sessions of the Council of Ministers, for example following the invasion of Guinea by mercenaries in 1970 and
at the Summit in Moravia, Liberia in 1979 [OAU, CM 1767 (LVIII) 21]. Even
military operations which required only cease-fire operations, such as provided
by the 1963 Bamako Cease-fire Commission, operated outside the framework
of the OAU.
3. Nigeria had sent a peacekeeping force to Chad, with the support and approval of
the OAU, on the basis of the Lagos Accord (Lagos II) reached in August 1979
130
The Path of a Genocide
agreed upon by the majority of the political groups in Chad, but Nigeria withdrew its forces when fighting broke out in mid-March 1980. The SecretaryGeneral of the OAV then attempted to create a neutral African force composed
of contingents from Benin, the Congo, and Guinea, again on the basis of the
Lagos Accord, both to supervise a cease-fire and to chair a monitoring commission, but this initiative was abandoned when the only force that arrived, a Congolese force of 500, had to be evacuated as soon as it arrived because of renewed
fighting in the Chadian capital, N'Djamena.
4. It was declared that the OAV "did not only have the right but also the obligation
to get invo1ved even before appealing to the international community" (Ibid,
31).
5. OAV, AHGlDec. 3 (XXIX), 1993:28-30; see Proposal for Strengthening The
General Secretariat in the Field of Conjlict Management, Central Organ/Mecl
Amb 3, (11) Annex 2, 1.
7
The Arusha Peace Process
Bruce D. Jones
Introduction
While most accounts of the Arusha process in Rwanda date it from
June of 1992 until the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in August 1993, we will refer to three phases of Arusha which ran from the
outset of the civil war in 1990 until the RPF victory in July of 1994.
These were:
1. A pre-negotiation phase, starting almost immediately after the outbreak
of hostilities. While not formally conducted under the aegis of the Arusha
process, the texts of agreements reached in this phase were incorporated
into the final Arusha document, and in other important ways contextualize
the formal Arusha process. This phase involved the regional and international efforts which led to the establishment of the Arusha political negotiations;
2. A formal negotiation phase, starting in June of 1992 and continuing, with
interruptions, until the signing of the Peace Accord on 4 August 1993;
3. An implementation phase, during which the parties to the Arusha accord
attempted to establish the transitional institutions called for in the agreement, and during which UNAMIR was deployed in Rwanda to help secure the transition process. This phase can also be taken to encompass the
last-ditch efforts taken in April and May of 1994 to salvage the accords
following the resumption of civil war and the commencement of the genocide following the 6 April 1994 assassination of President Habyarimana.
Each of these phases is considered in tum followed by an attempt to
evaluate the Arusha process. Did the ultimate failure of Arusha result
from the process itself or should that failure be attributed to external
forces? With reference to these competing perspectives, was Arusha
131
132
The Path of a Genocide
either a disastrous transition bargain or good preventive diplomacy sabotaged by the interference of outsiders? The central argument developed
in this chapter is that the truth of the Arusha process lies somewhere
between the perspective adhered to by some participants who argue
that the agreement constituted excellent preventive diplomacy and was
undermined by outsiders, and critical commentary which suggests that
the Arusha process was foisted on Rwanda by outsiders and was inherently deeply flawed. Both perspectives miss key points. In evaluating
conflict resolution efforts, such as Arusha, it is important to maintain a
distinction between process and outcome. The argument developed here
is that the Arusha process was sophisticated and weIl managed, but that
the outcome was indeed flawed. The outcome reflected, in part, the
inherent difficulties in achieving a stable transition bargain in the context of civil war.
Pre-Negotiation: Regional Peace Efforts
Efforts to bring the civil conflict in Rwanda to a peaceful resolution
began within days of the RPF's invasion on l October. The Belgian
government, as part of a compromise worked out between the Socialist
and Christian Democrat parties around withdrawing Belgian troops from
Rwanda, sent a peace mission to Kigali comprised of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Minister of Defence. This trio met
with Habyarimana in Nairobi on 14 October 1990. Over the next three
days, they held talks in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. They also met
with the OAU. This mission appears to have helped to stimulate a nascent regional process, which quickly became the focns of negotiations. A summit held three days later at Mwanza, Tanzania, formalized
the involvement of Rwanda's neighbors in the peace process, laid the
basis for further discussions, and shifted the locus of talks to the Organization for African Unity (Mwanza Communique, 17 October 1990).
This regional peace process, in itself ineffective in containing flghting,
can nevertheless be seen as forming a pre-negotiation phase to what
eventually become the Arusha peace process. 1
The regional process comprised two tracks. The rITst track was a
series of official summit meetings between the heads of the members
states of the Communite Economique de Pays des Grands Lacs
(CEPGL); the members were Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire. The second
track consisted of broader meetings which brought the CEPGL members into contact with Ugandan, Tanzanian, OAU, and U.N. officials.
The Arusha Peace Process
133
In two meetings held in late Oetober in Gbadolite, Zaire, President
Mobutu Sese Seko was appointed OAU Mediator for the peace process, despite the fact that Zaire had sent troops to Kigali to support
Habyarimana earlier that month. The CEPGL countries, plus Uganda,
also recornrnended the establishment of an African peacekeeping/monitoring force, the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) under the
observation of the OAU's Liberation Committee. Following the
Gbadolite talks, a working meeting of the CEPGL was held in Goma
on 20-22 November 1990, to which both Uganda and the RPF were
invited. At that meeting, President Museveni of Uganda, in cooperation with President Mwinyi of Tanzania, was asked to organize a regional summit on the question of refugees (Gbadolite Communique, 20
November 1990).
The moves towards a refugee conference began with a meeting of
regional foreign ministers in Kinshasa, Zaire, on 17-19 January 1991,
at which the OAU and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) were present. At this meeting, Habyarimana confirrned that
Mwinyi would host the conference and a date for it was set. Then,
immediately prior to the opening of the conference, Habyarimana attempted to gain the initiative by calling on all refugees to return, a
grandstanding and futile gesture at that time given both the situation in
Rwanda, his own past performanee and the troubled history ofrefugee
diplomacy in the region. Notwithstanding Habyarimana's grandstanding, the conference held in Dar-es-Salaam on 19 February was successful, insofar as it resulted in the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Rwandese
Refugees Problem, which cornrnitted the Government of Rwanda to
finding a "definitive and durable solution" to the refugee problem (Dar
es Salaam Declaration on the Rwandese Refugees Problem, 19 February 1991, p.l, Art.5). This declaration became a pre-negotiation text
for the Arusha process, and forrned the core of the eventual Arusha
protocol on refugees.
Another important development occurred at this time. At a
preconference meeting between Mwinyi, Museveni, and Habyarimana,
the Rwandese president was persuaded to sign the Zanzibar
Cornrnunique, which restated a commitment, original1y made in the
Mwanza Cornrnunique, to finding a peaceful solution to the eonflict
through achieving a eease-fire agreement, through conducting a dialogue with the interna1 and externa1 opposition, and through the regional conference on refugees (Zanaibar Communique 17 February
1991: 1). The flurry of sumrnitry had, to this point, done little to stop
134
The Path of a Genocide
the fighting between the Forces Armees Rwandaise (FAR). and the RPF,2
However, by the time of the Zanzibar Communique ~ubstance
was
added; the process moved from general principles towards negotiating
a real cease fire.
The first of these was signed on 29 March 1991 in N'Sele, Zaire.
The N'Sele Cease-fire Agreement Between the Government of the
Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front was the first
formal cease fire of the civil war. The N' Sele text established the terms
of the cease fire, set part of the agenda for continuing talks, and formalized the creation and make-up of the Neutral Military Observer Group
(NMOG), which was to police the cease fire and report to the OAU on
violations. Originally, NMOG was to be composed offive officers from
each of the CEPGL countries and five officers from each of Uganda
and the RPF (Cease-fire Agreement between the Government of the
Republic ofRwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, 29 March 1991).
Before NMOG had a chance to deploy, however, the FAR broke the
cease fire by shelling RPFpositions in north-eastern Rwanda. Fighting
continued for some months with significant losses to government forces,
though there was little movement on the ground since the RPF did not
advance much further into Rwandese territory.
Having once failed to implement a cease fire, negotiating a second
proved a more difficult task. Moves towards a second cease fire saw,
for the first time, a significant role for nonregional actors, including the
United States. The US lent its weight to the peace talks in a meeting
organized by Deputy Assistant Secretary Hicks, at the Government of
Rwanda's (GOR's). request, between the GOR and RPF representatives in Harare. The Hicks meeting did not produce anything concrete
in the way of agreements, but kept the spirit of negotiations alive, and
arguably laid the groundwork for a second round of cease-fire negotiations in Gbadolite.
The Gbadolite talks, held in September 1991, proved to be difficult
to manage. The RPF refused to attend several sessions, despite the presence of their Ugandan backers. Nevertheless, there were two achievements: first, the difficulties with Rwandese government intransigence
that NMOG first encountered while trying to deploy in May were addressed through creating a stronger structure which gave command of
the force to a Nigerian officer (previously a Zairean had headed up the
force), and replaced the Ugandan and CEPGL forces with twenty-five
Nigerian and fifteen Zairois officers; second, the Gbadolite meeting
reissued the N' Sele cease fire agreement in an arnended form and re-
The Arusha Peace Process
135
confirmed the participants' commitment to peaceful resolution of the
crisis (The Gbadolite Cease fire, 7 September 1991:1-2).
Even more significant than the content of the Gbadolite cease fire,
the meeting proved to be both the apogee and the effective end of
Mobutu's mediation role. According to both Rwandese and western
sources, by this time all the parties recognized the incompetence of
Mobuto in this role. Mobuto retained the formal title of "mediator," but
from this point on had little to do with the peace process, with one late
and disastrous exception described later in this chapter. The need to
bypass Mobutu as mediator shifted the locus of the peace process, minimized the role played by the CEPGL, and increased the participation of
nonregional states and actors. An intensification ofAmerican and French
diplomatic activity following Gbadolite marked a significant change in
direction for the peace process.
For several months, a series of French and American meetings with
Rwandese participants ran in paraIleI, while each side kept each other
informed of developments through working-level contacts. In France,
the Quai d'Orsay's Director for Africa and the Maghreb, Mr. Paul
Dijoud, called a 23-25 October 1991 meeting in Paris, but when Maj.Gen. Paul Kagame, military head of the RPF, failed to show up, the
meeting was canceled. A second attempt, on 14-15 January 1992, succeeded in bringing together Ambassador Pierre-Claver Kanyarushoki
for the GOR and Mr. Bizimungu for the RPF. At the meeting, Dijoud
told the RPF that there were two logics, the logic of peace and the logic
of war: "Vous continuez a attaquer votre pays, votre pays se defend."
He challenged the RPF to halt their attacks on Rwanda, and cal1ed on
the GOR to listen more attentively to the RPF (Front Patriotique
Rwandais, "compte rendu de la reunion du 14-15 janvier 1992 entre la
delegation du gouvernement rwandais et cel1e dur f.p.r." 3).
In Washington, during the same period, a series of talks and initiatives were taken by the Africa Bureau of the State Department. The
first of these was a working level contact made between RPF representatives in Washington and the State Department's desk officer for
Rwanda, Carol Fuller. The continuation of these talks eventually led
to the involvement of the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa,
Herman Cohen. Cohen convened an inter-agency meeting to discuss
the situation in Rwanda. This interagency forum would continue to
meet for the next two years to coordinate American efforts in Rwanda. 3
Having received the support of other relevant agencies to deepen
American involvement in the process, and with the formation of a
136
The Path of a Genocide
real coalition government in Rwanda in April 1992,4 Cohen traveled
to Kampala on 8 May 1992 and met with Museveni. At the meeting,
Cohen not only offered U.S. technical assistance for the negotiations,
but also cajoled Museveni into buying into the negotiation process.
Cohen argued that Uganda could not only ease the internaI pressure
caused by the Rwandese refugees by helping the RPF negotiate powersharing in Rwanda, but he could also thereby deal a blow to Habyarimana with whom Museveni had long-running tensions. Cohen then
followed this visit with a two day stop in Kigali where he also offered
us technical support for negotiations. 5
Independently of each other, the American and French efforts advanced the course of negotiations but made no formal breakthrough
concerning peace negotiations. However, on his return from Rwanda,
Cohen was asked by director Dijoud to attend a meeting at the Quai
d'Orsay with Ssemogerere, the Ugandan Foreign Minister. Cohen took
the opportunity of talking with Ssemogerere and taking a harder line;
citing Ugandan military support for the RPF, Cohen threatened to cut
America's foreign assistance to Uganda ifUganda did not pressure the
RPF to participate in political negotiations towards a peace settlement.
The most critical meeting prior to the Arusha talks was one hosted at
the Quai d'Orsay by Dijoud at which Cohen was again present. At this
session, on June 6-8 1992, the RPF and the GOR finally agreed to hold
comprehensive political negotiations under Tanzanian mediation and
to meet in July to launch that process. 6
Negotiations: The Arusha Process as
Prlev~ ntjlve
Diplomacy
Informed by a cogent theoretical analysis, the formal Arusha peace
process was an extraordinary story of a sophisticated conflict resolution process which went disastrously wrong. The process was also cooperative, perhaps to a surprising extent. In Tanzania, the end result
was celebrated among participants as the framework for a "new order"
providing a comprehensive agreement that went beyond the traditional
settlement of conflict, for the agreement made real inroads into resolving some of the underlying tensions which had sparked the civil war.
Yet, nine months after its signing, extremist forces in Kigali implemented their own bloody version of the new order. Did the Arusha agreements contain inherent flaws which helped escalate this violence? Or
was any potential peace agreement bound to be attacked by forces over
which the parties to the agreement had virtually no contral?
The Arusha Peace Process
137
The negotiation phase of the Arusha talks lasted thirteen months, the
two sides 7 reaching agreement and then deadlock and then agreement
again on a series of agenda items. As characterized by a French participant at Arusha, the agenda for discussion was set and the process facilitated by Tanzania. 8 The agenda covered the issue of a cease fire, the
principles of law, power sharing, the integration of armies, and the repatriation of refugees. A cease fire agreement, as an amended version
of a twice amended cease fire which originated in N'sele, was quickly
reached. In the other areas, key issues staI1ed negotiations and, at various points, threatened the peace process. A partial account of this process and these issues follows.
The agreement to meet in Arusha came on 8 June 1992, and the two
sides met there for the first time on 12 July 1992. On 14 July they
announced a cease fire scheduled to come into effect on 31 July and a
start to peace negotiations by 10 August with a deadline of 10 October.
Fighting in northem Rwanda on 29 July seemed to threaten that timetable, but the cease fire did in fact come into effect as planned and held
until the 10 October deadline. Both sides also agreed to yet another
restructuring of NMOG which removed from the force any officers
from neighboring countries and replaced them with officers from
Senegal, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Mali.
Very significantly, this first round of Arusha talks also caI1ed for the
creation of a joint political military commission to be established in
Addis Ababa at OAU headquarters. 9 The JPMC, as it became known,
was composed of five representatives of the Rwandese govemment
and five representatives of the RPF, and had parallei observers from
states observing the Arusha talks as well as those who had contributed
to NMOG, as it was restructured by the Arusha cease fire of 12 July
1992. Its mandate was to "ensure the folIow-up of the implementation
of the cease-fire agreement" and to "ensure the folIow-up of the implementation of the peace agreement to be signed at the conc1usion of the
political negotiations."lO As characterized by members of two Western
observer teams, the JPMC served as a place to meet but not negotiate,
a place where complaints could be aired, where the neutral military
observer group could lodge complaints or accusations of violations,
and in general where problems could be addressed without interfering
with the process of negotiations. l1 The JPMC became effectively a second channel through which the thomy issues of the Arusha process
could be hammered out. Talks in November 1992 at Kigali, in northem
Rwanda, under the chairmanship ofthe Nigerian commander ofNMOG,
138
The Path of a Genocide
produced an agreement on the deployment of NMOG forces along a
neutral zone. 12
This first phase of the Arusha talks led quickly to the second, which
on 17 August 1992 announced an agreement on a protocol on the rule
of law (signed on the 18th). The quick agreement on this protocol appears to have been made possible by an intemal agreement among the
delegates to leave some of the tricky issues-such as the composition
of a transitionai government-out of the protocol at this stage, and focus discussion on broad principles. The outstanding items were deferred to the end of the process. 13
Arusha III ran from 7-18 September, and saw Foreign Minister
Ngulinzira of Rwanda table a series of conciliatory proposals. Agreements on power sharing, unification, and political cooperation were
initialed but not signed, and the two sides returned to their respective
bases for consultation. It quickly emerged that Ngulinzira had acted
without Habyarimana's support. However, subsequent negotiations inside Kigali, between Habyarimana and the opposition parties, produced
an agreement on instructions for the delegates, who returned to Arusha
for a fourth round of talks on 6 October. By 12 October, the delegates
reached agreement on the issues of the nature of presidential power
under a broad-based transitionai government (BBTG). It was agreed
that the BBTG would last for no more than twenty-two months and
would be followed by free elections to determine the government of
the country. The system of authority was to be parliamentary in large
measure rather than presidential; the RPF insisted that power reside in
a council of ministers (effectively a cabinet) rather than with the president and presidential advisors. The powers of the president were diminished to those of a ceremonial head of state who did not even have
the power to name his own govemment. His authority, such as it was,
was secondary to that of the prime minister. The protocol to this effect
was signed and issued on 31 October 1992.
This protocol also created a transitionai national assembly (TNA) to
replace the Conseil National de Development (eND), which from the
moment of the signing of the accord was prohibited from passing new
laws. Between the BBTG and the national assembly, a fairly typical
parliamentary relationship was instituted wherein the president of the
republic could dissolve the assembly, but the assembly could in tum
censure the BBTG. The TNA was also given the unusual power of electing the president and vice-president of the supreme court; it was, thus,
a powerful institution. However, the protocol did not resolve the funda-
The Arusha Peace Process
139
mental issue of seats in the TNA, nor the distribution of cabinet posts
in the BBTG (Reyntjens, 1994).
Arusha V commenced on 25 November 1992, with the agenda focused on the difficult topic of the precise composition of the transitiona1 institutions on which agreement had been reached on the
framework. 14 These discussions, which required three months of background negotiations to conclude, formed the first of the major sticking
points in the Arusha process, and wou1d come back to bedevil the implementation phase. Two issues were at the heart of discussions. Pirst, the
RPF objected to a government proposal which included the coalition
pour le defense de la republique (CDR). in the government. Apart from
denouncing the extremist nature of the CDR, the RPF (aceurately). argued that it was a political organization but not a political party, and as
such ineligible for membership in the transitionai institutions. However, the government delegation insisted on the inelusion of the CDR
and were backed in this demand by the French. According to one of its
members, the French delegation argued that it was better to have the
CDR in the government, where they could be controlled, than on the
outside where they could wreak havoe. Equally, the Tanzanians argued
that it was better to have the extremists "on the inside of the tent, pissing
out, than on the outside of the tent, pissing in."15
In the end, however, the RPF prevailed; the CDR was, at this stage,
excluded from the transitionai institutions. Further, a protocol signed
on 22 December contained the following agreement about seats in the
transitionai government: MDR-four portfolios including Prime Minister and Foreign Minister; RPF five portfolios including the Vice-Prime
Minister and the Minister for Interior; MRND-five portfolios including Defence, Public Works, and the Presidency; PSD-three, inc1uding
Finance; PL-three, including Justiee; and the PDC one portfolio. Seats
in the assembly were divided among the major parties: the MRND,
RPF, MDR, PSD, and PL each had eleven seats; the PDC had four; and
a number of small parties obtained one seat each. As Reyntjens has
noted, the eomposition of the parliament meant that agreement from at
least four parties was required to reaeh a majority. From a government
perspective, it was clear that the RPF would have an easier time in
mustering opposition votes than would the MRND (see Reyntjens,
1994).
The distribution of seats among parties in the transitionai institutions, if put in place, would have marginalized the Habyarimana regime in the "new order." Key members of the Habyarimana power
140
The Path of a Genocide
structure, both within and surrounding the MRND, would have been
exc1uded from any substantiaI role in the Arusha institutions. Critically, without the CDR in the transitionaI institutions to bolster their
numbers, the MRND itself would have had little chance of mustering
adequate votes in either the BBTG or the TNA. First, their own share
of seats or votes was to be matched by those of the RPF. Second, as the
civil war dragged on and the process of multipartyism continued, the
opposition parties in Kigali, being "moderate" virtuaUy by definition
through their opposition to the dominance of the MRND, were seen as
natural allies of the RPF. Third, the power of the presidency was so
reduced as to tum the post into a symbolic one. Thus, members of the
Habyarimana regime reacted to the negotiated provisions of Arusha,
not as a transition bargain producing real power-sharing arrangements,
but as political victories by the RPF which denied them a meaningful
share in power.
The perceived marginalization of the regime was furthered when the
parties reconvened in Arusha on 5 January to tack1e the question of the
distribution of seats in the TNA. The agreement reached on 10 January
aUocated seats among the parties as follows: MRND (11), RPF (11),
MDR, PL, and PSD (11 each). The leftover seats were distributed among
small parties and "political groups"-a compromise reference to the
CDR attached to this compromise, however, was a caveat that political
groups which wished to be inc1uded in the TNA must sign a "code of
ethics" committing them to the maintenance of new, peaceful institutions-which the CDR promptly refused to do.
At a symbolic level, the question of the exc1usion of the CDR came
to be seen by the observer delegations in Arusha, and to a certain extent
in the capital itself, as a test of the RPF willingness to cooperate with
the regime within power-sharing arrangements. Though in real terms
the power equation was far more complex, involving as it did tacit and
shirting alliances with various and competing wings of the opposition
parties, the CDR became a symbolic flash point for the agreements. 16
The question of whether or not to inc1ude extremist organizations
such as the CDR in negotiations in the first place, is one which has
bedeviled conflict resolution. The experienee of the United Nations in
bringing the Khmer Rouge into discussions with difficult consequences
provides a counter case to the experience in South Africa, where all
political elements were included in negotiations, with apparent success. That the French were supportive of the inc1usion of the CDR could
easily be dismissed as evidence ofFrench complicity with the Habyari-
The Arusba Peace Process
141
mana regime. 17 But this was also the position of a more clearly neutral
negotiating team, the Americans. According to the State Department's
desk officer for Rwanda at the time of the negotiations, an inter-agency
meeting on conflict resolution in Rwanda agreed as earlyas March
1992 to take the approach of bringing the extremists into the govemment. Again, tent analogies were used: an American official commented
that their analysis was that "if you don't bring them [the CDR] into the
tent, they're going to bum the tent down" (confidential interview, state
department, Washington, June 1993). The eventual exclusion of the
CDR from power, as one central part of a broader marginalization of
the regime, was interpreted by most western govemments as atuming
point away from constructive negotiations over an effective transition
bargain in favor of a victor's deal which reflected RPF views much
more than it did a true compromise.
Within days of the signing of the agreement on distribution of seats
within the TNA, the CDR and MRND in Kigali were involved in demonstrations against the peace talks, especially in Ruhengiri and Gisenyi.
The demonstrations were precursors to violence: between 22 and 31
January, over three-hundred Tutsi civilians in the north were murdered.
This civil violence, in tum, led to a renewal of the civil war: on the 8
February 1993 the RPF launched a major offensive, claiming it was
occasioned by the recent massacres. However, more was at issue than
the recent killings; after all, periodic killings of civilians on a sirnilar
scale had been conducted in Rwanda almost from the onset of the invasion. Perhaps a more realistic explanation can be found in tactical thinking about the next agenda item for the Arusha discussions: integration
of the armed forces. Negotiating strength on this issue would tum out
to be a precise function of fighting strength on the ground. In this interpretation, the RPF launched the offensive at this point to prove their
fighting strength and thus put them on firm ground for these most important negotiations.
The offensive certainly did confirm their strength. Within two weeks
of fighting the RPF had doubled the amount of territory under its control (African Research Bulletin, 1-28 February 1993, 10902). The impact on the balance of strength was so significant that Rwanda had to
ask France to send reinforcements to bolster the army, which France
did in two waves, on 9 February (150 troops) and 20 February (250
troops). The latter deployment was justified by France as being necessary since the RPF advance threatened Kigali. Tanzanian and French
intelligence sources concluded at the time that the RPF could overrun
142
The Path of a Genocide
the FAR were it not for the presence of the French troops in Kigali.
This conc1usion would form the backdrop to the subsequent round of
negotiations. 18 This perception evidently was shared by Habyarimana,
for he personally called for a return to the Arusha process on 23 February. The next round would prove decisive.
That final round of negotiations dealt with two sets of issues: refugees and security, the latter including the composition of a neutral military force, the integration of the armed forces into a single national
army, and the composition of the army command structure. The refugee issue was settled quickly, as the framework for agreement had already been laid by the Dar-es-Salaam Dec1aration on the Rwandese
refugee problem. That dec1aration was for all intents and purposes simply reformulated in the framework of Arusha to form the protocol on
the Repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettiement of displaced
persons; agreement was announced on 10 June 1993. The security issues were more complex.
The issue of the authority for a neutral military force was fairly
easily dealt with through effective American third-party mediation
and request to the OAV to ascertain whether they could assume such
a responsibility. The division had been over whether the force should
be under the authority of the OAV (which the RPF favored) or the
V.N. The real limitations of the OAV to carry out such a task determined the outcome. The issue was settled by the OAV's announcement at the JPMC that it could not meet the requirements specified
by the two sides. On 6 April 1993 the GOR and RPF agreed to ask the
V.N. to q:>mpose a "neutral international force" to oversee the final
agreement.
The far more difficult negotiation in this phase concerned the critical issue of integrating the two armies into one national army, and the
percentage split of army command positions. These issues took months
of negotiations. On two occasions, they threatened to collapse the entire process. The government of Rwanda started off negotiating on this
issue by suggesting a 15 percent share of armed command for the RPF
to reflect the percentage of Tutsi in Rwanda. The RPF rejected this
outright, both because the figure was too low and because the rationale
used for arriving at it contradicted their platform of fighting for democracy for all Rwandese. The RPF counter offer was 50-50, which the
government delegation also rejected outright. However, the RPF stuck
to their position, and in an unusual breach from their "honest-broker"
role, the Tanzanians supported the RPF position. Negotiations took the
The Arusha Peace Process
143
number to 25 percent, then 30 percent, then 35 percent, then 40 percent, and final1y reached 50 percent.
The even stickier issue of how far down the command chain this
split should go caused more problems. An eventual agreement was
brokered wherein the command level was to be split 50-50, and the
forces were to be drawn 60 percent from govemment and 40 percent
from the RPF. At senior leveis, the RPF would be given the head of the
gendarmerie and the government was to retain controi of the head of
the armed forces. Both armies would be integrated into a 13,000 strong
army supplemented by a 6,000 strong gendarmerie. The announcement
of this agreement on 24 June seemed to presage an imminent signing of
the peace package.
This putative agreement was taken back to Kigali on 24 June by the
govemment's negotiating team. It was rejected by Habyarimana. An
American participant observed at the time that the division of the army
as it stood would never be accepted by hard-line factions in the army,
and threatened to col1apse the talks. 19 Differences emerged as to what
constituted a command level position. When the issue returned to
Arusha, the RPF not only stood their ground, they upped the ante in
anger over the govemment's reneging on the agreement, and cal1ed for
a 60-40 split weighted in their favor. After heavy intercession by the
Tanzanian, French, and American teams, the two sides agreed again on
the original deal, with the c1arification that "command levet" extended
all the way to field command positions. This represented a significant
new victory for the RPF in terms of their capacity to controi the merged
security forces.
The Arusha Accords were now complete and were signed on 4 August 1993.
The Implementation Phase
For nine months after signing that agreement, elements of the
Rwandese political system, the United Nations, and the participants in
the Arusha process struggled to implement its provisions: the establishment of the transitionaI institutions, principally the BBTG the mise
en place of a "neutral international force" to secure the transitionai
govemment; and the integration of armed forces and demobilization of
redundant troops by both sides. As the forces of peace struggled to
implement this first phase, extremist forces methodically and efficiently
undermined their efforts.
144
The Patn of a Genocide
The Arusha peace agreement called for the establishment of the
BBTG within thirty-seven days of the signing of the accord, and the
deployment of a U.N. force within the same time period, both ofwhich
goals were quickly shown to be hopelessly unrealistic. Immediately
after the signing of Arusha, France began to win agreement in the Security Council for a U.N. force, but was unable to succeed before the 5
October when Security Council Resolution 872 established the United
Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). UNAMIR was
established under Chapter VI authority, with a mission to enhance security in Kigali and assist in providing security for the transitionaI government. The mission was to be led by a Canadian, Brig.-Gen. Romeo
Dallaire.
General Dallaire and an advance party of twenty-one troops eventually arrived in Kigali on the 21 October 1993, the same day that the
Tutsi-dominated army of Burundi assassinated the newly elected president, Melchior Ndadaye, a Rutu, and commenced the killing of tens of
thousands of Burundi Rutu. The assassination and killings were rich
material for the extremists in Rwanda, who used the events to lend
credence to their claims that the Tutsi of the RPF were returning to
Rwanda to reestablish their historic dominance over the Hutu. The contrast could not have been more stark between the violence in Burundi
and the late token arrival of the neutral international security force.
Indeed, many observers, inc1uding members of the Tanzanian negotiating team, agreed that the assassination of Ndadaye was the tuming
point for the peace process in Rwanda. The voices of radical ethnic
hatred gained credence as events in Burundi seemed to unfold according to the extremist's doomsday scenario for Rwanda?O Those who
counted on the U.N. to provide security for the transition could only be
disappointed by the partial U.N. presence. For many observers, the
momentum of fear and opposition took sway over the momentum for
security and peace. 2l
Despite events in Burundi, efforts to establish the transitionaI institutions in Kigali began with the appointment of the MDR's Faustin
Twagiramungu to the Prime Ministership, as agreed in the final days of
Arusha. Almost simultaneously, the opposition parties in Kigali began
to splinter. Twagiramungu's party itse1f divided inta factions, and intense squabbles broke out among the parti liberal (PI) and the parti
socialist democratique (psd). Attempts to convene the BBTG on 8 January 1994 failed, because of a deadlock within the MDR and PL by 10
February, the deadlock within the PL was so intense that the other op-
The Al"Usba Peace Process
145
position parties, and the MRND, agreed to go ahead and establish the
BBTG without PL participation. Before this could occur, Felicien
Gatabazi, the leader of the PSD, was assassinated in Kigali, an event
which was immediately followed by the killing of Martin Bucyana of
the CDR. On 23 February, all opposition parties boycotted an MRND
attempt to hold up the installation ceremonies for the BBTG.
VNAMIR, its resources already stretched by the general deterioration of security in Kigali, was able to restore some sense of security
following these killings, but not before a sense of chaos and impending
catastrophe had already pervaded the Rwandese political system. Michel
Moussali, a VNHCR special envoy, argued on 23 February that Rwanda
would experience "a bloodbath of unparalleled proportions" if efforts
were not made to salvage the peace process.
The bloodbath was already in preparation. As revealed in a confidential, but by now widely circulated UNAMIR communication to V.N.
headquarters in New York,22 the assassination of Gatabazi was part of a
plan: to disrupt the establishment of the BBTG, compile lists of Tutsi
in Rwanda for the purpose oftheir extermination, underrnine UNAMIR
by killing Belgian peacekeepers, thereby precipitating their departure,
and resume the war against the RPF.
The plan was generated and controlled by the extremist elements in
Rwanda. It had been developed prior to the signing of the Arusha Accords, but their effective loss of power in the Arusha process spurred
them on. These military elements of the one-party state, who would
lose their authority in a democratic regime, were located in the Presidential Guard, the CDR, and extremist elements of the MRND, all of
whose senior ranks were held by members of the AKAZU. They were at
the heart of the planning to underrnine the peace process. These three
elements together financed and coordinated the training of extremist
militia groups, the interahamwe and the impuzamugambi. They also
directed the spread of propaganda based on ethnic fear, transmitted
through many media but most notoriously the Radio-television Libre
des mille collines, or RTLM. Focused on building the institutions of
peaceful transition, international and peaceful forces in Rwanda underestimated the potency and deadly seriousness of both the propaganda
and the planning.
Even after the assassination of Gatabazi, frantic attempts were made
to salvage the Arusha deal. A special representative of the U.N. Secretary General met with the RPF on 1 March to try to find ways to put the
peace process back on track. Tanzania, the Arusha facilitator, also kept
146
The Path of aGenodde
up its efforts to persuade the two sides to implement the agreement.
Ultimately, Tanzania persuaded Habyarimana to attend a summit in
Arusha on the crisis in Burundi, with the intention of pressuring him to
reaffirm his commitment to the BBTG. Habyarimana attended the meeting and did issue astatement reaffirming the Arusha agreement: it was
on his flight back from this conference, on 6 April 1994, that the plane
carrying bOth mm and President Ntariyamana of Burundi was shot down,
killing both men.
As events spiraled out of controi in Kigali, Tanzanian authorities
tried desperately to renew the Arusha process and thereby restore order
in Rwanda. On 7 April 1994, Tanzania ordered gasoline shipments to
Rwanda to be held at the border in order to place pressure on what
remained of the government to negotiate with UNAMIR and the RPF.
On 19 April, PresidentAli Hassan Mwinyi called for a return to Arusha
for 23 April. On 22 April, the RPF agreed to attend and to talk, not to
the putative government, but to the Rwandese army. On the 23rd, an
RPF delegation turned up in Arusha ready to announce a unilateral cease
fire; no government delegation presented itself at Arusha.
As it turned out, Zaire's Mobuto Sese Seko had, disastrously, chosen
this moment to reassert his authority as formal mediator of the Arusha
process. He had called the government of Rwanda to parallei talks in
Zaire on 23 April. The effective government had gone to Zaire, and had
itself supposedly been ready to announce a unilateral cease fIre. The Tanzanian government allowed diplomacy to win out over outrage when it
regretted Mobutu's interference, saying simply that "two unilaterally
decided cease fires do not add up to one that is effective" (Tanzanian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Official Statement, 25 April 1994). While it
is not clear that the two cease fIres would have been mutually acceptable
or could have returned order to Rwanda, it is certainly evidence that
Mobutu's interference denied the Arusha process any possible last chance.
23 April 1994 thus marks the effective end of the Arusha process.
Tanzania would in fact thrice more attempt to launch new peace initiatives for Rwanda, each time without success. Having disastrously missed
a possible opportunity to achieve a cease fIre in late April, the Arusha
process was effectively consigned to futile fInal efforts. The jaws of
genocide closed around the peace process in Rwanda.
Analysis of the Arusha Process
Two competing accounts of the Arusha process warrant critical analy-
The Arusha Peace Process
147
sis. The first, which we can term the diplomatic perspective,23 suggests
that Arusha was almost perfect preventive diplomacy. Western negotiators and diplomats argued that the Arusha Peace Agreement was the
best peace agreement in Africa since Lancaster House, and moreover
was the best agreement which could possibly have been reached. From
this perspective, the collapse of the accords should be attributed exclusively to manipulation by Hutu extremists who were outside of the
controi of the Arusha process.
The second perspective, which has been forcibly presented by Rene
Lemarchand (1994), a noted scholar of the region, takes issue with the
diplomatic perspective:
[T]he transition bargain in Rwanda emerges in retrospect as a recipe for disaster:
not only were the negotiations conducted under tremendous externat pressures,
but, partly for this reason, the concessions made to the FPR were seen by Hutu
hard-liners as a sell-out imposed by outsiders. For the Tutsi "rebels" to end up
claiming as many cabinet posts in the transitionaI govemment as the ruling MRND
(including Interior and Communal Development), as weIl as half of the fieldgrade officers and above, was immediately viewed by extremists in the so-called
"mouvanee presidentielle" as a surrender to blackmaiI. Many indeed wondered
whether the Arusha accords would have been signed in the absence of repeated
nudging from the OAU, Tanzania, France, the United States, and Belgium (my
Halks).
Lemarchand's argument has two important premises: namely that
the deal was negotiated between moderates; and that it was rejected by
extremists once ils contents became known. Thus, Lemarchand criticizes not only the content of the Arusha deal but also the process by
which it was reached. By dealing with each of the points in this analysis, and their premises, we can help weigh the merits of this competing
account of Arusha.
The extent of pressure (externai and internal). on the Habyarimana
regime was certainly considerable. Western pressure for democratic
reforms had pushed Habyarimana to accept, in principle, multiparty
democracy in 1989; falling world coffee prices had sharpened economic
decline in the country; the war with the RPF had exposed Rwanda to
western human rights monitors who were working with Rwandese
groups to expose extra-judicial executions, disappearances, and other
violations by the regime; and Habyarimana was certainly pushed into
negotiations by his western allies (Belgium and France) and pulled into
them by his regional counterparts.
That being said, the externai pressure on the regime within the Arusha
process cannot be seen as being overwhelming because of the presence
148
The Pata of Il Genodde
of supportive regimes like France and Zaire in the talks. Rather, the
pressure came from the nature of the process. Arusha was fundamentally about power-sharing, and the power to share was all held by the
regime. Thus, the nature of the process itself was such that every
conceivable resolution of an issue involved some limitation on the
regime's power. What's more, at some points the externai delegations,
or observers, actually tried to limit the concessions made in Arusha.
The most important example of this was the American delegation's
attempt to convince the Arusha participants that the deal on the armed
forces had moved past what was acceptable in Kigali. I will return to
this last point.
Lemarchand was not wrong to say that the process involved major
concessions to the RPF: that was precisely the essence of the process.
What is inaccurate, however, is to argue that these concessions were
somehow deals made between moderates and the RPF without the full
comprehension of Habyarimana or the hard-liners, or that they were
only reached because of pressure from outsiders. For while the Government of Rwanda delegation to Arusha was led by opposition party
moderates, two other delegation members fulfilled other functions.
Colonel Bagosora, a known extremist (who had eamed the nickname
"the Colonel of Death" for his role in directing killings against Tutsi)
was present for the entire Arusha process, and provided a direct link
between the process and the Hutu extremist groups in Kigali. Ambassador Kanyarushoki was seen by western delegates to Arusha as the
eyes and ears of Habyarimana, and he too was present for the entire
Arusha process. The political communities these two representedHabyarimana and his elosest supporters, and the Hum extremists (groups
which certainly overlapped but may not have been identical)-were
fully aware of the course of Arusha as it was negotiated. This can be
seen in the fact that on at least three occasions the Arusha process was
suspended in order to refer agreements reached to Kigali, where they
were rejected by Habyarimana in response to the reactions from these
two communities. The argument is not that Bagasora and Kanyarushoki
were able to contain the negotiating process, but simply that they fed
information about the process directly to Habyarimana and the hardliners throughout the course of negotiations. These constituencies had
input into the course of negotiations as revealed in a comment made by
Foreign Minister Ngulinzira, who remarked to one western observer
that it was more difficult to negotiate with his own team than with the
RPF.
Tbe Arusba Peace Process
149
How is it then that the Arusha process appeared to most western
observers to go too far with respect to the integration of armed forces,
the distribution of command posts, and arguably on the exc1usion of
the CDR from the transitional institutions of the BBTG? U the external
pressures were not excessive, if Arusha was not entirely controlled by
moderates, why were these agreements reached by August 1993?
The critical explanatory variable, which is missing from both the
"preventive diplomacy" and the Lemarchand account, was the strength
of the RPF-their superior position both on the ground and in the negotiating room. Although the two sides appeared to be in a military stalemate when the Arusha process had begun, the February offensive had
proven decisively that the RPF had a significant military advantage on
the ground, and were poised to continue winning military victories
should the negotiations break down. This, then, created a second form
of strength, namelya superior bargaining position.
Further, the RPF offensive in February increased the displaced population to almost a million people. Aside from the huge financial burden
this displaced population placed on the government, these internai refugees came largely from Ruhengiri and Bambi, two of Rwanda's "breadbasket" regions. This intensified the economic pressures on the
Habyarimana regime. Militarily dominant, and free from the government's position of having to try to run a country at war in ful1-scale
economic collapse, the RPF was in a position effectively to dictate the
terms of 'agreement' at this stage in the negotiations. Ultimately it was
not "repeated nudging" from the observers and facilitators that produced the positions taken on the contentious elements of the deal; rather,
it was RPF bargaining strength and intransigence in some parts, as weIl
as intransigence on the part of the CDR and elements of the govemment delegation in others. The contentious positions on the CDR and
the military split were taken precisely contrary to the nudges, and occasionally concerted pressure, of the observers. For this reason, the
final version of the Arusha agreement reads like a victor's deal, rather
than a general settlement between relatively equal sides which was the
perspective of the third-parties.
Thus, both the preventive diplomacy argument and the Lemarchand
critique each capture an aspect of truth, but conflate a critical distinction between content and process. As a preventive diplomacy process,
the Arusha process was excellent in a number of respects: the right mix
of relevant regional players, committed international players, and neutral elements around the table; the innovative and effective use of the
150
The Path of a Genocide
JPMC to negotiate military elements while having peace negotiations
continue; the representation in the government delegation to Arusha of
the major power groupings in Kigali itself; actual1y addressing and
resalving in the agreement itself, in many dimensions, fundamental
causes of conflict (Le., the question of refugees) as opposed to merely
settling the fighting; adumbrating and making provision for a neutral
international force to secure the transition. However, the final result
did indeed prove to be a failure, in part, at least, because it pushed wel1
beyond what was acceptable in Kigali with respect to distribution of
command posts and the exc1usion of hard-liners from the final transitionai arrangements.
This stillleaves open the question of whether the alternative would
have been beuer-inc1uding the "spoilers"24 or extremists (the CDR)
within the transitionai government, and giving more power to
Habyarimana and his faction. In any case, the "exemplary preventive
diplomacy" analysis, while correct in terms of process, must be rejected in terms of the content of the final deal. On the one hand, the
Arusha accords violated traditional key tenets of conflict resolution in
the context of protracted social conflicts by effectively excluding the
CDR from power, and thus marginalizing even the MRND, diverging
from the tenet that forces which comprise the problem must be made
part of the solution. On the other hand, the steps which were taken to
enact the alternative-namely, remove extremist forces from power
and tackle them militarily-were far from sufficient; the Accords cal1ed
only for a "neutral international force" to perform the far from neutral
task of tackling violent opposition to the peace deal, though it did request that the Neutral Force be charged with prorecting civilians, a charge
which the U.N. did not take Up.25
Second, the Arusha Accords failed to balance properly the security
concerns of the combatants. The twin victories won by the RPF over
the CDR and the structure of the integrated forces created a situation in
which a powerful political force in Kigali was deprived, not only of
their absolute military controi over the security forces in Rwanda, even
though the FAR continued to appoint the head of the integrated armed
forces and the MRND appointed the Minister of Defence, but also of
the political controi over those forces. On the other hand, the only way
to achieve the latter .would have required the RPF to concede power to
the CDR. It could be argued that the fault was that agreement had the
form of a victor's deal but not enough of the content. It fell between the
two stoois, and almost a million Tutsi civilians, as well as the peace
process itself, were the victims.
The Arusha Peace Process
151
Thus, while the Arusha process was effective in raising key issues
and allowing the parties to the conflict an opportunity to negotiate alternatives, the finalouteome was indeed deeply flawed, and ended up,
despite the apparent intentions of those involved, eontributing to the
dynamic which resulted in the massive bloodshed of the spring and
summer of 1994.
This argument relies on an unprovable eounterfaetual argument,
namely that there were alternatives, that different decisions at different
stages could have produced a more viable, sustainable outcome. In theoretical terms, the counterfactual is easily construeted. On the one hand,
a more balanced power-sharing arrangement between the regime and
its opponents, one which did not trump the MRND at every tum, could
have produced an incentive structure for members of the regime to participate in securing the establishment and survival of the transitionai
institutions. More sensitive handling of the issue of army command
may have produeed less of a feeling of insecurity among those in Kigali
who would lose absolute controi of a military base and any effective
political base to contain the damage of such a loss. This was the agreement sought by the Tanzanian facilitator, by the American delegation,
and by the French.
The second step in this counterfactual position is to argue that, having been given a more substantive role in transitional institutions, those
who did in fact execute the genocide would not have done so. This is
unprovable though the argument for the position was made by the Tanzanians and the Americans. They argued that it would simply have been
more difficult to plan, coordinate, and launch a genocide--or any form
of violent opposition-from within the government than from without.
Faced with the imminent loss of power, those who controlled the genocide had little to lose by destroying the transitional institutions; with a
substantive role in those institutions, the argument goes, at least some
of those potentially involved in violent opposition would see their interests in securing a position in the "new order" and limiting their resort to the use of violenee.
Further, the argument goes, the potential for fracture and dissent
among the old guard would be higher in eonditions where members of
that old guard had a greater stake in the new Rwandese state. Thus,
while it is clear that a core group of extremists among the Habyarimana
inner circle were developing a genocidai plan from the very outset of
negotiations, their capacity to attract wider sympathy to that plan might
have been scuttled by offering members of the regime a choice. President Mwinyi of Tanzania used allegorical terms to extol this position:
152
The Path of a Genocide
when chasing a cat in a house, he instructed his facilitation team, make
sure to leave a window open; or else, be prepared to be scratched. 26 By
denying the regime a substantive enough role in the "new order," the
power-sharing protocols ofArusha failed to leave a window sufficiently
wide open and, instead, backed the regime into a corner. Instead of
offering members of the regime a choice between sufficient power and
violent opposition, the far more stark choice was offered of effective
loss of power or violent opposition.
Providing greater controi of the military and a more substantive political role for the Habyarimana regime would have involved, for the
RPF, a substantial risk as weIl as the morally and psychologically difficult step of cooperating with those whose rhetoric called for their own
elimination. As Stedman (1991) has pointed out, flnding a negotiated
settlement in a civil war necessarily involves the psychological stress
of "working with the enerny." On the other hand, Stedman has since
argued that there are enernies with whom one is engaged in violent
conflict and there are "enemies" with whom one is engaged in death to
the finish. This is the other side of the counterfactua1. Would the small
core of extremists determined to destroy the Arusha Accords and any
cooperation with their sworn foes have been even more effective if
their allies had been given agreater role, or would they have been neutralized in executing their monstrous plans?
Conc1usion
Conflict resolution theory would suggest two options in dealing with
those who lose out in political transformation, the rITSt of which is to
give them a stake in the new arrangements in order to minimize their
destructiveness (Le., keeping minority whites in the political system in
South Africa). The successful transition in South Africa, and earlier
successes in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, prove that peace agreements which
forge transition bargains of this nature can succeed. Alternatively, a
peace settlement may accept the exc1usion of certain powerful groups
but flnd ways to ensure that they are unable to undermine the transition
bargain (Le., pushing and pulling the military junta out of power in
Haiti). The international peace efforts for Rwanda took neither option.
Had the Arusha process given the Habyarimana regime a more meaningful stake in power, perhaps the neutral peacekeeping mandate of
UNAMIR would have been successful in securing the transition process. As it was, Arusha resulted in a decidedly non-neutral transition
The Arusba Peace Process
153
bargain, with clear winners and losers. 27 Were a robust peacekeeping
force available to controi those losers-who, it should be recalled, were
in a position of considerable power, including contr01 of the army and
various militias-it might have been the right decision to exclude those
hard-liners from the "new order" for Rwanda.
From most western and diplomatic perspectives, in the context of
the possible, the second-best choice-to buy the hard-liners off by giving them a greater stake in the transitionai institutions, and thus some
security also-shou1d have been adopted in the Arusha Accords. From
other perspectives, especially the RPF, this was not only morally unpalatable, but was inherently unworkable. For most western and diplomatie observers, the first would certain1y have been preferable to taking
the large physical and moral risk of marginalizing powerful forces without taking adequate precautions against their inevitable reaction. For
many others, the failure rests with those who had the resources and the
means to deploy effective military forces to hold the extremists at bay
and protect civilians but who did not fulfin what had been expected of
them in the Arusha Accords.
Notes
1. The timeline contained herein was developed, except where otherwise noted,
through reference to documents obtained from western embassies in Dar-esSa1aam in December 1993 and January 1994; discussions with American, French,
Canadian, Rwandese, and Tanzanian officials in Dar-es-Salaam, Ottawa, London, Washington, New York, and Bergen; and from the texts of the accords themselves. American sources may appear to be prominent: this is large1y because of
all the interviews conducted, only Americans were willing to go on record and
even allow their names to be used.
2. After the FAR and its allies stopped the October invasion in ils tracks, the RPF
launched another offensive in November. Heavy clashes followed. In January
1991, the RPF briefly held Ruhengiri, the power base of Habyarimana and his
cohorts.
3. lnterview 14 December 1994 with Carol Fuller, Former. Rwanda Desk Officer,
Africa Bureau, Department of State, Washington, DC.
4. This was distinct from the MRND dominated pseudo-coalition created in December 1991. True moderates now occupied important positions in the government, and the new government adopted a policy of seeking a peace agreement
with the RPF.
5. This account draws principally on interviews conducted with present and former
members of the State Department, including Carol Fuller, Charles Snyder and
former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Herman Cohen, Washington, June
30, 1995, as well as with Quai d'Orsay officials invo1ved in the pre-Arusha
talks, and compares notes with Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, who held
similar interviews.
6. Second track dip10macy may have contributed to the success of the talks in
154
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
The Path of a Genocide
Paris. The second track consisted of a number of initiatives at unofficiallevels:
contacts between members of the RPF's diaspora network and Rwandese government officials in embassies overseas; efforts by NGOs, specifically by a former
Ugandan official working for Christian Aid in London, who facilitated the meeting
between the RPF and the GOR in Bujumbura (disclosed in a talk given by a
Christian Aid representative at an Open Forum on Rwanda convened by International Alert, London, 27 January 1995); a Rwandan church-based initiative;
and Vatican efforts to support church initiatives (confidential interview, Rome,
April 1995). These moves may generally have been atmospheric and supportive
of the first track diplomacy. But one process seems to have had a direct effect. In
May of 1992, after meetings between the Rwandese church leaders and the RPF
in Bujumbura, under the aegis of the Papal Nuncio in Burundi, the new foreign
minister of Rwanda, Ngulinzira, met with the Papal Nuncio in Rwanda which
led to a trip pf Ngulinzira to the Vatican. This facilitated the meeting between
Ngulinzira and the RPF in Kinihara, Rwanda on 23 May 1992, at which both
agreed to attend Dijoud's Paris meeting.
The RPF delegation, according to all observers at the talks that I interviewed,
was by far the most disciplined and effective of the two negotiating parties. Led
by Dr. Theogene Rudasingwa, General Secretary of the RPF and the eyes and
ears of Paul Kagame, it included Pasteur Bizimungu, who would later become
President of the Republic, and Patrick Mazimhaka, Vice Chairman of the RPF.
The GOR delegation was both divided and undisciplined and included members
from at least three parties; beside the government it included the opposition
MDR (Dr. Ngulinzira, the new Foreign Minister of Rwanda in the coalition government and Mr. Landoaid, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs) and the PL.
Colonel Bagasora, the extremist from CDR, and Ambassador Kanyarushoki to
Tanzania, with a direct line to Habyarimana, were also delegates.
In addition to the two formal delegations at Arusha, the Government of Rwanda
(GOR) and the Rwandese Patriotic front (RPF), three regional/functional categories of observer delegates were present at the talks: (1) African-in addition
to the facilitation team from Tanzania, it included delegations from Zaire (its
delegates were largely absent except for the initial meetings), Uganda, Burundi,
and Senegal (Abdou Diouf was chair of the OAU when the Arusha process began, and the Senegalese delegate, Ambassador Papa Louis Fall, was respected
by both sides); (2) inter-governmental organizations-the OAU and the U.N.;
and (3) Western-delegations from the US, Belgium (Ambassador Conte Michel
d' Aviola to Tanzania in the first phases), France, and Germany (Ambassador
Hans Peter Repnik to Tanzania who was more a witness than a participant).
Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, and the EU decided not to participate but followed the negotiations closely from their embassies in the region.
Because the observer teams to the Arusha negotiations and the JPMC overlapped,
the JPMC often met in Arusha instead of Addis.
The N'Sele Ceasefire Agreement between the Govemment o/the Rwandese Republic and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, as Amended at Gbadolite, 16 September 1991, and atArusha 12 July 1992, Article IV, p.7 (hereafter referred to as the
Arusha Ceasefire). The Arusha Ceasefire had restructured the NMOG (from that
point on referred to as NMOG II), so that it was composed of ten officers from
each of Nigeria, Senegal, Zimbabwe, and an African country to be named later,
and five officers each from the GOR and RPF.
Interview with officials of the Quai d'Orsay; with Lt. Col. Marley, Political-Military Advisor, Africa Bureau, State Department, Washington, 13 December 1994.
Col. Marley was a military representative of the US observer team at Arusha.
The Arusba Peace Process
155
12. JPMCfRWD/OAUll (I) Rev.2, "Rules of Procedure for the Joint Political-Military Commission (JPMC)"; JPMCfRWD/OAUI2 (I), "Terms of Reference of the
Neutral Military Observer Group."
13. Interview. Also, Interview, Lt. Col. Marley.
14. It should be noted that although the Arusha talks formally adjourned between
these periods, discussions, and negotiations continued in Kigali, Kampala, Addis
Ababa, and Dar-es-Salaam throughout these intervals, both under the aegis of
the JPMC and in informal meetings at various embassies in the region.
15. Confidential interview. The editors of this volume were given the same interpretation of the French and Tanzanian positions in their interviews. Further, the
Americans supported the French and Tanzanians.
16. For instance, Canadian and Dutch observers in Dar-es-Salaam reacted to the
RPF's unwillingness to include the CDR as evidence of their insincerity in participating in real power sharing; members of the Tanzanian facilitation team
also saw in this position a too-rigid stance. Interviews, Dar-es-Salaam, December 1993; Bergen 1995.
17. Other chapters tackle the question of France's role in Rwanda in some depth. It
is worth stating here, however, that, within the Quai d'Orsay, their analysis suggested that the Habyarimana regime would be unable to hold out against the
RPF, and thus that a negotiated settlement would be an acceptable second best
for France's interests (Interviews with Quai d'Orsay officials). Thus, France's
delegation to Arusha was not one which simply fought for the GOR positions,
but, according to American, Tanzanian and other third-party participants, was
cooperative and constructive.
18. Confidential document supplied by western embassy, Dar-es-Salaam, December 1993.
19. Lt. Col. Marley confirmed this perception.
20. It is important to note that the account of the killings in Burundi which were
current in the Great Lakes region in 1993 were of 100,000 Hutu having been
killed by the Tutsi army. The fact is that the killings were rather of the order of
35,000-50,000. More importantly, they were roughly evenly split between Hutu
and Tutsi (according to USAID and Medecins sans Frontieres). This was not
information which made its way into Rwanda or Tanzania at the time. Interviews with Sarah Poole, Rwanda-Burundi Information Officer, USAID Disaster
Assistance Response Team, Washington, July 1994; and with Samantha Bolton,
Public Information Officer, Medecins sans Frontieres, New York, December 1995.
21. This aceount, whieh was first given to me in Tanzania in December 1993 and
has been repeated sinee by American, Belgian, Canadian, Tanzanian, Yatican,
and French offieials, suggests that as late as October 1993 the forees which
were moving to genocide had not yet won the day. The logie of the position
suggests that the core extremists were able to use events in Burundi to sell their
vision to a broader constitueney which might, were it not for the killings in
Bujumbura, still have been won over by the transitionaI government.
22. This refers to the 11 January message of Force Commander Romeo Dallaire to
the U.N. headquarters in New York on the contents of very high level information he received about the detailed plans of the extremists (cf. Adelman and
Suhrke, 1996).
23. The diplomatic perspective is important to understanding the positions of "inside-outsiders" in the negotiating process and to conflict resolution more generally. A shared analysis had been developed based on a common negotiating history
among Tanzanian, American, and French officials who were instrumental in setting up the process. They considered the conflict in Rwanda to be part of a
156
24.
25.
26.
27.
The Path of a Genocide
protracted social conflict which would be resolved, not by high-Ievel summitry,
but over a period of time in which the belligerents would have an opportunity to
examine their sense of insecurity vis-a-vis one another and forge agreements
which would meet the security needs of both sides. Whether or not the diplomats rooted their convictions in theoretical studies, the theoretical foundations
of this position can be found in Edward Azar, Protracted Social Conjlict, and in
the writings of John Burton. At least one key diplomat expressed familiarity
with this literature. The diplomats' position was certainly based on the historical
experience of conflict resolution processes in other parts of Mrica, such as that
of Ami Mpungwe, former Director of the Africa and Middle East Department in
the Foreign Ministry and Tanzania's principal facilitator of the Arusha talks,
who left the Namibia negotiations in February 1992 to take the lead in the build
up to Arusha, Charles Snyder and John Byerly, members of Cohen's conflict
resolution team who had been involved with Namibia and Angola.
Professor Steve Stedman, now at Stanford University, coined the phrase "spoilers" for those who try to sabotage a peace agreement after it has been signed.
Stedman argues that eonciliation with respect to "spoilers" is ineffeetive. The
report written by the editors also argued that the spoilers had to be neutralized
by "defanging" them-removing them from military power-if they were not to
be made part of the transitionai power structure. This stillleaves open the question of whether the lalter option would have worked. The fact is, the Arusha
Agreement neither defanged the extremists nor included them in the transitionai
power structure.
It is arguable that the RPF believed that the neutral international force would
indeed prove an effeetive block on any violent opposition to the peace deal. If
so, this among other failures of communication between the U.N. and the OAU/
Tanzanians about the transition from mediation to implementation becomes a
crucial weakness in the overall response. However, simple referenee to
Mozambique, Namibia, and Angola--conflicts with which the RPF command
was certainly familiar-would have been enough to sew substantiai doubts that
a U.N. peaeekeeping presence could-or should-be relied upon to provide resistance to violent opposition and effectively proteet a civilian population. The
U.N. only agreed to assist the loeal gendarmie in its protective functions.
This allegory was relayed to me by a senior member of the Tanzanian negotiating team.
The Arusha failure resulted from a series of negotiating "victories" by the RPF
which so structured the finaloutcome of Arusha as to make it unacceptable to
powerful forees in Kigali. Critically, these decisions were not, as has been argued, foisted on Rwanda by outsiders; rather they were taken precisely in opposition to both neutral and partisan third-party advice and pressure. The
determining variable, missed by both the diplomatic and the critical perspectives, was the superior strength of the RPF, both on the battlefield and in the
negotiating rooms. In defiance of advice and pressure from regional and international actors, the RPF used their bargaining strength to marginalize the
Habyarimana regime within the negotiated power structures and erode major
elements of their power base. In both the political and military spheres, the RPF
insisted on arrangements which deprived hard-liners surrounding Habyarimana.
French Policy in Rwanda
Agnes Callamard
Introduction l
In the aftermath of the April 1994 genocide in Rwanda, a large portion of the French media and most NGOs vigorously denounced French
policy in Rwanda, going as far as accusing the govemment, in particular, the President, of complicity in the genocide. 2 Much was then written on the personal connections between French President Franyois
Mitterand and his Rwandese counterpart, Juvenal Habyarimana, and
between the two sons of the Presidents, on the business deals between
Paris and the Rwandese capital, Kigali, the secret sale of arms by Paris
to the Rwandese military involved in the genocide, and on hashish deals
and even gorillas.
In response, the French govemment insisted that it had supported
Arusha and contributed to the peace process in Rwanda. Franc;:ois
Mitterand was said to have been shocked: "I am convinced that we
have he1ped this country, like others, to take the road to democracy"
(Le Nouvel Observateur 1994, 40). Simi1arly, Edouard Balladur said
the accusations were scanda10us: "France supported the regular/legal
govemment of Rwanda. It was revealed afterwards that this govemment was not as regular as il claimed."3 These c1aims of innocence,
however, did not persuade many observers.
The question remained: arter the genocide how should these accusations, c1aims of innocence or, more generally, French policy towards
Rwanda from 1990 to 1994 be assessed? The main arguments of this
chapter are twofold. Pirst, the most striking features of French policies
in Rwanda were that they responded to and reflected the usual framework of Franco-African relationships: France gave military and diplo157
158
The Path of a Genocide
matic support to a dictatorial regime, trained government armed forces
as part of a cooperation agreement, and intervened to proteet a regime
against what was then considered to be external aggression. Official
policy was cemented by patrimoniai relationships between leaders and
possibly by secret business, military, or other deals between the two
countries. These are all common features of French relations with
Francophone Africa and consistent with the framework that deterrnined
French policy tow~ds
the region in the post-independence period.
The second argument of this chapter is that these common features
proved especiaIly catastrophic because of three main factors: The first
one is that the diplomatic logic (or "soft track" as it is also called)
never predominated for very long, if at aIl4; the military logic was applied in the first days of October 1990, never lost its significance, and
became increasingly prominent as the peace process weakened. The
second factor is the depoliticization of Rwandan affairs; there is little
evidence of a politicaIly based, politically controlled, and politicaIly
motivated management of Rwandan affairs and of a thorough synchronization between military actions and diplomatic steps.5 The third factor is that the conflict in Rwanda was perceived and analyzed through
corrective lenses which fed and cemented the military logic and the
preeminenee of military actors.
The Peace Process and the French Diplomatic Role
Background to French Diplomatic Efforts:
The 1990 Military Intervention
The first Technical Military Assistance Agreement (TMAA) between
Rwanda and France was signed on 18 July 1975 under Valery Giscard
d'Estaing's presidency as part of France's attempt to extend its zone of
influence beyond its former empire. 6 This agreement was not a defense
agreement: it sought to provide financial assistance, as weIl as actual
training for the Rwandese gendarmerie, and supplies of military equipment for both the gendarmerie and the army. In fact, like many TMAAs
signed between France and African countries, this one stipulated that
French soldiers could not be associated with the preparation and execution of war operations or the maintenance of domestic peace (cf.
Gattegno, Le Monde, 1994; Verschave 1994). French military assistance to Rwanda remained modest for several years, averaging 4 mil-
French Policy in Rwanda
159
lion francs per year (Le Monde, 22 June 1994). In January 1985, there
were twenty French military advisors in Rwanda (Chipman 1995,24),
while the number of Rwandese officers trained in France increased
slightly from twenty-three in 1982 to thirty-three in 1988.7 According
to Le Monde, the 1975 TMAA was officially (and aposteriori) revised
on 26 August 1991 when an agreement between Ambassador Martre
and Rwandese Defense Minister Ngulinzira incorporated the Rwandese
Armed Forces (in addition to the gendarmerie) as beneficiaries of the
military agreement (Gattegno 1994).
Evidently, the October 1990 RPF invasion drastically transformed
the nature and extent of the military relationship between France and
Rwanda. Francois Mitterand's decision to launch Operation Norolt,8
officially to protect the French expatriates present in Rwanda in case of
umest, was taken almost immediately.9 The force consisted of 150 soldiers drawn from the French force stationed in the Central African Republic (Human Rights Watch Arms Project, 1994), a number that
increased to 350 in November, at the same time as Belgian soldiers
were leaving the country. Following the RPF's renewed offensive on 8
February 1993, France sent 300 additional troops to Kigali,1O bringing
the total contingent to about 700 troops. 11 France also supplied the
govemment with important military equipment 12 as weIl as military
advisers. 13
The presidential decisions to send French troops, equipment, and
advisers in 1990,14 and reinforce them in February 1993, were taken
outside the scope of the TMMA (recaIl that it was not a defense agreement) and without parliamentary consent. These were two facts which
raised little surprise or concern at the time, given French past practices.
As Chipman noted, "for French military intervention to take place it is
not necessary that there exist a formal defense agreement. ... In fact,
France has intervened more often in countries not having defense agreements (Mauritania, Chad, and Zaire), than in those (Gabon and CAR)
with whom she has been, from a juridical point of view, more closely
allied (Chipman 1995, 28). Cohen also emphasizes that the military
interventions were undertaken without prior authorization ofthe French
parliament, and without encountering significant opposition (cf. Cohen
and Clarke 1990,205-06,212).
From the perspective of Franco-African relations, the French intervention satisfied two main, albeit minimalist, criteria 15 that have guided
French interventions on the continent l6 : it took place at the urging of
the Rwandese president 17 and in response to an "external" aggression.
160
The Paih of aGenodde
The latter condition had just been reiterated at the La Baule summit
meeting where Mitterand had stated that French troops would continue
to help countries facing externai threats; the RPF invasion was launched
from Uganda. Operation Noroit also appears to have been guided by
one additional consideration-the RPF was considered by French military and politicalleaders as a threat to jrancophonie and la jranrajrique.
This certainly played a role in the presidential decision. From this perspective, the intervention was probably conceived first and foremost as
an easy way to reinforce France's "guardian angel" image vis-a-vis
African leaders, and to support "a good guy," President Habyarimana
who, after all, was trying his best.
Two aspects of this assessment proved to be wrong: Habyarimana
did not try his best, and the intervention was not easy given the limited
capacity of the Rwandese army. The Rwandese armed forces were so
few (about 3,000 soldiers, according to most sources, although the figure of 6,000 has also been advanced) and, according to French military
officials (confidential interview, Ministry of Cooperation, May 1995),
also badly prepaI'ed and badly equipped; only 2,000 of the troops knew
how to fight. One month after the beginning of the war, it became clear
that the RPF would not easily be defeated. By the end of 1990, the
weakness of the Rwandese army had been the object of French military
intelligence reports which suggested that the RPF was actually capable
of defeating the FAR in conventionai warfare. 18 The RPF offensive on
8 February 1993 further confirmed these French assessments as French
military intelligence reported that the RPF had only stopped shOlt of
Kigali because of the presence of French troops there, an assessment
shared by Tanzanian intelligence. 19 In light of this assessment, and established policy of not providing open-ended military support for a long
period of time, it appears that by the end of 1990, the French government faced two options. They were not mutually exc1usive and both
were eventually embraced: supporting the peace process, and strengthening the Rwanda armed forces.
French Diplomatic Efforts-October 1990 to August 1993
Most accounts attribute the turning point of French policies in
Rwanda-the "shift" from the military to the diplomatic track--either
to the end of 1992 or to the beginning of 1993 when "cohabHation"
commenced. 20 In fact, the "soft" track was already in action in March
1991 (at the time of the cease-fire agreement brokered at N' Sele, Zaire)
French Policy in Rwanda
Hil
and was followed up in subsequent years, but never seemed to prevail
over the military logic. Contrary to most beliefs, moreover, the main
diplomatic issue at the end of the period of negotiating the Arusha Accords was not so much French military withdrawal-that issue was
settled quite early21-as it was about the nature of the international
peacekeeping operation to replace the French soldiers-whether it would
be under OAU or U.N. authority, France lobbying hard for the latter.
France was an important diplomatic actor in the pre-Arusha and
Arusha phases when France initiated a number of bilateral meetings
and participated in multilateral conferences. The reorientation towards
military disengagement and the peace process began in the early months
of 1991, perhaps at the end of 1990,22 at a time when a socialist government was still in power in France. By 1991, the French government
was pushing for a peace settlement between the Rwandese government
and the RPF,23 and was prepared to withdraw its troops from Rwanda.
The Quai d'Orsay was present at the N'Sele talks and encouraged the
Government of Rwanda (GOR) to sign the cease-fire agreement of 29
March 1991, an agreement which, among other things, called for the
withdrawal of all foreign troops (artic1e ii). The N'Sele agreement was
followed in the fall of 1991 by negotiations, led by the Elysee Africa
Bureau, to bring the Government of Rwanda and the RPF together; in
the spring and summer of 1992, the Quai d'Orsay held a series ofinformal talks between the two parties. 24 These efforts culminated in the
Paris meeting of June 1992 between the RPF and GOR delegations; the
agenda included fusion of the two armies, establishment of a broadbased transitionai government, and political guarantees.
All these diplomatic activities were probably instrumental in bringing the government of Rwanda to the negotiation table at Arusha in
July 1992. The Quai d'Orsay was present as an observer, 25 1ending support to the Rwandese government and ensuring that the negotiations
did not fundamentally jeopardize the interests of the Habyarimana regime. This role was especially reflected in the French backing of the
government's (unsuccessful) requests for a 1:2 ratio for the new integrated army and for the inclusion of the Coalition for the Defense of
the Republic (CDR) within the broad-based government (Adelman and
Suhrke 1996). Some six months later, on 28 February, following the
RPF offensive in February 1993, Marcel Debarge, Cooperation Minister, went to Kigali to reaffirm French support for Habyarimana and
convince him to implement the Arusha agreement. 26
French diplomatic strategy during these two years was based prima-
162
The Path of a Genocide
rily on an appreciation ofthe military capacity of the two parties and its
own reluctance to sustain a long-term war. The implication was that
France was walking on a fine, not to say self-destructive, line. On one
hand, France could not afford the repeated breaking of cease fires and
the prospect of a long peacemaking process. On the other, it had to
secure Habyarimana's agreement (and reinforce his position at the bargaining table), and thus be perceived by the GOR as fulfilling its commitments. Hence Mitterand made prornises not to withdraw French
troops without the government's agreement,27 and not before the
Rwandan armed forces were strengthened. In the same logic, the second major component of France's soft-track approach28 was to obtain a
U.N. peacekeeping force 29 that would enhance the survival chances of
its protege. 30 According to the N' Sele agreement, French troops would
remain until a neutral rnilitary force could be deployed. 31 Reiterated in
article 7232 of the Arusha Accords, this clause represented France's biggest bargaining chip at Arusha, and it was on this point that French
diplomatic efforts were concentrated.
French lobbying for a United Nations rnilitary presence-with the
dual function of monitoring the RwandanlUgandan border and acting
as an interpositional force between the RPF and the Rwandese armytook place within the Security Council of the United Nations. In the
fall of 1992, the French representative began asking for an interpositional
U.N. force, a request rejected until March 1993 by the UK and the US
which wanted the OAU to take the lead. On 9 March 1993 the French
delegation presented the Security Council members with a draft resolution which supported the Secretary General's initiative to send a goodwill mission to Rwanda and requested that the Secretary-General make
recommendations for the possible establishment of a United Nations
monitoring force to act, together with OAU forces,33 as a buffer
(Adelman and Suhrke, 1996). Resolution 812/93 was eventually passed
on March 12, after intense French lobbying in the Security Council.
The French efforts succeeded: following consultations between the OAU
and the U.N., it was decided at the beginning of June 1993 following a
formal request from the government of Rwanda34 that the United Nations would provide the neutral international force. Further, the French
referred to the protection of civilians as one of the functions of the
international force. 35 The formal resolution (872/1993) was passed on
5 October 1993.
This interpretation of French diplomatic efforts gives credit to the
claims advanced by the French government immediately after the April
Frenen Policy in Rwanda
163
1994 genocide. The govemment did support the Arusha process and
was instrumental in getting Habyarimana to the negotiation table. This
being said, the extent of the synchronization between diplomatic and
military action36 is questionable. The French diplomatic strategy, it will
be recalled, was preceded by a military intervention and predicated
upon a military balance of power in the field. It would remain driven
by military policy and military evolution on the ground.
French Diplomacy: The Actors
Analysts of French policy in Rwanda attributed a catalytic role to
the Quai d'Orsay and to "the cohabitation" in terms of supporting the
diplomatic track and the peace process at Arusha. 37 The coming into
power of a new majority, with Juppe as Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Balladur as Prime Minister, certainly reinforced the power of the Quai
vis-a-vis the Elysee. A possible blow to the old way came from the
growing power of a new brand of French technocrats, whose influence
had grown with the arrival of Balladur as Prime Minister.
[Balladur] has little of his peer's sentimental attachment to Africa.. He is a Treasury man: his aim seems to be to prise Africa policy out of the Elysee's tight grasp
and give the foreign minister a reasonable purchase on it. Mr. Balladur's team is
quietly trying to snuff out the old palace-to-palace networks. 38
Cohabitation also allowed more emphasis to be given to the multilateral and diplomatic tracks, and probably reinforced the notion that France
had to open a dialogue with the RPF, but it is highly unlikely that cohabitation constituted a significant tuming point in French African policy.39 It
is doubtful if Habyarimana would have signed the peace accords, which
gave heavy concessions to the RPF, without pressure and guarantees from
the Elysee through Fran~ois
Mitterand's personal emissaries, and possibly from representatives of the Military Mission of Cooperation, specifically General Huchon. 40 The Elysee defined the policy, took care of
personal and bilateral diplomacy, while the Quai pursued the soft-track
side and was responsible for multilateral negotiations.
That being said, Fran~ois
Mitterand's role remains unc1ear. He did
authorize the 1990 intervention-all French military interventions are
presidential prerogatives. The reason for this decision can be partly
located in the personal and patrimoniai ties that existed at the time, but
this was not unusual as personal contacts between French and African
leaders have been at the core of French-African relationships since de
164
The Path of a Genocide
Gaulle. The "mitterandisation" of French policy in Rwanda, which
numerous accounts claimed after the genocide, 41 has probably been
exaggerated. During the three to four years that preceded the genocide,
Mitterand had to deal with the Kuwait-Iraq war, Somalia, Serbia, "cohabitation," the making of the European Union, and his own illnesses,
to cite just a few items. The relative importance of Rwanda must be
assessed in this context. Existing evidence available to the writer suggests that if the President of the Republic erred seriously in Rwanda,
these were errors of omission rather than commission.
The same may be said of the ministers of foreign affairs, defense or
cooperation from 1990 to 1993: Rwanda was not the main issue on
their agenda, and the diplomatic strategy even less so. To return to the
Arusha process, there was only one French representative there, the
charge d' affaires in Tanzania. The Quai did not send additional observers and, according to persons present at Arusha from July 1992 to August 1993, the French representative received few comrnunications and
only vague instructions from Paris. However, French rnilitary officers
(presumably based in Kigali) came to Arusha to consult with the French
representative on a number of occasions. In itself it is hardly surprising
that rnilitary actors worked alongside diplomats in negotiations of this
kind. On the other hand, the general political detachment from Rwandan
affairs would have enabled the rnilitary-more specifica11y the special
military unit in the Ministry of Cooperation---'-to take a leading role,
which seems to have been the case.
The relationship between Paris and Kigali reinforces the point. According to a French official, the embassy received little direction and
instructions from Paris (Interview, Paris, May 1995). The picture emerging from Kigali is one of a vacuum, of a rnissing politicallink between
the French diplomats posted to Rwanda and officials based in Paris.
This state of affairs is not surprising because the few officials in Paris
who fol1owed and supported the soft-track approach in Paris were few
and relatively powerless. According to an official in the Ministry of
Cooperation, during the three years that preceded the genocide, there
were only two French officials who supported the peace process and
opposed the perspective offered by General Huchon, then in charge of
the Mission Militaire de Cooperation. The two were "somebody in Tanzania [probably the charge d'affaires] and someone, here in Paris, at
the Ministry of Cooperation" (Interview, Paris, May 1995).
Other ministries also had Arusha proponents, but their views did not
prevail. Hence, at the Delegation aux affaires strategiques (DAS) of
Frenen Policy in Rwanda
165
the Minister of Defense, created in 1992 by Pierre Joxe,42 proposals for
military disengagement are said to have been launched but quickly repressed. Similarly, while the hiring ofnew experts within the CAP (Centre d'analyse et de Prevision) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs meant
more support for the disengagement approach.
The Quai decided that we were on the wrong track at the end of 1992. Researchers at the CAP and diplomats argued that we needed to talk to the RPF, and that
the military thesis was wrong. (Interview, Paris)
Their advice did not seem to have had much impact. In sum, Rwanda
was not of great concern at the highest level of the French government-the level of Mitterand, Juppe, and Balladur-nor, for that matter, in the Elysee or Ministry of Foreign Affairs generally. The political
vacuum has had three main implications and/or characteristics. It first
meant that the diplomatic and political use of Franco-Rwandese relationships in general and French military intervention in particular have
been more important than their management, a characteristic of both
the pre-genocide and the post-genocide periods. Second, it has implied that the tasks of analyzing the future of Rwanda, and by extension the path and management of French involvement, has been left
to a limited set of actors; depolitidzation entailed that the management of French policy has been, above all, the product of these actors' respective power both among themselves and in relationship to
higher levels of decision-making. Thirdly, depoliticization signified
that the Rwandan crisis and situation have been analyzed, read and
advanced through self-absorbed, narcissistic lenses. One consequence,
as noted, was the ascendancy of what I have referred to as the military logic (to be discussed in detail in the next section). The overall
picture is one of the poverty of institutionai mechanisms and of the
actors. 43
The HegelnOJllic View: The Miilihlry Logic
General Kagame: "You armed and trained the
PresidentiaI Guards; you have accepted that the
PresidentiaI Guards armed and trained, in front of
you, the Hutu extremists. You have not required the
President of Rwanda to abandon ethnic identity
cards; vous portez donc une lourde part de
responsabilitl dans le genocide en cours. "
(Le Figaro, 25 June 1994)
166
The Path of a Genocide
"Africa is the only continent that remains within
the reach of French influence. It is the only place
where she can still, with 300 men, change the
course of history. "
(Louis de Guirangaud, Foreign Minister in 1979,
quoted in Chaigneau 1989,340)
The French Military
The exact role of Freneh troops in Rwanda from 1990 to 1993 is
unclear and controversial. OfficiaIly, "Freneh military troops were in
Rwanda to proteet French citizens and other foreigners. They have never
been given a mission against the RPF."44 As opposed to this official
position, journalists and eye witnesses argued that French soldiers did
much more than just protect French expatriates, and in faet went as far
as engaging in combat. For instanee, a Nigerian colonel of the international military observer group (NMOG) is said to have accused French
troops ofbombarding the RPF position in Ruhengiri (AFP and Reuters,
15 February 1993), an aeeusation disputed by French officials. 45 Similar types of accusations have been made by several Frenchjournalists46
as weIl as Human Rights Watch. EquaIly seriously, the Belgian lawyer,
Eric Gillet, present in Rwanda in August 1991, reported that French
arrny officers were responsible for questioning seventeen or eighteen
RPF prisoners (see for instance Exuperry 1994). French soldiers manned
checkpoints north of Kigali, demanding identification cards from
civilians.41
In retrospect, focusing on France's rules and practice of engagement
does not capture the dynamic of the French-Rwandese relationship.
This is not to underestimate its importance: French intervention changed
the course of history in that it stalled the RPF invasion 48 and later temporarily prevented the Front from taking Kigali. 49 However, the most
important and dramatic consequenee of French intervention does not
reside in the possible involvement of French soldiers in combat, but in
their functions in "internai security" matters. 50
One issue that attracted particular attention was the nornination in
February 1992 of Lieutenant-Colonel ChoIlet to head the Detachement
d'Assistance Militaire et d'Instruction (DAMI) in Rwanda. Chollet took
on the role of advisor to both the President Habyarimana and to the
Chief Commander ofthe Rwandese Arrned Forces. 51 When Chollet was
eventually recalled, Lieutenant-Colonel Maurin, assistant to the military attacM, took over these functions. As Chipman noticed in his analy-
Frencn Policy in Rwanda
167
sis of French military policy in Africa, "it is very hard to distinguish
between honest and impartial technical advice given to a minister or
armed services officer and interference in the internai affairs of another
state" (Chipman 1995,25).
In fact, the arrival offour French specialists in June 1992 to constitute
a "judicial inquiry section" to fight terrorism (Le., to engage in counterinsurgency) helped produce the report ofthe Rwandese gendarmie, "Terrorism in Rwanda since 1990," which blamed all acts of terror on the
RPF without once mentioning widely reported massacres of civilians by
Hutu (cf. Republique Rwandaise 1993). More significant is the charge
that the French military actually trained the interahamwe. 52
In the Rwanda case, there are two ways of looking at the French
military presence. On one hand, Rwanda was at war and the government forces were ill-prepared. French military advice was thus of primary importance and could be justified from a strictly military
perspective (Le., war against "foreign" aggression). The same may be
said about French contributians to the strengthening of Rwanda's military capacity. 53 On the other hand, the war efforts of the Habyarimana
regime were c1early accompanied by action against the perceived "internal enemy," inc1uding massacres, targeted killings, arrests, and other
forms of human rights violations. From this perspective, the appointment of French advisers within the highest ranks of Rwandese military
and political authority, the presence of French soldiers manning checkpoints, and France's contribution to the rapid expansion of the armed
forces and Presidential Guard are sufficient in and by themselves to
raise very serious concerns regarding French military ethics in particular and French policy more generally.
Information Gathering
More needs to be said about the inadequacy of French intelligence,
for the French problem was rooted in a mindblindness, a mental incapacity to see. At the outset, French military officers in Kigali or at the
Military Mission of Cooperation in Paris did not believe in Arusha:
"Arusha, it's Munich," one official said in the course of an interview.
Nor did they trust the RPF: "It was not in the logic of the RPF to follow
and obey the agreement" (interview, Paris, May 1995). The assessment
of civilian French officials and journalists on the position of the French
military was that the "Hutu track" predominated and that the military
establishment did not support Arusha. In fact, according to a European
168
The Path of a Genocide
diplomat in Kigali quoted by Human Rights Watch, "Cussac [in charge
of the DAMI] is a man in favor of a rnilitary solution."
Given these views, it is not exaggerated to refer to the concems of
the French military establishment vis-3.-vis the RPF and its mi1itary
gains as "obsessional." All the energy of intelligence gathering, (dis)information activities, and analysis centered on the "Ugandan Tutsi," inc1uding their continuous strategy of "Talk and Fight," their incursions
within the Rwandan territory, massacres of civi1ians, and later their
covert activities within the Demilitarized Zone. In the months following the genocide,joumalists were often approached by French mi1itary
officials who handed over documents, pictures, and leaked information
on the RPF, most ofwhich could not be independently confirmed. 54
However, French soldiers and/or their superiors were also aware of
other disturbing facts, ineluding strategies of intirnidation, murder, and
political manipulation at the highest level of the Rwandese government designed to stall the implementation of the transitionaI government agreed to at Arusha, and the repeated massacres and murders
committed by extremist Hutu during this period. In July 1991, a French
intelligenee assessment, which eventual1y found its way to other chancelleries, had identified three critica! cireles of power in relation to the
peace process: the President's in-Iaws and associates (the AKAZU), an
outer circ1e of relatively more moderate members of the rnilitary and
the cabinet, and an amorphous grouping of younger officers and intellectuals willing to entertain change. The assessment went on to estimate that since the principle objective of the first circ1e was to retain
power, any form of imposed negotiation would provoke their resistance. In addition, various officials and journalists have stressed the
existence of a number of French intelligence reports dealing with massacres taking place in the country, the role of the Rwandese President's
wife, Agathe Habyarimana, Radio Mille Collines, and the like. 55
French gendarmes in Rwanda and their superiors also had some
knowledge of human rights violations comrnitted in Rwanda. According to a Rwandese human rights activist, "I worked quite well together
with the French gendarmes. Whenever I had proof that a Rwandese
gendarme was torturing persons placed under his responsibility, and
reported the facts and name to the French gendarmes, they were always
successful in having the Rwandese gendarme transferred, usual1y to
places elose to the front-line in the newly 'liberated territories' that
were unpopulated and where he could not harm anybody" (interview,
July 1985).
French Policy in Rwanda
169
The testimony of the human rights activist underlines two important
points. First, French gendarmes had some degree of knowledge and understanding of the evolution of the regime. By extension, it is simply not
believable that their coUeagues in the French armed forces, who spent
months training Rwandese armed forces, did not have any knowledge of
some of their trainees' deadly activities at a time when these activities
were already reported by a large number of local and international human rights organizations and were known by expatriates in Rwanda.
Second, French gendarmes were sympathetic enough to the pleas of the
human rights activist and to the accusations brought against their trainees to act rapidly on the information.56 Consequently, their actions underline the extent of their power and influence on the Rwandese
gendarmerie, an influence they did not use to its full potential.
If the French military establishment did not appear sufficiently concerned with the exactions committed by the Habyarimana regime, neither did French diplomats. The absence of French diplomatic
interventions against human rights violations committed by the
Rwandese regime has been widely reported in the media. But their failure to even report these violations is as shocking.
More than two years after the genocide, on this issue, not one good or
positive statement has been made about the role ofAmbassador Georges
Martre, who was in Rwanda until March 1993. Interviews conducted in
Paris among French officials support the point. His successor, JeanPhilippe Mariaud, has been judged in a somewhat more positive light.
In contrast to other ambassadors in Kigali (especially the Belgian),
the French never seemed to have taken seriously the multiple accusations and evidence of human rights violations and massacres committed by members of the Rwandese government or with its consent. The
lack of reaction was made especially c1ear in January 1993, when Ambassador Martre refused to give credit to the investigation and chilling
discoveries of the FIDH, describing them as "rumors."57 To make matters worse, the French ambassador multiplied personal contacts with
the Rwandese President, and was the only foreign official present at
the wedding of the President's son.58 One day before his departure from
Rwanda, and the arrival of his successor, a human rights activist met
with Martre in his office.
I spake to him about Habyarimana, about the violations committed by the regime.
His reply was astonishing. He tald me, "I had dinner yesterday night with President Habyarimana; he is a nice man. I even drank champagne with him. I know
him, he is a charming person." (Interview, Montreal, July 1995)
110
The Path of a Genocide
According to officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
Ministry of Cooperation, Ambassador Martre never reported on the
rise of the extremists, Hutu power, and the continuous violence during his tour in Rwanda from 1990 until 1993 (interview, Paris, May
1995).
Mr. Marlaud, French ambassador from March 1993 to April 1994,
has received more praise, both from French officials and non-French
expatriates in Rwanda at the time. 59 Unlike Mr. Martre, the new ambassador was said to have belonged to the "new" diplomatic school: he
believed in opening up the political process and in the "third" political
force in Rwanda, the one that was eventually decimated in April 1994
(interview, Paris, March 1995). However, his first contacts with local
human rights activists did not begin very weIl. Shortly after his arrival,
one such activist spent several hours in his office, describing the human rights situation to him; Marlaud replied that he had not come to
Rwanda to contradict his predecessor (interview, July 1995).
There is little information on which to assess Mr. Marlaud's record
in Rwanda, but he seemed to have had a more balanced view of the
Rwandese situation than did Mr. Martre and a number of both French
and non-French officials concluded that he was "better" than his predecessor. There is also an interesting statement he made to the representatives of the United Nations Reconnaissance Mission in August 1993,
which was preparing the U.N. peacekeeping mission.
He [Mr. Mariaud] was worried that the vacuum created by the non-presence of the
NIF [Neutral International Force] on September 10 might be very tempting for
the extremists who opposed the Arusha Accords and were waiting for the first
opportunity to conclude that it was "dead." He stated that it was imperative that
some means be found to reassure the Rwandese people on 10 September. Even a
simple gesture might allay the fears of the population and discourage the extremists from taking action. As far as France was concerned, it would respect the Arusha
Accords and leave Kigali whatever the size of the NIF, 10 or 10,000 men. He
suggested that the NIF should wait a week or two to settle solidly in Kigali before
letting the RPF enter the capital. Pending the arrival of the NIF, the Ambassador
expressed the hope that the Security Council would agree to the deployment of an
element of avant-garde to avoid the psychological negative impact of the simultaneous departure of the French troops and arrival of the RPF battalion. (Report of
the Reconnaissance Mission, Political Aspects, New York, DPKO, pp. 6-7)
In retrospeet, one might be tempted to evaluate the ambassador's
statement regarding the "extremists" as a clear early warning message.
At least in August 1993, one French official knew of the existence of
extremists and the possibility they might take deadly action. Given the
French Policy in Rwanda
171
intentions of the "extremists," he clearly perceived the French military
presence in Kigali as ensuring some form of stability as weIl as helping
to allay fears and negative psychological reactions. His statement is
also striking in being based solely on a military logic and military evaluation of the forces present.
To summarize the extent and nature of French information gathering: the ambassador (at least the first one) did not play his role; military officials were obsessed with the RPF-the French secret services
seemed mainly to collect information on Uganda and the RPF. The
early warning process with regard to "Hutu power" barely functioned.
The question of sharing of information was less relevant since all intelligence sources were under the same roof (the French embassy), and
on identical sources for their analysis. 60
the ministries in Paris rel~d
However, during the three years that preceded the genocide, signals
contrary to the ones sent by the embassy and the military were also
available to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense,
Cooperation and the Elysee. A large number of reports from international human rights organizations and, much fewer from the media, as
weIl as the dissenting voices within the various ministries, all argued
that the military thesis was wrong.
Despite these messages, Paris was no more concemed about the state
of human rights violations in Rwanda than were its representatives in
Kigali, and disregarded opinions contrary to the ones provided by the
French military or the French ambassador, at least up to March 1993.
The chilling human rights report from the FIDH received little attention and was rapidly buried at the Elysee, the Quai, the Ministries of
Defense and Cooperation (lnterview, Paris, May 1995; see also
Verschave 1994, 75). This dismissaI of information has three origins:
individual, institutional, and "ideological."
Rwanda through Corrective Lenses
WeIl in evidence in Herodotus and Thucydides, the idea that peoples
have an aggregate moral character and political temperament is one of
the foundations of Western statecraft. For better or for worse, whether
they are treated as explicit working hypothesis or remain unspoken
assumptions, whether they are triggered off by journalistic images or
learned from scholarly accounts, such general notions are almost always a starting point for the analysis of societies other than our own.
The impressions formed on first contact, the initial discoveries of the
172
The Path of a Genocide
others, generaIly have a long life. They act as the durable lenses through
which distant realities are perceived. 61
It is not surprising, given the narrow spectrum of sources and the
predispositional perspectives on Rwanda, that one view predominated.
Further, the balance of power within and among French officials in this
case favored the military side, especially represented by General
Huchon, rather than the human rights organizations or the "dissenting"
voices.
General Huchon has been described as talented and shrewd, one who
knew how to convince a minister. He held considerable power, not only
within his own Ministry of Cooperation, but also at the Quai d'Orsay
and of course at the Elysee where he used to work. According to an
official from his ministry, General Huchon wielded a strong influence
even during the cohabitation period. There were dissenting voices, but
they were never powerful or numerous enough to prevail over General
Huchon's analysis. 62
This state of affairs also reflected institutionai problems. There is a
gap between the powers of the president and the instruments available
to him63 as well as an outdated division of prerogatives and responsibilities between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of
Cooperation, with the latter dealing exclusively with what has been
terrned "les pays du champ,"64 that is French-speaking African countries. One of the major consequences is that the management of Frenchspeaking African affairs escapes the responsibility of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, contributing to ministerial turf wars and lack of coordination. 65 The mismanagement of the Rwanda crisis is also linked to
institutionai barriers within each ministerial department. For instance,
General Huchon's power-in part a reflection of his personality, in part
the result of his position first at the Elysee and then as the Head of the
Mission Militaire de Cooperation66-as weIl as the influence of French
diplomats posted to Kigali, were reinforced by weaknesses of information-gathering and decisionmaking elsewhere. 67
Ultimately, however, the key to an understanding of the French political establishment's dismissal of early warning signs from the rest of the
international community and its blind support for the analysis constructed
within its ranks and from the military, stems from a mixture of ideology
and culture. The Rwandan crisis was read and analyzed through corrective lenses, which tells us more about France than it does about Rwanda.
One such lens is that of "democracy." Here, the images of the 1789
revolution and French democratic principles based on universal suf-
Freneh Poliey in Rwanda
173
frage have been superimposed on the Rwandese reality. To support
Habyarimana, that is the Hum, made democratic sense: the Hum, too,
had a (1959) social revolution, consthuted the majority, and
Habyarimana, like one of the leaders of the French revolution, would
eventually emerge as the strong man of the democratization process.
In comparison, the RPF was drawn from a social and ethnic minority, and was hungry for power, revenge, and ethnic killings (in the French
view). They were, in other words, the "black Khmers."68 The implication of this reading was that military support was necessary to ensure
that the democratic process would not be short-circuited by the ambitions of a minority.
The second lens is the old Franco-Britain rivalry: the century-Iong,
losing battle of the French language against English, and the even longer
antagonism between France and Great Britain which found a specific
African meaning in the Fashoda incident in 1898. Hence the multiple
references 69 after the genocide to the "Fashoda syndrome" as a way of
explaining French policies70 and sharp critiques of this "geo-political
infantilism" (Verschave 1994, 62). Statements of this sort were not exceptional in the months preceding the Rwandese carnage and indicated
growing criticism, at times, rage, against the French political scene. 71
French Intentions and Responsibilities
Three interpretations may be offered to explain France's intentions
and responsibilities in Rwanda. They are not mumally exclusive, espedaIly when applied to different actors at different times. The first interpretation concerns the failure of both the political and the military
establishment to draw the line between what might have been a limited
response by the Rwandan armed forces to the October 1990 invasion,
and what rapidly became fascist and genocidal strategies. Analyses of
the pregenocide period in Rwanda underlined the constant linkage between the war and internaI strife, and the bhuring of the boundary between military measures and actions against civilian populations. In
Rwanda, the government came to implement and justify the latter with
reference to the former. It may be that perceptions and activities of
French officials in Kigali underwent a similar process and permeated
the communication between Paris and Kigali. Or, as Lemarchand (1994)
observed, by turning a blind eye and deaf ear to the multiple signs of
human rights violations and a coming genocide emerging from the
Habyarimana regime, 72 while "substantially strengthening the military
174
The Path of a Genocide
capabilities of the regime against its internaI and external foes," French
officials "created major disincentives for the Habyarimana clique to
make concessions to the opposition" (Lemarchand 1994, 603).
France helped give the Habyarimana regime a degree of credibility that proved
totally ilIusory, and thus created false expectations about its commitment to
democracy ... [N]o amount of retrospective guilt can diminish its place in history
as the principal villain in the Rwandan apocalypse. (Lemarchand 1994, 603)
A second possible interpretation is that French policy sought to contain extremism. Unlike the rest of the international community, French
representatives, especially the military, did not isolate the extremists or
treat them as outcasts. France appeared to have been the only country
that had regular contacts with the CDR, for instance. The general tenor
of French policy-defined above all by assisting the military and not
holding the government accountable for its human rights violationsmay be interpreted as efforts to manage the extremists by going some
way to accommodate them, consistent with France's practices elsewhere,
according to some observers.
French governments do not make a fetish of consistency. In the 1980s
some terrorists were punished, some were tolerated. Illegal aliens with
no connection to violence were rounded up while deals were cut with
real terrorists. The pattern was repeated with Iranian, Syrian, and Palestinian groups. The purpose was not to elirninate the sources of terrorism,
only to reach an understanding with its organizers.
The third and more "diabolic" version is that some French military
officials contributed to the development of the extremists' strategies, if
not in their chilling details, at least in the overall objective of destroying the peace process. The possibility has been suggested by the noted
scholar Jean-Franyois Bayart:
Some French military officials seem to have suggested, both to the Habyarimana
regime and to his entourage, that the Arusha accord was neither good nor ineluctable. Even if they did not want this atrocious genocide, one may ask whether
they had not put the seed of the idea, among the extremists of the regime, that this
accord had to be sabotaged at all costs. (Bayart 1994)
What others have called incompetence here becomes intentional. In
this perspective, the poor reporting on the evolving extremist fringe,
along with France's involvement in Rwanda's internaI war, appear to
be the result of acceptance of "Hutu power" ideology in French decision-making circles. French officials themselves acknowledged that
Hutu extremist ideology had found support in the French bureaucracy.
French Policy in Rwanda
175
Shortly after the genocide was launched, one French official is reported
to have said: "We got rid of the most extremists [officiaIs] of our past
policy, in fact, [they were] totally pro-Hutu."73
The statement raises several questions. If the existence of French,
pro-Hutu extremists was known within the political establishment, why
had they had not been moved aside a long time ago? Whatever the
reason, the political responsibility for inaction in this respect is enormous. Second, the political establishment could not have chosen a worse
time to wake up from four years of consenting amnesia. If some French
actors were totally pro-Hutu, they were the only ones who could have
had some influence upon the Rwandese extremists during the first phase
of the genocide and could perhaps have limited the killings. 74
Conc1usion: France and the April 1994 GenocideReturn to a Political Logic
On 8 April 1994, two days after the plane crash that killed
Habyarimana, and without any waming to the United Nations, 190
French soldiers landed and secured the Kigali airport. The following
day, 400 additional troops arrived and proceeded to evacuate French
expatriates in the midst of horrendous massacres and chaos. After evacuating some 1,361 persons, the last French troops withdrew on 14 April.
Among those evacuated were some 450 French nationals, but also 178
Rwandese officials or their families, including the widow and close
associates of the assassinated President. 75 No other Rwandese nationals, not even the local Tutsi personnel of the French embassy, or some
well-known opponents to the Habyarimana regime targeted by the militia, were brought to safety.76 Els de Temmerman, a Belgianjournalist
who covered the evacuation, testified as follows:
I arrived in Kigali on April 10th, with a plane sent by World Faod Program....
There were 50 journalists following the French and Belgian troops. I was in a
French convoy. At same point, we witnessed the murder of 6 persons in front of
us. The journalists begged the soldiers to intervene; we were crying. "It is not our
mandate," one of the soldiers replied. I was so revolted and disgusted.... People
were laughing in front of the mountains of corpses. (Els de Temmerman, oral
presentation, Conference on" the Media and Rwanda," Montreal, May 1995. My
translation.)
On 8 April 1994, the French political establishment had finally decided that enough was enough and that France's military adventures in
Rwanda had to end. The rescue operation was short and restricted: with
176
The Path of a Genocide
the last expatriate evacuated, the French troops withdrew. The decision
to limit French involvement in 1994 to a rescue operation was not a
military but a political decision taken by the political establishment
and it might have made political, albeit not moral, sense. Huchon and
some of the most extremist, pro-Hutu, agents ofFrance's previous policy
were against a limited military intervention, and lobbied hard for a
larger mandate that would prolong the presence of French troops as
weIl as protect civilians.
On April 8, in the course of an emergency meeting, the military officials c!aimed
that a massacre of 100,000 Tutsis would occur and decided that French troops
should withdraw. General Huchon was furious, "[T]hey don't care about 100,000
Rwandese deaths." (interviews, Paris, May 1995)
The French decision to launch a intervention sharply limited in time
and mandate was triggered by the realization that assigning other objectives would necessarily involve a military confrontation with the
RPF, something that had been ruled out from the flrst days of French
involvement in Rwanda. This implication became explicit on 12 Aprilif not earlier-when the RPF wamed the Belgian and French national
forces to leave Kigali. In addition, an RPF representative had made it
elear in the course of an 8 April meeting with the New Zealand President of the Security Council that it would not accept any strengthening
of U.N. forces that would impede the advance of RPF troops.
In April 1994, the pendulum of French relations with Rwanda for
some four years had returned to the logic of the political establishmenl.
But the consequences of the politicallogic were no less "diabolic" than
the military one that preceded il. The results were captured in the images of the women, men, and children who climbed the gates of the
French embassy, and of those who served the French govemment, but
were left to fend for themselves in the face of the genocide, while those
who, for years had sown the seeds of ethnic hatred and helped build a
vast maehinery of death, were lifted to safety in French planes.
l. Much of the information on which this chapter is based was collected in interviews in Paris during the first half of 1995. Translations from French books,
artic!es and newspapers are my own.
2. ef. Krop 1994; in a more subtle fashion, see Verschave 1994. On 15 May 1994
on French television, Dr. Jean-Herve Bradoi from Mederins Sans Frontieres
virulently attacked French policy in Africa.
Frencn Policy in Rwanda
177
3. Ibid. See also the interview with Michel Roussin, Minister of Cooperation in Le
Monde, 16 July 1994.
4. Editors: from the perspective of the negotiations at Arusha, as analyzed in the
previous chapter by Jones, negotiation strategy was the predominant element in
French policy at those negotiations (Cf. Lemarchand 1994,602 for a discussion
of the diplomatic or "soft track").
5. To borrow from Cohen's (Paris 1994, p. 139) reading of what constitutes good
crisis management.
6. Cf. Chipman 1989, 134 and Chipman 1995. Burundi and Zaire also signed the
TMAA with France.
7. Cf. Chipman 1989, 132. For example, this compared with 269 from the Ivory
Coast, 197 from Gabon, 40 from Zaire.
8. The 1990 intervention has not been the object of mueh analysis or research.
Anton Andereggen, in his 1994 work on France's relationship with Sub-Sahara
Africa, does not even mention it. Cohen (1994, 123) makes only one brief reference to the 1993 intervention in Rwanda.
9. Prunier 1995, 100. On 2 October, President Habyarimana also called JeanChristophe Mitterand, then at the Africa Unit of the Elysee, to reiterate his request for assistance. Habyarimana made a similar (and successful) plea with the
Belgian king.
10. Braeckman 1994,257. According to Colette Braeckman, this new troop movement consisted ofthe flrst regiment ofmarine infantry, originally based in Bayonne.
11. Africa Watch 1993, 26. It should be noted that flgures of French troops present
in Rwanda from 1990 to 1993 slightly vary from source to source. In a later
report, the Arms Project of Human Rights Watch estimated that there were at
least 680 troops as of March 1993. (Cf. Human Rights Watch Arms Project 1994,
23.) The figure most often cited by researchers and journalists is around 700,
although it remains quite unclear as to when exactly the troops were either sent
to Kigali or brought back to their bases. According to Braeckman (1994, 260),
at some point there were more than 1000 men in Rwanda, while in a confidential interview, an official from the Ministry of Cooperation in Paris stated that
there was only one company in 1991, and that at the peak of French presence in
Rwanda, there were 500 soldiers (Field notes, Paris, May 1995.)
12. According to Le Monde (22 September 1994), military equipment aid grew from
a 4 million franc value in 1990 to 14 million in 1992. If reports of clandestine
assistance are added, the total actually grew to 20 million francs. Human Rights
Watch Arms uncovered a $6 million bank guarantee from a French nationalized
bank, le credit lyonnais, for a Rwanda arms supply deal from Egypt (6:2, January 1994). Following the genocide and despite the arms embargo, five shipments of arms took place in Goma, Zaire from May to June 1994 (7:4, 1995).
13. There were 150 according to Gattengo (1994).
14. According to Prunier's account (1995), the decision to launch Operation Noroit
and the objectives of the intervention were not the subject of intense discussions
in Paris. Prunier was present when Mitterand had the 3-4 minute discussion
with Habyarimana. This reinforces the interpretation that Rwanda did not preoccupy Mitterand but was a matter of routine African policy. Jean-Christophe
Mitterand kept himFerney, however, reports that during his traveIs, sio~narF
self constantly informed of the Rwandese military situation (Cf. Ferney, 1993).
15. As stated previously, it does not appear that the initial decision to launch the
operation had been the subject of much discussion. The criteria, however, have
certainly played a major roIe in deflning the nature and extent of the support
later provided to the Rwandese regime by the French troops.
178
The Path of a Genocide
16. The 1979 French operation resulting in the overthrow of Emperor Bokassa in
the Central African Republic owed very little to these criteria. Yet, even when
these two conditions are met, French response is not automatic. While France
rendered assistance to Mba in Gabon in 1964, to Mobutu in zaire (against the
forces of the Front de Liberation Nationale) in 1977-78, to Eyadema in Togo in
1986, to Tchad in 1983-84, and discretely to Cameroon in 1981, France did not
intervene for Tsiranama in Madagascar in 1973, Diori in Nigerin 1974, or Dacko
of the Central African Republic in 1981 (Cf. Chipman 1989, 135).
17. After the Baule summit announcing France's democratization "vision" for Africa, Habyarimana was said to have asked for French support and a guarantee of
military assistance in case of aggression.
18. See the previous chapter by Jones and his manuscript, "Intervention Without
Borders: Humanitarian Interventions in Rwanda, 1990--1994," unpublished at
the time this chapter was written.
19. Ibid. Bruce Jones conducted extensive research among diplomatic circles in
Tanzania. However, he does not cite the name of the French military services to
which he was referring. It could have been the DGSE or the DRM (Direction du
Renseignement Militaire). The DGSE was most likely since the DRM was only
created in April 1992 (under General Jean Heinrich) in order to gather intelligence in an open manner through the "traditional" work of military attaches in
embassies and intelligenee officers in uniform. As of July 1994, the DGSE was
providing information collected in Burundi, Uganda, Zaire, and in those parts of
Rwanda under the controi of the RPF, while the DRM was concentrating on the
zone in which French troops were pursuing Operation Turquoise (Cf. Intelligence Newsletter, No.245, 26 July 1994).
20. Cohabitation refers to the political situation in France when the Presidency is
controlled by one party and parliament is controlled by the opposition. Thus, the
President and the Prime Minister come from opposing parties.
21. According to an informant from the Ministry of Cooperation, the French decision to disengage was already evident in 1990: "We did not want to remain
alone.... There were great powers behind the RPF. Uganda could send 30,000 to
40,000 soldiers ..."
22. Interview, Paris, March 1995. French withdrawal may have already been discussed in November 1990, when a French delegation led by the Minister of
Cooperation, Mr. Pelletier, and the Elysee African advisor, Jean-Christophe
Mitterand, met with various European and African 1eaders, including leaders
from Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda, to discuss the situation in Rwanda.
23. This shift may have been facilitated by the replacement of Jean-Christophe
Mitterand by Bruno Delaye as the Elysee African advisor in 1991, although
opinions on this issue differ sharply. Most journalists, researchers, and French
officials have analyzed the arrival of Bruno Delaye as an important turning point
in French policies in Rwanda. Others (a minority) were skeptical: they did not
perceive Bruno Delaye as having imposed a new orientation to French policies.
24. Increased French diplomatic activities were probably stimulated, and even triggered, by similar American efforts. For details of the initiatives and the meetings, see the previous chapter by Jones.
the Quai
25. Jean-Christophe Beliard, charge d'affaires in Tanzania,
d'Orsay during the Arusha process.
26. (Cf. Prunier 1995,29). Debarge also asked Habyarimana and the opposition to
as a
''faire unfront commun," which, in Prunier's opinion, could be
caU for interethnic struggle, given that the opposition and the
were both
Hutu.
Frencb
in Rwanda
119
27. Mitterand's letter to Habyarimana has been mostly interpreted as another proof
of France's unconditional support to what became a genocidai government. The
interpretation given here is more benign. Mitterand's promise was necessary to
bring Habyarimana to accept participation in the peace talks and eventually concessions to the RPF.
28. French military assistance may have been a necessary component in its diplomatic strategy. First, it added crucialleverage to the otherwise very weak position of the Rwandese government. Second, it allowed French diplomats to bring
pressure on Habyarimana to negotiate. Third, the Western diplomatic community (though not the human rights NGOs) not only regarded the French presence
in Rwanda as an evil necessity, but as a security blanket for their own expatriates in Rwanda (Interview, Ottawa, April 1995). In February of 1991, the Canadian Foreign Minister, Joe Clarke, wrote a letter to Roland Dumas, then his
French equivalent, thanking him for the role French parachutists played in evacuating Canadian citizens from Ruhengiri. Finally, the French military presence
was intended to serve as a push factor on the RPF, provided the RPF believed in
French political will to back the military.
29. The theoretical alternative was an OAU force (see chapter 6); Belgium in October of 1990 had requested that France and Germany provide logistical support
for just such a force.
30. France's stated reason for pushing for a U.N. force was that the OAU lacked the
means and experience of peacekeeping operations. OAU lacked experience in
managing peacekeeping operations. (An exception could be Liberia, although
it was not an OAU operation but a regional one.) The OAU did lack the financial
and technical means to sustain peacekeeping activities, and would have required
extensive logistical assistance and military equipment from United Nations
member states. But three other factors probably also explained France's insistence on U.N. troops. First, at the time of the RPF invasion in October 1990, the
Ugandan president was the Secretary General of the OAU, which meant, within
French strategic parameters, that the OAU could not be trusted. Second, a U.N.led peacekeeping operation necessarily involved the Security Council in which
France is a permanent member, hence allowing France greater controi over the
mandate and activities of a U.N. deployed peacekeeping force. According to
members of the Security Council, France tried to increase its influence in Africa, using the United Nations as a cover. Thirdly, as long as the peacekeeping
operation remained a U.N. operation, there remained the slight possibility that
some French troops would be integrated within the peacekeeping forces.
31. When Dallaire's reconnaissance mission went to Africa in August to draw up
the details of the Neutral International Force (NIF) that would become UNAMIR,
the RPF representative insisted that the RPF battalion would not be deployed in
Kigali as long as French troops were in the capital. Article 72 of the Arusha
Accords also provided that foreign troops would only be required to be withdrawn after the deployment of the NIF or the expansion of NMOG under the
controI of the U.N. Kagame suggested that the U.N. provide the logistics to
enable the OAU to deploy an Egyptian battalion and meet the 10 September
deadline. This would enable the French troops to depart. But the French ambassador insisted that such a battalion would be insufficient to counterbalance the
presence of an RPF battalion (Cf. U.N. Report of the Reconnaissance Mission,
September, 1993).
32. The article states that the withdrawal of foreign troops shall take place after the
deployment of the Neutral International Force (NIF) or the expanded NMOG
under the command and controi of the United Nations.
180
The Path of Ii Genocide
33. Three out of nine operative paragraphs of the resolution passed in the Security
Council in March of 1993 called for or welcomed U.N. cooperation with the
OAU (Cf. Security Council Informal Discussions, 9 March 1993).
34. Letter from the permanent representative of Rwanda to the United Nations, addressed to the President of the Security Council, 14 June, 1993.
35. Following the passing of the resolution, Herve Ladsous (Assistant to the French
Permanent Representative) explicitly referred to the possibility of a U.N. contribution to the protection of civilians. Further, in the course of the Security Council discussion of 9 March 1992, the French representative, though indicating
clearly that this was not what France desired, offered to consider providing French
peacekeepers if both sides in Rwanda made such a request.
36. According to Cohen (1994, 139) such a thorough synchronization is the primary
requirement for good crisis management.
37. Roussin, interviewed in Le Monde, 16 July 1994, stated that: "The Rwandan file
is essentially handled by the Quai d'Orsay and the Defense Ministry. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is responsible for French policy. Increasingly, the Quai
d'Orsay handles African affairs."
38. The Economist, 23 July 1994. As part ofhis dealing with Africa, Balladur pushed
through a painful, but long overdue, 50 percent devaluation of the CFA franc.
39. Interview, Paris, May 1965. The idea that cohabitation led to a transformation or
shift in French policies is undermined also by the fact that during the flrst period
of cohabitation (1986-88), there was little dissent over African policy when
Chirac was Prime Minister. In fact, Cohen and Clarke (1990) argue that it was
characterized by harmony.
40. Respondents interviewed for this chapter in early 1995 indicated, for instance,
that Bruno Delaye met with various regionalleaders (including Habyarimana
and Museveni) on numerous occasions, and that General Huchon conducted
several missions in Rwanda in 1992 and 1993 where he met with Habyarimana.
The principle French actors of this military track were General Huchon, in charge
of the Mission Militaire de Cooperation and previously (at the time of the 1990
invasion) at the Elysee Palace as the Assistant to the Commander-In-Chief (General Lanxade); Colonel Cussac, French military attache and head of the French
Military Assistance Mission in Rwanda, and his assistant, Lieutenant-colonel
Maurin.
41. Cf. Whiteman (1983, 334) and Golan (1981,3-12). She quotes the then Liberian
Foreign Minister, Cecil Dennis. Those who explain the secret of the French role
in Africa in terms of personal diplomacy at the highest level seem to be exaggerating. Mitterand only visited Rwanda twice, in May and October of 1982 (Cf.
Andreggen, 1994). The two presidents met at various Franco-African summits
and in Paris in 1993.
42. M Pierre Joxe had meant to provide the Defense Ministry with a tool to reflect
upon international, strategic, and defense issues (Cf. Cohen 1994, 98).
43. Cr. Bourmaud 1994. "Elites, be they intellectual or leaders, have deserted the
African continent for a long time aiready.... The French parliament did not make
Africa an exception to its passivity."
44. Colonel Cussac, French military Attache, Head of the French Military Assistance, French Mission to Rwanda, quoted in Human Rights Watch Arms Project
1994,23.
45. Confidential interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to this source, at
one of the JPMC meetings, this same Nigerian colonel testified, under questioning from France, that French troops were not fighting.
46. Interviews with French journalists, May 1995; see also Girard, 1995.
Frencb Policy in Rwanda
181
47. Human Rights Watch, various journalists, and French, Canadian, and American
individuals present in Rwanda at the time that I interviewed in 1995, told stories
about unnerving encounters with French soldiers along the road to Kigali (Cf.
Braeclanan 1994, 258).
48. As one respondent hinted, without such an intervention France, Rwanda, and
the world cornmunity rnight have also have avoided a genocide.
49. AFP, 11 October 1991, transcribed in Guichaoua (1995, op cit 712). According
to the AFP release, the questioning was correctly handled, and the prisoners did
not refuse to respond.
50. The 1991 creation of a "self-defense" program, which included the distribution
of arms to civilians and their training, also underlines the amalgamation of the
rnilitary and civil spheres in Rwanda.
51. Among other sources, this information is reported by Liberation, 18 May 1994;
L'Humanite, 30 June 1994, Reyntjens (1994, 176); Krop (1994, 75-76);
Yerschave (1994, 40). It should be noticed that Braeckman dates Chollet's nornination as of 1 January 1992 (Cf. Braeckman 1994,259).
52. (Cf. Le Flambeau, 17 December 1993.) "About 8000 interahamwe sufficiently
trained and equipped by the French arrny await the signal to begin the assassinations among the city of Kigali and its surroundings" (quoted in African Rights
1994,54-55) More direct testimony came from Janvier Afrika, a former rnilitia
member. "French rnilitaries taught us how to capture our victims and tie them
up ... the French taught the interahamwe to throw knives and assemble rifles.
The French trained uS ... for a total of 4 months between February 1991 and
January 1992" (Cf. Gattegno, Le Monde 1994), who alleged French soldiers
were present when the Presidentiai Guard perpetrated a large number of massacres in April 1994. Jean Carbonar, a member of the International Enquiry Commission that went to Rwanda in January 1993, c1aimed that French trainers were
present in the Bigogwe rnilitary camp where hundreds of civilians were brought,
tortured and killed (Cf. Le Nouvel Observateur, 4 August 1994). However, the
testimony from K. Gasana, former Minister of Defense under Habyarimana,
who fled to Switzerland in July of 1993, clairned that French training of the
rnilitia began only at the end of 1993 and stopped in December (Cf. Gasana
1995,690).
53. All informants for this artic1e, including persons who were present in Rwanda
during this period and some who were relatively sympathetic to France's actions, found the presence of the French soldiers highly disturbing. Feelings ranged
from "they really exaggerated," to "this was disgusting, revolting, total colonialism, they were arrogant, etc." In March 1993, the RwandeseAssociation for
Human Rights complained openly of the French soldiers' ethnic discrirnination
at roadblocks, and considered, along with the other opposition parties, that "the
French soldiers (militaires) constitute an additional force of oppression" (cited
Braeckman 1994, 258).
54. Nevertheless, the allegations of the French rnilitary should not be rejected outright. Human rights violations comrnitted by RPF troops have been reported by
other sources, including local and international human rights organization. RPF
border crossings between Uganda and Rwanda, and the role of the Ugandan
army (NRA) in blocking UNOMUR patrols have been acknowledged by the
United Nations as cited in various cables sent from UNAMIR in Kigali to U.N.
Headquarters in New York.
55. Most significantly, this former DGSE high-ranked official states: "[S]ince independence, Western military apparatus never stopped to support African leaders
on the basis that a nation could not exist without an army.... This policy has
182
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
The Path of a Genocide
resulted [in Rwanda] in the increasing integration of French military cooperants
within the governmental forces ... and in the repression that tbey organized."
Clause Silberzahn also implied that his intelligence service had foreseen the
RPF victory over the Rwandese armed forces (Silberzahn 1995,203).
According to the activist, the French gendarmes were totally obsessed with human rights violations aUegedly committed by the RPF. Interview, July 1995.
At tbe invitation oflocal human rights groups, from 7 to 21 January 1993, eleven
experts from eight different countries, as part of tbe International Commission
of Investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda sponsored by international human rights organizations, investigated allegations of human rights violations by the Rwandan government and the RPF. The Human Rights and Watch
organizations provided tbe most accurate record of Rwanda's deteriorating human rights situation. Just after the Commission arrived in Kigali, the government's
crackdown on opponents and a slaughter of members of the Tutsi minority followed Habyarimana's protocol on power-sharing on 9 January 1993. The accuracy of the information and analysis was confirmed by a separate U.N. Human
Rights commission investigation in March of 1993 (Cf. Adelman 1997;
Braeckman 1994,261; Braurnan 1994,52).
Interview, Paris, May 1995; Ottawa, March 1995. This fact especially struck tbe
expatriate population in Kigali as totally unwarranted and unetbical.
Interviews, Paris, OUawa, 1995. It should be noticed, however, tbat General
Kagame refused to meet with him and former Ambassador to Kampala, Yannick
Gerard, in June 1995, considering him to be a supporter of Habyarimana.
This point was reiterated by all officials interviewed, be they from the Ministries of Foreign Affaus, Cooperation, or Defense.
Cf. Zolberg 1973,728. While written some twenty years ago, Zolberg's perceptive analysis is as relevant as ever.
Interviews, Paris, May 1995. According to a French official at the Ministry of
Cooperation, during the three years that preceded the genocide, there were only
two French officials who presented a perspective different from Huchon's. They
were "somebody in Tanzania (likely the charge d'affaires) and someone here in
Paris at the Ministry of Cooperation."
The gap between means and ends is discussed in Bayart (1984, 103); Cohen and
Clarke (1990, 213) use a ship metaphor-the gap between the captain's power
and the navigationai instruments-to make the same point.
One possible and nonliterai translation is "countries in the backyard."
A number of books and articles have denounced the institutionai disfunctioning
tbat characterizes the running ofAfrican affairs. In addition to Cohen and Clarke
(1990) and Bayart (1994), Reyntjens (1994, 179) and Yerschave (1994, 58) comment on the problem. Others have highlighted the predominance ofparaUel networks in defining African policies. See, for instance, Kalfleche 1988, 56; Pean
1983; Glaser and Smith; the newsletter Billets d'Ajrique et d'ailleurs, published
by the association Survie, Paris, which focuses on the mismanagement of French
Official Development Assistance.
However, as one informant pointed out, it is all too easy for the political establishment to go after one (politically appointed) individual and make him a scapegoat of this establishment's incompetence.
Reyntjens (1994) with respect to the monopolyand poor quality of information
in Central Africa attributes the failure of intelligence to secrecy (Cf. Cohen and
Clarke 1990, 213; and, more generally, Yerschave 1994).
This reference was still used to describe the Rwandese govemment during my
interviews in Paris in 1995.
FreDen Policy in Rwanda
183
69. Almost every single book or articles cited in the core of this paper inc1ude reference to the Fashoda syndrome.
70. This interpretation is legitimate both in Africa and elsewhere, as long as it entails respect for human and rninority rights, none of which were in effect in
Rwanda. It also holds to some degree for other French-speaking Western states,
such as Canada and Belgium, but they do not seem to be nearly as obsessed as
France. There might be two reasons for this difference: first, the Rwandan ctisis
came at a time when both Canada and Belgium had begun to disengage from
Africa, and their interest in Rwanda was even more lirnited and narrow than that
of France; second, it is also possible that both countries, with a history based on
the existence of so-called linguistic minorities, had a different understanding of
the meaning of democracy, Le., one that is based on the tights of minotities.
71. In a similar fashion, Rwanda fed the collective fantasies and constructed visions
of "self" in both Canada and Belgium. Colette Braeckman argues that Rwanda
constituted a rnirror image for the Belgians: "They projected themselves on
Rwanda, they have read Rwanda's history according to their own history, their
own social conflicts" (Braeckman 1994, 247). A sirnilar "self-ref1ecting" process was noticeable in Canada. Canadian perceptions of the RPF, Habyarimana,
and the role ofUganda divided neatly along language lines, with French-speaking Canadians opposing the Anglophones (interviews, Ottawa March 1995; see
the next chapter by Adelman). However, what distinguished both Canada and
Belgium from France is that the self-ref1ective lenses proved insufficient to define or bind the policies of the state. This was not the case in France, perhaps
because "France is the only country that wants to express its foreign policy in
universal, logical terms," as Romano (1986, 35-41) has suggested in a different
context.
72. Interviews, Canada and France, March 1995. Two sources interviewed for this
article reported that some French soldiers, upon realizing that Rwandese soldiers were involved in extra-judicial killings, communicated the information to
their superiors. No follow-up was given to their warning except for them being
requested to "shut-up."
73. The French version is: "On a mis sur la touche les plus extremistes de notre
politique passee, en effet totalement pro-hutu." These words reverberated
throughout the French media (cf. Verschave 1994, 40).
74. What might have occurred, however, is that the military conditions imposed by
these so-called "totally pro-Hutu" elements were totally unacceptable from the
perspective of the political establishment, and therefore precluded their participation and contribution to the contlict management process. Thejournalist, Steven
Smith, also questioned the nature of the French intervention in Rwanda, comparing it with the one that took place in Burundi in October 1993, which, in his
opinion, contributed to limiting the massacres and counter-massacres (Smith
1995,452).
75. Cf. Guichaoua 1995, 697-701. Guichaoua lists all 178 persons evacuated, a
large number of whom were children.
76. The testimony of the former employee of the French cultural center is especially
heart gripping. It has been quoted in a large number of articles and books (Cf.
Krop 1994, 91-99). Despite the pressing requests from Andre Guichaoua and
the apostolic nuncio, no action was taken to insure the protection of FranyoisXavier Nsanzuwera, the public prosecutor in Kigali (Guichaoua 1995, 707).
Canadian Policy in Rwanda
Howard Adelman
Canadian foreign policy might seem irrelevant with respect to
Rwanda since Canada is not an important player on the world stage in
general-and in Africa in particular-compared to the U.S. and France.
Further, in relationship to the "realist" policies of the United States and
the cynical policies of France, Canadian policy may seem totally naive. But if middle players who have a commitment to foreign aid and
multilateralism, as is the case with Canada, the Nordics, the Netherlands, and the like, then considering Canadian policy in Rwanda is a
valuable exercise, particularly since, with respect to Rwanda, Canada
was the most influential rniddle power in Rwanda, and Canadian policy
makers have been at or near the forefront of multilateralist activity ever
since the U.N. was created.
But Canadian policy has not only been based on aid and multilateralism. In fact, as this chapter tries to demonstrate, as Canadian aid
diminished and as Canada stood four square behind the structural adjustment policies of the IMF applied to Rwanda since 1989 when structural adjustment became a central priority, Canada became more active
diplomatically and morally, becoming a prime mover in disc10sing the
human rights abuses of the Habyarimana regime. What is less wellknown is how Canadian foreign policy is a projection of domestic binational policy at home while projecting itself abroad as a leader in
international peacekeeping. If Americans drew the lesson from Somalia that they should avoid peacekeeping, Canadians became even more
committed.
But commitment does not entail that Canadian policy was any more
intelligent or informed. And though Canadians took the lessons of
Rwanda very seriously, that seriousness translated into exhibitionist
185
186
The Patn of Il Genocide
rather than in-depth policy, and more recently has followed the precedent of the NGOs in the civil society in pursuing single issue international policy, with some dramatic success on the issue of banning land
mines, but at the cost of a coherent global international foreign policy.
This case study not only describes the role of an important middle
player in Rwanda, but demonstrates that the "good guys" in the international arena may have added their own proportion of errors to those
of the realists and cynics.
Canadian Involvement in Rwanda l
Since the 1960s, Canada has had a elose association with Rwanda
through the involvement of individual Canadians and at the government level. Since 1990, two Canadian priests, Father CardinaF in 1992
and Father Simard on 17 October 1994, were victims of the violence in
Rwanda. As weIl, seven Rwandese nationals who held Canadian citizenship were slaughtered in the genocide. 3
Canada was not only intimately linked to victims of the genocide,
but to alleged perpetrators as weIl. Leon Mugesera, who had been a
elose coIleague of President Habyarimana of Rwanda,4 was admitted
to Canada as a refugee, though he has since been ordered to be deported by the Canadian government5 ; Mugesera was accused of abetting crimes against humanity and by some of being the intel1ectual
architect of the genocide against the Thtsi.
Canadian
Behind the personal stones, there is also a story of
government involvement with Rwanda. Following the genocide in
Rwanda, Prime Time News on 29 November 1994 on the
English
Canadian network and, much more pointedly,
Point on French-Canadian television on 23 January 1995, accused the government of ignoring the alarm signals of the impending genocide. Le Point actually
charged Canada with complicity in the genocide. 6 The
Time News
special item was the kinder of the two. First, it claimed that Canada
was but one member of the international community accused of "wilful
blindness that led to the kind of horror that the world thought that it
would never see again." The thesis of the show was unequivocal: "the
United Nations ignored clear and repeated warnings of a state-sponsored plan for genocide in Rwanda" (transcript,
Time News,
Toronto: CBC Corporation, 29 November 1994:9). Le Point was much
stronger. That show asserted that Canada was guilty of abetting the
genocide through both its actions and inactions:
Csnsdisn Policy in Rwanda
187
"By her inaction Canada was an accomplice to the genocide."
"In Rwanda, for more than thirty years, some Canadians witnessed and experienced all stages of the crisis which led to the systematic genoeide of an ethnic
group. One of them was even in the direet service of the state. It wou1d be false to
conc1ude that some Canadians were accomplices to the massacre. But they saw
all the preparations over the eourse of years.
"The Canadian foreign minister and ClDA who had their own representatives on
1oeation, who kept the witnesses who had been privy to this historie drama from
testifying. (St-Pierre, 1995:19)
The charge of complicity in genocide is based on c1aims that there
was plenty of information about the impending genocide; Canadian
blindness, ineptitude, and overt miscalculations abetted the mass mur·
derers. In this chapter we will depict the Canadian attitude to Rwanda
by the Canadian International DevelopmentAgency (CIDA) at the time
of the invasion of Rwanda by the RPF on 1 October 1990, the subsequent shift in focus of policy by what was then called the Department
of Externai Affairs, subsequently renamed the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) the role and different perspective developed by the quasi-governmental agency, the International
Commission for Human Rights and Democratic Development
(ICHRDD), and then the role of the Canadian military in leading the
peacekeeping mission to Rwanda following the signing of the Arusha
Accords on 4 August 1993 until the end of the genocide in July of
1994. 7
This chapter approaches the Canadian role in a traditional chronological fashion and attempts to describe varions perspectives on Rwanda
by Canadian officials in order to understand and explain Canadian actions in the context of policies and practices that emerged in a global
context. The chapter attempts to make c1ear what was known, who knew
it, what the basis of that knowledge was, to whom that knowledge was
transmitted, and how that knowledge or lack of knowledge translated
into Canadian policy. Whatever e1se one might want to say about Canadian misjudgment and error, I trust it will become clear that the accusation of wilful "blindness" or of being "complice du genocide" is
unwarranted.
Rwanda, even though a small country, occupies an important position in Canadian government foreign policy concerns. The reasons are
188
The Path of a Genocide
historic. For thirty years, Canada was involved in the development of
Rwanda. Just after Rwanda gained independence, the Rwandese government asked the Dominicans in Rome to assist them in setting up a
university in Rwanda. The Dominican fathers solicited one of their
Dominican brothers, Pere Uvesque, who was then Dean of Social Sciences at Laval University in Quebec city, to: undertake the task. 8 He
did. Since Levesque's involvement in the creation of the National University of Rwanda in Butare in 1962, Canadians, led by Uvesque, have
been intimately involved in the training of the elites of Rwanda. Many
Rwandese came to Canada for training. An extensive network among
Rwandese and Canadians developed, with many Canadians taking
Rwandese wives. When President Habyarimana had to cut short his
visit to Canada and return to Rwanda via Paris and Brussels to deal
with the October 1990 invasion, he missed being personally present
when l'Universite du Quebec awarded him an honorary doctorate for
his contribution to the development of the National University of
Rwanda.
In 1982, Canada initiated a number of bilateral projects beyond the
previous aid provided to the National University of Rwanda. As the
Canadian overseas development budget expanded and Africa became
the most important focus of that development aid,9 Rwanda was considered the jewel in the crown of countries receiving Canadian aid.
During the 1980s, Rwanda was perceived by Canadian CIDA officials
as incredibly stable with virtually no corruption; a very small portion
of its gross national product was expended on its relatively small military force of 5,000 personne1. lO Rwanda was, in tum, rewarded for its
perceived commitment to the rule of law and for delivering results in
its partnership with Canada in aid projects, by becoming the highest
recipient of aid per capita of any other country. 11
Rwandese exiles accused Canadian policy makers in particular and
the international community in general of closing their eyes to the persecution of Tutsi in Rwanda under the guise of regional and ethnic
balance. 12 And by the end of the eighties, the Canadian government
perception of Rwanda began to alter. With the crash of coffee prices in
1988, Rwanda's main staple export crop, exacerbated by the influx in
1988 of 75,000 refugees fleeing the slaughter of Hutu by Tutsi in
Burundi, Rwanda underwent drastic changes. Canadians began to note
the creeping corruption of political and business elites in Rwanda following the pattern of other recipient countries in Africa such as Zaire
and Uganda. For example, trading companies were allegedly owned by
Canadian Policy in Rwanda
189
relatives of elites who benefited from their connections. 13 Canada by
the late eighties endorsed l4 the structural adjustment programs of the
World Bank to satisfy World Bank demands that the Rwandese government deal with the country's economic crisis brought on by the collapse of coffee prices. 15
The shifts in the economic approach were paralleled by shifts in the
attitude to internal politics in Rwanda. The Canadian development experts involved and committed to Rwanda had no sense of popular unrest even in the late eighties. For them, the anti-Rwandese propaganda
efforts were considered to be the product ofTutsis who had been forced
out of Rwanda over twenty years ago. Their vitriolic attacks were perceived as lacking any credibility. According to these veteran Rwandan
development hands, President Habyarimana, though his image was
beginning to tarnish slightly when this century celebrated its ninetieth
birthday, remained the knight of purity for the vast majority of
Rwandans, a man dedicated to the well-being of his people who could
do little wrong in the eyes of those he ruled. 16
The old refugees who had fled with the overturn of the monarchy
just after Rwanda gained its independence from Belgium thirty years
earlier, remained a problem. But as these Canadian experts perceived
the situation, Rwanda was the most densely populated country in Africa (with a population growth rate of3.9 percent per year and a population density of 290 inhabitants per square kilometer). According to
the ClDA experts, there was no place to which the refugees could
return in a country where 90 percent of the population lived on agriculturalland, and arable land was in short supply because of both the
hilly terrain and stretches of swampy lands. The economy was
undiversified, with manufacturing almost exclusively devoted to satisfying domestic needs.
The new push towards democratization was initiated by the foreign
policy mandarins rather than the experts on economie development.
For the experienced Canadian Rwandan development experts, Rwanda,
at the grass roots, was more democratic than its western counterparts.
There was widespread consultation and involvement of the people in
initiating and executing development projects. However, Canada had
also developed a policy of linking aid to the process of democratization, a process based on multiparty democracy and the protection of
human rights. Political adjustments were pushed on Rwanda at the same
time as Canada required Rwanda to adopt a structural adjustment approach to its economy.
190
The Path of Il Genodde
When the internai economic and political crisis came to a head in
1990 in Rwanda, Habyarimana committed his country to complying
with the structura1 adjustment program imposed by the World Bank
with its traditiona1 mix of reducing public sector spending, reform of
the public enterprise sector, liberalizing the economy, and relying on
market forces and the private sector to return to viab1e external and
domestic economic positions. Habyarimana also introduced his new
constitution in June of 1990. The military were required to remain outside of politics. Multiparty democracy was initiated. President
Habyarimana also agreed to solve the situation of the refugees with the
promise that at 1east some of the refugees wou1d be given an opportunity to return.
While many saw this as a new beginning for Rwanda, some veteran
development officers in CIDA with long experience in and with Rwanda
saw this as the beginning of a slide down the slippery slope to disaster
when these initiatives were followed by the October 1990 invasion of
Rwanda by the experienced and highly trained Thtsi military forces which
had helped Museveni gain power in Uganda (cf. Otunnu, Chapter 2).
In the 1990s, Canadian policy towards Rwanda diverged from its
almost exc1usive focus on development aid to include three new areas
of concentration-preventive diplomacy, human rights, and, in 1993,
never had an embassy Rwanda. When
peacekeeping. 17 Canada
President Habyarimana's plane was shot down on April 6, 1994, and
the systematic slaughter ofThtsi mushroomed from small
killings to widespread wholesale mass murder, the Canadian government
presenee in Rwanda still only consisted ofthree Canadian International
DevelopmentAid (CIDA) officials. Canadian diplomatic contacts were
mn from the Canadian embassy Kinshasa,
until
closed
that embassy in May of 1993 as a result of budgetary cutbacks.
Up,enjltlng from the Canadian embassy Kenya,
Edwards also
ambassador to
She was
by Bernard
Dussault
spring of 1994
Was
Canadian Ambassador
for Central Africa
out a base in
building in
Ottawa.
Canadian
in
became a matter
diplomatic
from Uganda.
concern in 1990 even before
invasion of the
many western countries, because of the
and
Canadian Policy in Rwanda
191
the rise of dissent, as weIl as the increasing number of reported incidences of human rights abuses, Canada was afraid that the country,
which had previously shown such promise in economic development,
was very quickly going downhill.
To illustrate the relative prominence of Rwanda in Canadian foreign
policy and not just aid concerns, Brian Mulroney, the Canadian Prime
Minister during the beginning of the 1990s until he retired from politics in 1993, wrote President Habyarimana three times after he spoke
personally to him at the Francophone Summit in October of 1991.
Habyarimana had buttonholed Mulroney at the summit to complain
about the Ugandan role in the invasion and to ask Mulroney for more
aid. Mulroney, in tum, suggested that Habyarimana had helped bring
the problems on himself and his country by refusing to repatriate the
refugees from Uganda and Tanzania and for increasing the amount of
funds devoted to defense from a very low ratio in 1970 of 2.5 percent of
government expenditures to what Mulroney would point out in a subsequent letter in 1992 amounted to over 25 percent of the government
budget. 18 Brian Mulroney also accused Habyarimana in his correspondence, in diplomatic language of course, of dragging his feet in the
peace negotiations.
The significance of Mulroney's remonstrations of Habyarimana can
be indicated by the fact that it was only the second time during his term
of office that Mulroney had written a criticalletter to an African leader.
More significantly, Mulroney had a propensity to say yes to African
requests for assistance. 19 There was a second significance to the
Mulroney letters. They ran contrary to the interpretations and concerns
of Francophone officials at CIDA who had a long involvement with
Rwanda.
The invasion of Rwanda by the RPF forces from Uganda on the first
of October of 1990 moved Rwanda to the top of the list of African
countries of major concern to Canada. Canadians feared regional instability. Human rights concerns by then were a cornerstone of Canadian
policy. Canada strongly supported a negotiated settlement in the pursuit of both reconciliation between the rebel forces as well as strengthening human rights in Rwanda. The latter concern predated the invasion.
Thus, for example, the Canadian ambassador, using Canadian clout as
a large donor to Rwanda (the Canadian ambassador spoke directly with
the director ofprisoners), became one of the significant moving forces
to enable the ICRC to gain access to political prisoners, access which
had been cut off from October of 1987 to June of 1990.
192
The Path of a Genocide
In 1991 Canada adopted a two-prong approach to the developing
Rwandan crisis. One of the prongs was diplomatic. It was directed at the
Rwanda government itself, the RPF invaders and other neighboring governments concerned with Rwanda-primarily Uganda perceived as the
prime supporter of the RPF invaders, with secondary efforts targeting
Zaire and Tanzania. There was also a small effort directed at perceived
British support of the RPF, but there is no evidence that diplomatic pressure was expended on French support for the government. 20
The second prong of Canadian foreign policy was directed at the
ci vii society and strengthening both the protection of human rights and
democratic processes and institutions within Rwanda. By 1993, Canada
would add a defense and a humanitarian aid component to its efforts to
infiuence the developing crisis in Rwanda.
The diplomatic prong directed at Zaire was dropped when diplomats
met the Foreign Minister of Zaire to entreat his cooperation, but the
Foreign Minister was subsequently pushed out of his post by President
Mobutu. Canada continued to put pressure on Uganda. A Canadian dip10matic representative in Ottawa metAlex Kanyarengwe, the Hutu president of the RPF. Diplomatic efforts directed towards Tanzania through
the Canadian embassy in Dar es Salaam increased graduallyas Tanzania coordinated the peace efforts leading to and following the signing
of peace accords in Arusha on 4 August 1993. Canada was a strong
supporter and believer in the positive role Tanzania played in moving
the peace process forward (cf. Jones, chapter 6).
The Canadian government initiatives on the human rights area and in
support of democratic institutions was not merely based on diplomatic
exchanges. On 6 December 1991, the Externai Affairs Minister wrote Ed
Broadbent, a former leader of the small opposition federal New Democratic Party, whom Brian Mulroney had appointed in a rare non-patronage gesture following Broadbent's retirement as leader of that party, to
head a new independent but government financed International Centre
for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD) based in
Montreal. This letter followed the Francophone summit in October of
that year and expressed the government concern with the increasing number of human rights violations in Rwanda as weIl as the government's
support of the opening towards democracy in Rwanda that had begun in
1990. In that letter, the Minister suggested that Broadbent visit Rwanda
and consider initiating some program in that country.
At the same time, on the fifteenth of December, the Minister of External Affairs also wrote her equivalent in Uganda expressing the Canadian concern with the armed incursions into Rwanda being launched
Canadian Policy in Rwanda
193
from Ugandan soil which Canada felt would destabilize the region.
Canada urged Uganda to play a positive and supporting role in the negotiations beginning in Arusha, negotiations which Canada supported.
Canada, unlike the Americans, never sent an observer to Arusha; the
reasons were economic rather than political.
Canadian government officials were divided on their interpretation
of the Ugandan role. Some were convinced that Museveni was embarrassed by the desertion of military units from the Ugandan army made
up of Tutsi to constitute the invading army of the Rwandese Patriotic
Front (RPF), especially since Museveni had just become head of the
OAU. Others believed that Museveni was a strong backer of the invasion in spite of his constant denials. After all, they noted, Museveni
was half Tutsi on his mother's side,2! and his Minister of Defense, his
Chief of Staff, and the head of the Ugandan intelligence were all Tutsi.
Museveni owed his military success and the capture of the Presidency
to the support of the Tutsi. At the same time, he could use his presidency of the OAU to discourage criticism of any role Uganda played in
supporting the rebellion. In turn, supporting the RPF invasion would
help resolve rising tribal problems and resentments within Uganda at
the prominent role of Tutsis in the Ugandan government (cf. Otunnu,
chapter 2). Canadian officials who believed Uganda actively backed
the invasion saw Museveni as one of the brightest and most intellectually astute of African leaders who was too smart not to know that some
of his leading supporters and ministers were about to desert with whole
units of the Ugandan army to invade Rwanda.
Those who believed that Museveni secretly supported the invasion
won the day given the fact that the Canadian foreign minister wrote her
counterpart in Uganda diplomatically raising the issue and suggesting
that Uganda should play a far more positive role in the peace efforts
with respect to Rwanda. This was followed by another letter from the
Canadian Externai Affairs Minister on the eleventh of February in 1992,
this time to her counterpart in Britain, followed by a personal visit,
encouraging Britain to dissuade the Ugandans from permitting incursions into Rwanda from Ugandan territory. Canada was aware that Britain had a military attache in Uganda, but the British denied any
knowledge or reports of Ugandan support for the RPF invasion, a denial the Canadians suspected of being disingenuous.
At the same time, the Externai Affairs Minister wrote the President of
Nigeria, who then occupied the Presidency of the OAU, asking that the
OAU take the lead in reactivating the peace negotiations not only between the RPF and the Rwandan government, but between Rwanda and
194
The Path of a Genocide
Uganda. This was fol1owed by the Canadian Prime Minister's letter to
Habyarimana on 4 March 1992 discussed above, where Mulroney linked
fumre development aid to Rwanda to decreased expenses in the military
area. In June, the Prime Minister also wrote Museveni reiterating Canadian concerns with destabilization in that part of Africa and urging a
Ugandan-Rwandese-RPF dialogue and movement towards a peaceful
solution to the conflict. Tt is clear that Canadian policy makers saw the
Ugandan government as a central player and possibly instigator in the
conflict in Rwanda. Though the Prime Minister did not convey this interpretation in his third letter to Habyarimana in September of 1992, he did
indicate that he had written Museveni urging that the parties search for a
durable solution to both the conflict and the problem of the refugees.
At the same time as Mulroney was writing Museveni, the Minister
of Externai Affairs again wrote Broadbent urging that the International
Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development take an active
interest in Rwanda. Broadbent fol1owed up with his visit to Rwanda in
November of 1992. As a result ofthat visit, Broadbent came away with
a very different portrait of Habyarimana than that of the CIDA experts
on Rwanda and the Rwandese experts in Externai Affairs. Whereas
Canadian diplomats, much like the Americans, viewed Habyarimana
as not nearly as sharp as Museveni nor as a man of vision or ideas, they
did respect him as trying his best to accommodate various competing
forces and pressures with no great egomaniacal stake in the results,
though they did not glorify his leadership as some officials in CIDA
seemed to have done. In eontrast to this image of a rather aeeommodating figure (or a noble leader on the road to democracy), Broadbent,
along with virtual1y all the human rights activists dealing with Rwanda,
came away with an impression of Habyarimana as a man who was
elever, devious, and double dealing, appearing outwardly as aeeommodating, helpful, and open while behind the scenes he looked the other
way if he did not aetually organize the murder of those who reported
human rights abuses. His ostensible cooperation with the human rights
organizations was just a cover to gather intelligenee on those who were
critical of the government. Tt was an image directly contrary to the
diplomats' and development specialists' perspective.
The Development of Canadian Policy During 1993
When the rights organizations took credit for initiating the initiative
into the inquiry into human rights abuses in Rwanda without crediting
Canadian Policy in Rwanda
195
the government for stimulating the inquiry, and when the rights organizations seemed to ignore the interstate components of the conflict with
a singular concentration on the rights issues, and since the two groups
had such diametrically opposed views of Habyarimana,22 the diplomats
and the rights groups began to follow two very divergent paths. When
the international human rights commission set up at the initiative of
Broadbent returned from Rwanda and gave a press conference in January in Brussels accusing Habyarimana ofbeing directly responsible for
a genocide in Rwanda,23 diplomats in Canadian missions were very
annoyed and considered the rights report partisan, nonobjective, and
hysterical. They questioned not only the c1aim that the murders were
centrally and systematically directed, but even the objectivity of the
members. They considered that the report lacked substantive proof of
the charges made.
Thus, the human rights initiative was viewed as setting back rather
than advancing Canadian foreign policy objectives in Rwanda, for the
report was considered counterproductive in advancing and reinforcing
human rights in Rwanda at the same time as it seemed to undermine
Canadian diplomatic initiatives.
The Canadian government became further annoyed when the human
rights organization c1aimed that, as a result of their report on human
rights abuses in Rwanda, Canadian aid to Rwanda had been canceled.
Though the cut of aid by about one-third immediately followed the
release of the results of the Human Rights Commission to Rwanda, in
fact, the aid cut-off resulted from budget cuts and a decision to focus
aid on specific countries. Zaire was cut off as well as Rwanda. Aid
officials did indicate that the decision to cut off aid in certain countries
was infiuenced by reports of human rights abuses, but the report sponsored by the Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development
came too late to infiuence the decision. Nevertheless, the ambassador
indicated to Rwanda that a prime reason for the cut in aid was the failure to do anything about human rights abuses (correspondence, October, 1995).
During the 1992 diplomatic initiatives, there is no evidence that
Canada made any diplomatic representations to France about its military support and the arms supplies to the Rwandan government, even
though the Canadian government was fully aware of the French role.
The absence of any evidence of representations to France, which had
troops on the ground aiding the Rwandan government, while diplomatic representations were made to Britain simply because Britain had
196
The Path of aGenodde
a military attache in Kampala, indicates that Canadian foreign policy
was based on holding the Ugandan government and the invasion as a
much more serious cause of destabilization in the region than the French
support for the Rwandan government. As one diplomat said: what should
Canadian policy be if aPaiestinian refugee force suddenly launched a
full scale invasion of Israel supported by Jordan (interview, Ottawa,
May 1995)? The Canadian government, like the Americans, regarded
the Ugandan government and the RPF as more democratically inclined
than the President of Rwanda. Nevertheless, Canada, along with the
US, regarded the interstate support for the rebels as a more serious
destabilizing force than the actions of the government in repressing
dissent.
In 1993, Canada initiated another front in its efforts to try to avert a
disaster in Rwanda. Following a U.N. goodwill mission during the first
two weeks of March led by Macaire Pedanou, during which a ceasefire was signed on 9 March which required foreign troops to be withdrawn and an international joint U.N.lOAU interpositional force be
established, the mission went onto Arusha in Tanzania to observe the
opening of the peace talks which had been started on 16 March between the Rwandan government and the RPF. However, the Arusha
talks quickly became deadlocked, and France requested that the Secretary General deploy U.N. military observers in an attempt to avert the
renewal ofhostilities. A Canadian general, Major General Maurice Barll,
who was in charge of the Planning Division as weIl as serving as Military Adviser to Kofi Annan, then Under-Secretary General who ran the
Department ofPeace-keeping Operations (DPKO) of the U.N. and subsequently became Secretary-General of the United Nations, led a technical mission to both Rwanda and Uganda in the first week of April.
The mission recommended that 100 U.N. military observers (UNMOs)
be placed on the Ugandan side. As weIl, preparations should be made
to send a larger force to supervise the cease-fire, disarm the combatants, organize and train a merged military/police force and provide election observers if a peace agreement were signed.
The United Nations approached Canada asking that personnel be
sent as part of the mission. Canada's initial response was negative because Canada questioned the absence of any high profile leadership to
the mission. At the same time, Canada agreed to consider a request to
provide such leadership if asked. A formal request of precisely that
type followed. Canada asked General Romeo Dallaire to accompany
Major General Baril on the technical mission. As a result of that mis-
Canadian Policy in Rwanda
197
sion, the Secretary General on 20 May 1993 requested authorization
for a United Nations Military Observer force for Uganda and Rwanda
(UNOMUR). In the interim, the OAU sent a Neutral Mi1itary Observer
Group (NMOG) to Rwanda.
On 22 June 1993, the Security Council passed resolution 846 establishing a mi1itary observer mission to visit Rwanda. The resolution was
a compromise between those who wanted the U.N. to playa larger role
and be deployed within Rwanda, and countries such as the United States
which were not only wary of alarger role for UNOMUR, but were
wary about whether the combatants were yet ready for peace. On 21
July, Major General Romeo Dallaire was chosen to command the mission. Shortly thereafter, on 4 August, President Juvenal Habyarimana
and Alexis Kanyarengwe, President of the RPF, signed the Arusha Accords. Another technical mission led by Dallaire this time determined
that a larger force should be sent with a broader mandate. Resolution
872 was passed by the Security Council authorizing UNAMIR, with
NMOG and UNOMUR falling under its responsibi1ities.
On 5 Oetober, the Security Council established UNAMIR under the
command of Da1laire. In the same period, the Associate Deputy Minister
for Mrican Affairs and the Middle East met Herman Cohen, his US equivalent, to discuss Rwanda and Zaire. The Canadian diplomat came away
convinced that he and Cohen shared the same views of the situation.
Parallei to this diplomatic effort, a large scale humanitarian effort
was underway within the country. At the beginning of 1993, there were
300,000 internally displaced within the country. By February of 1993,
that number had increased to 800,000 as a direct consequence of the
latest RPF offensive in the war. By the end of the year, the number of
internally displaced, in spite of peace negotiatians, cease fires and signing a peace agreement, had reached a million. Almost one in seven of
Rwandan citizens had been displaced. Canada was a financial contributor to that humanitarian effort in which agencies, such as UNICEF,
assumed a major responsibi1ity for latrine construction, the clean water
supply, and supplementary feeding for pregnant women and undemourished children. In the war zone itself, the ICRC, as a widely perceived
neutral and independent body, was very active. In the south, other U.N.
agencies and Red CrosslRed Crescent societies took the lead.
It must be recalled that events in Burundi made Rwanda look optimistic in comparison. Further, with the massacres of the Hutu in Burundi
in October and the flight of 300,000 refugees, the reprisals against Thtsis
in Rwanda that followed seemed like spontaneous tit for tat actions,
198
The Path of a Genocide
even though it was widely believed by Canadian diplomats that the
reprisals, particularly in Kigali, were initiated by the Interahamwe, the
militias that were then being expanded and armed by the government
in Rwanda at the same time as the peace accords were supposed to be
bringing peace.
In spite of the increasing numbers of internally displaced, the success of the diplomatic effort in Arusha and the deployment ofUNAMIR
made Canadian government officials cautiously optimistic. By the end
of the year that optimism began to unravei as Habyarimana stalled on
implementing the peace accord. However, the background noise, to
which they did not attend, was even more ominous. Rumors were rampant that targeted lists of victims were being drawn up. In September
of 1994, Radio Mille Collines filled the air waves with hate propaganda directed at the Thtsi (cf. Chalk, chapter 5). General Dallaire, in
investigating two massacres in November and December, found clear
evidence of an organized effort behind the killings. For example, in
one case of slaughters that occurred in five different areas during the
night in a single precinct, the 10cal precinct government was able to
announce those massacres at 7:00 A.M.
January to 6 April 1994
In the beginning of 1994, several hundred Burundi-Hutu refugees
left their camps south of Kibungo (near the Burundi border in the south)
and traveled north by bus to Gabiro in the northeast where the army
was training the militia. The army was also training militia in the southwest. There was also a J anuary report of a plane landing in the rniddle
of the night full of weapons for the Interahamwe. Most significantly,
on 11 January 1994, General Dallaire sent an intelligence report to U.N.
headquarters in New York that a very high level informant had information on secret arms caches, a plot to restart the war by provoking the
RPF, instigating the Belgian peacekeepers (the most effective and bestequipped unit in UNAMIR) to withdraw by killing some of the soldiers, killing moderate Hutu and, most significantly, to kill all the Thtsis
in Kigali. In fact, a calculation had been done, based on previous slaughters, that they could murder 1,000 people every twenty rninutes. 24
These and other signs, along with President Habyarimana's stalling,
stimulated the international community to increase the pressures on
the President. Contrary to the interpretations that the international community ignored such signs, the evidence is that they paid attention to
Canadian Policy in Rwanda
199
them, but interpreted them as signs to spur the peace process forward at
a faster pace, but failed to read them as indicators that they should also
act to do something about the increasing signs of organized and centrally directed violence. The arming of the militias was interpreted as a
preparation for renewed fighting against the RPF rather than as a preparation for a war of a very different kind, a war against the defenseless
Tutsi civilians (and Hutu moderates) by the extremists in the military
and their trained militias (d. Kakwenzire and Kamukama, chapter 4).
April 6 to August 1994
As Lucie Edwards wrote, Canadian diplomats were taken totally offguard by the genocide itself as weIl as its scope and size. They suspected conspiracy and anticipated massacre, but not of the dimensions
that took place. Caught unprepared, Canada's initial reaction and first
concern was the safety of Canadians. Within several days, all those
willing to go were evacuated.
Canada's efforts now concentrated on peacekeeping and then emergency assistance. The Canadian contribution to UNAMIR II, Operation Lance, included a radio heavy brigade-sized headquarters and signal
squadron to provide force level communication and headquarters support along with a force signal officer and experienced planning staff
along with a lawyer and MPs. In addition, to ensure self-sufficiency,
half of a regimental support squadron was also deployed. The unit also
had a troop-size engineer surge capability, a security platoon and an air
support detachment which reopened and supported the operation of
Kigali airport. The unit was intended to provide signal support to meet
operational tasks. An advance party of fortYpersonnelleft Canada on
15 July on a commercial aircraft. Twelve days later, 160 soldiers were
deployed on an airbus for Entebbe. They arrived in Kigali on 28 July
followed by a second aircraft with ninety-five soldiers on August 16.
The airlift of equipment began on 26 July and was completed on 2
September. In the end, total troop strength stood at a complement of
about 450 officers and enlisted soldiers. However, by the time they
were deployed, the genocide was over.
Conc1usion
Canada was a strong supporter of the Habyarimana regime in the
period prior to 1990. However, after 1990, Canada used the gamut of
200
The Path of Ii Genocide
diplomatic tools at its disposal to move the rival parties in the conflict
towards peace. Canada was the one aid country to practice human rights
conditionality, even though budget constraints and a realignment of
priorities made it convenient for Canada to do so. Canada, through
ICHRDD, was a leading participant in the International Commission
on Human Rights which was the first to indicate that a genocide was
underway in which the central government was directly implicated.
Canada not only provided the Force Commander for UNAMIR, but
General Dallaire was the source of some of the best early information
flowing back to New York indicating that a centrally organized conspiracy to commit genocide was underway. When New York failed to
respond to those warnings or to provide UNAMIR with the tools it
needed, and when the coup took place and the genocide was underway,
the peacekeeping troops managed to save some lives not on1y by guarding the stadium and hospital where refugees had fled, but, contrary to
instructions from U.N. headquarters, small groups oflightlY armed soldiers actively rescued frightened civilians and escorted them past armed
baITiers to bring them back to the stadium where they were safe. Further, Canada was the only country to reinforce its small contingent of
peacekeepers when the Belgians and others decided to withdraw. When
the Americans landed at Kigali airport in July on their way to Goma,
they did so because Canadian military communication experts and
Ghanian peacekeepers held the airport.
What is clear is that Canada remained eommitted to helpful mediation and multilateralism,25 to financial support for the U.N. in spite of
criticisms and the need for reform, and remained committed to the principles and practices of peacekeeping. What is also elear is that Canadian policy within this overall umbrella of middle-power brokerage
politics was also fragmented among units of the government and shifted
dramatically over a few short years. While CIDA old-hands continued
to find virtue in the merits of the Habyarimana government, the Ministry of Externai Affairs pushed strongly for human rights conditionality
through quiet diplomaey, but were eritical if not hostile to the open
remonstrations that ICHRDD leveled at the Habyarimanaregime. However, Canadian peaeekeepers through its unauthorized inte11igence activities demonstrated that these concerns were more than warranted,
but nevertheless followed official channels in warning U.N. headquarters in New York.
One can speeulate what might have happened if Canadian policymakers had been able to build a policy that was more rather than less
Canadian Policy in Rwanda
201
than the sum of its parts, and if Canadians had been able to take a
greater initiative and to assume a more direct responsibility for Rwanda.
But Canadian efforts had exhibited internai inconsistencies over the
years. It had failed to exert any pressure on France. It had failed to
ensure that a more coherent and effective multilateral strategy was in
place.
This, however, is the wisdom of hindsight. What effect have the failures had on Canadian foreign policy with respect to the Great Lakes
region of Mrica since the horrific 1994 genocide? Have we learned from
the studies of that failure?26 Canada, unlike the United States, took the
international report27 on the genocide as a landmark study and is convinced that "she heard the message that political will is crucial, and responded with conviction" (The Joint Evaluation ofEmergency Assistance
to Rwanda: A Review of Follow-up and lmpact Fifteen Months After
Publication, hereinafter referred to as the JEFF Report, 1997:33). In the
Canadian view, the lessons learned required the Canadian government to
continue to be involved in the Great Lakes region and to act on the findings of the Evaluation, to develop a rapid response capability to deal
with similar situations, and to support peace-building in the region, steps
consistent with the overall direction of Canadian policy.
Canada did conduct numerous seminars in Ottawa to discuss the
lessons of the report. Canada convened a donor meeting in Geneva in
November 1996 to deal with refugee reintegration in the region and
chaired a follow-up meeting in December in Kigali which gathered
piedges for reintegration and reconstruction. Further, on the humanitarian front, Canada is in the process of developing a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) as a rapid response capability in
humanitarian disaster. In addition to enhanced humanitarian aid initiatives, Canada has also taken steps on the peacekeeping front, acting to
improve coordination between NGOs and Canadian peacekeepers, enhancing the roster of Canadians available as human fights monitors,
taken initiatives to involve NGOs more directly into the peace-building policy process,28 and established a peace-building fund of CAN
$10 million. Canada has targeted significant funds for humanitarian
assistance, social reconstruction, support for human rights, democracy
and good governance, including improvements in the justice system,
for the Great Lakes region of Africa.
However, although there has been a great deal of effort to ensure
much greater coordination in Canadian policy in the region involving
not only various different sectors of government, but the NGO and aca-
202
The Path of a Genocide
demic communities as weIl, the aborted Canadian government initiative to lead a humanitarian peacekeeping rescue mission on behalf of
the refugees in Zaire in November and terminated at the end of 1996
(cf. Onamo, chapter 16) does not indicate that Canadians learned the
lesson on early warning (cf. discussion in the Preface).
Canada has not been able to develop any coherence in international
multilateral policy with respect to peacekeeping as the aborted peacekeeping mission indicated. 29 That initiative was very late in the day and
a response to a crisis already weIl underway which ignored much earlier warnings of the need for action to disarm the militias and to deal
with what Paul Kagame referred to as the continuing genocide in Zaire
against the Banyarwanda. Further, the initiative ignored the recommendations about deferring to some degree to the initiatives of regional
actors, ignoring the determinations of the loca1 African states that the
militias and ex-FAR militant components controlling the refugee camps
needed to be disarmed, and instead came up with a feeble but very
weIl-intentioned initiative that patched together the eagerness of the
French to become invo1ved under multilateral auspices and the total
reluctance of the America defense and foreign policy establishment to
do anything at all, perhaps because they covertly supported the militant
actions of the rebe1s supported by Rwanda and Uganda.
Canada seems to continue to believe that good will and intentions
constitute political will, even when the political will lacks a critical
and weIl-thought out strategic analysis based on quality information. 30
The intervention in Zaire was a response to some superficiallessons
learned from the Rwanda genocide and was more a response to media
coverage than to a detailed analysis of the Zaire crisiS. 31
Notes
1. The understanding of Canadian policy development was acquired through interviews with Canadian officials and restricted access to Canadian government
documents (quotes of direct citations were not allowed) as part of the preparation of the report co-authored with Astri Suhrke, Early Warning and Conflict
Management in Rwanda, Copenhagen: DANIDA, 1996.
2. Canadian officials at the time accepted the interpretation that Cardinal's murder
had been committed by four criminals.
3. The most prominent was the wife of Landoald Ndasingwa, a member of the
opposition Parti liberal established in 1991 and 1eader of its moderate faction;
he became Minister of Labor and Social Affairs in the transitionai government
installed on July 1992, one of the rare Tutsi in that cabinet. On April 7, the day
on which the genocide started, she, along with her husband, two children, and
mother-in-law, were murdered.
Canadian Policy in Rwanda
203
4. In Gisenyi prefecture, Mugesera was Vice-President of the Mouvement
Revolutionaire National pour le Developpement (MRND-National Revolutionary Movement for Development which added the phrase et de la democratie to
its name in 1991), the ruling party President Habyarimana created in 1975, two
years after his military coup and the ouster the previous Kayibanda government.
Mugesera was considered to be the intelIectual architect of an ideology which
equated any opposition to the government as equivalent to siding with the enemy and, hence, being a traitor and worthy of death. More significantly, he was
the ideologue and contributing architect of the genocide against the Tutsi, as
weIl as its most voeal advocate and propagandist. In a widely reported speech in
1992, and rebroadcast subsequently on Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines
(RTLM), he already advocated the arrest and extermination of Tutsi.
5. The Canadian government announced its intention of expelling Mugesera on 12
July 1996 on the grounds that he had incited genocide. Mugesera lost his initial
appeal of the decision.
6. The effect of these shows was to make Canadian policymakers very sensitive
about publicity on the Canadian role in Rwanda; at the same time, government
officials were very concemed to set the record straight. Thus, the investigation
of the Canadian role may have been more difficult because of the sensitivities
and defensiveness of many of those interviewed, but also easier as it also seemed
to induce many to be more forthcoming than they might otherwise have been.
7. The Canadian govemment itself commissioned one retrospective study on early
warning and conflict management in Rwanda (cf. LaRose-Edwards, 1994). It
also prepared a departmental think piece on prospective future policy for Rwanda
(cf. Soroka, Gary and Christopher Cooter, "Central Africa: Turning aTide,"
Ottawa: Political and Security Policy Staff Commentary, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, December, 1994.
8. The fundamental principles of the National University of Rwanda as articulated
by Pere Georges-Henri Uvesque was "de travailler a la preservation et au
de sa naissanee,
developpementde votre eulture nationale. Chaque homme re~oit
et de son edueation, de sa famille, de son groupe ethnique une eulture partieuliere
deterrninee alaqueIle it doit rester fidele puisqu' eIle fait corps avec sa personalite"
(transeript, "Le Role du Canada au Rwanda Depuis 30 Ans," Le Pointe, January
23,1995, pp. 4-5.) Note that the social mission of the university was not professional development of a set of skilIs, nor a eommitment to resolving the social
problems of a society, but the development and preservation of a unique culturai
heritage. This was the foundation stone of the National University of Rwanda
(ef. Adelman, 1973), which distinguishes between the Sanetuary of Truth dedieated to perpetuating values, the Sanetuary of Method, a university dedieated to
the development of professionals in culture and science as weIl as those fields
sueh as medicine and law more narrowly defined as professions, and the university as a social service station, the eontemporary dominant model of the university committed primarily to serving society rather than producing independent
professionals or ensuring the continuation and preservation of a set of values.
9. In the tension between using aid strictly for humanitarian goals and linking aid
with the promotion of trade, until the 1990s Canada managed to maintain, and
sometimes increase its aid directed at eountries most in need. The Latin American debt erisis, India's testing of a nuclear device which utilized Canadian nuclear
teehnology, and the 1984-85 famine in sub-saharan Africa meant that an inereasing proportion of sueh aid went to Africa [ef. David R. Morrison, "The
Choice of Bilateral Aid recipients," in Pratt (1994) 123-55]. Rwanda had become a eore country for reeeiving aid by 1981.
204
The Path of a Genocide
10. Eight years later this was not considered to be a virtue, particularly in France
(see Callamard's chapter). The small army in which only 2,000 of the 5,000 in
the force were considered weIl trained to fight, was characterized by French
intelligence as a sign of the government's incapability to sustain itself.
11. (Ct. Carlson, 1995: 7). As Margaret Carley Carlson said at the twenty-fifth anruversary celebrations of Rwandan independence, Canada participated in over 150
development aid projects to Rwanda and had contributed $150 million (transcript, "La Role du Canada au Rwanda Depuis 30 Ans," Le Point, January 23,
1995, p. 7).
12. "The great politic of regional ethnic equality, officially, while a very nice idea,
is a euphemism to say that governmental resources have been divvied up between different groups of the population, but everyone in Rwanda knew that it
was in place to prevent the Tutsi civil servants from acceding to positions of
leadership; no Tutsis in the army, but the politic called ethnic and regional and
ethnic, everyone knew, but of which no one spoke ... continued to go to his
government, everyone knew that it was a racist and regional government, but
had a certain complicity towards silence on the part of the international community" (transcript, "La Role du Canada au Rwanda depuis 30 ans," Le Point,
January 23, 1995, p. 7).
13. In fact, the World Bank Report (1991) suggested the decline in the economy
was due to more structural causes and dated back to the early 1980s. "After
1980, Rwanda's economic growth slowed and became more erratic. Compared
to an average yearly GDP growth of 6.5 percent over 1973-80, 1980-87 growth
averaged only 3.1 percent, including a decline of 0.3 percent in 1987 [when
coffee prices began to decline, but the explanation the World Bank gave for the
1987 decline was that quality declined due primarily to a producer price policy
that did not discriminate for quality]. Real GDP stagnated in 1988 and declined
by 5.7 percent in 1989, mostly reflecting weather conditions and world-market
prices for coffee." According to the World Bank, during the 1980s, "imports
continued to expand at a time when export eamings were declining." Further,
there was a loss of export competitiveness when, "between 1980 and October
1990 the real effective exchange rate of Rwanda appreciated by about 30 percent, mainly as a result of depreciation of the dollar." A sharp decline in tax
income on coffee exports accompanied by increased government expenditures
beginning in 1981, led to persistent budgetary deficits, which during 1987-89
rose to 8 percent of GDP. The domestic debt quadrupled between 1981 and 1988
and net reserves fell from five months of imports in 1987 to two months in 1989.
There was, however, one positive sign-reduction in the inflation rate from the
average of 10.6 percent between 1977-82 to 2 percent per year during the 198389 period (468-69). However, during the 1990s, the annual reports became successively more ominous. In 1993, the President of the World Bank, Lewis Preston,
wrote a letter to Habyarimana that was circulated among the entire diplomatic
corps which insisted that Habyarimana immediately take steps to reduce military expenditures and get on with peace. As the 1993 report had indicated, "The
fiscal situation continued to deteriorate in 1992. Current expenditures exceeded
by 23 percent the target set in June 1992. The overspending was caused by
military expenditures, which reached about 8 percent of GDP, compared to 2
percent in 1989, and by the government continuing subsidizing coffee producers"(427). Rwanda's primary deficit had risen to 8.2 percent of GDP financed
by the central bank and accumulated domestic arrears. Foreign reserves had
been depleted, and Rwanda was effectively broke by 1993, thus very susceptible to international pressures.
Canadian Policy in Rwanda
205
14. Canada began to support structural adjustment programs in the mid-1980s. In
the CIDA document Sharing Our Future issued in 1987 (CIDA, Sharing Our
future: Canada 's International development Assistance, Ottawa: Supply and
services, 1987), structural adjustment was one of six priorities set out for Canadian aid policy. "By 1989, support for the IMFlWorld Bank structural adjustment policies had become a central preoccupation of the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA)" (Burdette, 1994: 211).
15. Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) are economie reforms involving changes
in pricing and trade policies, reductions in the size of government, and its involvement in and regulation of production, in order to integrate those countries
more fuUy into the international market economy. Countries (usually third world)
are required to make these economie changes in order to receive funds from the
IMF and the World Bank.
16. Cr. Callamard's account of the France's official attitude in this volume, which
was almost identical. Canadian Rwandese policy was dominated by French Canadians who shared many of the views of the French, except perhaps the predominance of the "Fashoda syndrome" (cf. Prunier's chapter).
17. This was in keeping with a general shift in Canadian foreign policy underway in
the nineties. Cf. the White Paper oumning and consolidating these changes, and
articulating the principles of CUITent Canadian foreign policy: "The promotion
of global peace as the key to protecting our security remains a central element of
our foreign policy" [Canada in the World, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), February 1995]. Note that security no
longer means just proteeting one's own country against military attack from an
enemy, but has come to take on a global meaning in two senses: first, the securitY of the whole globe is a precondition for the security of one's own country;
secondly, the threats include not only outbreaks of civil and inter-state war elsewhere in the globe, but the population explosion, poverty, human rights violations, good governance, refugee flows, threats of the spread of disease and
environmental issues. As part of this conceptual shift, the Department of Foreign Affairs created the Bureau of Global Issues and Culture with flve divisions:
Environment; Human Rights and lustiGe; Peace building and Democratic Development; Population; Social and Economic Development. The Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, Andre Ouellet, in his address to the conference, Conflict
Prevention: African Perspective, for the International Francophone Meeting,
Ottawa, September, 1995 conveyed this perspective when he said that "problems that transcend national boundaries are erasing the dividing line between
domestic and foreign policy" (Proceedings, Ottawa: Government of Canada,
47). This revised view of security was flrst put forth in Canada, to the best of my
knowledge, by my colleague, Professor David Dewitt, Director, Centre for International and Security Studies, York University, Toronto, who in fact changed
the name of his Centre from "Strategic" to "Security" Studies to take into account this conceptional shift (cf.Idem, "Confldence and Security Building Measures in the Third World: Is there a Role?" International Journal, XLII:3, summer
1987, 509-35). With the faU of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, in a
process of general recycling still underway, many other scholars adopted the
same conception (cf. Jessica Matthews, "Redeflning Security," Foreign Affairs,
68:2,1989,168-71; Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation," Review ofInternational Studies, 1991, 313-26; Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An
Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 1991; Helga Haftendorn, "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security," International Studies
206
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
The Path of a Genocide
Quarterly, 35, 1991,3-17; MichaelIntrilgator, "Defining Global Security," Disarmament, 14, 1991,59-72; Patrick Morgan, "Forum: 'What is Security and
Security Studies?' Revisited," Arms Control, 13:3, December, 1991; Edward
Kolodziej, "Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!" International Studies Quarterly, 36, 1992,421-38), and was a central theme of a recent collection
of scholarly articles-Michael Klare and Daniel Thomas, eds., World Security:
Challengesfor a New Century, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. This shift is
summarized very well in Simon Dalby's paper, "Contesting an Essential Concept: Dilemmas in Contemporary Security Discourse," apaper presented at the
conference, Strategies in Conflict: CriticalApproaches to Security Studies, Centre
for International and Security Studies, York University, May 1994.
Again, this is a complete contrast with the view in France which deplored the
poor state of the armed forces in Rwanda. Again cf. Callamard's chapter.
I personally recall being present at a dinner Mulroney had for Mandela arter he
had been released from prison when Mulroney used the occasion to announce a
contribution of $5,000,000 to the ANC. When Mandela rose to thank Mulroney,
with a twinkle in his eye that would make any lrishman envious, Mandela expressed his gratitude to Canada, but with diplomatic chutzpah added, "Of course,
that will be in American dollars" (the Canadian dollar was then worthjust under
80 American cents). As the rest of the dinner guests laughed, Mulroney with his
wide grin nodded his assent.
The only record of formal communications with France that we learned about
was a letter from the Canadian Foreign Minister (then called the Minister of
Externai Affairs), Joe Clarke, to his French counterpart thanking him for landing French parachutists in Rwanda and protecting the lives of Canadian expatriates (cf. Callamard).
Alison des Forges (correspondence November 1995), one of the foremost experts on Rwanda, has pooh-poohed this factor as totally irrelevant in explaining
Museveni's actions.
A detailed examination of the role of the rights organizations is undertaken in a
separate paper.
The genocide description was partially retracted in their published report in
March, but not the attribution to the government of a prime role in organized
slaughter.
The unofficiai intelligence units with the Belgian peace-keepers were given
monies for informants by Be1gium and sent detailed information on the plans
back to the Belgian Foreign Ministry. We have no evidence that Dallaire sent
equivalent information to Ottawa, though prior to 6 April, Dallaire had alerted
key officers in the Department of Defense to prepare to send rum more troops.
"Canadian policy makers have consistently been at or near the forefront of
multilateralist activity for the past fifty years. Based on recent policies Canadian support for multilateralism remains as strong as ever" (Tom Keating, "The
Future of Canadian Multilateralism," Maureen Appel Molot and Herald von
Riekoff, eds., Canada Among Nations 1994: A Part of The Peace, Ottawa:
Carleton University Press, 1994, 74). Multilateralism is defmed as the coordination of behavior among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct (cf. Robert O. Keohane, "Multilateralism: An Agenda for
Research," International1ournal, XLV: 4, Autunm 1990,731-64). John Ruggie,
"Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution," International Organization,
46:3, Summer, 1993,574. See also Robert Cox, "Multilateralism and world order," Review ofInternational Studies, 18:2, April 1992. For a survey of Canada's
economic multilateralism from a gramscian viewpoint, cf. David Black and Clair
Canadian Policy in Rwanda
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
207
Turenne Sjolander, "Multilateralism Re-constituted and the Discourse of Canadian Foreign Policy," Studies in Political Economics, 49, Spring 1996, 7-36.
Most importantly, see Tom Keating's full book on the issue, Canada and world
order: the multilateralist tradition in Canadian foreign policy, Toronto:
McLelland and Stewart, 1993. For an account that challenges the theory of the
preeminence of multilateralism in Canadian foreign policy, cf. Claire Cutler and
Mark Zacher, "Introduction" in idem, eds., Canadian Foreign Policy and International Economic Regimes, Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992.
There is also the view that we learn from trial and error and not primarily academic scholarship (cf. ''Taking Stock: A Survey of Canadian Thinking and Activities on Peace building," Ottawa: Parliamentary Paper, March 1995).
The reference is to the report of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance
to Rwanda of which I was the co-author of study II and of parts of the Synthesis
Report that dealt with Early Warning and Conflict Management.
As an example and initial step, the Peacebuilding and Human Development Division of the Global Issues Bureau at what is now calIed the Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (AGP-DFAIT) has entered into a partnership with the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee in Ottawa
along with the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the
Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa to compile a database on the peacebuilding activities, programming, policy
directions and advocacy work among Canadian NGOs and research communities.
It also raises questions about the effectiveness of some aspects related to peace
and governance of what has been billed as the largest U.N. undertaking in history, the coordinated action across the entire U.N. system-the United Nations
System-wide Special Initiative on Africa to enhance the capacity of African institutions. But that is not the subject of this chapter.
The Canadian government adopted a very different, and, I believe, very misconceived notion of early warning. That view is superbly summarized (and advocated) in an excellent paper by Jean Guilmette (an expert on Africa, a long time
civil servant with ClDA in Canada and now with the International Development
and Research Centre in Ottawa), first circulated to me privately for comment,
and then presented at the International Francophone Meeting: Conflict Prevention: African Perspective, Ottawa, 19-22 September 1995. For Guilmette, and
now Canadian policy implementers, early warning entails a critical third factor
in addition to the first, information collection, and the second, analysis. In what
he calls this third link, "the information is developed and once again translated
into ordinary language. Common wisdom must be produced to provide policy
makers with a basis for action that will be viewed as legitimate by citizens" (his
emphasis). (Proceedings, Ottawa, Government of Canada, 1995,93-94.) Early
warning comes to mean a public relations exercise. The third stage is not the
conversion of the analysis into strategic options. (For an articulation of that
view of early warning, cf. two of my own articles-"The Concept of Early Warning: The Practice of International Organizations," in Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Limitations and Opportunities, eds. Alfred van Staden and Klaas
van Walgraven, The Hague: Clingendael" 1997; and "Early Warning and Prevention: The Case of Rwanda," chapter 3 in Evolving International Concepts
and Regimes, ed. Frances Nicholson, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997). The process of translating the analysis into a strategic action plan is relegated to early warning experts, compressed into the second stage and reduced
to a single conc1usion about what to do. From the Foreign Affairs Department's
208
The Path of a Genocide
own study of the Rwanda genocide (cf. Paul Larose-Edwards, 1995) and mistakenly from our own study of the international response to the genocide in
Rwanda, the conc1usion has been drawn, as Kenneth Bush put it so succinctly,
that "the fundamental and essentiai ingredient is political will" (cf. [dem, Draft,
"Fitting the Pieces Together: Canadian Contributions to the Chal1enge of Rebuilding War-tom Societies," Ottawa: IDRC, July, 1995,22). In this conception
of early warning, the focus is on "the visibility of information as a means of
provoking political will" (cf. "Lessons Learned: Canadian NGOs Review the
Impact of United Nations' Peacekeeping Interventions on Humanitarian Aid in
Regions of Civil and Ethnic Conflict," Ottawa: Canadian Council for International Cooperation, 1993; Bush, op. cit., 22; and Kenneth Bush, "When Two
Anarchies Meet: International Intervention in Somalia," in Robert Miller, ed.,
Missions for Peace: Canadian Experienee and Future Rotes, forthcoming). If
Americans drew the lesson from Somalia that they should avoid such involvements, Canadians drew the lesson that the problem was a lack of political will
(Bush, ibid, 30). This misconceived conjunction of early warning and public
relations in order to garner political will, and the total failure to undertake a
detailed analysis of the Zaire crisis and develop and weigh strategic alternatives
is behind the failure of the November Zaire initiative. Unfortunately, this conjunction of lack of political will and public relations is a one hundred and eighty
degree shift from the earlier assessment by the Canadian Foreign Minister that
the lack of political will was to be traced to the absence of a wel1 thought-out
strategy and the mechanisms to implement it. Cf. the remarks made by the Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, Andre Ouel1et, in his address to the conference,
Conjliet Prevention: Afriean Perspeetive, for the International Francophone
Meeting, OUawa, September, 1995 when he said that, "The power to act is useless without the will to act. Rwanda and now Burundi afford proofthat the weakness of preventive diplomacy lies not in a lack of ways to identify conflict
situations, but in the international community's inability to decide how best to
prevent and contain conflicts" (Proceedings, Ottawa: Government of Canada,
48).
31. The brilliant international diplomat, Mohamed Sahnoun was both prescient and
wise when he criticized institutions when they "take the facts on the ground
only partial1y into account and are sometimes motivated by pressure from the
media. The result is that these recipes may weil prove sterile if not harmful"
(Proeeedings-Conjliet Prevention: Afriean Perspeetive, for the International
Francophone Meeting, Ottawa, September, 1995, 57). He also endorsed "decentralization and empowerment," not exactly the policy followed in the Zaire initiative which ignored the decision of the regional African states at their summit
on 5 November 1996 in Nairobi stating that the first priority had to be the disarming of the ex-FAR and interahamwe militias in the refugee camps.
Rwanda: U.S. Policy and Television Coverage
Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus
Editor's Note
Other chapters have referred and will refer to the"Somalia Syndrome"
and PDD-25 (see the next chapter as an example). The effect of the
American involvement and debacle in the latter part ofthe peacekeeping operation in Somalia had made Americans very wary of any involvement in peacekeeping. When the coup took place in Rwanda on 6
April 1994 and during the genocide that immediately followed, the
Executive Office had already drafted Presidential Decision Directive
25 (see section on policy considerations, below) which severely restricted U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations, including U.S.
authorization andfinancingfor such operations. PDD 25 was issued in
May of 1994. Thus, the question is not why Americans did not support
a more proactive operation in Rwanda, on which this examination will
provide some further analysis, but why Americans became involved
once more in the peacekeeping operation related to the humanitarian
assistance towards refugees in Zaire. This chapter focuses on the formation ofpublic opinion through television coverage and the impact of
that TV coverage and public opinion on American policy. Since there
was virtually no coverage of Rwanda until 6 April 1994, this paper
concentrates on the TV coverage during the genocide in Rwanda.
Introduction
The scale of the Rwandese tragedy in the spring and summer of
1994 was almost beyond belief. ABC News' veteran correspondent,
Jim Wooten, c1aimed that "it is not like anything I've ever seen in 30
209
210
The Path of a Genocide
years as a reporter. It is, I think, the standard against which all further
tragedies will be measured" (ABC News 1994). Yet, despite the ghastly
scale of suffering in Rwanda, American television news paid relatively
modest attention to the story during its first three bloody months. It
was only later, after the crisis of violence had been transformed into a
crisis of refugees and disease, did television news remain focused on
the story. We will argue that this had rather profound policy consequences, at least in the case of the response of the United States. Rwanda
was the first test case for a new, very cautious U.S. posture toward
humanitarian crises. The episodic coverage given to Rwanda by television news in the initial months of violence gave encouragement to the
Clinton administration's limited policy response.
American television news coverage of Rwanda came in three phases.
The first phase came prior to 6 April 1994, the day President Juvenal
Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi
were killed in a mysterious plane crash. During this first phase almost
nothing at all was heard of Rwanda on American network television.
The second phase came in the weeks immediately following the crash,
and in the midst of the massive killing. In this period we see a substantiai increase in news attention, as one would expect in the systematic
murder of tens of thousands of people. But as data presented below
indicate, coverage was still relatively modest, at least when one considers the scale of the killing occurring at the time.
Most of the coverage was found in a third phase, beginning roughly
in July. It was devoted to refugees in--or in a route to-camps in neighboring Tanzania and Zaire.
While we will use this general structure to describe news coverage
of events in and around Rwanda, at the same time it must be said that,
with the exception of the April plane crash, no clear point of demarcation signifies the transition between phases. Stories regarding massacres did not suddenly give way to stories solely about refugees. The
two blended and twisted together until some point in August when world
attention was largely focused on a sea of humanity in a disease-ridden
camp called Goma, Zaire.
Methods
The primary research methodology used in conducting this study
was quantitative media content analysis. Using an archival computer
database, we obtained all broadcast transcripts of ABC World News
Rwanda: U.S. Policy and Television Coverage
211
(n=92) and CNN (N=423) programming relating to Rwanda for a fivemonth period, April through August 1994. We also used computer-assisted searches on several other occasions to provide specific points of
information. After obtaining the transcripts, we coded all ABC World
News coverage and a sample ofCNN coverage of Rwanda for the time
period under consideration. l
Data were also obtained for NBC Nightly News and CBS Evening
News. This included Rwanda story frequencies (how often they appeared on the network news shows), story length measured in minutes,
Rwanda story segments' placement within the news program, who the
reporting correspondent was, and the origin of the story (Le., whether it
originated in Rwanda, Zaire, Washington, New York, or elsewhere).
Our study was also informed by the field work by one of the authors
who was in Nairobi, Kenya during the initial weeks of the massacres in
Rwanda. The purpose of his stay there was to interview and observe
Western correspondents in Nairobi, the base of nearly all Western press
operations for the northem half of Africa, including Rwanda. For more
than three weeks he interviewed correspondents, attended news conferences, spoke with diplomats, and attended editorial meetings conceming strategies for covering the emerging situation in Rwanda.
In the analysis to follow, we offer mostly aggregate quantitative data
concerning American television coverage of events in and around
Rwanda during the spring and summer of 1994. In tum, using insights
gained from field experience and the research literature, we suggest
why each phase of coverage looked as it did.
Phase One
The first phase is an open-ended period leading up to the April plane
crash that killed the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda. In particular,
this phase includes the period following a military offensive in Rwanda
by the Rwandan Patriotic Front in October 1990 from their sanctuaries
in Uganda. It is perhaps the most important of the three phases, indicated by what was not reported, rather than what was. The lack of coverage in this phase, we argue, contributed to the sometimes superficial
coverage found in the subsequent news of the Rwandan tragedy.
On 10 September 1993, approximately seven months prior to one of
the worst periods ofbloodshed in human history, CNN's Gary Strieker
reported that the signing of the Arusha Accords on August 4 had ushered in a new sense of optimism in Rwanda. A U.N. representative in
212
The Path of Il Genocide
Rwanda was quoted as saying "there is an enonnous amount of positive, optimistic hope for the future through this mission." According to
this, the only American television news story in 1993 to focus on political developments in Rwanda, things were looking up for the tiny
Central African nation? Whether CNN should be faulted for missing
the emerging crisis in Rwanda is not the point. More important was the
total lack of attention-----except for this one report-regarding the events
there by all American television media prior to the bloodshed of 1994.
There was, of course, nothing new in this. Records dating back to the
spring of 1991 indicated that none of the broadcast networks reported
on the political situation in Rwanda.
Yet, according to Human Rights Watch, between October 1990 and
April 1994 human rights abuses by both the RPF and Rwandan military were commonplace. Even more astonishing, when over 50,000
persons were killed in neighboring Burundi in 1993, the horrif1c events
there were given no broadcast media attention whatsoever. The year
before, Human Rights Watch had even tried drawing greater attention
to Burundi and Rwanda by issuing areport that spelled out quite c1early
that "the developments in Burundi, tragic in themselves, also complicate the situation in Rwanda." The report received no press coverage
(MacGuire 1994, 42). And when in the flrst week of April 1994 regionalleaders gathered in Dar es Salaam to work out an accommodation that might finally bring an end to the violence, no broadcast
networks carried news of the meeting, though, as we already mentioned,
CNN did.
Such inattention to Rwanda was not out of the ordinary for American news coverage of Africa. With the exception of South Africa, subSahara Africa has been consistently ignored by the networks. In 1986,
only l percent of the broadcast time of the three broadcast networks
was devoted to black Africa (Corry 1986, C17). This lack of media
attention to Rwanda was the result of several factors.
Television News
Part of the problem may have rested with a redefinition of news
resulting from the dramatic changes wrought by CNN. Broadcast networks, under pressure from CNN's twenty-four-hour fonnat, began
making international video available to their affiliates, something they
had not done before for fear of underrnining the exc1usivity of their
own national evening newscasts. As it turned out, that fear may have
Rwanda: U.S. Policy and Television Coverage
213
been weIl founded. "It turned network news into water, like a utility,"
as one news executive was quoted by the New York Times. "CNN created news on demand. That hurt the networks. It also hurt CNN. I think
CNN's ratings problem is tied into a jadedness about world events"
(Carter 1993, A20).
At the beginning of 1994, CNN's ratings had dropped by about 25
percent, giving it an average prime-time audience of about 500,000
households. By May its average daily audience had fallen to about
250,000 households, the lowest level since 1982 when CNN was disparagingly referred to as "Chieken Noodle News."3 It was a stunning
predicament. In a period marked by the continuing crisis in Bosnia and
the systematic slaughter of tens of thousands of persons in Rwanda,
CNN could not get Americans to watch the news.
This came at a time when the television news business was not good
to begin with, particularly for NBC and CBS. Of the broadcast networks, NBC and CBS paid the least attention to Rwanda (see figure
10.1). This is not surprising, for both networks were in a shambles at
the time, particu1arly NBC.
Michael G. Gartner, President ofNBC's News Division since 1988,
had resigned in 1993 in the midst of several trying controversies, all
relating to questions of news judgment and budget restraints. At the
time he had taken over the news division it was losing more than $100
million a year. General Electric, the corporate owners of NBC since
1986, wanted Gartner to make the news division profitable, which he
did with staff reductions, elimination of bureaus, and through greater
reliance on outside video and information sources.
The year Gartner left, NBC News showed a profit of $20 million.
But according to Don Browne, executive vice president of NBC News,
the cost cutting took "an emotionai and spiritual toll" on the division.
In the judgment of some, it also led to poorer quality news.
Besides the general malaise of the news business, the task of getting
the news in Africa suffered perhaps the most. A relatively small corps
of Africa-based journalists was laden with covering an extraordinarily
complex array of issues over a vast range of territory. During the initial
stages of the crisis in Rwanda in 1993, the Africa-based press corps
was responsible for covering, to mention but a few cases, the ongoing
civil war in the Sudan, rising political conflict in Kenya, the emergence
of an unstable democracy in Ethiopia, continued political and civil strife
in Zaire, and, of course, Somalia. The Washington Post, New York Times,
and Christian Science Monitor each had one-person bureaus in Nairobi.
214
The Path of a Genocide
The Associated Press and Reuters had larger staffs, but still not enough
to cover the region adequately. The Los Angeles Times bureau consisted of a room with a desk and a secretary who arrived for a few hours
most days, but no correspondent. One flew in from time to time to do a
story and then left.
Television news resources in Africa were stretched even thinner. With
so few resources, the amount of news devoted to even major stories
was not great. In 1993, ABC, CBS, and NBC carried a combined total
of 66 stories conceming Somalia. (As a point of comparison, on the
twenty-four-hour cable news channel, CNN, there were 1,597 stories.)4
In South Africa in 1993, the year white minority rule ended and Nelson
Mandela became president, the three broadcast networks presented a
total of twenty-five stories.
As mentioned earlier, the three broadcast networks completely missed
the bloodshed in Burundi where an estimated 50,000 were killed following the overthrow and assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye
in October 1993. CNN mentioned Burundi on four occasions, three of
them on talk shows. The fourth news item was a report by correspondent Gary Streiker on October 29 from along the Rwandan-Burundi
river border. He had stumbled across bodies floating downriver out of
Burundi, victims of the fighting there.
Inadequate staffing in 1993 ofAmerican news bureaus in Africa made
covering even the more obvious political crises difficult. Working alone,
CNN's Streiker was responsible for covering much of the northem half
of Africa, from coast to coast. During a thirty-day stay in Nairobi in
overlapping portions of May and June 1994, one of the authors of the
present study found Streiker in Nairobi, where his home was located, for
a total of one aftemoon. In a telephone interview that aftemoon Streiker
explained that as the only CNN correspondent in that part of Africa he
was "constantly living out of a backpack" (interview, Kenya 1994).
Besides CNN, the other English-language television news bureaus
in Nairobi belonged to Reuters, formerly known as Visnews, and a BBC
bureau. The latter served BBC World Television (currently unavailable
in the United States) and the British domestic market. Reuters Television, as with its print counterpart, is in the business of selling news, in
this case video news, to other news organization. The Reuters bureau
in Nairobi was headed by the highly respected Mohamed Amin, best
known for the video footage he shot of the catastrophic Ethiopian famine in 1984. The video was credited with mobilizing the massive famine relief effort that year.
Rwanda: U.S. Policy and Television Coverage
215
The lack of permanent bureau staffing by American networks in
Nairobi meant that when a story broke, such as Ethiopia in 1984, Somalia in 1992, or Rwanda in 1994, the networks sent in "parachute
journalists," generalist reporters and sometimes even anchors, who were
usually unfamiliar with the history and culture of the area. As Mohamed
Amin noted of the parachute journalists who finally came to document
the Ethiopian famine, "These guys didn't know where anything was.
They were lost" (interview, Kenya 1994). Sometimes they were quite
literally lost. In a 1985 interview with the New York Times, he told a
story that keenly captured the problem with parachutejournalists: "They
(the newly arrived correspondents during the Ethiopian famine) had to
ask questions and take our word for it. One correspondent I know wanted
to go to Zaire and couldn't remember the name: he told the airport
worker he wanted to go to that Z country." They sent him off to Zambia
instead of Zaire" (Kaplan 1985, C26).
Ancient Hatreds
But one can lose one's way in the complex affairs of Africa in more
serious ways. This was evident in the coverage of Rwanda during the
first several weeks following the plane crash. Not having covered
Rwanda for years, network correspondents and producers seemed to
believe nothing of importance had happened there prior to their arrival
and that as with other regions and other "ethnic conflicts," the violence
in Rwanda was the result of the "resurgence of ancient ethnic hatreds"
mysteriously and inextricably exploding to the surface.
Yet as one critic remarked, "the massacre in Rwanda was not 'sudden' at all, but the culmination of years of trouble, which the press for
the most part did not cover" (MacGuire 1994,40). Not understanding
Rwanda and its complex politics, both domestic and international, television news relied on vague references to ethnic violence to explain
events they otherwise did not understand.
Understanding the role and ambitions of France in Africa, for example, was important for understanding events in Rwanda. Just two
years after Habyarimana had seized power in a 1973 coup d' etat, France
signed amilitary agreement with his regime. Since 1959, many of the
leaders ofthe Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) had come
to speak English, rather than the French more commonly found among
the Hutu elite in Rwanda. Furthermore, members of the RPF had served
in the British-trained Uganda Army before joining the rebels. This led
216
The Path of a Gellocide
to some in the European press to speculate that in actuality, the bloodshed in Rwanda was something of a proxy war between the British and
French. Though denied by both governments, the New York Times noted
that "it remains a fact that the civil war is being fought between English-speaking and French-speaking officers" (Simons 1994, A6).
In response to the RPF invasion of Rwanda in 1990, the Habyarimana
government militarized. With French assistance, the Rwandan armyexpanded from 5,000 to more than 30,000 in the span of three years. French
soldiers also provided intelligence and ran government checkpoints in
the countryside. As one aid worker put it, ''There, in the middle ofAfrica,
French military would ask you for your passport" (Simons 1994).
All this was explained by French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur
in the spring of 1994. "France sees itself as a world power," said Balladur.
"This is its ambition and its honor and I wish for it to preserve this
ambition. And its main field of action is Africa, where it has an important role to play because of long-standing tradition--especially in
French-speaking Africa" (Simons 1994).
Among those accused of orchestrating the attacks by the military
and militias in April 1994 were Rwandan Army officers who had studied with French officers at St. Cyr and the Defense University, France's
top military academies. To understand Rwanda in the spring of 1994
required something much more than vague references to tribalism and
ancient ethnic conflicts. It require an understanding of political ambitions, both in Rwanda and elsewhere.
Phase
In the early months of 1994 prior to the plane crash on April 6, CNN
carried one story about Rwanda (concerning the mountain gorillas),
while the broadcast networks failed to mention it at all. That pattern
soon changed.
Figure 10.1 shows the broadcast networks coverage from April
through August. Four distinct episodes of coverage are evident, particularly in the coverage provided by ABC and CBS. As can be seen, of
the broadcast networks ABC World News devoted the most attention to
Rwanda, especially during the later stages of the story. In fact, by July
and August ABC was devoting twice as much air time to Rwanda as
were the other two broadcast networks.
Figure 10.2 shows a similar pattem with CNN's coverage of Rwanda,
though the period from the end of May through the first week of July is
Rwanda: U.S. Policy and Television Coverage
217
FIGURE 10.1
Television Coverage in Minutes (Networks)
35
~ABC
30
+CBS
*NBC
25
20
15
10
5
O
FIGURE 10.2
Television Coverage in Minutes (Cable News Network)
200.,.------.,,------------------,
"CNN
150
100
50
Oill-----,-----.---------,----------,---------..J
218
The Path of a Genocide
relatively flat, and almost nonexistent in mid-June. This is in part explained by the emergence of several other news stories. As figure 10.2
indicates, Haiti's continuing unrest and the expanding exodus of refugees to the United States became a growing focus of attention for CNN
and the broadcast networks, actually eclipsing coverage of Rwanda by
a significant degree.
Beginning with the second week of June, the big story for American
television news, bigger than Haiti or Rwanda, and certainly bigger than
Bosnia, was the seemingly never-ending saga of O.J. Sirnpson, the
American football player and television personality who was accused
of murdering his wife and her friend.
The initial April peak in coverage shown in figure 10.1 concerns, of
course, the plane crash that killed presidents Habyarimana and
Ntaryamira, the first of the massacres, and the evacuation of Westerners. The first network reports of the plane crash came on April 7, with
ABC devoting twenty seconds and CBS and NBC each devoting fifteen seconds to the story. On April 8, CBS made no mention of Rwanda,
while ABC and NBC noted the outbreak of fighting and the beginning
evacuation of Americans.
By 11 April, the bloodshed had begun to make an impression on the
networks, with a story breaking the two-minute mark for the first time
on ABC. That network's anchor, Peter Jennings, called it the "terrifying civil war in Rwanda," while NBC referred to the "unspeakable
atrocities" and CBS to "ethnic violence." This established a pattern in
at least the initial television coverage of Rwanda. For the lack of a
better explanation, the violence was attributed to "tribal" or "ethnic"
slaughter.
Critics of television coverage of Rwanda must be careful, however,
not to overstate the degree to which the news relied on this explanation. While it is certainly true that references such as "tribal violence"
were common, there were more sophisticated analyses also offered,
though late in the development of the story.
ABC News, for example, aired a story on 7 May, fully one month
after the onset of the violence, that went beyond the more superficiaI
explanations of the violence. ABC correspondent Ron Allen reported
that events in Rwanda suggested something more than spontaneous
tribal violence. "As investigators try to make sense of the killing," reported Allen, "there is more evidence Rwanda's massacres may be a
premeditated political act, not a spontaneous eruption of ethnic hatred.
Those responsible, human rights investigators say, are Hutu extremists
Rwanda: U.S. Policy and Television Coverage
219
with Rwanda's govemment trying to grab more power." The report includes an interview with a human rights investigator who says the killings were "intended to wipe out opposition from whatever quarter it
came from, political or ethnic groups, once and for all. It really was
intended as a final solution."
Hutu extremists feared that Habyarimana was moving toward a reconciliation and power-sharing agreement with the Tutsi minority. In
response, they shot his plane down and activated a well-planned "final
solution," all the while claiming the bloodshed was the result of spontaneous rage at the killing of Habyarimana by Tutsi rebels. 5 As one
person interviewed in Allen's account said, "I think this thing was very
carefully planned, was very well-planned, well in advance. There was
absolutely nothing spontaneous about it."
FIGURE10.3
Network Coverage by Topic (Coverage in Minutes)
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220
The Path of a Genocide
The May peak in coverage of Rwanda seen in figure 10.1 is largely
explained by the presence of television crews who were sent to cover
the South African election. Once in Africa, they were reassigned to
cover Rwanda (see also figure 10.3). Nelson Mandela was declared
winner of the election on May 3 and was swom in as president on May
10. Mark Foley, ABC News' assignment manager in London, explained
the coverage by noting that, "Rwanda was a hugely important story for
us. We initially pulled one crew from the South Africa story to cover
Rwanda" (interview, 1995). AdditionaI crews followed.
The precipitous drop in the two stories paralIeI one another, as seen
in figure 10.2, and reflected the withdrawal of the additional network
resources sent for the South African election and Mandela's inauguration. The May coverage of Rwanda was, at least in part, an artifact of
the South Africa story, reflecting as it did the temporary availability of
additional crews in Africa there to cover the South Africa election. In
the larger scheme of Africa news coverage, this makes sense.
As we have mentioned aIready, death and destruction in black Africa, even on the scale seen in Rwanda in May, does not necessarily
translate into news coverage. In 1993, the murder of upwards of 50,000
persons in Burundi did not result in a single broadcast network story.
Likewise, wars in the Sudan, Liberia, and Angola (particularly since
the end of the Cold War) have killed thousands, but were rarely if ever
covered by the American networks (Livingston 1996; Livingston and
Eachus 1995,413-30).
BY May, as the RPF was met with greater batt1efield success and
took controI of more and more territory, and the Hutu population began
to flee in fear of Tutsi retribution, Rwanda became a story about refugees, rather than a story about massacres. As we have seen in figures
10.1 and 10.2, most of the coverage came in the July-August time frame.
More than anything else, Rwanda-related stories were mostly about
the refugees, and not the killing itself.
This was particularly true of CNN coverage. Figure 10.4 shows the
percentage distribution of stories according to the location of the action or events in the news segment. CNN devoted much of its coverage
to the refugee story, something in the area of 70 percent. As a point of
comparison, ABC devoted about 50 percent of its overall Rwanda coverage to the refugees, as seen in figure 10.4.
This is the same story told by figures 10.5 and 10.6, which show the
frequencies of datelines from Rwandan versus those from Zaire between April and August for CNN and broadcast network coverage. 6 As
Rwanda: U.S. Policy and Television Coverage
221
FIGURE 10.4
Characteristics of Coverage
Location (in Percenls)
%
70
BABC
[Z]CNN
60
50
40
30
20
10 .
O
REFUGEE CAMPS
RWANDA
ABC N=92, CNN N=298
can be c1early seen, for American television news, the story of the crisis in Rwanda was not the massacres as much as it was the exodus of
Hutu refugees who feared Tutsi reprisals.
Ph ase
Most news attention to Rwanda came in July and August and was
devoted to Goma, Zaire, where 1.2, million mostly Hutu refugees were
ravaged by dehydration, cholera, and dysentery. Given the scale of the
suffering, the intense coverage made sense.?
The reasons for this pattem of coverage, we believe, are rather
straightforward. Once the scale of the violenee became c1ear, news organizations, including television, made the determination to cover the
222
The Path of a Genocide
FIGURE 10.5
Datelines (Cable News Network)
120
~
RWANDA
+ ZAIRE
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FIGURE 10.6
Datelines (Networks)
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JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
Rwanda: U.S. Policy and Television Coverage
223
story. This was assisted by the additional crews in Africa covering the
South Africa election.
The problem, however, was access. As with Somalia the year before, the news crews' own security was at risk in Rwanda. In recent
years, we have seen the creation of a new kind of war correspondent, as
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan has noted: One who covers massacres rather than battles. Those who carry out the massacre of civilians
have no qualms about killing journalists, as data from the Committee
for the Protection of Journalists can attest. Covering Rwanda in the
midst of the killing spree was not an easy or safe proposition.
One of the authors of the present study had the opportunity to spend
several days with Reid G. Miller, Nairobi bureau chief for the Associated Press, and Mohamed Amin, Nairobi bureau chief for Reuters Television, among other media professionals in Nairobi, as they desperately
tried to find ways to get their correspondents into Rwanda. At one point,
Terry Leonard of the Associated Press had gotten as far as the airport in
Kigali, only to find he could go no further. Covering the violence of
Rwanda during those initial weeks was a risky, uncertain undertaking.
A popular alternative was Lake Victoria. As the killing progressed,
bodies were being dumped into rivers. By the end of May, officials in
bordering Uganda had estimated that as manyas 10,000 bodies had
washed down the Kagera River. 8 Bodies 1inOO the shore ofLake Victoria,
offering a horrific display. As Donatella Lorch of the New York Times
put it, the bodies were "shocking the world with the magnitude of the
slaughter." In a sense, the slaughter was thus brought to the correspondents feet as they visited the safer shores of Lake Victoria, rather than
venture to the source of the carnage in the killing fields of Rwanda. 9
As a news story, going from watching the dead to watching those in
the process of dying was a minor transition. They were both spectacles,
easy to film and full of pathos. Refugees in the camps in Zaire were the
dead-in-waiting. The networks, still not burdened by the subtleties of
the conflict, chose the spectacle of Goma, with its familiar (read Western) actors. CBS, for example, sent in its physician correspondent to
report to the viewers about how the fight against disease in the camp
was going. It all made for great television.
Figures 10.7 and 10.8 show the relative prevalence of two Rwanda
news frames. As one can see, both ABC and CNN began focusing most
of their attention on the scourge of disease in the camps. Again, we see
that most of the story concerning Rwanda was about Hutu refugees
fleeing in fear from the RPF, rather than the killing of Thtsi by Hutu
224
The Path of a Genocide
military and militia groups. For American television news, this was the
story of choice.
Policy Considerations
What about the possible effects such coverage might have on policy
responses? Much of what might be said on this point is speculative, but
this much can be suggested: In the case of the policy response of the
United States, the coverage of the massacre had only a minimal effect.
During its first two years in office the Clinton administration had
vacillated on the lise of military forces in humanitarian crises. During
the 1992 campaign and during the first several months of his administration, Bill Clinton spoke of "assertive multilateralism" and the need
to come to the assistance of people in need. But following the American experience in Somalia, the Clinton administration reversed course
and instituted strict guidelines for future U.S. intervention in similar
crises. Under the provisions of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)
25, issued in May 1994, approval ofthe use ofU.S. forces for humanitarian undertakings became highly unlikely. Among the conditions to
be met before the United States involved itself in U.N. peacekeeping
operations was a clear statement of American interests in the operation, the approval of Congress, the availability of funds for the operation, a specifically fixed date ofwithdrawal ofU.S. forces, and an agreed
upon command and controI structure (Minear and Weiss 1995). Larry
Minear and Thomas G. Weiss have suggested that, "since new and urgent needs will rarely, if ever, satisfy these political conditions, the
effect ofWashington's policy is to place severe limits on humanitarian
initiatives" (Minear and Weiss 1995,36).
As a result of PDD 25, the Clinton administration effectively isolated itself-and in some measure other nations as well-from involvement in Rwanda during the period of the massacres. Douglas Jehl of
the New York Times summarized the situation this way: "Seeing Rwanda
as a first test of its restrictive new guidelines on peacekeeping (PDD
25], the Administration has not only ruled out sending American troops
but has stood in the way of an aggressive United Nations plan to dispatch an African force of 5,500" (Jehl 1994, A8). The administration
was intent on doing as little as possible.
The 1948 Genocide Convention obligates signers to investigate and
punish those who are responsible for the systematic killing of members
of specific racial or ethnic groups. Wary of the obligations that ensued
Rwanda: U.S. Policy and Television Coverage
225
FIGURE 10.7
Characteristics of Coverage (News Frames)
35 . " . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
~
30
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ETHNIC CONFLlCT
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JULY
Source: ABC Nightly News
FIGURE 10.8
Characteristics of Coverage (News Frames)
100 ~ - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
~.
ETHNIC CONFLlCT
+ DISEASE/STARVATlON
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20
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MAY
Source: Cable Networ!< News
JUNE
JULY
226
The Path of a Genocide
as a result of the use of the term, the State Department and the National
Security Council drafted guidance instructing spokesmen to say instead
that "acts of genocide may have occurred" in Rwanda, rather than bluntly
stating that the Hutu slaughter of Tutsi and other political opponents
constituted genocide. Quite simply, as Jehl noted, the administration
was attempting to avoid the moral pressure to stop the mass killing in
Rwanda by pretending it was something else.
But this is where television coverage served as a potential threat to
the administration's desired policy ends. As Jehl pointed out, though
perhaps overstating the case in the process, "a gruesome feature of international news coverage since early April" was coverage of the massacres. As a result, he said, those upset with the passive nature of the
international response, particularly that of the United States, began to
protest the lack of U.S. involvement in Rwanda.
Our argument has been that in actuality, television coverage during
the massacres was rather episodic and often misleading, encouraging
the mistaken belief that the slaughter in Rwanda was simply an example of "ancient tribal hatreds," rather than a planned, politically inspired genocide. There are fewer rationaI responses to irrationaI
behavior, such as a presumably spontaneous massacre. But had American news organizations been more forceful, had they, for instance, stayed
with the Rwanda story beyond the May piggy-backing on the South
Africa coverage (see figure 10.3), the Clinton administration would
have probably experienced greater difficulty pursuing its dogged policy
of doing nothing.
Conc1usions
Much has been made in recent years of the so called CNN effect, the
rather ill-defined constellation of policy consequences said to result
from the injection of stark media images into the political and policy
process. We have argued that the Clinton administration made a conscious effort to distance itself, and the policy process, from the effects
of media images. Further, we have argued that they were successful in
doing so, in some measure, because the media themselves did not fully
cover Rwanda's bloodshed during the early months of 1994. What the
media did cover, and cover in great detail, was the plight of the refugees, which was certainly understandable and worthwhile. But if there
was a policy response borne of television coverage, as with the coverage itself, the policy was too late.
Rwanda: U.S. Policy and Television Coverage
227
There were two Rwanda stories in 1994, and they should not be
confused. One was that of the massacres. That story is seen in the flat
graph lines of figures 10.7 and 10.8. The second story was Goma and
other refugee camps. That is seen in the rising line of the same graphs.
If there was a "CNN effect," it came in response to this second story.
The administration was quite ready to employ Pentagon resources in a
"feeding and watering" operation, as it was commonly referred to at
the Pentagon. What it was not willing to do, and would not allow television pictures to force it to do, was stop the slaughter early on. As a
result, both the United States government and the networks offered too
little too late to stop the killing.
Notes
1. While we were able to review all of the major television coverage transcripts
concerning Rwanda, it is important to point out that we were not able to review
what was perhaps the most important component of television news: the visual
image. The costs associated with obtaining video archived material was prohibitive. We were therefore limited to an analysis of variables other than the
visual image.
2. In total, there were two television news programs directly concerning Rwanda
in 1993 (severai CNN reports concerning neighboring Burundi also mentioned
Rwanda). As a point of comparison, The New York Times carried several articles
regarding the Arusha Peace Accords and U.N. actions. See "U.N. Approves
Troops for Rwanda," The New York Times, 60ctober, 1993, A17; "Accord Ends
3-year Civil War in Rwanda," The New York Times, 5 August, 1993, A12;
Donatella Lorch, "Refugees Trying to Flee a War Settle for Limbo," The New
York Times, 8 July, 1993, A4; Steven A. Holmes, "Africa, From the Cold War to
Cold Shoulders," The New York Times, 7 March, 1993,4; "Rwanda's Aristocratic Guerillas," The New York Times Magazine, 17 January, 1993, 10.
3. This began to change in mid-June, helped by O.J. Simpson. In July, CNN posted
a ratings gain. When asked why CNN was devoting so much time to the OJ.
Simpson arraignment and trial, CNN correspondent Ralph Begleiter said quite
simply that it was because ratings were about flve times what they would otherwise be.
4. It is important to always keep in mind that these numbers ref1ect not only the
fact that CNN is a twenty-four-hour news network, but also that programming
includes talk shows and other formats. There were not, in short 1,500 reports
from Somalia in 1993. Rather, there were 1,500 news items of various types
regarding Somalia.
5. Cf. ch. 4 for a discussion of various theories explaining the shooting down of
the plane and Prunier 1995 ch. 8.
6. most instances, location and dateline are the same.
7. The flrst Rwandese refugee stories, however, came from Tanzania during the
flrst week of May. On 3 May, ABC and NBC reported on the large number of
refugees at the Tanzanian barder, which ABC put at 300,000.
8. Lorch, Donatella. "Bodies From Rwanda Cast a Pall on Lakeside Villagers in
Uganda," The New York Times, 28 May 1994, Al. Onlyasmall and relatively
228
The Path of a Genocide
innocuous portion of the available video ever made Hs way to American television. One author spent an afternoon sitting with Reuters editors as they reviewed
hour after hour of horrific video pictures of bodies being pulled from Lake
Victoria. Bodies sometimes came apart as they were lifted from the water. Only
the more circumspect-within the bounds of what was possible-of video was
sent back to New York or London.
9. It is important to note that in no way are we suggesting that the journalists covering the slaughter in Rwanda were anything less than professional, and in many
cases exceedingly brave in providing the coverage they did. We only wish to
point out that covering the actual violenee proved difficult and that substitutes
were used.
Part
Peacekeeping
11
U.N. Peacekeeping in Rwanda
Turid Laegreid
Introduction
One of the most important aspects of U.N. involvement in Rwanda
reIated to the peacekeeping operations ofUNAMIR I and II. This chapter
will discuss the formation and functions of the two missions.
The Arusha Process and the Establishment of UNAMIR
The Arusha Peace Agreement of 4 August 1993-three years of civil war in Rwanda--envisaged a major roIe for the
United Nations in impIementing the Accords. A twenty-two-month transitionai period was to begin with the formation of a transitionai government and a multiparty National Assembly, leading to national
elections to be heId by the end of 1995. To help monitor the process and
maintain security in the transition period, the Security Council authorized on 5 October 1993 a U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda
(UNAMIR). A U.N. observation force established in June 1993 to monitor the border between Rwanda and Uganda (UNOMUR) was folded
into UNAMIR, although it remained an autonomous body that kept Hs
original mandate.
UNAMIR's mandate, as outlined in Security Council Resolution 872,
was to contribute to the security of the city of Kigali and monitor a
weapons-secure area to be established by the Rwandese parties in and
around the city. The force was to monitor the observance of the ceasefire agreement, including the establishment of cantonment and assembly zones, and the demarcation of the new demilitarized zone (DMZ),
and to monitor the security situation during the final period of the tran231
232
The Path of a Gel10cide
sitional government's mandate before the elections. UNAMIR also was
to assist with mine clearance. The Mission was authorized to investigate alleged noncompliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace
Agreement and investigate complaints regarding the activities of the
gendarmerie and police. Finally, it was to help coordinate relief assistance and monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees
and displaced persons.
The initial perception ofmany U.N. personnel involved was that the
Arusha Agreement would proceed smoothly and that UNAMIR would
be a "success story." However, there were some differences when assessing what size would be appropriate for the new force. The final
result was due more to political and economical considerations than
military ones, which was unexceptional in U.N. peacekeeping. The Force
Commander, General Romeo Dallaire, had initially considered 4.500
as a maximum option, and 2,600 as a minimum. The U.N. Reconnaissance Mission to Rwanda in August, which he headed, presented two
lower options in its report, thus already reflecting a compromise. The
minimum option was now 1,935 troops, while the Mission's recommended option was 2,538 troops. The latter, described by the Mission
as a "reasonable, responsible, credible and decisive option," was finally adopted (Report, U.N. Reconnaissance Mission to Rwanda 1993).
The Reconnaissance Mission's report also underlined the need for
mobility to enable the force to react in a timely fashion and with sufficient strength to diffuse potentially dangerous situations. The nature of
the terrain in Rwanda, the lack of local resources and the fragile road
network called for several armored personne1 carriers (APCs) and helicopters. In U.N. peacekeeping operations, however, APCs and helicopters have traditionally been contingent-owned equipment (Le., to be
provided by nations contributing troops and to be subsequently reimbursed by the U.N.). If contributing nations faH to provide the requested
material, the U.N. has no logistical reserves upon which to depend. In
the Rwanda case, only the Belgian contingent arrived with APCs. The
U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) succeeded in
borrowing eight additional APCs from the U.N. operation in
Mozambique, but they were Russian vehicles with manuals written only
in Russian. In any case, there were no spare parts, access to the engines
were locked, and the Bangladeshi contingent in UNAMIR that was
supposed to man the APCs lacked basic knowledge and experience in
operating them. Almost all of them quickly broke down. When it was
c1ear that no contributing country would provide the helicopter unit
U.N. Peacekeeping in Rwanda
233
authorized by the Security Council, private contractors were hired.
However, when the war broke out in April 1994, the contractors were
unavailable.
In virtually all peacekeeping operations, lack of trained personnel,
equipment, and finances have been continuous problems. Troop contributing nations faH to provide equipment as pledged, or troops arrive
with totally inadequate equipment and training. Such "best-case scenario" thinking gives the operation few possibilities for flexible adaptation, and makes it extremely vulnerable to changing conditions. The
Rwanda operation was in this matter not a unique case, but the limitations would have devastating consequences when the crisis erupted in
early April.
UNAMIR was to be deployed in four phases, beginning with the
departure of foreign forces and the establishment of a secure area in
Kigali. Preparations for the disengagement, demobilization, and integration of the armed forces and gendarmerie were to be completed during phase II, due to begin with the installment of the transitionaI
govemment. In this phase, the force would be deployed at the maximum strength of 2,538, including 331 observers. In phase III, the force
would gradually be reduced to a strength of 1,240, which would conclude the disengagement and demobilization process. In phase IV a
further reduction would take place. In this final phase, the force would
be monitoring the general security situation in the country leading up
to the national elections to be held between October and December
1995.
By the end of phase I, the Rwandese parties to the peace agreement
had made little progress towards its implementation. Formation of the
transitionai political institutions was held up as the splitting of political
parties caused havoc with the formulas for representation in the National Assembly and the transitionaI govemment. Therefore, while
UNAMIR could not keep to its scheduled tasks, deployment proceeded-indeed, was slightly speeded up. The second battalion was
deployed in the DMZ in January 1993. By the end of March, the force
had been brought to its maximum strength.!
During thefirst months of 1994, UNAMIR expressed concern over
the deteriorating security situation in Rwanda. Political violence in February included the assassination of the two political leaders, Felicien
Gatabazi and Martin Bucyana. There was evidence of importation of
arms and reports that weapons were distributed to civilians. In January a
high-ranking official in the Interahamwe militia informed UNAMIR that
234
The Path of a Genocide
he had been ordered to plan for the extermination of the Tutsi minority
community; plans were also being made for a plot against the Belgian
peacekeepers. The alleged plot included an attempt to provoke a flreexchange with the UN, with the aim of killing Belgian soldiers in the
hope that this would make the contingent withdraw. 2 Although he had no
confrrmation of this information, Force Commander Dallaire requested
U.N./DPKO for permission to conduct a cordon and search in areas of
Kigali identified by the informant as hiding weapons caches. The request
was rejected on the grounds that this would be an offensive operation
and not in accordance with the mission's Chapter VI mandate.
According to key DPKO officials in New York, the reluctance to
take offensive action was due to lack of additional information confirming the alleged plot, which made it difflcult to rule out the possibility of its being a trap. It was also believed that offensive operations
would meet with opposition from U.N. members that would be concerned that this might create a precedent for stretching mandates. With
the memory of the Somalia experience fresh, the DPKO did not want to
propose any changes in the mandate that would not be accepted by
members of the Security Council. The information in the cable, moreover, was only one ofmany indications that Rwanda's Hutu extremists
were obstructing the peace process. Since some of the information that
had reached New York indicated that the President himself was involved
in these incidents, offensive action of the kind proposed by the Force
Commander might provoke protests from the government of Rwanda. 3
Moreover, UNAMIR's mandate speciflcally limited the force to carry
out its security functions in co-operation with the local police and
gendarmerie.
The Force Commander, who from January onwards became increasingly aware that the situation was deteriorating, repeatedly sent requests
to U.N./New York for all the equipment originally authorized by the Security Council. He also asked for an additional infantry company, which
DPKO tried to acquire from Canada in vain. The Belgian Foreign Minister, Willy Claes, reportedly also asked the U.N. to give UNAMIR amore
flexible mandate to permit an active search for weapons.
In New York, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali repeatedly
underlined that the success of the mission depended on the cooperation
of the Rwandese parties and their willingness to implement the Arusha
Agreement. Evidence that the political process had stalled and was being
undermined caused concern in the Security Council when the members
discussed the renewal of UNAMIR's mandate in January, and again in
U.N. Peacekeeping in Rwanda
235
the first week of April 1994 (Res. 909/1994). The decision to authorize
a U.N. continued presence was disputed, and several members wanted
to withdraw the force, or withdraw their contribution to it. Supporters
of the force, on the other hand, emphasized that the one basic premise
for the operation-the cease fire-was holding.
The Crisis of 6 April
President Habyarimana, his Chief of Staff and President Ntaryamira
of Burundi were all killed as their aircraft was shot down when approaching Kigali Airport on 6 Apri11994. There is strong evidence that
the Rwandese government forces were responsible for both the assault
on the president and the killings which starting immediately afterwards. 4
The first roadblocks were set up in Kigali even before the news of the
plane crash had been announced, and UNAMIR observers who went to
investigate were denied access to the site of the crash of the PresidentiaI Guard.
The first to be killed were prominent opposition politicians, both
moderate Hutu and Tutsi. Among the first victims early on 7 April,
were Prime Minister Agathe Unwilingiyamana and ten Belgian peacekeepers who were guarding her but taken by the Presidential Guard and
killed in an army compound. The second objective was to eliminate
dissent. Critical journalists, human rights activists, lawyers, and civil
servants were targeted during the first phase of the slaughter. 5 The killings reignited the civil war. The RPF battalion stationed in Kigali to
proteet the RPF political leaders immediately broke out to avoid entrapment, and engaged the government forces. Some RPF units from
the DMZ in the north advanced rapidly towards Kigali, reaching the
outskirts of the capital on the morning of 10 April, but did not enter the
city until the 13 April.
Giving the UNAMIR Force Commander only 40 minutes prior notice, French troops landed at Kigali Airport by 9 April in order to evacuate their nationals. 6 They controlled the airport and used vehic1es of
Rwanda's Presidential Guard to collect expatriates. The evacuation
operation was conducted effectively and rapidly, with the last French
troops leaving on 14 April. The Belgians started a similar operation out
of Nairobi on 10 April and took contral over the airport after the French
left. AIso three Italian C-BO aircraft left for Nairobi to help in the
evacuation of foreign nationals from Rwanda. The U.S. sent about 300
troops to Bujumbura in neighboring Burundi for the same purpose, but
236
The Path of a Genocide
did not enter Rwanda, as U.S. civilians were escorted to the border by
UNAMIR, and were airlifted from there. Most expatriates were evacuated by 14 April, but individuals continued coming to UNAMIR assembly areas during the next week to be escorted out of the country.
When the crisis broke, UNAMIR had been responsible for evacuating
U.N. personnel, and, on 8 April, the Force Commander began negotiating with the RPF on the freedom of movement for UNAMIR to escort
convoys through RPF sectors for purposes of evacuation.
Several mortar shelIs exploded at the Kigali airport on 13 April, but
the evacuation did not otherwise meet with armed resistance. Nevertheiess, both the Rwandese "interim government" and the RPF urged
non-UNAMIR troops to 1eave as soon as possib1e. The RPF, which was
most skeptical towards the presence of French and Belgian national
troops, told both on 12 April to leave within twenty-four hours. The
demand was later modified to 12 hours after the evacuation of expatriates was comp1eted.
There was some initial discomfort with the non-U.N. evacuation
operations in the U.N./DPKO and among some members of the Security Council. One concern was that command and controi problems
might arise similar to the Somali operation in 1993. 7 On the other hand,
the members recognized the benefits of having the French and later
Belgian (national) units secure the airport, and that UNAMIR itself
could play only a limited role in the evacuation.
The radical deterioration of the situation after 6 April put UNAMIR
in an impossible situation. Its mandate was closely tied to the peace
agreement, and the success of the operation required that the Rwandan
parties work to implement the Accords. Both premises vanished in early
April. Though Dallaire's version of the Rules of Engagement seemed
to be quite broad (see chapter 12), the Rules of Engagement as understood by U.N. New York headquarters permitted use of force only in
self-defense, which in itselfbecame difficult due to the degree of hostilities, and because the force was more lightly equipped than originally planned. The other critical factor was the decision by the Belgian
government, formally announced on 14 April, to withdraw its battalion
from UNAMIR. The withdrawal began on 19 April and was completed
the next day.
The problem of varying standards for troops is ageneric one in peacekeeping operations. Under normal circumstances it causes frustration
and decreases the operational capacity of the force; in unstable and
hostile situations it becomes a matter of life and death. UNAMIR had
U.N. Peacekeeping in Rwanda
237
struggled with such problems since its deployment. The Belgian contingent was by far the best equipped and best trained unit. The equally
more professionai Ghanaian battalion was deployed in the DMZ but,
lacking vehicles to move and caught in heavy fighting around
Buyumbura, the contingent did not reach Kigali until April 13.
The Force Commander's main concerns during the flrst weeks were
to protect the force and U.N. personnel, assist in evacuating U.N. personnel and expatriates, protect civilians at assembly points, secure the
airport and-as instructed by the revised mission terms formulated in
New York-try to establish a new cease-flre agreement between the
two warring parties (see chapter 13).
The cease-flre talks, however, led nowhere. Fighting between the
RPF and government forces in Kigali continued unabated until18 April
when RPF forces took controi of the northern part of the city, surrounding the gendarmerie camp at Kacyiru (northeast of Kigali) and the quarters of the Presidential Guard. The flghting then slowed, although still
continued at a low level at different places in the city.
During this period, UNAMIR became increasingly involved in selfprotection tasks as weIl as trying to protect or extract the many thousands of people under U.N. protection. Initially, the Rwanda government
forces (RGF) did not allow movement of U.N. troops and UNMOs in
Kigali, while the RPF was not generally hostile to U.N. forces. By
April 18 the situation had improved somewhat. Neither the RGF nor
the RPF were reported hostile to UNAMIR, while the militia showed
little or no regard for the U.N. flag or the Red Cross, and stopped convoys and attacked even Rwandese U.N. guards.
The Force Commander had redeployed UNAMIR units from DMZ
to Kigali so as better to protect his own force and civilians. Once the
Belgian UNAMIR contingent had left, the Ghanaian unit was assigned
the critical task of securing the airport. UNAMIR HQ was regrouped to
Hotel Meridien, initially protected by the French and Belgian troops
sent in to evacuate foreigners. The Thnisian company was regrouped to
Hotel Meridien and assigned to protect the nearby Faisal Hospital (which
also served UNAMIR personnel). The Amahoro Stadium was selected
as an assembly point for the evacuation of expatriates, and on 16 April
declared a "U.N. installation"; it was guarded by the Bangaldeshi battalion and soon Rwandese also sought shelter there.
The number of refugees increased daily, and within a week, some
14,000 civilians had gathered under U.N. protection. There was an acute
shortage of accommodation, food, and water for the refugees during
238
The Path of a Genocide
the first week, with some improvement only by the end of the second
week. The stadium was under indirect, but intense fire most of the time.
Both the hospital and the stadium were hit by mortars-resulting in the
death of one U.N. soldier and around forty civilian casualties-but there
was no direct attack on either. Additional Rules of Engagement regarding all U.N. installations, defined as a "compound containing U.N. personnel or equipment and vital grounds defended by U.N. troops," were
issued on 17 April. Without being specifically outlined in the new RoE,
the adjustments opened the possibility ofthe defense of civilians. However, UNAMIR's capability of stopping a direct attack was severely
limited, as the Force Commander acknowledged.
The security of the airfield was a constant worry to the Force Commander. He considered it his "lifeline," the only way to ensure that
supplies could get in, but also the only exit if withdrawal were necessary. Dallaire spent considerable time trying to persuade both parties
to accept the airport and surrounding area as a neutral zone. Both
refused, however, and the airport was constantly in danger of indirect
fire.
Having very limited resources, DaIlaire clearly was directing an extremely vulnerable force. When the Belgians announced that their battalion would be withdrawn, and no additional resources were provided
for him, his concern about the safety of the force became accentuated.
The force had no possibility of protecting itself. "We had no defense
structures, no sand bags, no timber for the troops to dig in," as he later
recalled (interview 1995). He also lacked trucks and protective vehicles
(only one APC was functioning), and communication was difficult during the first week since few UNAMIR channels were operationaL The
Force Commander neverthe1ess staked out a proactive course, and within
the first few days of the crisis asked for additional troops and equipment as weIl as a change in RoEs to actively protect civilians. This was
turned down by U.N. Headquarters.
U.N./New York initially had difficulty assessing the situation on the
ground, both with regard to the security ofU.N. personnel and the scale
of the killing of civilians. The decision-making process was further
complicated by the memory of the U.N. debacle in Somalia, which had
given negative connotations to both the terms "humanitarian intervention" and "peace enforcement." The main lessons drawn from that experience, both in the Secretariat and the Security Council, was that if
the basic principles of traditional peacekeeping are abandoned, escalation and war will follow.
U.N. Peacekeeping in Rwanda
239
The Secretariat
In retrospect, DPKO officials stress that although their task was to
draw up plans and offer options based on their independent analysis of
the situation, the political restraints communicated by the Security
Council was that no "Somali type" operation (Le., under chapter VII)
would be authorized. This severely restrained the range of options for
the DPKO which was charged with formulating plans. The fact that
UNAMIR was gradually dismantled by unilateral national decisions
was also of great concern. The withdrawal of the Belgian unit deprived
UNAMIR of its strongest and best equipped unit. Soon after the Belgian withdrawal was announced, the Government of Bangladesh announced it might follow suit. 8 With a cease-fire seemingly remote, there
was severe doubt in the Secretariat whether keeping the force on the
ground without reinforcements was a viable option.
In the period from when killings started on 6 April, to 21 April when
the Security Council decided to reduce UNAMIR's force to a "political"
presence, the crisis response in New York went through several phases.
The death of the ten Belgian peacekeepers created an initial, deep concern for the safety of miIitary and civilian U.N. personneI. This is reflected in the Secretary-General's letter to the Security Council of9 April,
where he suggested that the evacuation of civilian U.N. staff and foreign
nationals "might become unavoidable." IfUNAMIR were to effect such
an evacuation, this would require two to three additionaI battalions and a
changed mandate and RoEs, he concluded. In the informal consultations
in the Security Council on 8 April France suggested that a change in the
mandate of UNAMIR to assist the evacuation of nationals would be necessary. At that very time, France was preparing its own evacuation operation, although without informing the U.N.
The option of withdrawing the force was held open. On 9 April,
Boutros-GhaIi (who happened to be in Geneva) told the then UnderSecretary-General Kofi Annan that if the Force Commander and SRSG
together with DPKO judged the situation to be sufficiently dangerous,
UNAMIR should be withdrawn, and adding, that in this case he would
inform, rather than seek prior instructions from, the Security Council.
When briefing the Security Council later the same day, Annan passed
on the message that withdrawal of the force could not be ruled out,
depending on factors such as loss in UNAMIR credibility due to the
French and Belgian unilateral operations, or if there was increased hostility towards UNAMIR. 9
240
The Path of a Genocide
From 11 April and onwards, the focus shifted to discussions about
the future of UNAMIR. There was grave doubt in the DPKO that the
force could function satisfactorily without being strengthened both in
terms of size and mandate. DPKO officials also concluded that this
was not a very likely outcome.
The message that UNAMIR had to be strengthened if it were to have
any impact on the ground was communicated to the Security Council
on several occasions. When the Security Council on 11 April discussed
a possible evacuation of the force, Kofi Annan argued in his briefing
that UNAMIR's mandate might have to change, otherwise, if the force
was to carry on, additional resources might have to be allocated. Briefing the Security Council on 13 April, Assistant Secretary-General Iqbal
Riza raised the question of protecting civilian nationals in the long term.
He also conveyed the opinion of the Force Commander, that if the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR left, the security of the rest of the force
could not be guaranteed; nor could the airport remain secure. Furthermore he maintained that protection of civilians would require more
resources, and that the Council should consider whether peacekeeping
operations should include this task (consultations, Security Council
1994). AIso the Secretary-General's letter of 13 April stressed that, with
the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent, UNAMIR would be unable
to carry out its mandate, and stated that "in these circumstances, I have
asked my Special Representative and the Force Commander to prepare
plans for the withdrawal of UNAMIR, should this prove necessary"
(Leitenberg 1994, vol. 23 no. 6). His representative stressed to the Security Council, however, that this did not constitute a recommendation
to withdraw.
The signals from the Security Council were dear. The Council would
not accept another "Somali operation" to resolve the crisis and, on 13
April, asked the Secretariat for feasible options that were between a Somali-type enforcement action and a total withdrawal. When the Secretariat gave options to the Security Council for the frrst time on 14 April,
these reflected the instructions of charting "mid-way" courses. One was
to keep a reduced mission in place (the present UNAMIR without the
Belgian contingent), with the parties being given about three weeks to
reach an agreement to return to the Arusha Accords. A few days before
the deadline expired, the parties would be given a warning, while the
troops would prepare for withdrawal. The other option was to reduce the
U.N. presence to a very smalllevel, a total of2oo, on the assumption that
there would be no quick resumption of the peace process. Both options,
U.N. Peacekeeping in Rwanda
241
however, were based on the unlikely premise of a cease fIre, a condition
which was criticized by several Security Council members as being unrealistic. But the Security Council could still not agree on any action.
The only consensus on 14 April was on what not to do: neither total
withdrawal nor any enforcement or expansion of the force.
There was no attempt to draw a distinction between the fIghting between the RPF and the interim government, and the massacres carried
out by individuals or lightly armed militias against unarmed civilians. 10
The Secretariat's focus on the cease-fIre as a condition for ending the
massacres might, therefore, have led it to exclude the concept of "humanitarian intervention," that is, a peace enforcement operation focusing on protection or more explicit law-and-order tasks.
On 19 April, during the fInal drafting of the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General's Task Force suggested a sharp reduction of UNAMIR (although keeping a presenee in
a neighboring country). An important factor that contrlbuted to this
recommendation was that another main troop contributing country,
Bangladesh, had signaled to DPKO its desire to withdraw. The DPKO
representative argued that the force was unable to function, and there
was no prospect for a cease fire. The Task Force decided to present the
option of sharp withdrawal as a strong recommendation to the Security
Council. The recommendation by the Task Force was, however, not
fully followed by the Secretary-General, who in his report the fol1owing day (S/1994/470) did not exclude the possibility of massive
enforcement.
In his report to the Security Council of 20 Aprill994, the SecretaryGeneral underlined that the UNAMIR personnel "cannot be left at risk
indefinitely when there is no possibility for their perforrning the tasks
for which they were dispatched" (Rwanda U.N. Doc. S/1994/470 1994).
VNAMIR military personnel on that date numbered 1515, down from
2165, and there were 190 military observers, down from 321. The Secretary-General outlined three alternatives for the Security Council.
Assuming there was no realistic prospect for a cease fire in the immediate future, fighting and massacres could only be averted by an immediate and massive reinforcement of UNAMIR and a change in its
mandate to an enforcement operation. This would require several thousand additionai troops and might require VNAMIR being given enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the V.N. Charter. Option II
was to keep a small U.N. detachment in Kigali to act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to make them agree on a cease
242
The Path of a Genocide
fire. This effort eould be maintained for a period of up to two weeks or
longer. Under this option, the military personnel would number about
270. However, a full relief effort would be impossible without a eeasefire under this arrangement. Finally, the Secretary-General noted that
UNAMIR could be completely withdrawn, although he did not favor
this alternative, as the eost of a withdrawal in human lives eould be
very severe.
The Secretary-General's report reflected the indecisiveness in the
Secretariat during the first, crucial weeks of the crisis. While c1airning
that UNAMIR required an expanded mandate and reinforcements in
order to function, no contingency planning was made, and a firm reeommendation for an offensive operation was never forwarded. Nevertheless, by not exc1uding an enforcement operation in this round, the
Secretary-General eould legitimately call for forceful action as soon as
two weeks later. For two weeks after 6 April, the Security Council held
almost daily eonsultations on the Rwandan crisis. During the first week
there was little eonsisteney in the discussions, and Council members
complained about lack of information and c1ear options from the Secretariat. But the Security Council, when presented with options on 14
April, was unable to decide how to react, only agreeing that extreme
options of a Somali-type operation and a complete withdrawal were
unacceptable.
After the first few days, the U.S. delegation argued consistently
against a continuing presence,u The main reason was the U.S. failure
in Somalia, which beeame an important turning point in the Clinton
adrninistration's policy on peacekeeping. The Rwanda crisis erupted
during the last phase of the drafting of a new doctrine (PDD 25) that
strictly limited U.S. support for U.N. peacekeeping. The main message
from Washington was that "the U.N. must learn when to say no," and
that "hard questions" had to be asked before a new peacekeeping force
would be authorized. Belgium's campaign to withdraw the force was
also important. The Belgians were afraid of giving the impression of
leaving an impossible mission behind in great danger, and wanted all
of UNAMIR to withdraw. The phone eall from the Belgian Foreign
Minster, Willy Claes, to U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, is
regarded by many American officials as being decisive for the U.S.
final reeommendation to withdraw. 12 On the other hand, Belgians were
possibly pushing on an open door.
The United Kingdom repeatedly wamed against leaving a vulnerable force in unstable eonditions, but ended up voting for a reduetion of
U.N. Peacekeeping in Rwanda
243
the force. France did not play a prominent role in the discussions. Nigeria, representing the NAM (Non-Aligned Members) caucus, initially
criticized the focus on the safety of expatriates, and wanted more protection for Rwandese civilians. On 13 April, Nigeria circulated a draft
resolution to extend UNAMIR's mandate, but withdrew it when it became clear that it would not receive support in the Security Council.
The OAU supported the Nigerian initiative, urging the Security Council to "take urgent actions to help protect the lives and property of civilians in Rwanda and to consider expanding the size and mandate of
UNAMIR in Rwanda" (New YorklOAU/AG/1I94 1994). New Zealand,
which held the presidency in the Security Council at the time, preferred a more activist role for UNAMIR, but did not forward specific
proposals for an extended mandate. Under the circumstances, and to
counter the push for full withdrawal, the New Zealand delegation actually preferred a "non-decision" [Le., to give the Force Commander more
time to work with the existing force and continue the tasks he was
conducting (interview 1995)].
On 21 April, the Security Council decided inits resolution 912 (1994)
to reduce UNAMIR to the number recommended by the Secretary-General in his option II. Simultaneously, the mandate of UNAMIR was
adjusted: the force was to act as an intermediary between the parties in
an attempt to obtain a cease-fire, assist in the resumption ofhumanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible, and monitor developments
in Rwanda, including the safety and security of civilians who sought
refuge with UNAMIR.
The decision to withdraw the main bulk of the peacekeeping force
was met with criticism from several quarters, including the Organization of African Unity, which denounced the withdrawal as "a sign of
indifference or lack of sufficient concern" for Africans (Leitenberg
1994).
The Secretary-General Seizes the Initiative
On 29 April, Boutros-Ghali appealed to the Security Council to take
more forceful action to stop the massacres (S/1994/518). The initiative
marked a shift of focus and direction in the Secretary-General's attitude toward the Rwandan crisis. The massacres and the need to proteet
civilians in Rwanda now became his main priority, although he did not
use the term "genocide" untillate May. The Secretary-General had by
now numerous reports on the immense scale of the humanitarian catas-
244
The Path of a Genocide
trophe and referred to estimates of 200,000 kiIled in the previous three
weeks (U.N. Department of Public Information 1995). The
Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Peter Hansen, had
recently paid a visit to Rwanda, and had launched a DHA "flash appeal" on behalf of U.N. agencies for immediate emergency operations.
UNAMIR was reporting on the ongoing violence and massacres of civilians in Kigali and beyond.
By raising doubts about the viability of the revised mandate given to
UNAMIR by the Security Council 21 April, the Secretary-General implicitly criticized the Security Council for not making appropriate decisions. Now calling for "forceful action," even though that would
require a "commitment of human and material resources on a scale
which Member States had so far proved reluctant to contempiate," the
Secretary-General argued that the scale of human suffering and its implications for the stability of neighboring countries left the Security
Council with no other alternative (S/1994/518).
The Expansion of UNAMIR
With no Western state willing to commit troops to an expanded
UNAMIR, the U.N. 's only alternative was to create a strengthened force
comprised of African contingents with Western financial and logistic
support. A few African countries indicated that they might have some
lightly armed infantry, but requested more details about the mandate,
operational plans, the size of the force and the logistics available. Soon,
this became a "chicken-egg situation" since the U.S. said there was no
point in the Council discussing a possible mandate until it knew roughly
what resources would be available.
Informal discussions in the Security Council on 6 May resulted in a
request for indicative contingency planning with regard to the delivery
of humanitarian assistance as weIl as support to the displaced persons
in Rwanda. At the urging of the U.K. representative, the Security Council
requested options in the form of a "non-paper" from the SecretaryGeneral in order to pre-empt a forceful directive such as the one made
by Boutros-Ghali on 29 April (Security Council 1994). There was no
agreement on an operational concept, especiaIly regarding the question
of a cease fire and co-operation of the parties. The proposal from France
was to focus on humanitarian assistance, with the concept of "humanitarian corridors," as tried out in Iraq, with the political aspect left aside.
The U.K., advocating its own peacekeeping doctrine firmly based on
U.N. Peacekeeping in Rwanda
245
consent, opposed this perspective, claiming that co-operation was essential unless it was to be a full-scale chapter VII-type operation with
helicopter gun ships.
The Force Commander's operational concept was a highly mobile
force with deterrent capacity, preferably with a chapter VII mandate.
The Secretary-General's proposal, presented in the non-paper of 9 May,
was built on the Force Commander's recommendation. Although authorized under a chapter VI mandate, Rules of Engagement would be
strong, including an extended interpretation of self-defense or "mission defense."13 For the protection of civilians, the Secretary-General
included the possibility of establishing safety zones.
The U.S. had reservations about the proposal which they read as
establishing a large peace enforcement mission to restore order and
pacify the population, and caIled for a small force restricted to monitoring "protective zones" on the borders. The U.S. finally agreed to the
Secretary-General's concept, but insisted that only the first phase could
be implemented without a functioning cease fire. The U.S. conditionality, which dominated the whole process of establishing the expanded
operation, was a direct consequence of the new Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD 25) on peace operations that had been released the
same month. The expansion of UNAMIR was seen as an occasion to
apply the new doctrine for the first time. The result was to delay the
process further, and the U.S. insistence of phased deployment was criticized by several Security Council members, as weIl as by BoutrosGhali and General Dallaire. 14
The first phase would include about 150 unarmed observers and a
battalion from Ghana of 800 men to secure the airport. Authorization
for the deployment of the bulk of the force was, at U.S. insistence,
made dependent on a further report regarding the co-operation of the
parties, the duration of the mandate and the availability of troops.
In a resolution on 17 May, the Security Council adjusted the mandate for UNAMIR and increased its strength to 5,500 troops. FoIlowing most of the recommendations of the Secretary-General, UNAMIR
would support and provide safe conditions for displaced persons and
other groups in Rwanda and would help with the provision of assistance by humanitarian organizations (SlRes/918/1994). UNAMIR would
also monitor border crossing points. Authorized under chapter VI of
the U.N. Charter, the operation's roles of engagement did not include
enforcement action, but permitted a proactive role to protect civilians.
The Security Council solved this apparent inconsistency by introduc-
246
The Path of a Genocide
ing an expanded definition of "self-defense" in Res.918: the force could
be "required to take action in self-defense against those who threatened protected sites and populations and the means of delivery and
distribution ofhumanitarian relief." Until then, similar protection mandates in U.N. operations-notably the "no fly zone" and "safe havens
in Bosnia, and the humanitarian zone in Northern Iraq-had been based
on chapter VII.
FaHure to Activate the U.N. Stand-by Roster
The U.N.'s stand-by roster for peacekeeping, a recently established
and at the time highly applauded mechanism for quickly providing troops
for peacekeeping missions, was tried in the process of expanding
UNAMIR. Although thirty-four countries had committed troops and
logistics to the stand-by roster, the only function it had in reality was to
get a quicker no from member states. AIso, the African countries which
had criticized the downsizing ofUNAMIR were quick to pledge troops
in response to requests from OAU's Secretary-General, but of the nine
African countries that by early May had volunteered units, all but one
had inadequate equipment (Karhilo, 1995). DPKO officials spent the
following months in endless negotiations trying to provide logistics
and equipment from Western countries. The combination of excessive
lists of demands from the African troop contributing countries and lack
of response from the Western countries made the deployment of
UNAMIR a slow and difficult task. 15 As of mid-June, UNAMIR had
only reached a strength of 354 troops and 124 military observers (Le.,
less than 10 percent of the authorized force).
The delays in setting up the expanded UNAMIR force pointed to the
long-standing problem of recruiting troops for peacekeeping operations.
Normally it takes up to 6 months to set up a peacekeeping force. The
stand-by rooster was an improvement by giving the Secretariat a clearer
overview of troops and equipment potentially available. Yet stand-by
arrangements do not guarantee that member states actually will commit troopS.16
From FaHed Protection to Failed Peace-building?
When the expanded UNAMIR finally was brought up to full strength
in August-October, the conditions in Rwanda were totally changed. The
resolutions of 17 May (918) and 8 June 1994 (925) authorized UNAMIR
U.N. Peacekeeping in Rwanda
247
to protect civilians and internally displaced persons threatened by genocide, but by mid-July, the RPF controlled practically all Rwandan territory, and both the civil war and the genocide had effectively ended.
The new situation required a different role for U.N. rnilitary assistance. While retaining its formal mandate, UNAMIR's functions in practice became closely tied to repatriation of refugees and internally
displaced persons (IDPs), and in assisting the Govemment in reconstructing basic infrastructure and providing general security.17
The first task was to receive controI from the French forces in the
"safe humanitarian zone" in the southwest. There was widespread fear
that the French withdrawal would be completed before deployment of
the new UNAMIR troops, and that this would create further refugee
flows into Zaire. UNAMIR began deploying troops in the zone on 10
August, and on 21 August the full transfer took place. A large refugee
outflow was averted, and, in co-operation with UNAMIR, the Rwandese
Govemment gradually established its authority in the area.
UNAMIR's civil police component of ninety observers was originally planned to monitor the local gendarmerie and the police force.
However, no police force was left when the civil war ended. The govemment therefore requested UNAMIR to start a training program for
future local police and a gendarmerie. UNAMIR immediately started
new training programs and by mid-November had helped train about
100 gendarmes. The strength of the police component was increased to
120, but attempts to get more French-speaking staff proved unsuccessful, and by April 1995 only fifty-eight police observers were deployed
(U.N. Doc. S/19951297 1995).
The refugee camps in Zaire and the IDP camps in the southwest of
the country posed serious and immediate security threats for the new
govemment of Rwanda. Militants and the old leadership in the camps
were trying to prevent IDPs from retuming home, and used the camps
as bases for raids. Launching Operation Hope and Operation Retour in
December 1994, concerted efforts were made by the humanitarian organizations, UNAMIR and the government to empty the camps.
UNAMIR and RPA were to jointly provide security for the returning
refugees. The establishment of Open Relief Centers (ORCs), where
accommodation, food and protection would be provided, represented
an attempt to create safe corridors for retuming IDPs and refugees. By
January 1995, about half of the remaining 350,000 IDPs had returned
home, though a large concentration remained at the Kibeho camp and
other smaller ones.
248
The Path of Il Genodde
On 18 April, a new offensive was initiated by the government to
elose the remaining camps. The operation was supposed to take place
without force, and with UNAMIR providing safe escort for the IDPs in
co-operation with the RPA. However, the c10sure of the Kibeho camp
led to the killing of a very large number of persons, mostly by RPA
soldiers. While an Independent International Commission generally
exonerated the Rwandese authorities, international condemnation was
swift and, to the Rwandese government, stood in stark contrast to the
world's lack of commitment during the genocide (U.N. Doc. S/1995/
4111995).
The Kibeho incident further complicated relations between the U.N.
and the Rwanda government. Throughout the autumn of 1994, the relationship between UNAMIR and the government had been reported to
be "cordial and co-operative" and the Secretary-General expressed confidence regarding the government's efforts in reconciliation and rehabilitation. The discipline of the Rwandan Patriotic Army was recognized,
although incidents of intimidation were reported. In March and April
1995, however, reports of mistrust and deliberate attacks on the U.N.
force caused concern in UNAMIR as weIl as in New York. RPA frequently restricted the movement of UNAMIR personnel, and denied it
access to certain areas (UN Doc. S/1995/297 1995). Armed robberies,
allegedly by uniformed individuals, increased. State-run radio stations
began accusing UNAMIR of aiding criminals and having sex with
Rwandan women (Reuter News report 1995).
When the Secretary-General in June 1995 outlined the future of
UNAMIR (S/1995/457), he stressed the changing nature of the mission. He argued that the force should be transformed into a confidencebuilding instrument, rather than focusing on traditional peacekeeping
tasks. Paradoxically, this initiative came when the relationship between
the government and the international community was at its lowest ebb.
The Security Council decided on 9 June to reduce the force to 2,330
within three months, and 1,800 within four months (SlRes.997/1995).
The new mandate reduced the security and protective functions of
UNAMIR, leaving almost exc1usively humanitarian functions like 10gistics support for relief and rehabilitation.
The downsizing was a response to the Rwandese government's discomfort with the force. Kigali asserted that the U.N. force was neither
needed, nor wanted, and told the press that the force was "costly, useless and undisciplined" (International Herald Tribune 1995). Several
factors contributed to the distrust and lack of cooperation. Fust, the
U.N. Peacekeeping in Rwanda
249
Rwandese government was far more in need ofdevelopment assistance
and frustrated over what it regarded as a niggardly international response. More important, the U.N.'s withdrawal of the peacekeeping
force, and failure to react when a genocide was unfolding, was not
forgotten. There was also a sense that the main security threat--crossborder insurgencies by former government forces--could be countered
most efficiently without a U.N. military presence. UNAMIR, in effect,
was seen as an international "controi mechanism." There were also
indications that the government was increasingly interested in bilateral
military support, like military advisors and training experts, which required the departure ofUNAMIR. Finally, UNAMIR arguably had become a mission without a credible rationale since its humanitarian
functions could be better provided by humanitarian agencies that did
not antagonize the population to the same extent.
Conc1usions
The Rwanda crisis sheds light on the doctrinal shortcomings of international peace operations. The U.N. Secretary-General's concept of
peace, introduced in his An Agenda for Peace, 1992, would have been
applicable in this case. But the concept needs to be further developed.
Attempts to define an alternative between the black and white options
of peacekeeping, which is mainly a diplomatic tool, and massive enforcement action against an international aggressor as described in
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, were set back by the experiments in
Somalia. The result was a conceptual vacuum. Peace enforcement can
mean a range of actions between these two extremes. The escalation of
the Rwandan conflict in early April required a decisive intervention of
this intermediate kind Somali-type operation, not a peacekeeping force
with a few more weapons and "robust" RoE.
The Rwanda crisis also highlighted the need for a rapid and more
predictable reaction capacity. The U.N. decision-making structures and
laborious system for mobilizing personnel have repeatedly proved inadequate. The gradually expanding stand-by roster is an improvement
but not the appropriate answer in crises like that in Rwanda, as was
demonstrated in May and June 1994 when an attempt was made to
activate the roster.
Based on the experienee of spending months requesting troops while
a massive genocide was developing, the Secretary-General has called
for a "U.N. rapid reaction force for peacekeeping" to be activated on a
250
The Path of a Genocide
short notice (U.N. Doc. A/50/60 1995). He has deliberately not recommended a specific model, rather giving an open invitation to member
states or interested groups to take initiatives within a wide framework.
By mid-1995, some responses were circulating. A Dutch proposal to
set up an independent U.N. brigade, individually recruited, and under
the direct command of the U.N. was one proposal. The financial costs
of establishing a new military structure, combined with poor, or nonexisting, military command and controI systems in the U.N., make this
proposal a point of departure for discussion, but it is not an answer in
the short-term. More realistic is the Danish proposal for a multinational "U.N. Stand-By Force High Readiness Brigade," where national
stand-by units would be integrated in alarger multinational brigade.
The strength of this proposal is that the different units would have coordinated training programs and some joint maneuvers prior to deployment. Nevertheless, national contributions are subject to the political
will of member states in each new situation.
Arguably, Western reluctance to get involved militarily in African
conflicts must also be met by an effort to enhance the regional capacity
for conflict management on the continent. Although the GAU has improved its capacity by establishing a "Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution," this cannot deal with larger
emergencies. Problems related to lack of resources, training and experience must be addressed by both Western nations and the U.N. In partnership with African actors, there is a need for funding, assets and
training programs.
Notes
l. The major part of the force, consisting of two infantry battalions, and two companies, was deployed in the Kigali sector. Their main task was to establish and
monitor the Kigali Weapon Secure Area (KWSA), located within a 10 km radius
of the Kigali city center. A Belgian infantry battalion was deployed in the southem sector, city center and airport. A Bangladeshi infantry battalion was deployed
to the northern part of the KWSA. In addition, a 1Unisian company was deployed at the CND building complex where the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF)
and its battalion were quartered. A Ghanaian company was transferred from the
DMZ to provide security for UNAMIR in the weapons secure area. A Ghanaian
infantry battalion, thirty-two military observers (UNMOs) and a Force Engineer
Company operated within the Dernilitarized Zone. Two UNMO teams were deployed in the RPF sector and the Rwandese govemment sector, respectively.
Thirty-two UNMOs were responsible for the monitoring of the southem part of
the country. UNOMUR continued to monitor the Uganda-Rwanda border according to ils mandate of June 1993.
2. Referred to in a cable from UNAMIR Force Commander to UNIDPKO, 11 January 1994.
U.N. Peacekeeping in Rwanda
251
3. UNAMIR lacked a political analytic capacity in political affairs, that is, specialized staff (civilian or military) to monitor and analyze the situation.
4. Cr. Prunier 1995, ch. 7 for a discussion of the various theories.
5. The account of the killings is based onAfrican Rights (1994) and Karhilo (1995).
6. The unit consisted of four C-BO aircraft carrying around 280 soldiers and a
medical team. The following day the French troops reached battalion strength.
7. As was said at the Secretary-General's Task Force meeting on 12 April: ''The
deployment of the non-U.N. Belgian unit for the evacuation exercise, collocated
in Kigali with a Belgian unit serving under U.N. command in UNAMIR, recalled the U.N.tu.S. difficulties in Somalia."
8. Around 15 April, the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the U.N. started
communicating to DPKO that his Government "under pressure from some governments" was on the brink of announcing withdrawal from UNAMIR. In an
internai DPKO letter, concern was expressed about this development. Other
observers c1aim that the undersized Bangladeshi battalion by then was at the
point of deserting.
9. Referred to in notes of the meeting of the Secretary-General's Task Force on
United Nations Operations, 12 April 1994.
10. This has been pointed out by several critics, inc1uding Oxfam 1995.
11. According to an official in the U.S. delegation to the U.N., this position was "to
the disCOInfort of working level people in the delegation" (interview May 1995).
On 12 April, the U.S. representative expressed "major doubts about the viability
of UNAMIR in the present circumstances; it certainly could not carry out its
mandate, and may even be a destabilizing factor." On 13 April the delegation
"suggested leaving a small skeletal operation." On 15 April the U.S. position
was that in the current circumstances, there was no role that could be performed
by a U.N. peacekeeping force; the U.S. opposition to keeping UNAMIR in place
was firm (see Adelman and Suhrke 1996).
12. LaRose-Edwards (1995) comments that the c1aim of the impact of Belgian lobbying "seems a bit of an overstatement."
13. For a discussion on traditional principles of use of force in peacekeeping, see
for example Häggiund 1990.
14. An official in the American U.N. delegation later noted that this insistence on
conditionality was damaging to the process, and that it contributed to a similar
reluctance among potential troop contributors to get involved (Barnett 1995).
15. Also member states which had agreed to provide equipment contributed to delays in deployment. The delivery of 50 APCs from the U.S. was delayed for
weeks, the first APC arriving in Rwanda on 30 July. Pentagon officials said this
was "normal" delivery time, but there is no doubt that a political decision could
have speeded up the process (see Adelman and Suhrke, op.dt.).
16. For a discussion on the short-comings in stand-by arrangements, see Leurdik
1995.
17. With a normal deployment time of up to 6 months for a peacekeeping mission,
the mismatch between the mandate given at one stage of a conflict and the
changed realities on the ground when the force is deployed is a quite common,
but it is seldom as striking as in the case of the expanded UNAMIR force.
12
Dilemmas of Proteetion:
The Log of the Kigali Battalion
Astr; Suhrke
Introduction
The shooting down of President Habyarimana's plane over the
Rwandan capital Kigali on 6 April 1994 set off multiple cnses. There
was the genocide itself-the systematic hunting down and killing of
several hundred thousand persons-and a smaller civil war which unfolded alongside it. The events produced something akin to a crisis as
weIl in the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Rwanda. Deployed half a
year earlier to help implement the peace agreement, UNAMIR was
suddenly in the midst of a situation that was totally different than that
for which it had been prepared and equipped. In the annals of U.N.
peacekeeping gone awry, the UNAMIR mission was soon to become a
c1assic.
As a general failure of U.N. peacekeeping, the Rwanda case has
been weIl documented. From the perspective of the forces on the
ground, however, much has remained unexplored and unknown. What
did the transformed situation mean to the U.N. contingent in operational, policy, and moral terms? At the outset of the crisis, ten Belgian blue berets stationed in Kigali were kiIled by Rwandan soldiers.
Rumors of evacuation of the peacekeepers followed. Systematic
"c1eansing" and killings took place all around them. This chapter tries
to present the consequent dilemmas of protection as they appeared to
the Belgian battalion in Kigali (KIBAT), which by virtue of its location and strength in UNAMIR as a whole took the brunt of the question of how to respond.
253
254
The Path of a Genocide
The account is based largely on the battalion logbook which became
available recently and constitutes a uniquely valuable source. Because
of the historical importance of the events of April 1994, and the enduring controversies which surround them, the Belgian unit most closely
involved subsequently sought to present the record as it appeared in
their sources. The 2nd Commando battalion, which formed the Kigali
Battalion, systematically undertook to reconstruct events from 6 until
19 April 1994, when its last men were withdrawn. After three months
of research based on the battalion 10gbook, records of the Belgian paratrooper unit which flew in to help with the evacuation of expatriates,
other notes and numerous interviews, the narrative was completed in
September 1995. It is a detailed-at times minute-by-minute-account
of the first crucial days as the Belgian unit experienced them. The account, entitled KIBAT: Chronique 06avr-19avr 1994, is written in the
format of a military log and was eventually published by the battalion
commander, Col. J. Dewez. While presumably reflecting institutional
biases, it remains a valuable primary source for an analysis of the peacekeepers ' dilemmas during the first days of crisis in Kigali. 1
At times, the dilemma appeared to be one of saving themselves versus saving others. At other times, the choice was between protecting
expatriates or Rwandans. At critical points the choice was made for
them. During the few days after 6 April when the battalion remained in
Kigali, its resources were tied up by orders to help evacuate expatriates. About the same time, the Belgian government gave priority to
saving the Belgian peacekeepers by unilaterally deciding to withdraw
the battalion (announced on 12 April). In the U.N., the Security Council readily followed the Belgian example by voting on 21 April to withdrawall but a token numher of the entire force. The decision effectively
terrninated any significant international presence in Rwanda during the
next several months, perrnitting the organizers of the genocide to proceed unhindered.
What happened during the first few days and nights after 6 April has
remained of extraordinary concern and controversy, both in Rwanda
and outside. Apart from the international tribunal proceedings against
those guilty of genocide, the most intense attention abroad was probably sustained in Belgium. The head of the Kigali sector of UNAMIR,
the Belgian Colonel Luc Marchal, was charged and subjected to possible court-martial in Brussels in 1996 for failing to protect his men. A
legal process was initially initiated by the families of the ten Belgian
commandos who were killed, but the court-martial process pre-empted
Dilemmas of Proteetion: The Log of the Kigali Battalion
255
the possibility of a civil trial; it ended in acquittal. Col. Marchal was
widely viewed as a scapegoat for more deep-seated anger and bewilderment-anger against the seeming messiness of U.N. peacekeeping
operations, and bewilderment in such situations about what constitutes
moral and political responsibility and where it resides. In an effort to
sort out these issues, a Belgian parliamentary commission of inquiry
was established; by the end of 1997, the commission had assembled a
prodigious amount of testimony.2
General Deployment
The Chronique opens by emphasizing that KlBAT was instructed to
operate in a defensive mode. The battalion deployed in Rwanda had
previously served in the U.N. force in Somalia. As they prepared for
the Rwanda mission, the men were continuously told that this was not
like Somalia; this was peacekeeping-not peaceenforcement. Force was
to be used only in self-defense, or when specifieally authorized by higher
leveis.
In the kit given eaeh soldier was a one-page summary of the Rules
of Engagement (RoE), condensed into six points from the complieated
and detailed original rules issued (in English) by the U.N. Department
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO),3 purportedly from the eomplicated and detailed original rules issued (in English). The six points,
however, were clear. Force was to be used only in self-defense, or when
specifically authorized by higher echelons. If incidents arose, the soldiers were instructed to demonstrate nonaggressive and eooperative
behavior: Try first to defuse the situation verbally, the rules proc1aimed,
then enlist the help of the Rwandan gendarmerie, UNAMIR's designated loeal partner. If that does not wqrk, do not use force uniess authorized. Before firing a single shot from a non-automatic weapon, obtain
authorization from the battalion commander. Use of heavier weapons
required higher authority: semiautomatic weapons (Mi.5) had to be
authorized by the UNAMIR Sector Commander for Kigali, and the use
of autornatic weapons (Mag) had to be cleared at the very top, by the
Force Commander himself. Machine-guns were, in any case, in short
supply and the special fittings necessary to mount them on vehicles
were unavailable.
While not rnentioned in the Chronique, an incident in March of
1994-0nly a month before the genocide-served more than anything
else to bring horne the central rnessage that force was not to be used
256
The Path of a Genocide
without authorization. 4 At that time, a battalion unit had reacted to a
nasty crowd situation by shooting without obtaining prior authorization. Although no one was hurt, the unit involved was sternly reprimanded and sent home early.
When deployed in Kigali, KIBAT was not at the full strength of 800
men originally envisaged; the Belgian army could spare only 450 men
at the time. Bangladeshi soldiers made up the rest of the U.N. force in
the Kigali sector. The Bangladeshi battalion was not only below strength,
but poorly equipped and inexperienced. Named the Rutongo Battalion
(RUTBAT) after its place of deployment just outside Kigali, the
Bangladeshi contingent inc1uded a logistics unit and was assigned
UNAMIR's armored vehicles. The eight APCs were mostly immobile;
they were Russian APCs taken from Mozambique with no keys to access the engines and no spare parts making maintenance virtually impossible. The Bangladeshis had few other vehicles. As a result, regular
patrolling and protection activities fen mainly to the Belgians.
KIBATbecame the backbone of the U.N. force in Kigali and, to that
extent, of UNAMIR as a whole. The other main unit was a Ghanaian
battalion deployed in the demilitarized zone in the North. The total
force level authorized by the U.N. was 2,548, including unarmed military observers.
The small, hybrid U.N. force in Kigali was, like the town itself, spread
out. The Belgians were scattered in small, isolated cantonments-a
fact which was to assume considerable significance during the first
week of crisis. KIBAT's small he1icopter detachment, consisting of nine
persons to look after two machines, was installed in a private house.
Six of the eleven members of the medical unit were in another private
house, a considerable distance from the remaining five members of the
unit who were on another hill. The logistical base was put in the warehouse of a large state-owned coffee trading company, RWANDEX. One
of the platoons assigned to the airfield was cantoned at the technical
school mn by Franciscan monks in the center of town (ATS Don Bosco);
the other platoon was near the airport. The staff and most of the rest of
KIBAT were divided in groups of fifteen to thirty-six in various private
houses. The largest unit of 90 men was put up at the Technical School
(ETO). Code-named Beverly Hills, this particular cantonment was later
to become infamous during the killings. UNAMIR's HQ was in the
modest Amahoro hotel, near the large stadium by the same name which
was to become another landmark in the history of April 1994.
The scatter effect was accentuated by the geography of Kigali, a
Dilemmas of Protection: The Log of the Kigali Battalion
257
rural-Iooking capitallaid out on numerous hills connected by a maze of
roads which connected at strategically placed round-abouts. The traffic
circles were central coordinates on the city map and ideal points for
controlling movement. UNAMIR's Sector Command for Kigali had
numbered them on their maps from NI to N15.
The main reason for KIBAT's dispersion was lack of central accommodation and the need for quick deployment. As long as UNAMIR
was engaged in c1assic peacekeeping, the decentralized cantonrnent was
hardly more than a nuisance, and perhaps a blessing in disguise by
making the blue berets more visible. With a mandate that excluded
actions to deter or retaliate, as the Security Council had formulated the
authorizing resolution on 5 October 1993, UNAMIR had to rely on the
power of presence. When the situation changed radically with renewed
civil war and widespread killings of civilians, the cantonment pattem
had different implications.
6 April
The night of 6 April started with the usual coca-cola patroIs (Goffin,
1995). Accompanied by Rwandan gendarmes, the Belgians were demonstrating U.N. presence by making patroIs in Kigali and stopping at
roadside cafes to make contact with the locals. On the night of 6 April,
they were interrupted by the explosion of the downed jet at 8:30 p.m.
While the source of the explosion initially was unknown, UNAMIR
was soon informed that the president's plane had gone down and realized that an entirely new scenario was unfolding that night in Kigali.
Four Belgian soldiers on their way to the airport to meet a Belgian
transport-plane (C-130), which regularly carried supplies for UNAMIR
from Nairobi, were the fIrst to notice.
At one airport gate, the Belgian blue berets were stopped by a group
of visibly nervous gendarmes. The PresidentiaI Guard-the elite battalion of the Rwandan armed forces (FAR)-had blocked the access at
the other gate and opened fIre when the two jeeps with the Belgians
approached. The Belgians were stopped, their arms confIscated, and
they were held at the roadside with a group of civilian Rwandans who
were also stopped. The civilian Rwandans were hostile as weIl. One of
the Belgians, who was of Rwandan origin and spoke kinyarwanda, overheard them trying to set the soldiers up against the Belgians. Other
Belgians who later tried to enter the airport area were aggressively
stopped by govemment soldiers, but all were unharmed.
258
The Path of a Genocide
Although it was not so clear to any individuals at the time, apattern
emerges from the Chronique soon after 6 April. In the next few days,
Belgian soldiers who went into the city to escort expatriates to safe
areas or, more rarely, Rwandans, or who were leaving small and exposed cantonment areas for larger assembly points, were stopped at
roadblocks run by the Rwandan army and occasionally the gendarmerie.
Hostile crowds also gathered at the roadblocks, armed with machetes,
stones, and grenades, and when a stone was hurled it could look dangerously like a grenade. The crowds, the Belgians noted, were easily
controlled by the FAR-surging forward when the Rwandan soldiers
permitted, and moving back when ordered. The outcome varied. KIBAT
detachments were sometimes turned back, and sometimes pushed their
way through by a combination of bravado and diplomacy. They never
shot their way through. As a matter of policy, escorts were normally
requested from the gendarmerie, or even friendly elements in FAR, in
order to pass roadblocks, especially on out-of-town missions to evacuate expatriates. Escorts were sometimes provided, but mostly not.
The gendarmiere had been designated as UNAMIR's local partner
because it supposedly constituted a neutral, national force, unlike the
competing forces of the government (FAR) and the rebels (RPA). When
the crisis struck, however, the gendarmerie tended to melt away or appeared at roadblocks. At one o'clock in the morning of 7 April, Col.
Marchal ordered patroIs to resume in order to showa U.N. presence in
the city, but insisted on the usual participation by the gendarmerie. The
gendarmerie was reluctant, perhaps not so much from a determination
to oppose the U.N., but more likely from an unwillingness to take risks
in a new situation. As long as UNAMIR followed the rules of joint
patrol to the letter, the gendarmes could frustrate activity by the force
simply by not responding.
On 7 April at the ETO cantonment (Beverly Hills), Lt. Lemaire is ready to resume
patroIs but can only get two of the six gendarmes he needs. At the airport, Capt.
Vandriessehe cannot get anyone from the gendarme post to join patroIs, but finally loeates one unenthusiastie fellow who eonsents to go 500 meters towards
the city from the airport, but no further. Other patrois do not fare mueh better.
Five days later the pattem is mueh the same. On 12 April, a unit ordered to evaeuate 80 expatriates from the Rwamagana area outside Kigali can find only one
single gendarme for eseort-he is from Rwamagana and wants a ride home. Along
the way, the eonvoy is stopped by the loeal gendarmes, but-as an indieation of
the deeentralized nature of the opposition-the Belgians eontaet the loeal
gendarmerie commander and the roadblock opens.
The source of the hostility towards the Belgian soldiers soon be-
Dilemmas of Proteetion: The Log of the Kigali Battalion
259
came apparent. At six o'c1ock in the morning of7 April, KIBAT commander Dewez reported by radio to all stations that rumors had been
planted that the Belgians had shot down the plane and killed the president. In reality, the attack was probably organized by Hutu extremists
as a first step to seizing power and eliminating the Thtsi minority as
well as the political opposition, whether Hutu or Thtsi. 5 Targeting the
latter directly involved UNAMIR as it had from the beginning been
assigned to protect opposition members of the present and designated
future coalition government. Of these, the mission to proteet the Prime
Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana-generally known among expatriates as Mme Agathe-turned out to be unique because of the obstac1es
involved as well as the consequences.
Protecting the Prime Minister
In a courageous defiance of the extremists, the Prime Minister announced soon after the shooting down of the plane that she would give
a radio address at 5:50 in the morning of 7 April to demonstrate that her
government was still in contro!. The commander ofUNAMIR's Kigali
Sector, Co!. Marchal, ordered an escort. Two KIBAT units were sent to
the Radio Rwanda building, and a platoon headed by Lt. Lotin was to
escort Mme Agathe from her residence to the radio station a brief distance away. Both buildings were located in the small, so-called presidential quarter of the city which also housed the U.N. compound, the
U.S. embassy and up-scale residences. Just before 4 am in the morning
of the 7 April, the KIBAT units reported back to headquarters:
The "presidentiai quarter" is hermetically sealed off by roadblocks reinforced by
armored cars. The gendarmes who accompany the Belgian platoons cannot get
them through. The staff officer on duty says he will try to contact liaison officers
at FAR to lift the roadblock. In the meantime, the Belgians seek another passage
in the maze of roads and find a roadblock on the southem side that seems more
penetrable. They argue their way through, and the four jeeps race down Avenue of
Paul VI towards Agathe's house. Here they come under fire but get through. Inside the gate ofAgathe's house they join the 3 Ghanaian U.N. soldiers (BUYBAT)
who had been assigned to guard the Prlme Minister. Outside the gates, an armored
car of the Presidential Guard is aiming at the U.N. vehicles; the sound of gun fire
and exploding grenades are heard from the neighborhood.
Agathe decides not to proceed with the radio address and asks for more U.N.
protection. She waits in vain for two hours, then flees on her own through a bamboo fence in a desperate effort to reach safety at the U.N. compound nearby. She
is caught and killed. Having advised the Prlme Minister not to leave, the Belgians
remain at her house. Ten minutes later a Rwandan army major approaches, asks
them to tum over their weapons, and escorts them away. It is about 8:30 a.m.
260
The Path of a Genocide
By late afternoon, the ten Belgians were all dead. The arrest and
subsequent killings of the Belgians were a defining event for UNAMIR
and, more generally, for the international response towards the swiftly
developing genocide. The Belgian govemment responded by withdrawing KIBAT. This in tum triggered the U.N. decision to abandon the
mission, leaving the coup makers to carry out the genocide during the
next two and a half months virtually unhindered by the international
community. The question whether there were alternative courses of
action has naturally been raised. Given the restraints of the situation,
could the events on 7 April and the momentous consequences have
been avoided?
While the exact developments on the ground remain controversial,
there seems to be consensus on the key points described in the
Chronique.
Tald by the Rwandan anny major to surrender their anns, and hearing hostile
murmurs from Rwandan soldiers (Hif you don't, you will be killed"), Lt. Latin
radios for instructions. While lightly anned, they have a capacity to resist: each of
his men has an automatic rifle (FNC), half of them also have revolvers, and there
are two semi-automatics (Minimi) in the vehicles. (Goffin, 45) Battalion commander Ca!. Dewez tells them not to give up their anns, but the Sector commander, Ca!. Marchal, intervenes: HIt is up to you to decide, you are on the spot.'"
A few minutes later, Latin radios back. The situation is getting worse; three of his
men have been disanned and are on the ground. At that point Dewez says, Hit is
best to do what theyask."
Lotin and his men give up their anns and, along with the Ghanaians,
are taken away in a minibus. The next and the last that is heard from the
Belgians is Lotin's voice on a cellular phone: "We have been disanned
and taken to I don't know where. Mon colonel, je crois qu'on va se faire
lyncher." The call is logged in at 9:06 in the morning on 7 April. It takes
the Sector Command only a couple of minutes to decide that the men
must be at the Rwandan anny's Camp Kigali. The Motorola phone belongs to a Togolese U.N. military observer at the camp. What to do now?
Col. Marchal informs the Force Headquarters (9:08) and then tries
to contact the Chief of Staff of FAR by telephone. Not getting through,
he tries to contact the military observer with the Motorola. There is no
answer. At 9:45, he is still trying to make contact by telephone, pointedly affirming that the Rules of Engagement remain unchanged. At
10:30 he announces on the battalion-wide radio band that Lotin apparently has been killed. The efforts on the telephone intensify; part of the
problem is that UNAMIR has mainly worked with the gendannerie
Dilemmas of Protection: The Log of the Kigali BattaUon
261
and does not have elose liaison with the army. There is a scramble for
telephone numbers. The liaison officer of the gendarmerie is asked to
help, but by 1 p.m., the Sector Command has still not succeeded in
establishing telephonic contact with FAR. Later in the afternoon, the
U.N. military observer and the Ghanaians taken from Agathe's house
are released from Camp Kigali and inform the force that the Belgians
have been killed at the camp.
Alternatives to the telephone were hardly considered before being
shelved. At the very moment when the Belgian soldiers were being
slaughtered by the Rwandan Presidentiai Guard, the U.N. Force Commander, General Romeo Dallaire, was on his way to a meeting of the
Crisis Committee called by the Rwandan coup-Ieaders. 8 The meeting
was held at the Ecole Superieure Militaire, located 200 meters from
Camp Kigali. In the car with him were a Rwandan and a Belgian officer. All were unarmed. As Dallaire later recalls events, when passing
Camp Kigali he saw bodies on the ground inside the compound; they
appeared to be Europeans. Making inquiries, he was told that they were
not Belgians, and that he could not enter to investigate due to chaotic
conditions in the compound where the soldiers were rebelling. Dallaire
proceeded to the meeting at the Crisis Committee, which was headed
by the well-known Hutu extremist, Col. Bagosora. Dallaire again asked
for permission to go to Camp Kigali, but was rebuffed. It was too dangerous because of the chaos in the camp, Bagosora said.
In the evening, Dallaire went to the morgue to identify the bodies.
They were in such a state that it took some time to sort out how many
there were-ten? eleven? As recorded in a later TV-interview, Dallaire
at this point in the recollection covers his face, visibly upset.
In the slow-moving drama that morning (the last Belgian was not
killed until the afternoon) a rescue mission elearly could have arrived
in time. The decision not to send one was taken, in effect, by default. In
the detailed records of the Chronique for that day, there is no mentian
of a discussion to launch a rescue mission, either at the Sector Commander level or in the communications with the Force HQ. UNAMIR
continued to operate in the diplomatic mode, a mode that was determined-according to Dallaire-by the balance of forces. A counterattack would have been "suicidal," he later said in a Belgian TV
interview. With a weak and dispersed force, he was extremely vulnerable to retaliation. "Had Marchal at that moment asked me [to counterattack], I would have said no," Dallaire conc1uded, adding; "It would
not have succeeded" (Les oublies de Kigali).
262
The Path of a Genocide
Dallaire sent a similar assessment to U.N. headquarters in New York
the next day. In a cable dated April 8, he outlined the grim situation in
Kigali. KIBAT is "separated into confined camps which are isolated by
fighting, firing and roadblocks, and the battalion's elements are focused
on self defense. In addition, these elements are separated from their
logistical support, i.e., water and food sources (except emergency rations), and no resupply of power, washing water, gasoline, sanitation,
and most importantly, given the threat of the present situation, their
supporting field hospitaL ... This is a defensive survival exercise for
UNAMIR."9
It was also clear that Rwandan forces were determined to prevent
UNAMIR from carrying out its monitoring and protection role during
the very first phase of the crisis. They used force to block U.N. efforts
to protect the Prime Minister and other political personalities in the
presidential quarter. They aggressively cordoned off the airport and the
adjacent site of the plane crash. When the KIBAT helicopter unit tried
to make reconnaissance flights over the city early on the morning of 7
April, Presidential Guard soldiers fired at them; the mission was aborted.
But it is also striking that during the entire rest of the Chronique, only
one other incident is recorded in which Rwandans fire directly at the
Belgian blue berets. That incident also occurred on 7 April and involved
a gendarme and municipal police. The gendarme fired at two Belgian
soldiers who had set up a machine-gun in front of their cantonment
(one of the medical units, code named Vitamine). The Belgians fired
back and the gendarme took off. Nobody was hurt.
One explanation is that Rwandan forces did not need to use force to
make the Belgians comply. The U.N. force quietly absorbed the deliberate killing of ten of its members; abandoned rather than used force
when its monitoring and escort functions were frustrated; and was soon
ordered to prepare withdrawing from Rwanda altogether. Quite possibly, and perhaps likely, the killings of the Belgians were a deliberate
provocation to that end. As earlier intelligence information picked up
by UNAMIR had indicated and later events seemed to confirm, those
who planned the coup and the genocide evidently wanted to get the
U.N. out of Rwanda so as to achieve their objectives without foreign
witnesses and interference (Adelman and Suhrke, 1996).
In a telling entry on 8 April, the Chronique notes that the KIBAT
Commander calls FAR for escorts to collect the bodies of the ten soldiers. The army is ready to cooperate. In the early afternoon they leave
the morgue. Accompanied by two light armored cars and a Rwandan
Dilemmas of Proteetion: The Log of the Kigali Battalion
263
army captain, the convoy of the. dead-protected by their killers-moved
swiftly through all roadblocks.
Prob~cting
Expatriates
As part of the survival exercise, small and isolated UNAMIR units
were regrouped in a few assembly areas soon after the crisis strock.
Regrouping was designed to reduce their vulnerability to direct attack
from Rwandan units or mobs, and from indirect fire from the war which
FAR and RPA units fought in a moving front-line through the town.
The supply situation was serious as well. Some cantonments had only
one to two days of drinking water, and most units had only two to three
days of fuel. A Tunisian company on guard duty had not eaten for two
days when it staggered into the Amahoro stadium. However, as a result
of the regrouping exercise, UNAMIR spent much of its scarce resources
reassembling for self-protection.
As for protecting others, first priority was given to U.N. civilian
personnel and expatriates. In particular, the decision taken by the French
and Belgian governments soon after 6 April to send in a military force
to evacuate their nationals effectively set the agenda for UNAMIR as
weIl. The French force landed in Kigali in the early morning of the 9
April, and the advance party of the Belgian "Operation Silver Back"
arrived the following night. A division of labor was agreed upon: the
Belgian paratroopers would guard the airport, the French would secure
the access areas, and UNAMIR would provide escort to the evacuees.
During the next few days, most of the remaining energy of UNAMIR
was used to escort expatriates for evacuation.
Numerous individual requests for expatriate protection are littered
throughout the Chronique in this period: the Italians call on the morning
of 9 April-there is a hostile crowd at the gate; the Americans want protection at the American Club, and so on. AIso embassies ask for protection, although the Belgian ambassador (Johan Swinnen) not only refrained
from "nationalizing" the Belgian battalion, but apparently refused offers
by Col. Marchal for U.N. protection and was among the last to order
evacuation of nationals. lO Some embassies evacuated overland, covering
the short distance to the border in convoys on their own. Still, during the
crucial first days when the genocide gathered momentum, KIBAT was
heavily preoccupied with expatriate evacuation.
It is not clear who decided on the division of labor among the military units during the evacuation, or why UNAMIR soldiers were in-
264
The Path of a Genocide
volved in the operation at all. The U.N. Secretariat and the Security
Council had on 7-8 April explored the idea of giving UNAMIR the
responsibility for evacuation and considered strengthening the force
for that purpose (Adelman and Suhrke, 1996). The initiative was overtaken by the French decision to launch a national evacuation force,
followed by similar moves by other governments who had sizable expatriate communities in Rwanda (Belgium and Italy).
UNAMIR did have a general mandate to "contribute to the security
of Kigali," but nothing in its mandate suggested that the force had a
particular responsibility to protect expatriates, inc1uding businessmen,
missionaries and embassy personnel of various countries. However,
the force defined Hs mission to inc1ude "protection during evacuation
of UNAMIR, U.N. personnel, diplomatic personnel and expatriates"(Chronique, 1), and contingency plans for this purpose had been
prepared at UNAMIR headquarters (Dewez, written communication 5
December 1997).
Protecting Rwandans
While events seemed chaotic during the first few days of the crisis,
a few things were c1ear to the U.N. soldiers at the outset. The Chronique
records distress calls received from Rwandans from early 7 April and
onwards, as weIl as reports from Belgian soldiers of systematic c1eansing and killings in the various cantonment areas. General Dallaire used
the terms "a very well planned, programmed, deliberate and conducted
campaign of terror" when describing the violenee in a report to U.N.
Headquarters on 8 April (outgoing code cable, 8 April 1994). Belgian
soldiers later described the scenes around them: "There were two kinds
of cries: the shouts of those doing the killing and mutilation, and the
cries of those being mutilated" (Reuters, Brussels, 13 April 1994).
It was also c1ear that UNAMIR had various mandates to protect
Rwandan civilians. Protection of key personalities in the Rwandan political process was integral to the task of implementing the Arusha peace
accords and was undertaken from the beginning of the mission. The
Force Commander interpreted the general mandate issued by the SecuritY Council to inc1ude other specificprotection functions. As drafted
by Dallaire in the Rules of Engagement, this inc1uded use of force to
defend "persons under [U.N.] protection against direct attack" (#11 (a»;
and the use of armed force against armed persons "when other lives are
in mortal danger" (#13-k) (Le., other than self defense). Most impor-
Dilemmas of Proteetion: The Log of the Kigali Battalion
265
tantly, a compelling but highly unusual clause stated that, with or without the support of local authorities, "UNAMIR will take the necessary
action to prevent any crime against humanity" (# 17).11
UNAMIR did protect Rwandan civilians during the violence in April.
Some were political VIPs belonging to the opposition parties who previously had been under U.N. guard. Others sought safety in the de facto
"sanctuaries" established and partly guarded by the blue berets at various places in Kigali-at the Amahoro stadium, the King Faisal Hospital, and the Hotel Mille Collines. These sanctuaries saved perhaps
15-20,000 lives. But it is also clear that the U.N. force had little capacity, and mostly assigned lowest priority, to protect ordinary Rwandan
civilians.
On the evening of 7 April, the Kigali Sector Commander, Col.
Marchal, announced the policy regarding the protection of Rwandans:
all Rwandan refugees who had sought safety at the UNAMIR cantonments throughout town had to be out by next morning at 0600 hours. In
the despair and chaos that followed, different responses emerged.
At the Franciscan school, the fathers protested and KIBAT battalion
commander, Co1. Dewez effectively countennands Marchal's order:
"The fathers are masters in their own house," he tells the Belgian unit
stationed at the school. From the medical post "Vitamine," however,
some thirty Rwandans leave during the night, hoping to take cover of
the darkness. From the post "Pegasus," some twenty refugees leave
with the Belgian blue berets, and all reach safety at the Meridian Hotel.
At the technical school ETO ("Beverly Hills"), refugees have arrived
in the school compound throughout the day and night, mostly ordinary
Rwandan civilians but also priests and expatriates. The officer in charge,
Lt. Lemaire, calls the sector headquarters: Is
to protect only the
clergy who have gathered there or also the ordinary Rwandan refugees? The operations officers on the band, Capt. Choffray, interprets
the rules in his own way: "Protect alL"
At times, the competing demands for protection involved horrible
dilemmas, as the Belgian soldiers at the ETO acutely came to realize.
The government technical school had soon become the largest single
U.N. sanctuary outside the stadium. Already by 8 April, around 2,000
refugees had gathered for protection. About 150 were European. Many
of the Rwandans were badly wounded by machete cuts. There was hardly
any food or water, and sanitary conditions were appalling. Yet, there
was no attack on the cantonment, and new refugees were allowed in.
Lt. Lemaire even went personally out to look for a Rwandan priest and
266
The Path of a Genocide
a child reported to be in danger. By 9 April, however, the precariously
balanced situation was upset by the order to regroup.
Just before midday on 9 April, Co!. Dewez tells all KIBAT stations that UNAMIR
may be evacuated. "Pack your bags and get ready to evacuate in the early afternoon." Marchal says that the Security Council will decide on the evacuation issue
in two hours. Lt. Lemaire asks who will give protection to the Rwandan refugees
in his compound when his unit leaves. Nobody answers. The next morning, Lemaire
is ordered to provide escort to the airport for the 150 expatriates in the compound,
but he objects. Taking out men for escort duty will jeopardize the security of the
Rwandans under his protection. "We have 2000 refugees here". A hostile crowd is
gathering outside the compound. In the aftemoon he contacts the Medicins Sans
Frontieres. Can they do anything for the refugees? The answer is negative.
Lemaire achieved some short-term victories. His objections to provide escort for expatriates were sustained. Instead, French soldiers came
to ETO to collect the evacuees. The French troops were initially prepared to take only the French and the Italians among the expatriates
gathered at the ETO. Lemaire objected again-they should take all the
Europeans and the Rwandan clergy. The French grudgingly agreed; it
meant a second trip.
The next day Lemaire is again told to take ajeep, three trucks and a
platoon to pick up expatriates from Gitarama and Kabgay. The Rwandan
Army will provide security to the convoy. Lemaire again questions the
order: diversion of a platoon will reduce security and endanger the 2,000
refugees who are crammed into the compound. His battalion commander
is categorical: the Gitarama mission has priority. The mission is later
canceled for other reasons.
The unit at "Beverly Hills" was the last one to be regrouped. Early
in the morning on 11 April Col. Dewez told Lemaire to stand by for
evacuation to the Meridian hotel. Shortly after noon, Lemaire requested
permission to go-there were no expatriates left in the compound, and
the southern route used by the French evacuation troops to reach the
airport was still open. Dewez asked the Sector Commander: Could
Lemaire move out, and-the log pointedly noted-Ieave 2,000 refugees at "Beverly Hills"? Marchal approved. At 13:45 Lemaire and his
men departed, leaving behind them two broken-down vehicles and desperate refugees facing a hostile crowd. As the Rwandans left the compound to seek safety elsewhere, most were attacked and killed.
The story of the ETO is partlyan account of the limits of personal
heroism. There was a certain risk associated with protecting Rwandans,
as the events at Agathe's house showed. Small units of Belgian U.N.
Dilemmas of Protection: The Log of the Kigali Battalion
267
soldiers were likewise harassed when trying to protect other Rwandan
VIPs or bring out Rwandan refugees. For instance, a convoy heading
for the airport had hidden Rwandans among the expatriates, but was
stopped by Rwandan soldiers. The incident led Col. Marchal to issue a
new rule: UNAMIR was no longer to take Rwandan refugees in the
evacuation convoys as it might endanger the transport (Chronique, 44).
But the record also shows the considerable power exerted by a few
Belgian soldiers and a U.N. flag. It is thus equally arecord ofpossibilities unexplored and potentials unused. Apart from the Amahoro Stadium, which was shelled, and took several indirect hits, none of the
cantonments were attacked directly. What happened at ETO was only
the clearest and most dramatic illustration of a general rule: the
Rwandans were safe as long as they were gathered under U.N. protection, and as long as the blue berets were there, showing the flag. It was
when the U.N. forces left the site, that the killings started.
Protection of opposition VIPs involved different trade-offs. The pattern of the protection mission for Mme Agathe was not repeated, however. In other missions, only the Rwandans were targeted and killed;
occasionally UNAMIR succeeded in bringing some to safety.
The pattern played itself out in and near the house of Felicien Ngango,
the leader of the opposition party PSD. Since late March he had been
given U.N. guards. When the plane was downed, orders went out to
strengthen the protection of VIPs. The new situation placed heavy demands on KIBAT. Six groups had been set aside for escort service; the
attempt to get Agathe to Radio Rwanda tied up half of thern the first
night.
On the evening of 6 April, three men from Lt. Lemaire's unit were
on duty at Ngango's house. Ngango himself was away, but his wife and
family were horne. The house was in the Kimihurura area where rnany
ministers and political personalities of the opposition lived. Reports of
systematic "cleansing" in the area by the Presidential Guard and gendarmes started coming in to UNAMIR's Kigali Sector Command early
in the morning of 7 April. The source was the unit of Lt. Lotin, code
named "Viking," which was cantoned in a house on the same street as
the Ngango household. At 6:30 a.m. Col Marchal ordered a firm response: KIBAT must urgently deploy a complete platoon in the "Viking" cantonment.
Battalion commander Dewez interprets this as an order to "intervene in the quarter," and sets about finding men. Almost half the "Viking" group of 25 are at
Agathe's houses, but the airfield group of 50 at the Franciscan Order's Technical
268
The Path of a Genocide
School is only five blocks away. Together they form a group and set out, but are
stopped at the roadblocks by Rwandan soldiers and the gendarrnes. The Belgians
tum back. The Sector Command discusses calling in the Bangladeshi who have
some APCs. But the Bangladeshi have reacted to the crisis by fust looking after
their own safety; they have regrouped inside the gates at the Amahoro stadium
and will not open the gates, let alone come out.
It is still a few minutes past 6:30 in the morning when efforts to mobilize alarger
force are overtaken byevents at the Ngango house. About 20 Rwandan soldiers
are at the house and tell the three Belgians on guard duty to get out. The Rwandans
are excited and threatening, the Belgians report. Concemed about the security of
his men, Lt. Lemaire asks Dewez if he can evacuate them to the "Viking" post just
up the street He gets permission, but is told to bring the Ngango family out as
weIl.
Four men from "Viking" set out towards the Ngango house only 30 meters down
the street, a fifth is in the garden with a heavy machine gun to cover them. Halfway down the street the group is stopped byaroadblock. The Rwandan soldiers
will permit the Belgians to collect their cornrades at the Ngango house, but the
Rwandans must stay. Two men from the "Viking" unit are let through. Retuming,
the blue berets are stopped and their vehiele searched. Back at the Ngango house,
the soldiers elose in on their victims. The entire family is killed.
The pattern continued during the day ofthe 7th, the KIBAT log shows.
At 11:38 in the morning of 7 April, the Sector Commander informed
the net that systematic search and cleansing continues in the Kimihurura
district where the Lotin-group is cantoned, but that the soldiers attack
only Rwandans. Expatriates and U.N. personnel apparently had nothing to fear.
Some Rwandan politicalleaders were saved. The most famous rescue operation involved Faustin Twagiramungu, Prime Minister-designate under the Arusha Accords and considered a key person in efforts
to save the peace agreement. Jumping over the wall of his house, he
was rescued by one of UNAMIR's few armored vehic1es, and later
evacuated to Nairobi and Belgium (Africa Rights 1995, 194).
and Uptimls
Members of the Kigali Battalion were later to say that they did not
have the mandate to protect either themselves or civilians. When stepping off the plane as they returned to Belgium, some angrily threw
their berets on the tarmac and tore the U.N. insignia from their uniforms.
It is beyond dispute that the force was established in a diplomatic
mode and remained so despite the radically changed situation. It also
seems clear that this did not so much reflect limitations of the mandate,
Dilemmas of Proteetion: The Log of the Kigali Battalion
269
but of force capabilities. With RoEs which permitted necessary action
to prevent crimes against humanity, but no capacity to force even a
roadblock, the unit had limited options. Nevertheless, within these constraints there were choices to be made between protecting expatriates
and Rwandans, and in the risks taken to proteet others as against protecting self. The logbook of the Kigali battalion records these excruciating dilemmas of protection.
In some cases, the dilemmas were false. As the ETO experience
shows, a few Belgian soldiers did provide significant protection to some
two thousand Rwandan refugees with little evident risk to themselves.
Expatriates were escorted to the airport by the French forces flown in
for the evacuation operation; there was little justification for tying up
scarce U.N. resources for that purpose. Had this "power of presenee"
been more fully recognized, and had policy as a result been changed to
extend greater protection to those most at risk, quite possibly more
lives could have been saved even within the resource restraints of the
situation.
Yet, given the restraints of the situation, even under the best of circumstances the most UNAMIR could hope for was to buy time. Without reinforcements of men, material, or supply-inc1uding drinking
water and food at places like ETO-protection of civilians could last
for only a short while and buy time for a political or military solution.
The only genuine way of easing the dilemmas of protection, therefore,
required introducing a larger and differently constituted force. At the
time, General Dallaire c1aimed that with a force of some 5,000 men, he
could effectively have staved off the genocide. His c1aim was subsequently endorsed by an international panel ofmilitary experts assembled
by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict to examine the lessons of peacekeeping in Rwanda. Assessing various scenarios
in the conflict situation, the panel agreed that a better equipped and
more unified force of some 5,000 men, had they been introduced during the critical, early phase of the crisis, "could have significantly altered the outcome" (Scott, 1996).
Notes
l. The KIBAT Chronique is chronologically organized according to events and the
movements of the various battalion units. Here, references to the Chronique
mostly make use of these coordinates ralher than page numbers.
2. The Commission d'enquete parlementaire concemant les evenements du Rwanda
was originally established under the President of the Belgian Senate. Reports of
270
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
The Path of a Genocide
the proceedings ( Compte rendu analytique) were published regularly as documents of the Belgian Senate. In 1997, it was published in two volumes.
The RoE had been drafted by General Dallaire and their formal status by April
1994 was still that of a draft.
I am indebted to Allison des Forges for this information (17 September 1997).
For an authoritative analysis of the various interpretations, see Reyntjens (1995).
Reyntjens accepts the version which makes Hutu-extremist responsible.
Agathe flrst tried to scale the wall of her neighbor's garden, the DCM at the U.S.
Embassy, but it was too high. The U.S. residence might not have been safe at
any rate. FAR soldiers later entered the house and, not finding whoever they
were looking for, shot up the refrigerator.
Col. Marchal denies saying this; Col. Dewez says that the radio operator maintains that it was said, and it was, therefore, entered into the record. Letters from
Dewez to author, 5 December 1997, and from Marchal, 12 December 1997.
This account is based on interviews with General Dallaire and a documentary
covering the events of April 6-7, Les oublies de Kigali, produced for the Belgian French-language television corporation (RTBF) by Frederic Fran~ois,
who
used among other sources a two-hour taped, background interview with General
Dallaire.
"An update on the current situation in Rwanda and military aspects of the mission," 8 April 1994. Outgoing code cable. This is a joint cable with separate
sections from the SRSG Booh-Booh and Dallaire, addressed to AnnanlGoulding,
U.N., New York.
The record as presented to the Belgian commission of inquiry is unclear on this
point. Ambassador Swinnen says Col. Marchal offered the embassy UNAMIR
protection, but Swinnen refused because he feared that in the prevailing animosity against the Belgian soldiers this would attract hostility. Swinnen later
accepted protection when informed that he was on a death list. (For further elaboration on the death list, cf. Prunier 1995, 222, n. 22.) Marchal disputes the offer
of protection. Senat de Belgique, 1-86, COM-3, Compte rendu analytique des
auditions, 20 June 1997.
The flrst RoE draft is dated October 1993 and appears as "Force Commander
Directive No:Ol." Apart from minor editing changes, it is identical with a later
version which appears as "Operational Directive No.02: Rules of
Engagement(Interim)," 19 November 1993, also issued by the Force Commander.
The role of UNIDPKO in the drafting process is unclear.
13
In Search ofa New Cease-Fire
(April-July 1994)
Jacques Castonguay
Introduction
A lot has been said and written about the cease-fire signed on 29
March 1991, at N'sele, in Zai:re, but not much conceming the negotiations that took place in Rwanda to secure another cease-fire after 6
April 1994. The study of the latter is useful in understanding the role of
the U.N. as the massacres unfolded, as weIl as throwing some light on
the attitude of the parties with respect of the massacres, the war itself,
and the huge problem of the refugees.
The Goals of the "New Govemment"
In the aftermath of the murder of President Juvenal Habyarimana,
on 6 April, and the murder of Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana,
the following day, several prominent and so-caIled Rwandese Hutu
Power politicians tried to address the issue of the political vacuum.
They met several times. On 8 April, Mr. Theodore Sindikubwabo, de
facto head ofthe new govemment of Rwanda from 9 April to July 1994,
went on national radio on behalf of the new ruling group and, quoting
the Constitution approved on 10 June 1991, proclaimed himself the
new President. During this same address, he announced the formation
of an interim Govemment composed of the politicians from MRND
and CND and their allies in other parties.
The UNAMIR Force Commander, Major-General Romeo DaIlaire,
visited the "new President." Their first meeting took place on 9 April at
271
272
The Path of a Genocide
the Hötel des Diplomates in Kigali. Based on the notes taken by a
UNAMIR officer present at the meeting, there seemed to be three issues of critical importance to Sindikubwabo. He wanted the U.N. to
fully endorse the new government, to help him establish contact with
the RPF, and, finally, to help his government secure as soon as possible
a cease-fire agreement. To support his plea for U.N. endorsement,
Sindikubwabo c1aimed that his government was not in violation of the
Arusha Peace Accords and, more importantly, it was of the utmost urgency that the institutionaI void be filled as quickly as possible. 1 General Dallaire listened cautiously and abstained from discussing the
political issue.
The RPF also reacted rapidly to the announcement of the new Government. Like the position adopted at that time by the U.N. and many
nongovernmental organizations, it did not recognize il. Moreover, it
stated that it was contrary to the Arusha Accords and even racist
(Verschave1994, 115). In November 1994, Paul LaRose-Edwards,
wrote:
The RPF meanwhile were angry that U.N. Special Representative Booh-Booh
had made a failed attempt to set up a "transitionaI national authority" in Kigali.
He had deemed it "national" despite the fact it had no RPF or Tutsi representation.
(1994, 65)
The RPF argued that it was pointless to negotiate with Sindikubwabo's govemment.
The legitimacy of the new government was also at the forefront of
Major-General DaHaire's concerns. On more than one occasion, he
wondered whether he had not simply witnessed a coup d'etat by Hutu
extremists. During his first meeting with the Senior Staff Officers from
the Rwandese Government Forces (RGF) and the Gendarmerie in the
early morning hours after Habyarimana's plane had been shot down, he
witnessed how quickly aH of the leaders present rejected, whhout any
discussion, the idea of having Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana, who
was then still alive, acting as the interim head of the Republic. According to his diary, the Force Commander gave the coup d' etat theory more
thought on 13 April. In the face of the RPF military advance, three days
later the interim Government left Kigali to set up its headquarters in
Gitarama, a fact that did not simplify the situation. Only the Minister
of Defense stayed in the capital.
Without giving any formal recognition to the new Government,
Major-General Dallaire was wiHing to act as an intermediary between
In Search of a New Cease-Fire (April-July 1994)
273
the parties in an attempt to secure a cease-fire. However, in the days
following the death of Habyarimana and the beginning of the massacres, he was mostly involved in the negotiation of truces, 10cally, in the
dernilitarized zone (DMZ) and in Kigali, in order to perrnit the extrication of his troops and the evacuation of U.N. people and several thousands of expatriates. Between 8 April and 11 April, UNAMIR
contributed to the evacuation of 190 U.N. civilians. Having successfullYnegotiated two truces, the first one of forty-eight hours the second
one of twenty-four hours, the Force Commander also rendered possible Operation Silver Back during which at least 3,000 expatriates
were evacuated by approximately 1100 Belgian troops and 598 French
troops.
The Preconditions to a Cease-Fire
The rapid advance made by the RPF and the need to re-establish
controi in Kigali and elsewhere soon reinforced the conviction ofboth
the interim Government and the RGF that they had to secure a ceasefire as soon as possible. On 12 April, the same day the RPF troops
from the North East linked-up with the RPF battalion quartered in the
Conseil national de Developpement building, located in Kigali, ten
Colonels and Lieutenants-Colonels from the RGF handed a letter to
Major-General Dallaire in which theyasked him, on behalf of the
commander of the RGF, to mediate a cease-fire between the two opposing forces. 2 This petition came as no surprise to the Force Commander because the Rwandese Minister of Defense, after the President,
had made a similar request two days earlier. The rapid advance made
by the RPF probably explains why the interim Government was so
anxious to secure a cease-fire.
The problem, of course, was that the RPF did not recognize the Government and refused to negotiate directly with its members. For the
Government, the answer was to try to convince the RPF to negotiate
with the RGF and the Gendarmerie, with Major-General Dallaire acting as mediator. Such a task remained a very difficult one. The RPF,
which was winning the war but had not yet reached its initial objectives, would have to be convinced to lay down its weapons and sign a
cease-fire agreement when previous cease-fires in the past had been
repeatedly undermined.
After several prelirninary meetings, both parties finally agreed to
meet on 14 April. Much to the disappointment of the U.N. and the RGF,
274
The Path of a Genocide
the RPF did not appear at the meeting. The following day, however, the
Force Commander, after having met again with both parties separately,
succeeded in bringing them together at Hotel Meridien. The Special
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) attended the meeting
and when it was over, he was jubilant and issued a communique stating
that "the first meeting between the two opposing military forces had
occurred and that both sides agreed to discuss the conditions needed
prior to establishing a cease-fire." What the communique did not say,
however, is that the conditions required before the signing of any ceasefire agreement by the parties were incompatible. For the RGF, the ceasefire was a prerequisite to stop the massacres; for the RPF, the cessation
of the massacres was a prerequisite to the signing of any cease-fire
agreement.
Major L Diagne, the UNAMIR officer responsible for taking notes
during the subject meeting, summed up the RPF conditions as follows:
1. Stop the massacres carried out throughout the country;
2. Establish means of verification to ascertain whether the massacres were
stopped;
a. Installation of phone lines in the Conseil national de Developpement;
b. Patrois consisting of members from the RPF, RGF and UNAMIR;
c. Journalists be granted free access to the Conseil national de
Developpement.
3. The Garde presidentielle would be dissolved :
a. Military personnel responsible for war crimes would be charged
accordingl y;
b. Public condemnation of the Garde presidentielle. 3
The official RGF response to the RPF conditions were made known
by Brigadier-General Marcel Gatsinzi on April 17. The letter stated
that the RGF was prepared to stop the massacres being carried out by
both sides on condition that the fighting stop first. No mention was
made of the RPF condition conceming the Garde presidentielle.
Major-General Dallaire explained why the RPF was so firm in wanting the massacres to be stopped, as a preconditon to the cease-fire :
The Government forces wanted the cease-fire because they did not seem to be
holding very weIl. They were weak militarily. The RPF did not want it because
they were under the impression that a cease-fire would be a significant limiting
factor in their endeavor to stop the massacres. If the cease-fire had happened, then
we, the UN, would have been required to monitor the cease-fire lines and establish a series of rules for the cease-fire to be held: where, for example, the troops,
ammunitions, weapons and that kind of stuff would be. The RPF naturally real-
In Searcb of a New Cease-Fire (April-July 1994)
275
ized that these measures would stop their offensive, limit them in what they could
do with their forces, also stop the Govemment troops where they were (giving
them the advantage to regroup potentially), and, more importantly, compel the
U.N. to force the RGF to go behind the lines to stop the militias, the rogue battalions and units of the Gendarmerie involved in the massacres. If we were going to
do that, the RPF was fully convinced that the cease-fire will only reinforce those
doing the killings and accelerate the massacres.
The Government side projected, for its part, that all that it needed to
stop the massacres was a cease-fire, by which its troops will be re1eased from combat duties against the FPR. 4
The Security Council Adjusts the Mandate of UNAMIR
Fo11owing the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement on 4 August,
1993, the Security Council resolved that the United Nations should, at
the request of the Rwandese Government and the RPF, make its full
contribution to the implementation of this agreement. Accordingly the
Secretary-General recommended the establishment of a United Nations
Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) with the mandate of "contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive
to the secure installation and subsequent operation of the transitionaI
Government" (Security Council, S/26488, 24 September 1993).
After the incident in which President Habyarimana lost his life, the
Secretary-General discussed with the Security Council possib1e ways
of dealing with the new situation. He proposed three alternatives: a) an
immediate and massive reinforcement ofUNAMIR and a change in its
mandate to allow it to coerce opposing forces into a cease-fire; b) a
small group, headed by the Force Commander, to act as a mediator
between the two parties to bring them to agree on a cease-fire; and,
finally, c) the withdrawa1 ofUNAMIR. (Re did not propose maintaining the force at existing strength or using it to protect civilians.) On 21
April, the Security Council decided to reduce UNAMIR and adjust its
mandate so that it would act as an intermediary between the parties to
secure a cease-fire agreement and assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible [Security Council, SIRES/
912 (1994), 21 April 1994].
In doing so, the Security Council simp1y recognized or approved
what UNAMIR was doing. Its strength had been reduced by the decision of the Belgian government to pull out its contingent and other
countries were reconsidering their participation. Hs Force Commander
had been deeply involved in the negotiations of a cease-fire agreement
276
The Path of a Genocide
and his peacekeepers that had not bunkered down when the fighting
started were employed in humanitarian relief operations.
However, Major-General Dal1aire, more concemed with the massacres and sufferings of thousands of civilians than the negotiations of a
cease-fire agreement that appeared more and more distant, urged the
Secretary-General to re-examine and adjust once more the mandate of
his mission. This was done on 17 May, with the addition of the fol1owing responsibilities:
• To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees
and civilians at risk in Rwanda, inc1uding through the establishment and
maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas;
• To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and
humanitarian relief operations. (Cf. Security Council, SlRES/918 (1994),
17 May 1994)
Drafts of Cease-Fire Agreements
In spite of the setbacks, and his preoccupation with the massacres and
the humanitarian relief, the Force Commander ordered the preparation
of a plan to help implement an eventual cease-fire, should the parties
finally come to an agreemenl. The final draft of the subject document
was forwarded for comments to the Rwandese Govemrnent Forces and
the RwandesePatrlotic Front on 18 April 1994. The document was deemed
stillbom, however, when the RPF ignored il. Nevertheless the SRSG,
remaining apparently firm in his belief that a cease-fire could be reached,
and tried, for his part, to break the impasse by visiting Arusha where he
met, on 24 and 25 April, with the Secretary General of the OAV and the
Tanzanian Prime Minister. The meeting once more proved to be a disappointment. And to make things worse, the interim Govemment, now 10cated in Gitarama, decided to propose its own set of pre-conditions. The
list was made known on 28 April. It consisted of the following:
1. return of both military forces to their respective positions held on April
6th 1994;
2. stop the massacres;
3. return of all displaced persons to their homes;
4. formation of the Broad Based Transitionai Government.
(Meeting, Force Commander and Chief of Staff RGF, 28 April 1994)
Although he felt that these pre-conditions would not be agreed to by
the RPF, Major-General Dal1aire decided to go to Byumba to meet with
In Search of a New Cease-Fire (April-July 1994)
277
General Kagame and inform him of their existence. General Kagame's
response was immediate and scathing. 1t can be summed up as follows:
You (Major-General Dal1aire) are the representative of the United Nations. You
know who is doing what to whom. The RGF have participated in the massacres.
Our forces had not yet moved when the massacres started. The Interahamwes are
also taking part in the massacres. Who is controlling them? The idea of returning
to the positions we held on 6 April 94 is a French idea. It was brought forward at
a meeting organized by the French Ambassador in Kampala. I had a representative at the meeting.
The U.N. wants to send an intervention force in Rwanda for humanitarian reasons. Its too late. Those who had to die have already been kil1ed. Those who will
now be protected are the perpetrators of the crimes. They now hold the reigns of
power. If a U.N. force is deployed in Rwanda we will fight il.
The U.N. must be blamed for not giving UNAMIR the appropriate mandate at the
right time. Those who say stop the war and we will stop the massacres are using
blackmail. The Special Representative is no longer welcomed to Rwanda. If he
stays, we will stop all co11aboration with the UN. (Meeting, Force Commander
and Major-General P. Kagame, Byumba, 20 April 1994)
The meeting of the Force Commander with the commander of the
RPF lasted about two hours. At the end it seemed clear to the U.N.
officers that the chances for a cease-fire in the short term were nil. Still
Boutros-Ghali decided to send two envoys to Rwanda, Mr. 1qbal Riza,
Assistant Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations, and Major-General J. Maurice Barll, the Military Advisor of the SecretaryGeneral. Together, they held meetings on 23 and 24 May with the RGF
and the interim Govemment in Kigali and Gitarama, in order to: (1)
move the warring parties towards a cease-frre, (2) ascertain from them
their views on and intentions towards the implementation of resolution
918 (1994); and (3) review with UNAMIR the modalities of the operations outlined in the Secretary-General report of May 13, 1994 (Security Council, S/1994/640, 31 May 1994).
On 31 May, the Secretary-General reported that the special mission
had been able to obtain the agreement of the two parties to initiate the
talks for the establishment of a cease-fire, as called for by resolution
918 (1994), and has found, "on the basis of the evidence that had
emerged ... that there can be little doubt that the killings in Rwanda
constitute genocide. 5
A draft document was prepared by the Special Mission and UNAMIR
and sent to both parties on May 27. This working paper was, however,
a source of considerable debate and writing of numerous amendments.
1t suggested, especially the French version, that the cessation of hos-
278
The Path of a Genocide
tilities and even the signing of the cease-fire agreement, will take place
before the massacres could end. On page l of the French proposal the
following sentence appears :
Le cessez-Ie-feu doit etre precede d'une treve, c'est-ii-dire de I'arret des hostilites
qui doit entrer en vigueur ii minuit. ..
The equivalent of this sentence appears also in the English version.
On page 2, paragraph 6 reads as follows:
Immediatement apres la signature de l' accord, tous les actes de violence contre
les civils seront arretes.Accord de cessez-Ie-feu entre les commandants militaires
de la Force gouvemmentale rwandaise et du Front patriotique rwandais. (Ebauche
d'une entente de cessez-le-feu, 27 May 1994)6
The English text in this case reads as follows:
Immediately upon the signature of this agreement, all violence against civilians
will be halted.
Nevertheless, the meetings between the two groups, chaired by Brigadier-General Henry Anyidoho, the Deputy Commander of the Mission,
started three days later at the UNAMIR headquarters located in Hötel
Amahoro. Two weeks later, 13 June, Anyidoho had this to say conceming the negotiations:
I must say that the massacres are the primary reason from the very beginning of
our discussions.... The massacres are slowing down, if not stopping altogether
the process by which we hope to end the hostilities.7
The next day, representatives of the RPF headed by Andrew
Rwigmana8 had this to say:
At the time of the signing of the agreement all violence against civilians will have
ceased. In this connection the Garde presidentielle, all the militias, especially the
Interahamwe and the self-defense groups were to be dismantled. Measures to carry
out this dismantlement and the cessalion of violence should occur before the new
cease-fire can be signed. There will be no inflammatory radio broadcasts. 9
In Search of a Demonstration of Good Faith
As the negotiations were under way, UNAMIR also tried to get the
Government and the RGF to demonstrate their good faith. For the Force
Commander it was essentiai that they demonstrate they could really
influence the Interahamwe and the rogue units and have them stop the
In Search of a New Cease-Fire (April-July 1994)
279
killings. However, they were never able to do it. They c1aimed they did
not have enough troops to controi the militias.
UNAMIR had Tutsi and RPF people and sympathizers behind the
Govemment lines in Hotel des Mille Collines, in Kigali, and also Hutu
and Govemment people in the Amahoro Stadium, the Meridien Hotel
and the King Faisal Hospital. 10
A certain number of these internally displaced persons, among those
who had taken refuge in Hotel des Mille Collines, had expressed the
desire to be transferred, when possible, behind the RPF lines. One of
the means the Mission used to see if the RGF and the Gendarmerie
could controi the population, the Interahamwe and the rogue elements
of the Govemment Arrny, and agree to do it, was the transfer of this
group from the hotel. According to the Force Commander, everybody
agreed to it: General Bizimungu, the Chief of Staff, the RGF and the
RPF. "If things go smoothly," Dallaire later said, "that will be a sign of
good will and permit us to attack the negotiations of a cease-fire. Unfortunately things did not go well. It ended up in a fiasco. Members of
my garrison, that was responsible for the transfers, plus people they
were protecting were beaten, others injured and my troops manhandled."ll
The subsequent transfers of internally displaced persons in Kigali
involved persons from both sides and were consequently more successful. Nevertheless, the explanations or excuses given by the RGF
after the fiaseo of Hotel des Mille Collines did not convince the RPF of
the good faith of their opponents and the impasse remained.
RPF Unilaterally Dedan~
a Cease-Fire
The cease-fire finally took place, not with the signing of a formal
agreement between the warring parties, but with a RPF unilateral declaration on 18 July 1994 ending the war. The United Nations, shocked
by the ensuing large-scale violence in Rwanda, which has resulted in
the death of approximately 800,000 men, women and children, the displacement of a significant portion of the population and an unprecedented increase of refugees in the neighboring countries,12 spared no
efforts to move the RPF and the RGF towards a cease-fire. Nevertheless, the attitude of the RPF towards this initiative remained negative
from the beginning to the end. The RGF gave the appearance, at least
during the first days of the war, that they were positively disposed towards a cease-fire. Later on, however, during the campaign, when they
280
The Path of aGenodde
were forced to retreat, their interest in signing decreased considerably
and finally vanished. The proposal made by the interim Govemment
on 28 April is illustrative. Even if they kept saying "we want to stop the
massacres, we want to sign a cease-fire agreement," they did not want
il.
The opinion of Major-General Dallaire on this matter is worth quoting:
Later on, during the war, I came to the conclusion, as the RGF continued to withdraw, withdraw, withdraw, taking with them large volumes of population (which
they didn't have to do), that a strategic decision was taken by the interim Government to say: "right, we ...will pull out and we will take as many people we can
with us in order to regroup, reconstitute ourselves, and some day in the future
come back." I truly believe that is what they had in mind.B
Notes
1. Meeting, President T. Sindikubwabo and Major-General R. A. Dallaire, 9 April
1994.
2. Communique from the Commander ofthe Rwandese government Forces, Kigali,
12 April 1994.
3. Meeting between SRSG, Force Commander, Mr, Kane, and representatives from
both the RGF and RPF, 15 April 94, Hötel Meridien, 1550 hrs.
4. Interview, Major-General R. A. DalIaire by J. Castonguay, 1 Nov 1994.
5. The United Nations and the Situation in Rwanda, Reference Paper, April 1995,
Department of Public Information, 12.
6. Cease-fire agreement between the military commanders of the Rwandese Government Farces and the Rwandese Patriotic Army (proposed deaft 27 May 1994).
7. Proceedings taken from the cease-fire meeting between the RPF and the RGF,
held on 13 June 1994,2.
8. A. Rwigmana is today "Chef du Cabinet" of the Minister of Defence. The author of the present paper had the opportunity to discuss this topic with him in
Kigali, on 8 June 1995.
9. Translation of notes taken in French during a meeting held on June 14.
10. Approximately 25,000 persons took refuge in these public establishments during the war.
11. Interview, Major-General R. A. Dallaire by 1. Castonguay, 14 November 1995.
12. Security Council, S/RES/912 (1994), 21 April 1994.
13. Interview, Major-General R. A. Dallaire by J. Castonguay, 14 November 1995.
A Humanitarian Escape iI"~1!4fnl
a Political Dead
Gerard Prunier
The Historical Background to Operation Thrquoise
As the Rwandese genocide rolled on and as the world watched in
passive horror, Paris decided to undertake a humanitarian intervention.
A U.N. Resolution enabled Paris to intervene in Rwanda under a United
Nations political umbrella, even though, for all practical purposes,
France was acting alone. Why was this decision controversial and why
did it cause, together with admiration and support, considerable malaise in international public opinion? In order to understand this question, we have to go back a bit in history.
Rwanda, together with its sister kingdom of Burundi, both parts of
former Deutsche Ostafrika, had been given as mandate territories to
Belgium by the League of Nations in 1919. After independence was
formalized in 1962, the position of the former colonial power in these
countries started to wane. The French President Valery Giscard
d'Estaing, personally fascinated by African affairs, pursued an aggressive policy in the former Belgian territories, as exemplified by the French
military intervention in Shaba in 1978. In both Rwanda and Burundi,
Paris adopted a position of benign but sustained interest. The first military cooperation treaty between Paris and Kigali was signed in 1974.
President Habyarimana was received for the first time at the Elysee
Palace in 1975. From that moment on, Rwanda became one of the socalled pays du champ.
281
282
The Path of a Genocide
As far as French-speaking Africa is concemed the distinction between pays du champ ("field countries") and the others is absolutely
essential. The pays du champ are, in the French view of things, our
own, part of the family so to speak, and the whole relationship between
Paris and these states is special. Economic aid does not go through the
normal Quai d'Orsay (Foreign Affairs Ministry) channels but through
the Ministere de la Cooperation. This is not a simple administrative
distinction. Countries that deal with the Ministere de la Cooperation
have access to the speciallow-interest loans from the Caisse Centrale
de Cooperation, and military assistance is channeled through the Ministry of Cooperation. Most French foreign aid goes to pays du champ.
A small country like Djibouti, for example, will get eight or ten times
the amount of aid per capita as does its giant Ethiopian neighbor. AIso,
in political and cultural terms, the pays du champ retain elose links
with Paris. As Rwanda and Burundi became "absorbed" in this system,
they acquired the rank of junior members in the francophone family.
The question of the francophone family may be hard to understand
for non-French persons. The whole concept of a French Commonwealth
is linked to the vision that the French have of their language. It is a
special case among the world's cultures with the exception of the Arabic-speaking countries where the language, being God's own in the
Muslim world view, is a sacred thing. Although secular, the French
view of their language is almost as strong. In modem times, language
has become a political marker as weIl. After 1918, France knew that it
was not a major power any longer, but French had at least remained the
world language for diplomacy and culture. When English took this place
after 1945, it seemed to be the last blow. Moreover, as the United States
was perceived as diabolical heir to the perfide Albion, a new concept
was bom: the English-speaking adversary-the Anglo-Saxons. In this
scheme of things, the cunning Anglo-Saxons are seen to be everywhere,
always conspiring with each other to harm French interests world-wide.
Everything is a field of battle, whether commerce, military presence,
diplomacy, and-more than anything else-Ianguage.'
The basic, unforgivable, and original sin of the Rwandese Patriotic
Front when it invaded Rwanda on 1 October 1990 was that it came
from a former British colony and that its leadership was English speaking and English educated. The invasion and the automatic politico-cultural connotations it caused in France in 1990 could be so directly linked
to what several commentators described in terms of "the Fashoda syndrome," French reactions in Rwanda to the historical Franco-British
Operation Turquoise: A Bumanitarian Escape
283
rivalry. The reference was to a minor confrontation in Southern Sudan
in 1898 at a miserable cluster of huts dignified with the name of "town,"
which resulted in the famous Fashoda incident that almost caused a
Franco-British war.
In terms ofboth the level ofviolence and the pattern offoreign intervention, the Rwanda conflict can be seen as one of the first major postCold War conflicts. It is archaic in that its ."native" element of violence
stems from pre-colonial and colonial identity problems, while the French
involvement arises from pre-Cold War European relationships.
The French Army in Rwanda
The decision to militarily support the Rwandese government in the
face of the RPF attack was taken very early in October 1990, directly
by President Fran90is Mitterrand himself. This was not exceptional; in
all previous French military interventions in Africa the decision to commit French troops had a1ways been the President's alone. The paratroopers-initially 150 but later increased to nearly 700-were sent
from their base in the Central African Republic. Their mandate was
very clear through the period of French military presence in Rwanda
(October 1990 to December 1993): do everything to support the
Rwandese Army in its struggle against the RPF short of actual fighting.
The noncombat profile was intended to avoiding attracting attention
and criticism, and in this it succeeded. A number of specialists were
also brought in (helicopter mechanics, transmission experts, intelligence
officers, staff officers, military administrators, artillery officers). They
tremendously increased the level of expertise of the Rwandese Army.
The most vexing issue was undoubtedly that of training. After the
genocide started, the French were accused in many quarters of "having
trained the killer militias," as the newspaper Liberation wrote on 12
June 1994. Quite possibly, this occurred, but it is extremely doubtful
that it was done deliberately. French instructors who were part of the
expeditionary force did not carefully screen the men who were brought
into the Military Training Program they were running. In part, this was
due to the rapid expansion of the Rwandese Army-from slightly over
5,000 men at the beginning of the war in late 1990 to over 15,000 in
1992-which caused much confusion, corruption, and enormous administrative complications.
In general, the French response in 1990-93 was to "help our boys"
against what seemed an obvious Anglo-Saxon plot: the invasion by
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The Path of a Genocide
Ugandan-sponsored English-speaking guerillas. As it became clear that
the Habyarimana forces could not win, France came to support the
Arusha peace process. For lack of anything better, it seemed like an
opportunity to incorporate the RPF-despite its allen nature-into "our"
political system in Black Mrica.
The genocide in 1994 took Paris completely by surprise. Given its
past association with the Rwandese regime and obvious responsibility
in the situation, the French Government decided to keep a low profile,
which was initially possible. In April 1994 the French public was generally unaware that a conflict had been taking place in Rwanda for the
last four years, and that France had been seriously involved. Media
pressure started to build up slowly but steadily around the third week
of April, building and went into a crescendo during May.
While the government was trying to maintain a facade of unconcern,
behind the scenes there was considerable agitation to try to "save our
men." Weapons and ammunition were being delivered secretly into the
month of May, despite the official U.N. embargo (Observatoire Permanent de la Cooperation Fran~ise:
Rapport 1995, 157-59). On another level, confidentialletters linked with some of the Secret Service
circles tried to influence the French press by putting forward bizarre
geopolitical arguments for justifying French presence through accusations against Uganda and the US.2
Deciding and Preparing for Intervention
By late May, a media offensive, NGO lobbying, and the public opinion climate had clearly put Rwanda back on the political agenda in
Paris. One way or another, the government had to respond. What finally tipped the balance was a clarion call from Africa. Nelson Mandela's
statement at the OAU summit on 13 June that "we must in action assert
our will" to address the Rwandese situation was read as yet another
challenge to the French role in Africa emanating from the Anglo-Saxon
world.
Given the divided nature of French politics in the summer of 1994,
the decision to launch what became know as Operation Turquoise was
taken in a climate of mutual watchfulness. The 1993 legislative elections had brought to power a conservative majority, but Socialist President Mitterrand's term continued until1995. Moreover, the conservatives were split between the followers of Prime Minister Edouard
Balladur and the followers of RPR leader Jacques Chirac. As a result,
Operation Turquoise: A Humauitarian Escape
285
no one involved in policymaking represented abstractly "France," but
either Balladur, Chirac, or Mitterrand.
The President's Special Counsellor for African Affairs, Bruno Delaye,
was at the OAU summit in Tunis. He was flanked by Prime Minister
Balladur's Diplomatic Counsel1or Bernard de Montferrand and by the
Prime Minister's Africa-man, Philippe Baudillon. They watched each
other as much as they watched their African partners. When they returned from Tunis, Mitterrand was quick to act: at the 14 June Cabinet
meeting, he announced that France would intervene. He also asked the
Ministers to keep the decision secret for a few days to avoid a media
blitz. In the prevailing c1imate of political contest, this was too much to
ask from the conservative cabinet. Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, a
Chirac man, found the intervention idea too good to be left to the socialist President. The very next aftemoon he talked about it on French
TV, and the fol1owing day he wrote in a major newspaper:
We have a real duty to intervene in Rwanda. The time to passively watch the
massacre is over, we must take the initiative.... France is ready with hs main
European and African partners to prepare an intervention on the ground to put an
end to the massacres and to protect the populations threatened with extenrunation.... France will live up to hs responsibilities. (Liberation 16 June 1994)
From a moral point of view, it was a curious pronouncement. Having spent the last fortY days silently watching its former pupils and
proteges commit a massive genocide, the govemment discovered it had
a conscience just as media pressure became irresistible and when South
Africa threatened to intervene unilaterally.
The Ministry of Defense was to implement the decision, and was
told to do so with a speed that the Army itself had grave doubts about.
In fact, it was because the Ministry judged a hasty return to Rwanda
dangerous that it asked this author to participate in the Crisis Unit which
was preparing the intervention. The request came on 17 June and was
unexpected.
My association with the Rwandese crisis had at rrrst been only peripheral and mostly scholarly. It stemmed from a total failure ofjudgment on
my part about the RPF's October invasion of Rwanda. During my long
stay in Uganda in 1986, I met on many occasions young Banyarwanda
soldiers who had fought with Museveni's guerrilla army and who did not
hide their intention to one day fight their way back into their country of
origin one day. I did not take them seriously and thought such an invasion would be impossible. October 1990 therefore came as a bit of a
286
The Path of a Genocide
shock, and I started to seriously research the situation. Later, the small
civilian massacres which had punctuated the war years led to my growing involvement with Human Rights NGOs concerned about the situation. My visits to Rwanda, whether with the RPF guerillas (1992) or on
the govemment side (1993), had not met with much approval from the
French authorities. Moreover, as a member of the International Secretariat of the Socialist Party, I had fairly easy access to various offices,
and expressed some strongly-voiced criticisms ofFrance's role in Rwanda.
This did not exactly make me any more popular with the President's
Office, the Secret Service Direction Generale des Services Exterieurs
(DGSE) or with the Army. Thus, the call to serve in the Ministry of Defense Crisis Unit on Rwanda came as a surprise.
But the reason soon became apparent. Minister of Defense Fran90is
Uotard was a Balladur-man, and the Prime Minister felt that the whole
Rwanda operation was directed against him. Balladur is a typical financial technocrat, a pure product of the French bourgeoisie, with very
little "feel" for the raw rough-and-tumble of African politics. He hoped
to "multilateralize" France's relations with Africa, that is, to weaken
the ties and make them less of a family melodrama. His preferred tools
were the European Union and the World Bank. To him and his men in
the cabinet, the Rwanda venture was dangerous. If it failed, the Prime
Minister was bound to be blamed; ifit worked, the initiators-Mitterrand
and Chirac's man Juppe-would get the credit. In this political
minefield, the Defense Ministry felt it should act with great prudence.
To include an academic heretic in the Rwandese Crisis team could be a
good idea as he might draw attention to some unforeseen difficulties.
This is what I immediately did. The first draft of the intervention
plan had French troops entering Rwanda through Gisenyi. I considered
this very inappropriate for a number of reasons:
1. Gisenyi was the heart of Hutu extremist land, the "blessed region" of the
late President Habyarimana. Freneh troops would be welcomed with open
arms by the perpetrators of the genocide, a most embarrassing situation;
2. Geographically, the Freneh entry point would be uneomfortably elose to
the fighting. The RPF was at the time laying siege to Ruhengeri, a few
kilometers to the east, and we eould eount on our Interim Government
"friends" to do everything in their power to push us eastward in the hope
of engineering elashes between the Freneh expeditionary forees and the
RPF guerillas;
3. The official purpose of the mission was humanitarian, but there was preeious little to do at that level in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri prefectures. As a
loeal Hutu trader was later to tell a French journalist: "We never had many
Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape
287
Tutsi here, and we killed them all at the beginning without much of a
fuss" (Aubenas 1994). The French forces would find no Tutsi to be paraded in front of TV cameras to justify the intervention.
Another question quickly came to mind. Was the humanitarian operation just a giant deceit? Were not the French troops in reality sent to
bolster the Interim Government failing forces, just as the RPF suspected?
In that case, I wanted no part of il. I decided that the question of troop
entry point would be my litrnus test: if the Army General Staff accepted a change of plans, it meant it was sincere about the purpose of
the operation. If not, there was a hidden agenda. With the help of a
number of the Defense Ministry permanent staff I fought for one of two
solutions: a) fly our men to Bujumbura and enter Rwanda from the
south; or b) land in Goma with heavy transports, transfer the loads on
lighter twin-engine Transall planes, fly down to Bukavu and enter
through Cyangugu. The flrst solution seemed preferable since going
through Burundi might have a stabilizing effect on that country as weIl.
But I had seriously underestimated the capacity of the RPF to use the
mostly Tutsi UPRONA opposition party in Burundi as a relay for its
positions. Demonstrations were organized in Bujumbura against French
intervention, and FRODEBU Foreign Minister Jean-Marie Ngendahayo,
whatever his personal views, had to refuse Paris the right of transit.
The alternate plan of going through Bukavu and Cyangugu was opposed by the military on financial grounds. Unioading in Goma, reloading, and flying to Bukavu would be costly.3 The question was
whether this opposition was genuine or whether it hid something else.
After talking with General Mercier, who was in charge of the overall
planning for the operation, I felt that he, at least, had no hidden agenda.
But I was not sure about some of the other officers who were grumbling in the aisles about "breaking the back of the RPF."4 The question
was finally solved on Monday 20 June when Minister Franl(ois Leotard
made the decision to adopt the Cyangugu plan. My impression was that
the decisive argument had been that at Nyarushishi Camp near Cyangugu
we would find a large stock of surviving Tutsi who could be displayed
to the TV cameras. A humanitarian intervention in a place where there
was nobody left to save would indeed have been embarrassing.
As the intervention juggernaut gained momentum, everybody wanted
to climb on board. President Mitterrand was irritated at seeing his idea
hijacked by nearly everybody. To regain the initiative from Conservative Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, Mitterand made a speech while opening a Conference at UNESCO which had nothing to do with Rwanda.
288
The Path of a Genocide
Given the gravity of the situation, he proclaimed the urgency was extreme: "it was a matter not of days but of hours." This was on 18 June,
after two months of brutal slaughter that had elicited no reaction from
the Elysee. 5
French professions to stop a genocide that had almost run its course
were not taken at face value by many. The RPF had already vociferously condemned the intervention as a ploy by the French to save the
"Interim Government" from eventual defeal. There were other, more
unexpected rebuttals. Faustin Twagiramungu, Prime Minister designate according to the Arusha Agreement, also condemned the intervention from Montreal where he was on a visit. The OAU Secretary-General, Salim A. Salim, transmitted the protest of the OAU. In Kigali,
UNAMIR General Romeo Dallaire referred to "the initiative launched
by the French...which they describe as a humanirnrian task" with a
distinct lack of enthusiasm. 6 At the same time, all sorts of bad "revelations" were coming out about French participation in the training of
men who were now part of the Interahamwe militias. Amnesty International had released a communique asking the French government to
clarify its past involvement with the Rwandese Death Squads. A few
days earlier, Colonel Dominique Bon, Military Attache at the French
Embassy in Kinshasa, had practically admitted that there were still
weapons deliveries to the FAR through Goma, a most embarrassing
fact if the airport was now to be used for a humanitarian intervention
(La Lettre du Continent 1994).
In this deleterious atmosphere, Prime Minister Balladur's enthusiasm for intervention waned even further. In a Parliamentary speech on
21 June he listed flve preconditions for sending in the troops:
1. Get a U.N. Mandate.
2. Set a clear time limit to the intervention and stick to it.
3. No in-depth penetration of Rwanda; the operation should be carried from
just outside the borders.
4. The operation should be purely humanitarian and have no exclusively
military component.
5. Allied troops should be involved; France should not operate alone.
Condition three, of course, made no practical sense and could not be
adhered to. As for condition five, Paris went ahead without being able
to substantially fulfill il. The three others were met.
A problem which had not been much discussed in the planning of
Colonel Dominique was how the Army would carry out a humanitarian
Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape
289
operation in a warring country while managing to avoid armed confrontation. The French govemment had virtually no contact with the
party most likely to shoot at them; that is, the RPF. There was in French
official thinking a psychological resistance to the RPF, a mental stumbling-block against even proximity to the dreaded Anglo-Saxon enemy. When hearing on 20 June that the option of entering Rwanda
through Cyangugu had prevailed, I took it upon myself to phone Jacques
Bihozagara, the RPF European Representative, at his Brussels office. I
learned that he had not been contacted by Paris. Through the Defense
Minister's Cabinet, I urged the Foreign Ministry to make contact. When
I called Bihozagara back to learn about the result of my efforts, I thought
he would choke on the phone: he had received a telefax asking him to
come to Pari!! to meet Mrs Boisvineau, Under-Director for Eastern Africa at the Direction des Ajfaires Africaines et Malgaches (DAM) of
the Quai d'Orsay. We both knew that, although she was a very nice
lady of good will, she had no political capacity for making decisions.
Bihozagara was c1early angered:
This is ridiculous. This is an insult. I have been in Europe for three years and I
must have seen her six times at least. What good can I expect from seeing her
once more? I won't come.
I got back on the phone and tried again to get some kind of a reasonable response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By the next day, I
had the pleasant surprise of learning through the press that the Foreign
Minister was "in constant contact with the RPF." I called Jacques
Bihozagara in Brussels to find him even more exasperated than the
previous day. He had received a second telefax asking him to come to
Paris to meet Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs Lucette
Michaux-Chevry and DAM Director Rochereau de la Sabliere.
Bihozagara exc1aimed:
We are not asking for any bloody humanitarian aid, this is a political problem for
God's sake! And as for Mr. de la Sabliere, he can't decide about one thing. Either
I see the Minister or else I won't bother to lose my time.
I relayed this answer to the Defense Minister's Cabinet where a certain irritation had become obvious. "God damrnit! It is our boys going
in there. And if they get their asses shot up because of those idiots at
Foreign Affairs, there will be hell to pay," a Defense Ministry official
told me. I do not know what kind of message was relayed between the
Boulevard Saint Germain and the Quai d'Orsay, but the next morning
290
The Path of a Genocide
of 22 June, the RPF representatives were in Paris and were received by
Alain Juppe personally.
Managing later in the day to get the two RPF envoys inside the Defense Ministry was akin to carrying out a major military raid. Great
precautions had to be taken so that they would not meet the "Hawks"
on their way to General Mercier's office. Once there, we had two other
problems. First of all the RPF was extremely surprised, to say the least,
by the firepower that the French expeditionary forces wanted to take
along on a humanitarian mission. They also grew very suspicious of
the fact that the complete operational plans of the future Operation
Turquoise were then written on only two sheets of paper. The RPF envoys were politely angry: how could we pretend that we were going to
send 2,500 men all the way to Central Africa with masses of heavy
equipment and with plans for the operation covering only two sheets of
paper? Where were the hidden documents? We had to persuade them
that there were none and that, yes, this was a bit flimsy, but that we
would soon have more detailed plans.
As for the firepower, General Mercier explained, it was only contingency planning. He had just come back from Bosnia where he had
learned alesson: When he had no artillery, Serbian snipers would regularly shoot at his men. As soon as he received some artillery and tanks
and used them--even just a bit-Serbian troops immediately became
less aggressive. But in the Rwanda case, he emphasized, the heavy
artillery, the armored vehicles and the aircraft would stay put in Zaire
uniess there was fighting involving his men. And to avoid such clashes,
General Mercier continued, would the RPF host a French liaison officer at their Mulindi headquarters inside Rwanda?
There was a noticeable difference of attitude between the two RPF
envoys, Jacques Bihozagara-who had grown up in Burundi as a refugee and spoke perfect French-and Theogene Rudasingwa, "the Ugandan." Jacques was by far the most accommodating of the two, and the
worst suspicions of some of the officers in the Ministry of Defense
were confirmed. "That one, the one who speaks English only, he is the
sneaky one. He is Museveni's man, spying on the other," a Staff Officer remarked to me.
lasked Rudasingwa, who is by nature quite reserved, to at least try
to smile. l was not very successful. But l could see that the earnest and
open presentation of our positions by General Mercier had made an
impact. The RPF refused the idea of a liaison officer, "a spy," as they
put it, and their attitude in Paris remained defiant. But Jacques
Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape
291
Bihozagara and his "sneaky" colleague were not so sure any more that
the French were entering Rwanda to fight them.
Reading into Prime Minister Balladur's mind, had it been possible,
would have reassured them immediately. Balladur had been pushed
into something he did not particularly want to do, and he was going to
do it as quicldy and cheaply as possible. On the same day that the RPF
representatives met with General Mercier in Paris, the U.N. Security
Council adopted Resolution 929 which authorized the French intervention under Chapter Seven of the U.N. Charter. On the 23rd at dawn the
first elements of Operation Turquoise started to land in Goma.
The Intervention up to the Fall of Kigali
The surprise of the RPF delegates in Paris when they had learned
about the amount of firepower Turquoise was planning to pack was
understandable. For a maximum strength of 2,500 men, there were to
be over one hundred armored vehicles, a battery of heavy 120 mm
Marine mortars, two light Gazelle and eight heavy Super Puma helicopters plus air cover provided by four Jaguar fighter-bombers, four
Mirage FICT ground attack planes and four Mirage F1CR for reconnaissance. To deploy this armada, the Ministry had chartered one Airbus, one Boeing 747 and two Antonov An-124s to supplement a
squadron of six French Air Force Lockheed C-130s and nine Transalls.
The whole force was placed under the overall command of General
Jean-Claude Lafourcade in Goma, and his subordinate General
Raymond Germanos operating from Bukavu/Cyangugu. Still, the
meeting in Paris had helped to mollify the RPF, and Colonel Frank
Mugambage declared that he "was not opposed to a humanitarian
mission by French troops" (SWB/Radio Muhabura 1994). This in tum
softened the OAU, which passed a resolution in support ofthe French
effort. Foreign Minister Alain Juppe dec1ared that the French initiative was already reaping very substantiai diplomatic benefits, though
this was exaggerated optimism. Italy, the only European country which
had briefly seemed ready to join Paris in its endeavor quickly backed
out after the inexperienced Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was
briefed by Foreign Ministry Officials. Apart from France's Black Africa clients, there were some vague supportive noises including a brief
offer of Tunisian troops, rumors of fortYEgyptian "observers", and
the announeement of a Mauritanian Medical Team. In fact, Senegal
was the only country which actually sent troops.
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The Path of a Genocide
On the ground, the we1come given to the French troops by the
lnterahamwe and the local authorities of the former regime was enthusiastic. In Gisenyi, where the French only made a quick incursion, the
Hutu extremist radio station RTLMC had been broadcasting for several days calling for "you Hutu girIs to wash yourselves and put on a
good dress to we1come our French allies. The Tutsi girIs are all dead,
so you have your chance." Elsewhere, enormous French flags were
displayed, inc1uding on FAR military vehic1es. This was particularly
unfortunate because Tutsi, seeing the French flag, would come out of
hiding only to be immediately killed by FAR soldiers or the militiamen. For French troops, it was a rude awakening as they began to realize the relationship France had entertained with the Rwandese
authorities. As one French soldier said: "I am fed up with being cheered
along by murderers" (de Saint-Exupery 1994).
Efforts were made to justify the operation by "saving" as many Tutsi
as possible. Nyarushishi camp near Cyangugu with 8,000 refugees was
a good start. Apart from that, only small and scattered groups were
found. On 27 June, French forces had gone up to Kibuye and eastward
as far as Gikongoro. When Defense Minister Uotard and Secretary of
State for HumanitarianAffairs Lucette Michaux-Chevry went to Goma
two days later to inspect the situation, the limited life-saving effect of
the operation was becoming c1ear. The only people Operation Turquoise
could really help were those who were in the least danger (Le., the ones
in large concentrations such as Nyarushishi or Bissosero). For the many
who were lost in the bush, nothing much could be done. The point was
demonstrated by the situation around Kibuye, where the authorities were
still killing at a fairIy fast rate. Apart from Kibuye town itself and its
immediate surroundings, the French forces were powerIess to do anything. And not only were they few in numbers. The operation had been
designed more for fighting than for providing humanitarian relief, as
evidenced by the abundance of armored cars but lack of lomes to transport people. When finding small pockets of hunted Tutsi, the French
would be unable to rescue them on the spot, but often said they would
be back the next day with a lorry. By the next morning, the Tutsi were
usually dead. Similarly, the French forces often stoOO by in medium
size towns while the killing went on unabated in the hills a few kilometers away.
Meanwhile, the war between FAR units and the RPF continued. A
group of moderate FAR officers led by General Leonidas Rutasira and
Colonel Marcel Gatsinzi had organized themselves in Gikongoro in-
Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape
293
side the newly created French "safe humanitarian zone," from where
they called for national reconciliation. Their initiative failed. Other FARofficers hardly responded to their call. The French did not want to get
embroiled in political affairs and gave no help. In some cases, French
officers who sympathized with the former Rwandese regime even dissuaded moderate FAR officers from trying to get in touch with the RPF
Rapport 1995,
(Observatoire Permanent de la Cooperation Fran~ise,
159). On the French side there were still extremist officers in the expeditionary force, despite General Mercier's careful weeding out. They
were no doubt just itching for an occasion to get at the RPF and help
their old friends.
In these circumstances, nobody knew what might happen in case of
a c1ash between Turquoise troops and the RPF. The "Interim Government" that had taken power after Habyarimana's death was clearly trying to provoke a confrontation. In Cyangugu, for instance, the Pre/et
Emmanuel Bagambiki kept repeating that "the French Army must go
into the RPF area and free our civilian population taken as hostages by
the rebels," thus asking French troops to reconquer guerrilla-held territory (Liberation 25-26 June 1994).
In the absence of any agreed mechanism to defuse a crisis, I kept
pushing for the creation of a telephone hotline that would enable the
RPF General Staff to immediately get in touch with the Ministry of
Defense in Paris and with General Lafourcade. The idea was not popular either with the Parisian diehard supporters of Hutu power or with
some RPF elements who believed we would use the satellite telephone
to electronically eavesdrop on them. I finally got a technician to explain to them that if we wanted to eavesdrop, we could easily do so
from Goma anyway. We finally got the green light on 2 July and flew to
Entebbe to enter the RPF zone and meet the RPF leadership. The telephone idea thus opened for political contact as well, something which
had been sorely lacking since the beginning of the operation.
Earlier, on 23 June, the former French ambassador to Kigali, JeanMichel Marlaud, and the former ambassador to Kampala, Yannick
Gerard, had been received at RPF headquarters in Mulindi by Colonel
Kanyarengwe. Marlaud was considered a diehard Habyarimana supporter and Ambassador Gerard was not really known to the RPF, which
may be why General Kagame refused to see them. The choice of
Kanyarengwe to meet them instead was a sign that the Front did not
want to deal seriously with them. Now, our delegation met with part of
the Political Bureau of the Front at Mulindi. We then drove down to
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The Path of a Genocide
Kigali to find out that the city had finally fallen to the RPF. General
Kagame was quite open to the telephone idea (we were carrying an
Immarsat with us, complete with its regulation generator). We agreed
to continue the discussion the next day in Mulindi, but things remained
very fragile. As we sat down to talk the next day, General Kagame
received a dispatch telling him of military preparations carried out in
Gikongoro by the French fonner DGSE-man, now serving with Turquoise under the name of Colonel Thibaut. 7 "Colonel Thibaut" had
publicly said that in case of a battle with RPF forces, no quarters would
be given. General Kagame, who understands French but does not know
it weIl, did not know the expression "pas de quartier." It was translated
for him by a bilingual ADC: "Sir, it means they will kill the wounded."
Kagame furrowed his brow, turned towards us and said calmly: "This
is a hostile statement, isn't it?" It took a great deal of talking to persuade the RPF leader that at times French colonels could say foolish
things without instructions from Paris. The misunderstanding was eventually worked out and Kagame promised not to attack French troops.
To reciprocate, President Mitterrand and Admiral Lanxade declared on
6 July "the RPF is not our foe." Having taken Kigali probably helped
the Front achieve this belated semi-recognition.
The Fall of the Northwest and the Refugee Explosion
As the "Interim Government" disintegrated, thousands of civilians
were streaming out of Kigali Prefeeture, moving on foot either towards
the Northwest which was seen as the last government bunker, or towards the South where the French-proclaimed "safe humanitarian zone"
seemed to promise physical protection against the RPF. Many of the
people now moving had fled several times before during the RPF
offensives in 1992 and 1993. For them, the RPF generated enonnous
fear and visions of devil-like fighters engaged in massive killings everywhere. But the fear was such that even some Thtsi were running
away from their "saviours." Within a few days of the fall of Kigali,
about one and a half million refugees had moved to the Ruhengeri and
Gisenyi prefectures, and about the same numbers to the French zone.
The enonnous crowd of at least 300,000 people was a mixture of
many: dispirited Interahamwe who did not even bother any more to kill
the few Thtsi who walked alongside them, civil servants and their families riding in a motley fleet of comrnandeered ministry vehic1es, ordinary peasants fleeing from their own blind terror, exhausted FAR troops
Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape
295
trying to keep a minimum of discipline, abandoned children with swollen feet, middle class Kigali businessmen in their overloaded cars, whole
orphanages, priests, nuns, and madmen. If many were fleeing due to
personal choice, the administrative authorities tried their best to get
everyone to leave before the arrival of the RPF. In Ruhengeri, the Pre/et
had warned those who thought of staying that "the majority of the population will be massacred" (SWB/Radio France Internationale 1994).
The extremist radio Mille Collines, which had stopped broadcasting
from the capital on 3 July, restarted its poisonous propaganda from
Gisenyi on 10 July.
On 11 July, General Lafourcade declared that the members of the Interim Government would be allowed to seek asylum in the French "humanitarian zone" if Gisenyi fell. This embarrassing political statement
of course drew return ftre from the RPF which said that it would pursue
them, whatever the consequences (Liberation 13 July 1994). Evidently,
there was imperfect coordination between the Ministry of Defense and
the Quai d' Orsay because four days later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
declared that if ministers in the "Interim Government" entered the French
zone, they would be interned (Le Figaro 16-17 July 1994).
French politicians were desperately squirming in the Rwandese mess,
trying to glorify the humanitarian functions of the intervention in the
hope of washing any genocidai bloodspots off their hands. On 12 July,
Prime Minister Balladur declared at the U.N. in New York that:
France has sent its soldiers out of a moral duty to act without delay in order to
stop the genocide and provide irnmediate assistance to the threatened populations. (Agence France Press 1994)
He denied-contrary to the facts-that persons responsible for the
genocide had been allowed to stay in France. 8 He promised cooperation with the Commission of Inquiry into the genocide, established by
U.N. Resolution 935: "France was a co-author of this resolution and
will put at the disposal of the commission all the information it will be
able to gather" (Le Monde 13 July 1994). In fact, when the French
government actually gave some documents to the Commission in charge
of investigating the genocide and prepared the briefs of the international tribunal, these were so general as to be useless. 9
The President displayed the same freedom of mind when he stated
during an interview on French television that:
1. Operation Turquoise had saved "tens of thousands of lives."
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The Path of a Genocide
2. In 1990, President Habyarimana had been in the process of democratiz-
ing Rwanda, following the principles of the La Baule summit.
3. France had nothing to do with the genocide since it happened after we
left.
4. France could not intervene in Rwanda during the genocide because this
was the job of the U.N.
5. If the present Rwandese crisis had produced a re-empowerment of President Mobutu Sese Seko, this was due to "unforseen circumstances."1O
Slowly, such a process of truth rectification began to have an impact
on French public opinion. People began to forget that the French "safe
humanitarian zone" covered only 20 percent of the country and talked
as if France had secured all of Rwanda and made it safe. The actual
workings of Turquoise on the ground were overlooked. The genocide
began to recede into the mistY past for millions of fast-zapping TV
viewers, and, with it, any responsibility France might have had. Rumors of RPF summary executions began to spread, giving birth to the
notian of "double genocide" that later would be more fully developed:
of "the Hutu killing the Tutsi and the Tutsi killing the Hutu," as U.N.
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali put it (1994, 88). All in all,
Rwanda was too much. Compassion fatigue began to set in.
The New Government and the End of Turquoise
Ruhengeri fell to the RPF on 13 July, Gisenyi less than a week later.
The human torrent of refugees swelled as hundreds of thousands crossed
inta Zaire.
In Kigali, the new government was sworn in 19 July. For the first
time since 6 April, there was an attempt at same sort of normalization.
The last three months had seen a combination of genocide and civil
war which had killed over 10 percent of the population and forced another 30 percent inta exile. Those who remained in Rwanda were in a
complete state of disarray. Many were displaced. A1arge number, especially among the Tutsi survivors, had lost everything, including their
houses. Many people were hiding in the hills.
The French intervention and presence had stabilized the situation in
the Southwest. However, the 1.2 million displaced persons could start
moving again at any time if they feared that their security situation was
about to change. Psychologically, most people were in various states of
shock and many women who had been raped were now pregnant with
unwanted children. Most of the infrastructure had been brutally looted,
Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape
297
as though a horde of human locusts had fallen on the country. Door and
window frames had been removed, electric switches had been pried off
from the walls and there were practically no vehicles left in running
order except RPF rnilitary ones. There was no running water and electricity in the towns, and on the hills there was no one to harvest the ripe
crops. The former Tutsi refugees who were returning from Uganda inta
the Mutara, or from Burundi inta Bugesera, had plenty of room to pasture their cows.
This was the disaster scene which the new government was supposed to manage. But the "humanitarian" Operation Turquoise did not
cancern itself with this situation at all. The French did not even try to
talk with the RPF and did not send an exploratory mission inta RPFheld areas. The RPF was still perceived as the enerny, and helping the
civilians now under its controI was out of the question.
White the RPF-controlled government was partly derived from the
Arusha concept, there were two major changes. First, the RPF had allocated to itself all the Ministries which under the Arusha formula should
have gone to Habyarimana's MRND(D) party. Second, a new position
of Vice-President had been created and given to General Paul Kagame
so as to put him in a leading governmental position without making
him President. The key issue was the relationship between the cabinet
and the RPF, more specifically the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), as
the Front Army now became known. Conditions of almost total material dependence of one on the other did not further a healthy rapport.
The French used the RPA's dominance of the government to confirm
their judgment of "the Tutsi" and to completely separate Turquoise from
political developments elsewhere in Rwanda. Soon, moreover, tales of
RPF violence-partly reflecting the impact ofRPA's hasty recruitment
in the early summer of 1994-further inhibited a return to normal international relations with the new regime.
Across the barder, disaster reigned as weIl. The human mass which
had erashed on the shores ofZaire's Lake Kivu lacked everything: food,
medicine, latrine pits (which were hard to dig in the vo1canic lava
ground), shelter and-most basic--clean water. A chalera epidemic
broke out in the third week of July, and spread like wildfire. After a
week, there were 600 deaths a day and after two weeks the 3,000 mark
had been reached. The emergency catapulted the French Turquoise rear
echelon in Goma into the forefront of the news. Almost overnight the
soldiers were turned inta grave diggers. In an article entitled "France
must hold its head high," the Minister of Defense proudly wrote that
298
The Path of a Genocide
"we have stopped the violence, cared for the victims and prepared the
way for those who deserve the beautiful name of humanitarians" (Liberation 22 July 1994). The popular evening daily France-Soirreported
more humbly: "The French military feel completely impotent in front
of these uncontrollable events. They simply stand by, looking helplessly at this nightmare" (France-Sojr 22 July 1994).
Bodies were lying everywhere. All available shelters were crammed
with dying people and corpses kept falling into the lake, further polluting the water. Newspapers and TV reporters moved in with relish to
document in horrendous details the grisly situation. This peculiar twist
of fate, which now condemned many of the late killers to an atrocious
death, had an important media and public opinion consequence that
was we]] analyzed by the Secretary-General of Medecins Sans
Frontieres, Alain Destexhe:
Yesterday the genocide of the Tutsi by the Hutu militia, today the genocide of the
Hutu refugees by the chalera? This comparison, which one can see widely used in
the press, puts on the same plane things which have nothing to do with each other.
Through this confusion the original, singular and exemplary nature of the genocide is denied and the guilt of the perpetrators becomes diluted in the general
misery. (Liberation 27 July 1994)
The point is important. The terrible sufferings of the Hutu refugees
in Goma, with their "divine retribution" aspect, defused the intensity
of feeling linked with the previous genocide. The genocide became
weaker, more "diluted in the general misery," especially since it had
much less media coverage than the latter event, and finally lost the
exceptional nature which could have led to the quick constitution of an
international tribunal.
In Kigali, the government affirmed that the perpetrators of the genocide had to be punished. Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu announced on 2 August that some 30,000 persons would be tried-a figure
that appeared absurd at the time since there was not enough jail space
in all of Rwanda to hold so many prisoners Il and raised the prospect of
carrying out death sentences on a massive scale. Nor did it make relations between Kigali and Paris any easier since the new government
was simultaneously trying to get France to hand over the French zone
after the planned departure of Turquoise forces on 21 August. Paris did
not want to be involved in anything having to do with exarnining the
genocide or judging its perpetrators, and for good reasons.
Mrs. Habyarimana and some of her relatives as well as c10se political associates were still in France. 12 In the "humanitarian zone," Tur-
Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape
299
quoise troops were discreetly ordered to let whatever former political
leaders were still around go to Zaire without hindrance. Admiral
Lanxade, Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, declared on 18
July that "France has no mandate to arrest the members of the former
government" (SWB/Radio France Internationale 1994). Several ofthem
had slipped into the French zone after the fall of Gisenyi and were
negotiating with the French military authorities to obtain safe conduct
out of the country. This obviously angered the RPF. General Kagame
declaring that, even by letting them into the zone, "France had become
an accomplice of the militiamen" (SWBlFrance l TV Channel 1994).
The French retaliated by accusing-probably correctly-RPF soldiers
of entering the zone illegally to kidnap people and loot property.13
The question of disarming soldiers and militiamen in the zone had
been a vexing one from the start. France never had a clearly stated
policy. As a rule of thumb, French officers would disarm obvious civilian militiamen, but only when they walked around openly with their
weapons. No search was mounted to try to find hidden weapons. Regular FAR soldiers were not touched; psychologically it was difficult for
French soldiers to disarm the very same Rwandese soldiers they had
been arming and training for the past four years.
French forces in the zone were also regrouping civilian Hutu refugees in various camp locations where NGOs, the Red Cross and the
U.N. were beginning to take care ofthem. This was a logical thing to
do in the short run, but since Turquoise forces later withdrew without
any further organization of the camps, these were left as festering
sociopolitical sores which led to grave incidents, eventually culminating in the Kibeho tragedy of April 1995 when large numbers of
civilians were killed as the Rwandese govemment dismantled the
camp.
Towards the end of July, Paris finally recognized the need to talk to
what it called the "de facto govemment of Rwanda." A delegation was
sent to meet Premier Twagiramungu in Kigali on 22 July. The delegation had been carefully pegged at a medium diplomatic level, consisting of Mrs. Boisvineau, Under-Director for East Africa at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, General Germanos, second in command for Turquoise and Bertrand Dufourq, Secretary-General of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. As the talks moved forward, the RPF accepted on in
principle that the "humanitarian zone" would be demilitarized after the
departure of the French. Nobody in Paris had many illusions a bout
how long this would last, but it was a face-saving mechanism and the
300
The Path of aGenodde
French ministries concemed still hoped to avoid aGorna-like panic
when Turquoise withdrew.
Because they would indeed withdraw. In spite of various foreign
appeals, mostly from the U.N. and the Americans, Balladur was resolutely sticking to the two months deadline imparted to French Forces
by the U.N. Resolution 929, voted on 21 June. Incredible procrastination on the part of the United Nations left UNAMIR at a still desultory
level of 1,000 men, with endless discussions still preventing the full
5,500 contingent from being deployed. Problems were obviously going
to develop.
Refugees had started to trickle back into the RPF-controlled part of
the country, albeit very slowly. By early August their numbers were
estimated to be at around 100,000 (SWB/RTBF-Brussels 1994). But
the movement was slowing down as the rumors of RPF exactions became more and more insistent. General Kagame had denied that these
exactions were taking place; this scared everybody even more because
it was taken as an example of sinister duplicity confirming the refugees' fear of the "Secret Tutsi Plan" that the MRND had always been
talking about. Everybody "knew" that return would mean annihilation.
As the deadline for the French withdrawal in the Southwest drew
eloser, a new exodus got underway, out of the zone and towards Bukavu
in Za'ire. The French were trying to reason with the displaced persons
in their area, but nobody listened. The mixture of fear of the RPF and
obedience to authority played up again, and long columns of refugees
started to stream on foot towards the border. Desperate at seeing the
flimsy zone structure collapse even before they had left, French military authorities swallowed their pride and brought Seth Sendashonga,
the (Hutu) RPF Minister of the Interior, and his (Tutsi) Rehabilitation
colleague Jacques Bihozagara by French military helicopter to Kibuye
in order to try to calm the population. But increasingly there were also
objective factors to civilian Hutu fears. Although the RPF did not pursue a policy of systematic persecution, some Tutsi did, especially the
thousands of former refugees now streaming in from Burundi. Entering in the Southeast of Rwanda from Ngozi and Kirundo provinces on
the other side of the now much-travelled border, the returning Tutsi
evicted the Hutu from properties which they elaimed had been theirs
thirty years before.
As the deadline drew nearer and the panic grew in the "humanitarian
zone," French defensive statements multiplied. Minister of Defense
Leotard dec1ared on 19 August that
Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape
301
we did all what was possible to stabilize and reassure the population.... It is now
up to the RPF to make the necessary gestures. '" I don't think it is fair to say that
our intervention has only saved people temporarily.... Let us not forget that the
safe humanitarian zone now contains more population than all the rest of Rwanda
put together. (Liberation 20-21 August 1994)
This strange defense and illustration of the intervention conceptabout which, to be fair, the Minister of Defense had never felt very
sanguine-rested on a factual error. The French zone sheltered around
1.5 million people, while there were around 3.2 million in the rest of
the country. It was strange, also, that he such a statement was made
forty-eight hours before the total withdrawal of French troops when
thousands of refugees were streaming out of the area. The safety-andstabilization process could definitely not be seen as having been more
than temporary. Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, along with President
Mitterrand a godfather of Turquoise--evidently recognized the point.
On 22 August he defensively claimed in a radio interview that "we
have taken all the necessary precautions. We did not simply leave during the night and put the key under the doormat" (SWB/Radio France
Internationale 1994).
Although the exodus had been less catastrophic than in the Northwest, around half a million refugees had fled the French zone for Bukavu
by the time the expeditionary force left on 21 August. As Fran90is
Leotard had said, it was now up to the RPF.
Condusions
When all has been said and done, what was the real meaning of
Operation Turquoise? As discussed in the historical background, France
felt it had to get involved in Rwanda when one its black francophone
proteges was attacked by "the Anglo-Saxons," even if these "AngloSaxons" were black. Paris fought them (by proxy) for almost four years,
but failed to achieve the hoped-for military victory. The Arusha Agreement seemed the next best thing to keeping a minimum of influence in
the Central Great Lakes Area.
The genocide came as a complete surprise to the French political
leadership. It is often said that this is very surprising: there had been so
many signs, so many "small" massacres (actober 1990, Bugesera in
March 1992, Bugogwe in January 1993, and other smaller ones in between), surely the French had to know-they were bound to know.
Wrong-and the reason is simple. The French were not dealing only
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The Path of Il Genocide
with Rwanda in Africa. There had been rampant violence in the Ivory
Coast, in Cameroon, in Togo, in Chad, in Gabon, and in Djibouti. None
had "gotten out of control." In Paris, the Ministry of Cooperation, the
Quai d'Orsay, the DGSE and the President's Office were all prepared
for a certain "normal" level of violence. What was understood as a
"few dozen" scattered dead was known to mean in fact a few hundred.
As long as the media would not scream too loudly, as long as Bosnia,
monetary problems and domestic unemployment figures stole the political headlines, no one really cared.
Up to April 1994, the French felt that Rwanda was just another one
of these irritating but secondary African problems. When it blew up in
our face, we were in good faith genuinely surprised. We had expected
only some "routine bioodietting." Given the past history of our involvement, we did not know what to do. Intervening during the genocide in
order to stop it (which we could easily have done) would have entailed
two things: (1) fighting (and hence getting a few of our boys shot), and
(2) fighting the FAR, our former allies. Both were impossible. Public
opinion would not have al10wed it, although-given its fickle, contradictory and incoherent nature-public opinion could very well have
demanded both action to stop the genocide, but simultaneously refused
to put white French soldiers lives on the line in order to save Africans.
Moreover, an intervention at that point would have brought up past
links with the FAR, and the government would have been strongly attacked for its policy incoherence. President Mitterrand, an old, experienced, and completely amoral political tactician, was very weIl aware
of these probable developments. Finally, and most decisively, the French
Army would in practice have refused to fight the FAR with which it
had worked for years.
The President decided to wait and see. Once the FAR had almost
col1apsed and the genocide had ron its course, while public opinion
began to seriously demand that some action, he could launch the intervention with very few risks. Turquoise was a public relations device
with some political undertones. It was sold to the public as a humanitarian operation, which of course it was not. This was recognized in the
Security Council, where five members abstained on the vote authorizing the French intervention. Paris only got active diplomatic support
from its faithful African retainers. Sorne were even a bit embarrassing
in their clearly interested eagemess to see the French prop up whatever
was left of the old Habyarimana regime, such as President Ornar Bongo
of Gabon who had asked for an interpositional force (Liberation 17
Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape
303
June 1994). Given the situation on the ground, this could only mean
stopping the advance of the RPF.
The importance and efficiency of Turquoise in saving lives were
greatly exaggerated for propaganda purposes. If we try to estimate the
number of lives saved in Southwest Rwanda, and assume that all the
Tutsi in the Nyarushishi camp as weIl as those picked up by French
forces at smaller locations otherwise would all have been killed-which
is unlikely given the speed of the advancing RPF units-a reasonable
conc1usion is that Turquoise saved around 10-13,000 lives.
The cholera epidemie in Goma was a godsend because through it we
could kill several birds with one stone. First, Turquoise soldiers were
on all TV screens, surrounded by heaps of corpses, among the dead and
the dying. Their usefulness could not be put in doubt. They could be
conventionally admired and pitied. Second, the presence of thousands
of murderers among the refugees was conveniently blurred by their
plight. They were suffering human beings whom we were helping. Who
was going to bring back the stories of the genocide they had committed
when their children were seen dying on the screen? Thus, our former
regime friends moved from the status of murderers to that of fellow
victims of the Tutsi they had killed. The best illustration of this intel1ectual confusion appeared in the Fall 1994 edition of the French encyclopedic dictionary Le Robert. Ort the 1994 Rwandese crisis it said:
"The April shooting of President Habyarimana's plane by the RPF
caused massacres which led to the flight of two million refugees out of
the country." 14 Third, the war, the genocide, the refugees, and the cholera became mixed up: "suffering" became a pertinent category. Trying
to dissect it to get at its political components was seen as obscene in the
face of so much pain. French policy was the obvious beneficiary of this
intellectual and political confusion. Finally, the composite crisis became a "natural catastrophe." The danger of a volcanic eruption 100ming over the refugee camps around Goma only reinforced this
impression. The vio1ence ceased being a political problem for most
people. It became just "another of those things" in "another of those
countries"-war, pestilence, volcanic eruptions, or barbaric tribal killings; just another local disease. With Turquoise, France took on the
role of the courageous and gentie doctors trying to al1eviate some of
this dark, barbaric, incomprehensible pain.
One can say that, within its own public relations and diplomatic parameters, Operation Turquoise was a complete success. With time, details fade into the background and ambiguities are forgotten. On1y c1iches
304
The Path of a Genocide
and simple images remain: French soldiers protecting Thtsi survivors
at the Nyarushishi camp. French soldiers burying mountains of ehoIera
casualties in Goma, wearing white kerchiefs over their noses to fight
the stench. French doctors frantically trying to save dying babies and
their mothers. This is what popular history and conventionaI wisdom
will remember, rather than the complicated and ambiguous process
which led to a late return of French troops to the desolate scene of their
former involvement.
Notes
1. Lest the reader would think that this an exaggeration, remember the 1985 incident during which French frogmen put two bombs under the hull of the
Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior in New Zealand, sank it, and killed one person on board. Greenpeace's "crime" had been to protest French nuclear tests in
Polynesia. This author heard shortly afterwards a Foreign Ministry Official privately justify the action by saying that it was "legitimate resistance to New
Zealand's imperialism."
2. See for example "Les enjeux diplomatiques de la tragedie rwandaise," La lettre
du Sud, no. 27 (23 May 1994).
3. Large transport planes such as the Boeing 747s and Antonov 124s which the
Ministry was planning to charter could only land in Goma since the Bukavu
airport strip was too short for these wide-bodied aircraft.
4. Some of the French officers were quite aggressive. I came elose to physical
blows with a Colonel in the Defence Ministry Cabinet who called me a "traitor"
and a "lout." This was not the result of personal enmity and conveys weIl the
intra-army tensions.
5. The President was very sensitive about the press campaign revealing a compromising French role in Rwanda. On the morning of the 18 June speech, special
couriers delivered by hand to all newspapers a communique from the Elysee
Palace which read: "Every time it came to know about exactions and human
rights violations, France immediately intervened, making all efforts to have the
perpetrators sought out and arrested." Considering France's inactive human rights
record during the mini massacres after 1990, the statement can only be seen as
rather naive propaganda.
6. AFP News Agency, 19 June 1994. In private General Dallaire was even more
severe. He knew quite weIl about the French secret arms deliveries to the FAR
and when he learnt of the French intervention, he said: "If they land here to
deliver their damn weapons to the government, 1'11 have their planes shot
down"(Interview with a U.N. official, Geneva, 29 July 1994).
7. See SWB/ Radio France lntemationale, 4 July 1994, and Le Figaro, 6 July
1994. The real name of "Colonel Thibaut" was Thauzin. He was also a former
military adviser to General Habyarimana during the war and was itching to get
the RPF. He was later recalled.
8. Le Monde, 13 July 1994. For the reality of the situation, see Observatoire Permanent de la Cooperation Francaise: Rapport 1995, 165--67.
9. Author's interview with a member ofthe Commission. Kigali, 18 January 1995.
10. SWBlFrance 2 TV, 14 July 1994. This was a Bastille Day interview, and thus
particularly determined to show la gloire.
Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape
305
11. In fact, eventually the prison population would increase to 120,000, but only
after more jails had been built and many had died in the overcrowded prisons
(Eds.).
12. Most were discreetly pushed out during the summer of 1994. Mrs. Habyarimana
first went to Cameroun and then later to Kenya where she had a house.
13. SWB/Radio France Internationale, 6 August 1994. The accusation was perfectly true but reflecting the growing lack of contral of RPF soldiers by their
leaders rather than a deliberate policy by the new Kigali government.
14. This was corrected in a new edition after the RPF threatened court action.
15
Protection
Humanitarian
Assistance in the Refugee Camps in
The Problem of Security
Kate Halvorsen
Introduction
With the massive outflows of refugees from Rwanda in the aftermath of the 6 April crisis, the rapidly worsening security problems in
the camps in Zaire, and to alesser extent also in Tanzania and Burundi,
became a matter of great concern for the international cornmunity. The
security issue affected all types of humanitarian assistance, at times
seriously interrupting the relief programs. Working in an extremely inhospitable physical environment, international aid organizations faced
a formidable challenge of providing humanitarian assistance and protection under conditions of violence, intimidation, and corruption in
the camps. In Zaire, the difficulties were compounded by tense relations with the Iocal authorities and Zairean soldiers.
Although UNHCR is not responsible for Iaw and order in the campswhich is the primary responsibility of host country authorities-the
High Commissioner has to address security issues when these prevent
the organization from implementing its mandate. In the Zaire case,
UNHCR took a leading role in calling attention to the security problem, proposing and even trying remedies. These problems and the eventual solution form the subject of this chapter.! The role of the humanitarian agencies and UNHCR with respect to other aspects of the
humanitarian crisis was dealt with fully in the Part III of the Emergency Evaluation (1996).
307
308
The Path of a Genocide
Contingency Planning
The security problems were in part a result of unpreparedness, so
the issue of contingency planning must be dealt with first. In response
to the crisis in Burundi in October 1993 and the subsequent outflow of
refugees to Tanzania, UNHCR undertook a mission to the Great Lakes
Region to assess its preparedness for alarger refugee emergency. This
resulted in regional contingency planning for refugee outflows from
Rwanda and Burundi to Tanzania, Zaire, and Uganda. When the crisis
struck in Rwanda on 6 April following the death of the presidents of
Rwanda and Burundi, the first flow into Zaire was not as big as UNHCR
had expected. Only around 7,000 persons came out to Goma, Zaire
during this first period from 6 April to the middle of July. However, the
flow into Tanzania was the fastest and largest movement UNHCR had
experienced: some 250,000 persons arrived in Ngara, Tanzania in the
course of only two days (28 and 29 April). That record was soon surpassed by the new inflow into Goma in Zaire. Starting on 14 July, around
1.2 million people crossed the border to Goma within four days (Goma
II). The size and speed of the influx was unprecedented in UNHCR's
history and caught the international community by surprise and in total
disbelief.
In retrospect, many observers wondered why the early warning systems apparently failed. This was also noted by UNHCR's own staff. As
one said: "Why was it not possible, even in Geneva where an interagency task force was monitoring the evolving situation inside Rwanda
with a view to foreseeing population movements, to predict more reliable figures than the 50,000 upon which contingency planning was
based?" (UNHCR 1994). Several early warning signals and predictions
of refugee influxes had been made and constituted the basis for
UNHCR's regional contingency planning that commenced in late 1993.
UNHCR had two sources of information about the situation in Rwanda.
One was ICRC, which by May/June estimated that there were 250,000
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the northwest ofthe country, but
had no indication as to whether they were on the move. The other source
was UNREO (United Nations Rwanda Emergency Operation), the
Nairobi-based field operation of the U.N. Department of Humanitarian
Affairs (DHA).
On 10 June, UNREO called a meeting in Nairobi for contingency
planning in case of a major outflow of refugees from Rwanda. UNHCR
among many other agencies and organizations were present at the meet-
Protection and Humanitarian Assistance in the Refugee Camps
309
ing where UNREO presented a document containing various scenarios
with different numbers of refugees, ranging from one half to one and a
half million persons. According to UNHCR there was nothing in the
meeting or document which indicated clearly how many to plan for and
where and when they would actually cross the border. UNHCR therefore made no changes to the contingency plan which at that time was
being developed by UNHCR Goma. It was a modular plan based on an
initial arrival of 50,000, with allowance for subsequent increase in numbers. The contingency plan included concrete plans for choice of implementing partners (CARE, UNICEF, MSF-H, Oxfam, WFP, among
others), for the stockpiling offoods and medicines, and plans for staffing and camp sites, including water, sanitation, health, road construction, and rehabilitation.
UNHCR's modular plan also noted several limitations that might
come into play in case of a large influx in Goma. One factor was the
limited implementing capacity of NGOs, and another was the limited
cooperation from the Zairean government, especially the local authorities (UNHCR 1994). UNHCR's own emergency response capacity was
stretched to its limit by the sudden and large Ngara influx in late April.
Another major concern in the planning process was the hostile attitude in the Goma area towards receiving Rwandese refugees. The Kivu
region of Zaire is the most densely populated area of the country; it is
also one of the most remote and underdeveloped areas, adrninistered in
irregular ways by local authorities, and politically in opposition to President Mobutu. The region has been troubled by ethnic conflicts involving earlier inflows of Rwandese migrants and refugees. During the
1950s, several thousands of both Hutu and Tutsi from Rwanda settled
in the fertile areas in North Kivu, and during the 1960s more Tutsi
came to settle both here and in other countries in the region. The refugees were industrious and many established prosperous business ventures. While many became Zairean citizens, the prominent economic
position of many Tutsi gave rise to considerable tensions and conflicts
with the local population, who still considered them as foreigners. During the 1980s, and as late as 1993, several clashes occurred between
ethnic Rwandese and the local Zairians, in the process displacing some
of the local population. The arrival of the new refugees in April 1994even though few at the time-was regarded by local people and authorities as a reinforcement of the ethnic Rwandan presence and a further
threat to Zairean territory and resources (Interview, UNHCR, September 1995).
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The Path of a Genocide
The issue of camp sites arose from the beginning of Goma I as the
initial three sites were overcongested and not suitable. During April
and May and into June alternative sites were sought both for the present
refugee population and for contingency planning. The local authorities, however, did not cooperate. UNHCR thus had to make plans within
this restraint as weIl as the physicallimitations imposed by a difficult
volcanic terrain. Three areas were finally identified as the only suitable
ones, and these formed the basis for further contingency planning.
When the large inflow occurred-more than l million persons in
only a few days-total chaos and disorder initiaIly prevailed. Apart
from the physical conditions, which resulted in disease, a cholera epidemic and high death rates, the large and sudden inflow made it impossible for UNHCR to screen or register the refugees. Partiyas a
result, the camps started off with a highly mixed and difficult population structure.
The Camps: Security and Protection Problems
The refugee flow consisted of civilians as weIl as many members of
the former government, the civil administration, the militias, and defeated government forces. Many were implicated in the massive human rights violations of the regime before 6 April, and in the genocide
which unfolded afterwards. As the Rwandese communities sought to
re-establish their preflight structure and social organization in the camps,
the former leaders and the military were able to take controi over much
of the camps. This is in itself not unusual in refugee situations. What
distinguished the Rwandese situation, however, was the extent of control by former soldiers, leaders, and militia and the intensity of the
security problems, coupled with the virtual absence of host government law enforcement.
The security problem had many dimensions. The refugees, as weIl
as foreign relief workers, were frequently harassed by local Zairean
soldiers, especiaIly early on. Of more enduring concern were the
Rwandese militias, former soldiers and leaders who mixed with the
general refugee population. Widely believed to be responsible for the
killings and harassment of refugees, these militant groups sought to
controi the large exile population and prevent repatriation on terms
other than their own. Finally, the elose proximity of the camps to the
Rwandan border created another form of insecurity by facilitating military activity across the border.
Protection and Humanitarian Assistance in the Refugee Camps
311
The Zairean Context
Maintaining law and order, and ensuring that refugee camps have a
humanitarian and civilian character, is formally the responsibility of
the national government. In the case of Goma II, however, the Zairean
law enforcement body was either part of the security problem or lacked
the capacity to provide contro1. The police force was virtually nonfunctiona1. The local military was i11 trained and seriously underpaid; the
soldiers had not been paid for months and survived from theft and
corruption, feeding also on the refugee relief supplies. 2 The local authorities had little eontroI over the loeal military units. The central government evidently exercised little controI over anyone, but seemed
generally favorable to the militants in the camps; this was also evident
on the level of local authorities. The Zairean government had been a
main ally of the Habyarimana government in Rwanda; the remnants
now filled the camps. Consequently, during 1994, the lack of action by
the Zairean armed forces was one of the main constraints in providing
adequate protection to refugee in the Zairean camps.
But if there was political support for the refugees on one level, tension rapidly mounted on another leve1. The huge refugee influx brought
ehaos to the little town of Goma, causing new health hazards, a rapid
increase in crime, and distortions in the loeal eeonomy. The presenee
of the refugees and the international aid community pushed up the eost
of housing and reduced the cost of labor, especially round the area of
Goma. Working for wages far below the locallevel, especially in agrieulture and domestic services, Rwandese refugees took jobs from the
local population. There was also damage to public buildings, cattle rustling, increased banditry, and a proliferation of automatic weapons. Aid
supplies created a surplus of maize on the loeal market and led to a
decrease in 10cal maize production (Pottier 1995). In addition, the local
population witnessed how the international community assisted the refugees with food, shelter, and other items, and gave some of them jobs
with good salaries, which further aggravated tension. One local official
in Goma described a common sentiment: "the refugees are of different
cultural ethics and behavior. Carrying weapons and killing are quite
common among them; the same goes for stealing and squatting on other
people's property. The refugee population has overwhelmed Zairean
resources, destroyed our environment, introduced uncontrolled inflation into our market and abused our hospitality. We want them out of
here soon" (UNHCR 1995:37). As a result some 10cals staged road
312
The Path of a Genocide
blocks and took international staff as hostages, or occupied their offices and cars.
The Camps: Controi and Distribution
An estimated 230 Rwandese former politicalleaders were in Zaire
(1,200 with their families), most lived comfortably outside the camps
with links to the camps. The militia was believed to be mainly responsible for the security problems in the camps (UNHCR 1995). Many arms
were confiscated when the refugees crossed the border, but some ofthese
were subsequently returned and new supplies evidently were flown into
the area (Human Rights Watch, 1995). While in North Kivu the former
soldiers and leaders initially lived in the refugee camps, in South Kivu
(Bukavu area) there were two separate camps for the military. Mostly,
the military camps were not assisted by the international relief community, but at least one NGO (Caritas) gave some aid in Bukavu to prevent
the military from raiding the regular camps. Moreover, the military were
often fed by family and community members in the refugee camps, moved
freely in and out of the camps, took whatever else they needed and recruited from among the refugees. Reports indicated that, directly or indirectly, the refugee camps became a source of attacks on the Kigali
government. On 18 November, the Secretary UN General reported that
there were indications of preparations for an armed invasion of Rwanda
and stockpiling and selling food for this purpose (UNSG 1994).
The result was the disruption of humanitarian assistance from very
early on during Goma II and continuous acts of physical abuse, harassment, threats, rape, extortion, killings, and gang warfare. Security incidences were constantly reported by UNHCR personnel in the camps.
For instance, on 10 August one refugee was beaten to death for talking
about repatriation; on 11 August two refugees were beaten to death
during food distribution for objecting to the quantity of food; on 24
August five refugees were killed in a gang fight (UNHCR 1994: no.17).
A report on 3 September noted that "not a day passes without several
persons killed either by angry mob against robbers or by gangs who
sometimes also attacks Zairians" (UNHCR 1994: no.18). On some days,
food distributions had to be stopped. "Young militiamen and general
thuggery" were behind the violence, concluded another UNHCR report (UNHCR 1994: no.17).
There was also incitement to ethnic hatred and violence against the
Tutsi. On 22 November Reuters reported the establishment of an exile
Protection and Humanitarian Assistance in the Refugee Camps
313
administration in the refugee area, which worked with the defeated
arrned forces and the militia to stop repatriation and prepare for revenge against the new government in Kigali. The group disseminated a
pamphlet entitled "Le peuple Rwandais accuse..." to all camps in
Bukavu and held "information meetings" (UNHCR 1994: no.35).
At the outset, when food had to be distributed as quickly as possible,
only one distribution site was established per camp, and the old leadership could easily take controi over the distribution. Large amounts of
food and nonfood items were diverted. It is standard UNHCR practice
to use existing community structures in the organization of distributions, and the restoration of old communities during a time of chaos is
important also from a refugees perspective, as many Rwandese affmned
(Pottier 1995, 33). The system nevertheless served to strengthen the
negative elements in the camps. The situation improved somewhat during September and actober when more distribution points were established in each camp (Pottier 1995).
Although most of the camp population as weIl as the relief workers
were affected by the security and protection problems, the vulnerable
groups among the refugees were most severely affected. Vulnerability
and security must be broadly understood as not only exposure to physical abuse: the absence of an accountable authority in the camps, the
threat or use of violence and the corruption also affected access to services in the camps and distribution of food and other basic materials.
Among the vulnerable groups were a relatively large group of unaccompanied minors and female heads ofhouseholds in addition to physically and mentally disabled, chronically ill and traumatized persons
who all suffered acute1y from the insecure and unstable situation. These
groups were especially affected by the disruption and diversion of food
distribution which resulted in high levels of malnutrition and related
problems (UNHCR 1995).
Repatriation
The security situation seriously affected the repatriation, but conditions within Rwanda were also important. Immediately after the midJuly influx to Goma, people started to return to Rwanda, evidently
because of the conditions in the camps. By Il August a total of 115,000
had returned. Pressures against repatriation from the old leadership in
the camps mounted, however. On two occasions in August UNHCR
had to halt repatriation because of security incidents. On 24 August, for
314
The Path of a Genocide
instance, 300 refugees were prevented from returning by thugs who
seriously wounded one of them, detained flve others and damaged a
UNHCR vehicle (UNHCR 1994: no.17). By August and September
reports from Rwanda were circulating among the refugees that returnees were heing subjected to severe human rights abuses and also had
difficulties recovering their properties. By the month of September repatriation had stopped completely.
Towards the end of the month, UNHCR sent a mission to Rwanda to
look into the situation of the returnees with the hope of making plans
for accelerated returns. The (Gersony) mission reported, however, that
the RPF was engaged in systematic killing of Hutu in Rwanda and that
serious human rights abuses were still happening (UNHCR interview,
July 1995). The flndings were subsequently disputed and the report
remained very controversiaI. As a result of the uncertainty about the
safety of the returnees, UNHCR did not start planning a comprehensive organized repatriation but continued to facilitate spontaneous voluntary returns.
By the end of 1994 it was clear that the largest return had taken place
in July and August with estimates of the total varying from 100,0003
(U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1995) to 600,000 (Government of
Rwanda 1995), while UNHCR and the UNSG operated with an inbetween numher of 200,000. Repatriation slowly continued with 2000
in January, increased to 10,000 in February, but declined in March as
reports again reached the refugees about increased human rights ahuses
of returnees. The movement came to a full halt with the Kibeho incident in April 1995, when thousands of internally displaced were killed
in encounters with the Rwandan armyas the government closed down
IDP camps. (Adelman and Suhrke, 1996) After a few weeks, repatriation again started at a slow pace and by June 1995 a total of approximately 25,000 had returned since the beginning of the year (Rwanda
Evaluation, Study IV, 1996).
Addressing the Security Problems
In the case of the Rwandan refugees, the question of eligibility for
protection raised a serious moral dilemma which affected the whole
international community. Everybody involved in the refugee emergency
was painfuIly aware of the fact that the perpetrators of genocide and
human rights abuses were being fed and assisted in the refugee camps.
The OAU Convention recognizes that the need for protection is not
Protection and lIumanitarian Assistance in tbe Refugee Camps
315
limited to those fleeing persecution, but also includes victims of war
and generalized violence. In mass influxes resulting from war, all people
are, therefore, according to the OAU Convention on Refugees, prima
facie refugees. However, the exc1usion c1ause of the 1951 Refugee
Convention can be applied if there is reason to believe that someone is
responsible for serious war crimes or crimes against humanity. It was
known that there were large numbers of people who should be exc1uded,
but the problem was to identify them, collect evidence against them
and to actually separate them from the bona fide refugees in the camps.
Apart from the legal issues, it was evident that the negative elements in the camps also had to be dealt with because of the deteriorating security situation. Since security problems hampered the delivery
of humanitarian assistance, UNHCR could legitimately take the leadership in addressing these issues as well. On the field level, UNHCR
had at the outset established a coordination group with NGOs led by a
Security Officer, which monitored the security situation and discussed
remedies. At the same time discussions were going on at other leveis.
In the first round, involving numerous meetings with UNHCR, various U.N. agencies, the Zairean government and NGOs, the major focus
was on proposals for separating the former soldiers, militia, and refugee leaders from the camps. This meant moving an estimated 60,000100,000 militia and former soldiers with their family members. In early
September, a joint UNHCRlGovernment of Zaire mission was sent to
the camps to consider the feasibility of separation based on a proposal
by the Government of Zaire to the Rwandan refugee leaders in Goma
and Bukavu to discuss alternative sites for this group (UNHCR 1994:
no.18). In practice, however, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to identify the militants or extremists who in principle were excludable from refugee protection, and get people to serve as witnesses
against them. Even ifthey could be identified, it was doubtful that they
would leave peacefully, as demonstrated by the so-called Gatete incident in Ngara camp in Tanzania. Gatete, a refugee leader and known
killer, was promised protection from the Tanzanian police in exchange
for leaving the camp. When Gatete ignored the agreement and remained
in the camp, UNHCR attempted to throw him out, which resulted in
riots and security threats against
and NGO staff members
(UNHCR interview, July 1995). Moreover, a UNAMIR technica1 team
concluded that it would take six months to comp1ete the move to alternative sites and the move would be both complicated and extremely
costly. As a result, the option was abandoned.
316
The Path of a Genocide
Instead, UNHCR proposed to the U.N. Secretary General in September to establish a security contingent consisting of Zairean military
personnel with support from international technical experts. While the
Secretary General's Task Force on Rwanda meeting in New York on 27
October supported UNHCR's proposal and suggested that UNHCR
produce an overall strategy combining security in camps with modalities of return to Rwanda (UNHCR 1994: no.30), the Secretary General
wished to pursue other options including the deployment of separate
peacekeeping forces in the camps. He was reluctant to collaborate with
President Mobutu and Zairean soldiers because it could be regarded as
the U.N. training and strengthening of Mobutu's forces, and because it
involved UNHCR far beyond its scope and mandate (Jones 1995).
The option of deploying peacekeeping forces had a mixed reception
in UNHCR. Some we1comed the idea, while others argued that
"UNAMIR is seen by refugees as supporting the Kigali Government,
and its image, particularly after a clumsy attempt to promote repatriation through leaflets, is substantially tarnished to make an extension of
its services to Goma viable" (UNHCR 1994). An alternative option put
forward by DPKO (U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations) to
hire a private company to provide security in the camps was also rejected on the grounds that it would be too costly and complicated to
implement.
After a series of bad security incidents in the Goma area, flfteen
NGOs issued a communique on 3 November which emphasized the
urgency of the situation. Citing an "untenable" situation with "unacceptably dangerous" living and working conditions for refugees as weIl
as aid workers, the NGOs threatened to withdraw uniess there was "an
immediate and tangible effort to bring about positive change in the
camps" (UNHCR 1994: no.32). Shortly thereafter, flve out of the eight
NGOs working in the Bukavu areas issued a similar memoranda to
UNHCR and suggested ways of addressing the security problems. 4 The
large Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) decided to cease its activities:
"the situation has deteriorated to such an extent that it is now ethicaIly
impossible for MSF to continue aiding and abetting the perpetrators of
the Rwandan genocide." MSF also feared an offensive would be
launched against Rwanda from the camps and lead to "another round
of genocide" (UNHCR 1994: no.34).
On 18 November the Secretary General presented a report with three
major military options on how to deal with the security problems in the
camps to the Security Council. These included deploying a regular U.N.
Protection and Humanitarian Assistance in the Refugee Camps
317
peacekeeping operation, a U.N. force set up specifically to separate the
former military and militia from the ordinary refugee population, or a
multinational force not under U.N. command to do the same. Another
measure which was recommended in combination with any of these
options was to set up a group of foreign police and military experts to
train and monitor local security force(s) (UNSG S/1994/1308). Ajoint
UNHCR/DPKO assessment mission went to Goma in December to
evaluate the situation and concluded that the most realistic measure
was to deploy international security experts to work alongside Zairean
forces. In the meantime, the Secretariat's canvassing for troops to peacekeeping forces received insufficient response and this alternative had
to be abandoned. Final1y, on 10 January 1995 the Secretary General
asked UNHCR to pursue the option of a Zairean security contingent
with international advisors, as first suggested by UNHCR three months
earlier (UNHCR 1995).
As this was an innovative solution to an increasingly common problem, and a first of its kind in UNHCR's experience, it is importimt to
consider its structure, functions and results in some more detail.
The Zairean Camp Seen rity Operation
While the process of finding a solution was slow, the establishment
of the two camp security contingents went very quickly. On 27 January
UNHCR and the Government of Zaire signed an Memorandum of Understanding and an appeal went out to donors for money and personnel.
The Dutch government promptly offered sixteen policemen. The Zairean
government agreed to provide an elite group of soldiers to be trained
and supervised by the international group of military experts. UNHCR
agreed to support the Zairean authorities with an incentive allowance
for each individual and provide additional support for uniforms and
security posts, light and heavy vehicles, telecom equipment, office furnimre, and equipment for a crisis cell in Kinshasa. In addition, UNHCR
field offices in Goma and Bukavu would administer and supervise the
group of international security advisors, with the Zairean military command, and also supervise, monitor, and train the Zairean contingent in
refugee protection matters. The objectives of the security contingents
were to: (a) improve law and order in the refugee camps; (b) seek to
end intimidation and violence against candidates of voluntary repatriation; (c) proteet installations and humanitarian personnel; and (d) provide escorts to convoys for voluntary repatriation from refugee camps
318
The Path of aGenodde
to the border. The contingent was separated into two major areas of
operation, Goma and Bukavu (UNCHR 1994: no.42).
The Zairean government selected soldiers from the elite presidential
guard who were disciplined and weIl trained. The flrst group of 100 soldiers arrived on Il February to form the Zairean Camp Security Contingent (ZCSC) which increased to a total of 1,513 by the end ofApril 1995.
The fITst twelve international Liaison Officers arrived in Goma on 23
February to form the Civilian Security Liaison Group (CSLG) which
increased with a few more members from Europe and ten each from four
West-African countries, making a total of forty-flve. UNHCR rapidly
deployed one staff member to Goma, who arrived on 13 February, to be
responsible for the overall coordination of the operation. In addition, flve
UNHCR staff members were deployed to assist the functions of Head of
Operations. The Operation was fITst planned for flve months, but was
later extended to the end of 1995 (UNHCR 1995).
Both the CSLG and the ZCSC were trained by UNHCR protection
staff in the principles of refugee law and doctrine. The security liaison
officers trained the Zairians in riot controI and diffusing conflict by
nonviolent methods, and police versus military patrolling. They were
also provided with riot gear, such as helmets, batons, and rubber bullets. The CSLG also monitored the work of the ZCSC by participating
in night patrols on a regular basis and during daily activities. Both contingents had offices in elose proximity of each other (UNHCR 1995).
Contrary to much apprehension among international relief workers,
by July 1995 the operation had a signiflcant positive impact according
to UNHCR and NGOs, as weIl as the refugees themselves. The cooperation between the Government of Zaire and the Zairean soldiers had
been good, with the exception of a few incidents of theft and corruption, which were dealt with effectively. In the camps, the number of
killings, theft, banditry, rapes, beatings, and other security incidents
were greatly reduced, as was the generallevei of tension. Relief workers reported they could more easily perform their duties. Food and nonfood item distributions evidently were no longer controlled by the
militias and reached the family leve1. Riots and demonstrations at food
distribution points were effectively dealt with, as were a few serious
incidents during repatriation operations. The refugees themselves reported that security had improved after the contingent became operational, and they especiaIly noted that their presence during distribution
and the ability to diffuse tense situations had a great effect (Pottier
1995).
Protection and Humanitarian Assistance in the Refugee Camps
319
Importantly, the previously prevailing situation of impunity was corrected. People were taken to jails and courts and punished for theft,
violenee against other refugees, possession of small arms, and in one
instance, rape. Disarming the refugees was not a part of ZCSC's mandate because the contingent was heavily outnumbered by armed refugees; nevertheless, some small arms were seized and arrests made,
ineluding members of the Rwanda army who made political speeches
in the refugee camps.5 By July 1995, other positive achievements were
noted: the ZCSC had investigated mine explosions involving both refugees and locals; they had arrested a gang of armed robbers; had intervened against another local military unit which had been terrorizing
refugees and stealing their belongings; and they had successfully escorted refugees who wanted to return to Rwanda (UNHCR 1995). As
the security situation improved, so did other areas of protection and
assistance because relief workers could function more effectively. Only
some were manifestly displeased: on February 23 some local Zairean
soldiers exploded grenades elose to the UNHCR office as a reaction to
the fact that other Zairean soldiers were being paid by UNHCR.
Although the general security situation in the camps steadily improved, the situation remained volati1e. A number of cross border incidents were reported in the region-e.g., on 11 April thirty Hutu refugees
in one of the refugee camps were killed and another fifty-six wounded
by Rwandans coming across the border. The militias were still in the
refugee camps; military training was still going on; and military operations from the camps into Zaire were being conducted. By mid-1995
UNHCR had received many reports of soldiers and militia in Zaire still
receiving military training and supplies and that they conducted lowlevel intense operations.
Policy Implications
All contingency planning for refugees is subject to the limitations of
the pull effect and cooperation from local authorities. In the Zairean
case, UNHCR operated under several restraints in this respect. Nevertheiess, one lesson is that-to the extent possible--contingency preparations should inelude plans for separating out soldiers from the civilian
population, as weIl as alternate security arrangements if no effective
local national entity exists. A contingency plan for security should inelude measures to disarm refugees, and prompt registration and eligibility determination.
320
The Path of a Genocide
Another lesson learned is the need to compile accurate information
on security incidents so as to quickly identify the nature and seriousness of the problem. In this case, inadequate documentation was a problem, although ii did not hinder action to be taken. Both UNHCR and
the NGO community should institute procedures to document security
incidents in a systematic and thorough manner.
Initially, it was believed that the innovative solution to the security
problem involving an international military/police contingent would
provide a model for the future, but the subsequent performance of the
ZCSG, when it became more or less allied with the Hutu militants, as
the next chapter documents, raises questions about the model. The
Zairean case set another precedent. While UNHCR's primary role is to
provide legal protection and humanitarian assistance, the High Commissioner took a lead role also on security issues when this was necessary to implement its mandate and when a vacuum was left by Security
Council inaction.
Notes
1. This chapter draws heavily on data coIlected through interviews with UNHCR
staff members in Geneva (July 1995-96) and the study of UNHCR documents. It
also draws on substudies and reports made by other members of the Rwanda Evaluation teams, and other U.N. documentation. These are cited when appropriate.
2. The 10cal Zairean soldiers were also a security threat. Being unpaid, many survived by theft and extortion. The huge quantities of relief items delivered to the
refugee camps gave them a new source to exploit. Several incidents involving
Zairean soldiers were reported by UNHCR. During the month of November, for
instance, fighting erupted between Zairean soldiers and refugees, on one occasion, twenty-four refugees and three Zaireans were killed and seventy-seven
wounded. Zairean soldiers also looted and razed villages and ordered refugees
living in the surrounding communities to move into the camps (UNHCR, 1994f:
no. 37).
3. These and subsequent numbers of repatriated all refer to so-caIled new caseload
refugees (Le., those who fled Rwanda after 6 April 1994), of whom the majority
were Hutu.
4. Measures suggested by NGOs in Bukavu included: (a)separation of nefarious
elements from the refugees; (b) elimination of arms in camps; (c) urgent and
complete registration, and (d) establishment of security and protection in the
camps (UNHCR, 1994c: no.34).
5. By the first week of June 1995, for instance, arms had been seized on seventyone occasions, including twenty-three rif1es or pistols, thirty grenades, four mines,
and various amounts of ammunition.
16
The Rwandan Genocide and the
Collapse of Mobutu's Kleptocracy
Abbas H. Gnamo
Introduction
Changes and transformations of societies and states could be the
result of internai dynamism, externai factors, or the combination of
both. For a long period of time, the Marxist school emphasized internai
contradiction as an underlying cause of social and political change. In
contrast, although internai development is important, in some cases
internai factors are insufficient to account for change. Perhaps that is
why Otto Hintze privileged externai influence on the evolution and
transformation of European states: "We must stress that in the life of
peoples, externai events and contradiction exercise a decisive influence upon internai constitution" (Nairn 1977, 11).
Throughout its post-colonial history, externai forces played a critical role in the Zairean domestic political arena, perhaps more than elsewhere in the region. However, the most dramatic political event in the
Great Lakes region had the most significant impact-the genocide in
Rwanda in 1994. Temporarily, this tragedy and its aftermath rehabilitated Mobutu's declining power, at least vis-a-vis France, but undermined his shaky authority and legitimacy in the long term. The
consequence of the Rwandan crisis, together with the evolution in the
geopolitical vision of the major powers in the post-Cold War era and a
strong desire for change within Zaire itself, combined to bring about a
much awaited change-the departure of Mobutu.
Political analysts, diplomats, and Zaireans believe, correctly, that in
the post-Cold War era Mobutu's autocratic and patrimonial rule, as the
321
322
The Path of a Genocide
ideological and philosophical basis of his government, are anachronistic and a "leftover" of history. Mobutu did not want to relinquish power,
despite internai and externai pressures coming from his friends and
adversaries. He continued to divide and manipulate the opposition that
permiued him to prolong the transitionai period (starting in 1992) and
his decaying reign until May 1997. 1 So, the overthrow of Mobutu was
not the surprise ofthe century; many people expected that Mobutu would
either transmit power to a democratically elected leadership or that he
would be ousted through a coup. They did not imagine, however, that
the force would be an Alliance coming from the far remote eastern
region.
On the other hand, perhaps no one in the Great Lakes region or elsewhere imagined that the Rwandan tragedy would affect the whole region in general, and, in particular, its very much larger neighbor, Zaire.
But history frequently produces unexpected results. The international
community, inc1uding the U.S., took too long to recognize that the
massacre in Rwanda was first a human rights disaster and then a genocide (Braeckman 1994; Prunier 1995; Adelman and Suhrke 1996). It
was simply perceived as a c1assical tribal war (la lutte tribale). The
spiral of violence in Rwanda-Burundi, between the Hutu and Tutsi,
over the last four decades persuaded many observers to consider that
the Rwandan massacre was one among many others or a repetition of
history.2 However, this is a very simplistic approach to this complicated human tragedy. As Rene Lemarchand wrote:
The Rwandan genocide is neither reducible to a tribal meltdown rooted in atavistic hatred nor a spontaneous outburst of blind fury set off by shooting down of the
presidential plane on April 6, as officials of the Habyarimana regime have repeatedly claimed. However widespread, both views are travesties of reality. What
they mask is the political manipulation that lies behind the systematic massacre of
civilian populations, planned annihilalion, not the sudden eruption of long-simmering hatreds, is the key to the tragedy of Rwanda. (Lemarchand 1995,8)
Above all, France, then the influential power in the Great Lakes region, and Zairean authorities failed to realize that the ethnopolitical
crisis in this tiny and poor republic would alter the status quo and geopolitical alignment in Central Africa. Moreover, it is doubtful whether
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and its leadership, coming from
Rwandan Tutsi refugees ofthree decades ago, imagined that their invasion would lead to such a tragedy, although they were determined to
oust the Hutu-dominated government and reconquer state power. Neither could the RPF have predicted that the calculated risk of launching
The Rwandan Genocide and the Collapse of Mobutu's Kleptocracy
323
a war would affect the lives of millions in neighboring countries. But it
did, radically and una1terably, as Africa Confidential underlined (Africa Confidentia19 May 1997,38:10).
In this chapter, we will try to grasp the broader dynamics of the
conflict by examining the domestic political situation and ethnonational
factors in Zaire. Mobutu's strained diplomatic relations with most of
his neighbors, in particular, his amicable ties with the former Rwanda
government and president Habyarimana, his hostility towards the current Thtsi-dominated government since 1994 and the Ugandan 1eader,
Yoweri Museveni, made him many enemies. The massive refugee presence in Zaire, including many who perpetrated the genocide-the
genocidiaires as they are called-as well as his support to the various
guerrilla insurgents operating from Zaire in neighboring states, also
constituted key factors. In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and
the beginning of the war in eastern Zaire in the fall of 1996, aU Mobutu
adversaries in the region united against him in order to solve "four
conflicts in one," i.e., the problems of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, as
well as the Zairean domestic crisis (Prunier 1997). In addition to the
four conflicts, the crisis in Angola could be added; Angola joined the
anti-Mobutu front to settle its UNITA problem.
The war which led to the overthrow of the Zairean govemment started
in eastern Zaire. The conflicts in North-Kivu and South-Kivu were different, though they were ethnonational in character. First, the conflict
in North-Kivu was between the authochtones and the Banyarwanda
(people of Rwandan origin, both Tutsi and Hutu). The second was between the Hutu refugees including the ex-FAR-Forces Armees
Rwandaises-and the Interahamwe ("those who attack together") and
the authochtones on the one hand, with the Banyamu1enge, Le., Zairean
Thtsi, on the other. The conflict escalated when the Hutu refugees perpetrated ethnic cleansing against the Zairean Thtsi (Banyamu1enge) with
the understanding and encouragement of Zairean authorities and soldiers. The threat of expulsion loomed over the Zairean Tutsi community. The Banyamulenge took up arms against the Hutu and their backers,
the Mobutu regime; the latter had deprived the Banyamulenge ofZairean
citizenship rights almost two decades earUer. The Zairean Thtsi received
the support of their Tutsi or pro-Tutsi regimes in the region.
Banyamulenge revolt was joined by traditional revolutionary elements
hostile to Mobutu's rule. This brought Laurent Kabila, a long-time opponent of Mobutu, into the political scene, and resulted in the formation of the Alliance which easily overran this huge country.
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The Path of a Genocide
As has often been the case, the major powers were not absent in such
a conflict, though their role does not appear critical to the outcome.
The two post-Cold War major powers for Central Africa, and Africa in
general, are the U.S. and France. The two democracies were allied as
partners against the Communist threat. However, with the end of the
Cold War they became rivals. However, contrary to what many observers believe, Kabila's takeover and the departure of Mobutu were largely
planned, orchestrated, and executed by African leaders without direct
participation of foreign powers, though with the apparent understanding and even encouragement of the U.S.
The Diffusion of the Conflict:
Refugees and Ethnonational Problems in Eastern Zaire
The total victory of the RPF in July 1994 resulted in two major developments: the end of genocide and the massive displacement of
refugees. Instead of a message of reconciliation and mutual trust, rumors of massive executions by the RPF of the Hutu spread throughout
the country, inducing the population to leave in great numbers for the
neighboring countries of Zaire, Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda. At the
same time, "Old Refugees," the Tutsi, living in exile for more than
three decades, returned to Rwanda. Most of the estimated up to two
million Hutu refugees were concentrated in eastern Zaire (Goma :::
850,000, Bukavu::: 332,000 and Uviru ::: 62,000), although the spread
of cholera in the refugee camps of Goma caused the death of no less
than 30,000 people.
The ethnonational conflict in eastern Zaire was of two types. The
first was the decades-long interethnic relations between those who lived
together both in harmony and conflict. The second was the problem
created by the massive refugee presence. Among the refugees were
50,000 ex-FAR, various Hutu militias largely responsible for the massacre of 1994, and the Hutu guerrillas from Burundi led by Leonard
Nyangoma.
The current population of eastern Zaire is composed of various ethnic groups. Same of them migrated from Rwanda about two hundreds
years ago. Above and beyond this migration, which included both Hutu
and Tutsi, because of the overpopulation and shortage ofland in Rwanda/
Burundi, the Belgian colonizers continued to bring immigrants of
Rwandan origin to colonial Conga where there was a need for manpower. To these groups, one has to add the displaced Tutsi refugees
The Rwandan Genocide and the Collapse of Mobutu's Kleptocracy
325
from Rwanda by the Hutu revolution and government from 1959 to
1963. Moreover, there was an illegal but continuous immigration from
Rwanda-Burundi to eastern Zaire after the colonial period. Needless to
say, in precolonial Africa the notion of fixed borders did not exist even
when there was some form of centralized authority. Even in Europe,
undl the French Revolution and the subsequent rise of nation states,
borders were fluid. Post-colonial African borders are "artifidal" in the
sense that they were traced by European colonizers without any respect
to ethnic composition and the definition of the local social universe,
language and culture. Neither the colonial state nor the sovereign states
could strictly controi population movements from one country to another where they have relatives, kinsmen, affinities or potential opportunities-in Africa the reference is genealogy more than borders. Most
particularly, the sovereignty of many African states is nominal, and
states lacked full controi over their own territory. Because of administrative weaknesses, the states hardly registered births and deaths, let
alone imposed visas. The implication: it is difficult to distinguish between those who lived there for centuries or arrived only years ago,
particularly where the people are of the same ethnic group.
The last and the best known population movement to eastern Zaire
was related to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 when very large numbers
of Hutu refugees arrived and altered century-old interethnic relations.
The Hutu refugees constituted a unique kind of refugee flow since it
included the armed ex-FAR and the Interahamwe militias responsible
for the genocide and planning to return with force to Rwanda to oust
the Tutsi dominated government. Their massive presence affected the
local population in many ways. It resuscitated the dormant conflict
between the various ethnic groups, each struggling for access to resources in Kivu, the poorest and the most densely populated region in
Zaire. Above all, the Hutu influx broke a centuries-old Tutsi-Hutu alliance in Zaire. Until the Spring of 1993, the two communities had fought
together against indigenous Hunde and Nyanga even when the Hutu
were involved in ethnic cleansing against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Finally,
the drculation of a considerable number of weapons created a climate
of insecurity and even anarchy in the region.
Of course, until the crisis of the 1990s, the integration of Banyarwanda
into the community was relatively easy due to broad social contacts
and a common intermarriage process which, over the years, intertwined
the population to the point where it was nearly impossible to distinguish the ethnic identity ofindividuals. The Hutu of North-Kivu were
326
The Path of a Genocide
particularly ''Tutsized'' and lived in harmony with Thtsi, whereas in
South Kivu, the Banyamulenge remained more or less "pure-Thtsi."
The Banyarwanda community had done weIl econornically, particularly in commerce, but economic envy and jealousy of the authocthones
was one result (Prunier 1997, 195). Moreover, the influence of the HutuThtsi intelligentsia in the political and economic life of northem Kivu
was resented by other ethnic groups as was the domination of the
emigres. The indigenous populations clairned they were marginalized
by the newcomers throughout the Mobutu era. The Banyarwanda were
accused of putting in place a secret and hierarchical structure exclusively composed of the immigrants to promote their economic and political power at the expense of Hunde-Ngaya. The latter, whose leaders
were close to Mouvance presidentielIe (or Mobutu's supporters), even
claimed that their land ownership rights in the hills were jeopardized
by the Hutu-Tutsi elite. For its part, in many of the inter-ethnic conflicts, the Mobutu clan perpetuaIly sided with one of the protagonists
according to circumstances and opportunity. For instance, in earlier
periods Mobutu supported the Banyarwanda against the authochtones
who contested his authority, but later he encouraged the antiBanyarwanda sentiment of the local ethnic groups during the national
conference3 and particularly after the Rwandan genocide. As Thomas
Thmer wrote:
The erudest examples of divide-and-rule taeties involves incitement of ethnie violenee. In North Kivu, Hunde, Nyanga, and other "IDeal" peoples attaeked immigrants from Rwanda, with obvious eneouragement of Mobutu and his supporters.
In mineral-rieh Katanga (as Shaba Region was known onee) loeal people attaeked
Kasaians as a direct result of Mobutu's rule. (Turner 1996,257)
Mobutu always used the sentiment of frustration, real or imaginary,
of different communities, frustration emanating largely from competition for economic resources and political power. In this conflict, where
the indigenous population accused newcomers or immigrants from another province of sabotaging, profiting, exploiting, and oppressing the
original inhabitants, Mobutu did not adopt a responsible position. His
attitudes were dictated by the political advantage he would obtain from
the conflict. Instead of being an arbiter, he incited ethnic violence. In
addition, he took controversiai measures which aggravated the conflict. For instance, in 1992 he abrogated a principle of non-assignment
of soldiers in their own province of origin, as weIl as in North-Kivu.
The result was that every soldier mistreated the civilian population of
The Rwandan Genocide and the Collapse of Mobutu's Kleptocracy
327
his ethnic enemy. A case in point was the torture of the Hutu-Tutsi by
the soldiers ofFAZ (Forces Armees Zairoises) under the order of HundeNyanga notables. In spite of strong protests to local political and judicial authorities, this case was never even investigated (Bakajika 1997,
19). This, added to other conflicts of an econornic and ethnopolitical
order, exacerbated tensions which led to the recent war in eastern Zaire.
The massive arrival of Hutu refugees in the summer of 1994 altered
interethnic relations in many ways. First, the Banayarwanda (Hutu and
Tutsi of Rwandan extraction), who largely intermarried and expressed
solidarity during different conflicts with other ethnic groups in eastern
Zaire, lost their cohesion after the Rwandan genocide because both the
conflict and the Hutu refugees in Zaire set the two communities in
opposition. Generally speaking, the reaction to refugees in Zaire varied. It seems that there was a general consensus that the refugees shouId
be sent home, though many Zaireans in the east sympathized with the
Hutu of Burundi and Rwanda. It was in this context that the politicians
in Kivu envisaged the expulsion of the Zairean Tutsi-Banyamulengefrom the region. Since a 1981 law requiring proof of their ancestry, the
judicial condition or the citizenship rights of this community was in
doubt. In 1982, the govemment revoked the citizenship of the people
of Rwandan origin, the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda, and officially
branded them as "strangers" who could not hold public office. In so
doing, this measure was a flagrant human rights violation, but also politically absurd. In effect, how was it that the state, created some three
decades previously, could deny the citizenship rights of a people who
had lived there for 200 years? However, as Peter Rosenblum noted,
"corruption and political instability also prevented the conflict over
citizenship from being addressed in a legitimate forum, encouraging
the search for alternative solutions, such as mass expulsion" (Rosenblum
1997,200--05).
The massive arrival of anti-Tutsi refugees, combined with the local
anti-Tutsi sentiment fermented by local authorities and the Zairean
government, largely contributed to the escalation of the conflict. The
ex-FAR and the Interahamwe established de facto rninirepublics over
more than one million Hutu refugees and the local people with the full
understanding of the Zairean government and the FAZ (Forces Armees
Zairoises). One has to bear in mind that the former Rwandan authorities and the ex-FAR did not come empty-handed; they were not ordinary refugees induced to leave their country. They had the necessary
time to transfer whatever could be transferred from Rwanda to Zaire.
328
The Path of a Genocide
For instance, they shipped 20,000 tons of coffee estimated at 50 million dollars which they stocked in the stores belonging to Mobutu's
family (Verschave 1994, 160).4 They had also brought with them 17
billion Rwandese francs, most of which was put under the direct control of Mobutu (Prunier 1995, 321). Above all, they made use of the
constant flow of humanitarian aid from the DN and NGOs. For instance, it is reported that:
since 1994, these displaced people, as well as those in Tanzania, had been fed,
clothed and housed by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) at a
cost of more than $lm a day. Little attempt had been made to return them to
Rwanda, mainly because the hard-line Hutu militias and the former Rwandan
Army threatened anyone wanting to return home. (Strategic Survey 1996/1997,
214)
Further, the number of refugees was deliberately inflated to get more
resources which went to those who controlled the camps. The refugees
were also supplied with arms by different dealers and perhaps by some
states. Hence, they controlled the camps, preventing innocent refugees
from going back home for at least four reasons. Firstly, if the refugees
returned home, the militants would be cut off from lucrative humanitarian aid. Secondly, the refugees served as pawns for propaganda.
Thirdly, they were buffers to prevent their own arrest. Finally, the return of refugees would thwart their long term plan to organize themselves, overthrow the-RPF dominated government and restore Hutu
supremacy.
For the hard-liners, the dream of terminating the "work" (genocide)
remained alive. According to a document allegedly left behind during
the war and found in one of the refugee camps, the plan of invading
Rwanda from Zaire was on the agenda. The extremists undertook many
small-scale incursions into Rwanda from their refugee camps. In fact,
many observers were conscious of the necessity of separating the criminal elements from the majority of refugees, but no country was ready to
engage in a conflict with the ex-FAR and armed militias. The host government did not take any measures to controi the situation because of
Mobutu's sympathy with the Hutu and due to antipathy to the current
RPF leadership; nor did the Zairean government have any of its own
means to do so given the state of his unpaid and undisciplined soldiers.
Further, the latter developed a friendship with the ex-FAR and the
Interahamwe, who were more resourceful and rich thanks to relief aid
and smuggling. The Tutsi-dominated government was always irritated
by repeated incursions and violations of its border from the west.
The Rwandan Genocide and the Collapse of Mobntu's Kleptocracy
329
Rwanda warned the international community that if nothing was done,
it would attack the camps. Paul Kagame, Minister of Defense and vicepresident of Rwanda, informed the U.S. about his intentions (Rosenblum
1997,201-02).
Moreover, the militia and the ex-FAR did not behave like conventiona1 refugees. Their presence had a profound effect on the life of many
Zaireans in the region. Bakajika summarizes the social, political and
economie consequences of Rwandan refugees on the Zairean populations as follows:
The start of school for Zairan schoolchildren was jeopardized, the teachers preferring to offer thdr services to nongovemmental organizations (NGOs) for US$4
per day. Almost all of the civil service drivers became day 1aborers with these
NGOs; the Rwandan refugees regularly committed acts of appropriation, intimidation, even violence against the natives, but a1so against the 10ng-seUled Tutsis
in Zaire, insecurity supported by the Interhamwe, FAR, and FAZ. (Bakajika,
1997:20)
However, the most affected were the Tutsi pastoralists living in the
region for many centuries. In the face of the ethnic c1eansing launched
by the ex-FAR and Interahamwe in collaboration with other loea1 ethnic groups who used this opportunity to "settle" their own conflict with
the Tutsi, they forced some of the 1atter to abandon their houses in
order to return to Rwanda, where their kinsmen were in power and
where they wou1d be better proteeted. However, many of them decided
to take up arms to defend themse1ves. As opposed to their cousins,
Banyarwanda in the North-Kivu, who suffered in 1993 and 1994 without any externa1 support, the Banyamu1enge of South-Kivu believed
that the time had come to put up strong resistance as they cou1d count
on the regime in Kiga1i and eventually those of Bujumbura and Kampala.
The two could he1p not on1y due to ethnic solidarity, but a1so to ensure
the safety of their own borders and states.
Having foreign support from friend1y neighboring countries was
important but was not sufficient in itse1f; there had to be a suitab1e
internai c1imate in Zaire if the war had any chance of success. The
Zairean state was on the verge of collapse after thirty years of dictatoria1 and inept ru1e under Mabutu, who continued to suffer from cancer
and was usually abroad for treatment. The inconc1usive democratic transition with different competing institutions and individuals c1aiming
1egitimacy further destabilized the country as did the acute economic
crisis that para1yzed the administration, the hea1th and educational sector. Above all, the complete1y disorganized army, which was rarely paid,
330
The Path of Il Genocide
and was inadequately trained and armed, was not capable of putting up
much resistance as was seen in the seven-month war.
The A.rme~o
Rebellion and
Zairean Crisis
Without taking into aceount previous skirmishes, the war started in
Oetober 1966 in eastern Zaire. Naturally, the eause of this war was
loeal, but its implieations were both regional and geopolitical. As Gerard
Prunier argued, "If the eatalyst of the confliet was loeal-the persecution of the Banyamulenge by a Kinshasa-supported South Kivu tribal
eoalition-the reasons why it broke out, and especially why it broke
out on such a large scale, involved the entire region" (Prunier 1997,
197). One has to analyze, therefore, why the war broke out and why it
involved both the Zairean armed opposition and most ofZairean neighbors such as Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Angola. Although all these
countries have their own explanation for involvement in the war, the
trigger was assoeiated with the legacy of the Rwandan genocide of
1994.
In the summer of 1966, the conflict in eastern Zaire began. It gathered momentum in the fall of 1996 through the eombination of two
related factors. The first was the increasing harassment of the ethnic
Tutsi-Banyamulenge-estimated at 300,000 people, in Kivu; they had
already been denied their citizenship rights since 1982. Then they reeeived a serious threat of expulsion from their homeland by the Zairean
army and regional authorities, in this case the Deputy Governor of SouthKivu, Lwasi Ngabo Lwabanji. The Banyamulenge decided to put up
armed resistance against the Hutu militia and the Zairean army. Second, this resistance corresponded with a strong desire on the part of
Rwanda, which was irritated by a massive presence of Hutu refugees,
among them the Interahamwe and the ex-FAR, on Hs border in eastern
Zaire
which the Hutu armed
to destabilize its
western regions through repeated incursions. The armed elements took
the refugees hostage in order to obtain continuous relief aid and eventually to use them as a shield the case of attack from Rwanda. In the
absence of any reaction from the international community towards this
situation, Rwanda thought that the only way to solve the
was
to join the war of the Banyamulenge, not by a simple ethnic solidarity,
but as an effeetive means to end the incursions and to nip in the bud
plans for the reconquista by the refugees. The former Rwandan 801diers and the militia had made no 8ecret about their intention to invade
The Rwandan Genocide and the Collapse of Mobutu's Kleptocracy
331
Rwanda when they were once again strong. Interna1 security of Rwanda
had deteriorated in the summer of 1996, a1though some aspects of this
insecurity emanated from "the vi01ence linked to strugg1es within the
RPF and among Tutsi returnees from different countries" (Rosenb1um
1997,201). Furthermore, although the concerns of other neighboring
countries of Zaire-Uganda and Burundi-were not as strong as those
of Rwanda, they shared the same interest with the latter since Zairean
soil was used as rear bases for the opponents to their regimes (Strategic
Survey 1997,213-18).
At the start, the war appeared spontaneous with the Banyamulenge
spearheading the fight against the refugee camps and the FAZ. But
later, it became c1ear that the uprising of the Tutsi was far from spontaneous, though the reasons for the revolt were justified. This was mainly
because the fighters were prepared, armed, and trained to act according
to a well-established strategy and objectives far beyond the organizatianal and military capacity of the Tutsi community (Banyamulenge).
The plan was said to have been organized by strategists from Rwanda
and Uganda. The first strategic goal was to destroy Hutu refugees camps
in Eastern Zaire. The second was the conquest and controi of the mineral-rich South and Central provinces. Finally, the rebellion was to target the major cities before marching on Kinshasa. This presupposed
the participation of well-trained Rwandan, Ugandan and perhaps
Burundian soldiers (Leymarie 1997,12).
The attacks started in September 1996. On 13 October, the fust group
of Hutu refugees started to flee the rebel incursion inta the eastern
Zairean town of Uvira. On 18 October, the fighting intensified around
Uvira which was captured on 24 October. This was followed by the fall
of Bukavu and Gama on 30 October and 1 November respectively; the
conquest covered about 300 miles of eastern Zairean territory. At this
point the war changed its nature, attained its climax and attracted wider
media caverage because of the refugee and humanitarian crisis.
The defeat of the ex-FAR and the militias and the lack of humanitarian aid meant the refugees were forced to return to Rwanda. Others
were cut off from all aid and were caught in the war. The war induced
no less than 600,000 refugees to return to Rwanda, whereas others,
who were not willing to return, estimated as high as 300,000,5 fled west
deep into the Zairean jungle. These refugees suffered from lack of food,
medical aid and persecution from the ADLF (L' Alliance des Forces
Democratiques pour la Liberatian du Congo-Zaire-ADLF-CZ) fightexact number is not known, were said to have
ers. Many of them,
332
The Path of a Genocide
been systematically massacred, and some commentators even characterized these killings as another "genocide."6 The V.N. also accused
the rebels of systematically exterminating Hutu refugees in several
places. Kabila denied these accusations. In any case, the repatriation of
the other refugees to Rwanda was completed by the end of the summer
of 1997.
One has to bear in mind that the fighting commenced by Banyamulenge had considerable support from RwandalUganda, although it
is difficult to quantify the assistance. The sweeping victory shows the
importance of this aid, although Rwanda, Burundi and V ganda resolutely denied any involvement until the last stage of the war. But their
role was evident to all. As Newsweek wrote: "The rebels quick conquest of territory shows how deeply foreign troops are involved in the
offensive. Despite Mobutu's weakness, it never made much sense that
a ragtag anny composed from the Tutsi tribe could march alone across
a huge country" (Newsweek 12 March 1997,41).
Kabila, the leader
However, as soon as the war began, Laurent-Dsi~
of L' Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du CongoZaire (ADLF-CZ) became involved. Kabila is neither Hutu nor Tutsi,
but originates from "pure" Zairean roots-the Mluluba ethnic group.
Although the Banyamulenge are Zairians, they were perceived as Tutsi,
and the emergence of Kabila and his friends "Zairianized" the conflict
or provided the war with a national dimension. This became more evident when he became a spokesman and leader of the rebellion. However, the question of who really commanded and fought in the rebellion
remained shrouded in mystery, particularly until the beginning of 1997.
According to Peter Rosenblum, who visited the zone of the conflict
during Christmas of 1996:
The rnysteries surrounding the rebellion remain, no doubt intentionaIly. Little is
known about who is actuaIly fighting or what authority Kabila really has. Are the
fighters Ugandan? Rwandan? Angolan? Zairean? Who is pulling strings? Is Kabila
"Zairianzing" the rebellion as it sweeps through the country or sirnply winning
the battle of appearances necessary for popular support? (Rosenblurn 1997,201)
Such questions had been raised by Zaireans and many observers
throughout the war. In the beginning of the war, as in latter periods
when the FAZ was losing one battle after the other without putting up
any resistance, the Zairean public was shocked and felt humiliated by
what was perceived as external aggression. Kabila was considered a
simple "puppet" or stooge of V gandaJRwanda. Whatever his real au-
The Rwandan Genocide and the Collapse of Mobutu's Kleptocracy
333
tonomy vis-a-vis these countries, it is certain that Kabila was propelled
by Uganda/Rwanda not only to form the Alliance with the
Banyamulenge and other small fronts, but to recruit and arm thousands
of dissatisfied Zairean ethnics who live in Bukavu in eastem Zaire. He
also recruited from other regions as the war went on and he expanded
his zone of influence.
Unti1 the recent crisis, little was known and written about Kabila,
although he has a reputation as an etemal foe to the Mobutu regime. 7
He was bom at Moba, around Lake Tanganyika, in Shaba province. He
belongs to the Luba ethnic group. In the late 1950s, he studied in Paris
and then in Eastem Europe. As many young men of his generation of
Africans of that time, he came back with socialist ideas of Third-World
militancy. Upon his return to the Congo, he became a deputy in a newlyindependent Congo.
In 1960, Kabila gave his support to Patrice Lumumba, the father of
Congo's independence, who was arrested, tortured, and killed in 1961.
He then returned to Eastem Europe (Belgrade), and in 1963 he took
part in the Lumumbist insurrection led by Gaston Soumaillo and supported by the USSR. At the time, Kabila was fierce1y anti-imperialist
and anti-American. In 1965, along with Che Guevera, he tried without
success to give support to an anti-Mobutu revolt led by Pierre Mulele.
Disappointed, Che Guevera 1eft Eastern Zaire, South Kivu, six months
later. In 1967, Kabila founded "le Parti Revo1utionaire du Peup1e" which
formed the current AlIiance with four other small parties on 18 October
1996 at Memera, South Kivu. Between 1967 and 1996, he lived an
ordinary life in Kivu with fel10w combatants. Generally, he was said to
have combined political militancy of the Marxist inspiration of Che
Guevera with commercia1 adventures (Le Monde 1997,2). The coalition he formed (ADLF-CZ) included peop1e from the Muluba ethnic
group (Shaba and Kasai regions), the Munyamulenge ethnic group
(South Kivu), the Banyamulenge (Zairean Tutsi) in Kivu (Masisi) and
South-Kivu regions, and the Mukungo ethnic group of the Shaba region. The factions composing the AlIiance were far from having a coherent political and ideo10gical orientation. 8
Militarily speaking, there was hard1y abaUle, perhaps with the exception of Lubumbashi and Kenge, where strong resistance was carried out for many days by the Republican Guard. Initially, there was a
collective belief that the well-trained, armed, and paid Garde Republicaine could save Mobutu's power or could resist, but il did not. The
demoralized, poorly equipped and trained, undisciplined, and above all
334
The Path of aGenodde
unpaid soldiers were not up to the ADLF fighters. The FAZ were no
longer soldiers, but anarchic bands. The support they received from the
ex-FAR, the Interahamwe and UNITA did not make a difference. Indirectly, the UNHCR backed the FAZ by financing a Zairean Security
Contingent (CZSC) to proteet refugees. This desperate attempt did not
work either. The FAZ, instead of protecting the population, engaged in
unbelievable banditry and looting before escaping from the battlefield.
As such, they did more damage than the ADLF fighters. Many people
in the region, therefore, were openly hostile to the FAZ and were waiting for the arrival of the rebels to end the anarchy.
During this crisis, the Zairean dictator was abroad, first in Switzerland and then in France, to treat his prostate cancer and recuperate from
surgery. Mobutu invented a elever but manipulative political formula
known as "Mobutu or Chaos" (cf. Young and Turner 1985-"avant moi
le chaos, apres moi le deluge"; see also Braeckman 1992, 357-61).
Perhaps he believed that the defeat of his army and the humiliation of
his country in his absence would mean that he was needed back in
Zaire. This, more than ever, could have restored his fading internal
legitimacy. In fact, many Zaireans thought that with his presence things
would not have gone as badly. Many disillusioned Zaireans expressed
their discontent against the Kengo government that was accused of not
doing enough to defend the country. Same tried to connect this weakness to his Tutsi ancestry. Many also believed and hoped that the return
of Mobutu would permit the restoration of the prestige and image of
Zaire that had been "tarnished" by its small neighbors. It was with this
in mind that many Zaireans gave him a triumphant we1come upon his
return from France on 18 December 1996. Mobutu vowed to annihilate
the enemy and recover the occupied
territory; he named new
military commanders, mobilized his famous Republican Guard, and he
even employed mercenaries from France, Belgium, and Serbia. But he
was unable to reverse the tide. The highly expected counter-offensive
did not take place.
Republican Guards and mercenaries lost one
battle after the other. With the fall of Kisangani, the third largest Zairean
city, to the rebels, all analysts, as many Zaireans, coneluded that a
counter-offensive was no longer possible. The occupation of the whole
territory became a question of time.
One can ask why the Alliance won an easy victory. The first explanation for the success is attributed to the strength, discipline, training,
and determination of the ADLF fighters. The second explanation resides in the collapse of the Zairean state, which had already lost all
The Rwandan Genocide and the CoHapse of Mobutu's Kleptocracy
335
credibility and legitimacy through corruption and inept rule over the
last three decades. In spite of their initial hostility towards the rebels
who were perceived as instruments of foreign aggression, there was an
increasing awareness-prise de conscience--ofthe Zairean people that
the time for change had come even if it was brought by the ADLF
supported by foreigners. So they welcomed Kabila's men, or at least
understood them. Thirdly, the army, including the Republican Guard,
did not fight as it should have, not because of lack of motivation or
cowardice, but because it wanted change as weIl. As Colette Braeckman
wrote: "Moreover, ifMobutu's army didn't fight, it was not simply due
to cowardice or lack of motivation: it was also because the majority of
the soldiers were themselves waiting for the change, and they were no
longer worried too much about defending a discredited regime that had
forgotten to giver them their pay. (Braeckman, 1997: 12-13)."
(Braeckman 1997, 12-13). On the contrary, those who fiercely resisted
the ADLF were the Hutu militias, the ex-FAR and UNITA fighters,
who had everything to lose with the overthrow of the Mobutu regime;
because of this, they saw the war as their own.
On the other hand, upon his return from Europe, Mobutu attempted
some cosmetic changes. In fact, the reshuffling of the cabinet was largely
expected to at least give a new 61an to his counter-offensive, if not to
solve the underlying socioeconomic crisis of the country. He also surprisingly re-appointed the extremely unpopular Kengo wa Dondo as
the head of the crisis government The rationale for this was that Kengo
appeared to be France's favorite to succeed Mobutu. The ailing dictator could not resist French pressure, given that France was his only
important friend after he was abandoned by the U.S. Kengo was unsuccessful in solving the crisis militarilyor politically, and was forced to
resign. Mobutu replaced him with Etienne Tishesekedi, his long-time
political foe and rival. In the cabinet he formed, the latter practically
excluded Mobutu's supporters, whereas he reserved key portfolios for
the ADLF in the hope of sharing power with the AUiance. Kabila, however, declined since had already decided not to share power with anyone save his friends. Not surprisingly, Mobutu replaced Tishesekedi
with General Likulia Bolongo three days after his nomination.
This does not mean, however, that Tshisesekedi himself did not make
recent
mistakes during the long period of democratic transition and
conflict despite his political courage and resolute opposition to dictatorial rule. During the democratic transition, he was unable to provide
leadership although Mobutu's divisive and manipulative mechanisms
336
The Path of a Genocide
were partly responsible for this handicap 9 (Rosenblum 1997, 203). Furthermore, in the beginning of the war, Tishesekedi and other members
of the opposition parties and civil society, seem to have forgolten their
differences with the dictator in the nationalistic fervor against what
was considered as externai aggression. He went too far when he visited
Mobutu in Nice, asked the population to pray for the health of ailing
president and accepted to be Prime Minister in a situation where the
government and the dictator were on the brink of collapse (Braeckman
1997,13).
An African Revolution? Regional States
and Major Powers in the Zairean Crisis
Although the dialectic for change and many other factors united to
end Mobutu's thirty year dictatorship from within, the momentum in
fact came from outside. In fact, many commentators underlined the
role played by some Zairean neighbors-in this case RwandalUganda/
BurundiJ Angola, in the Zairean crisis. At the same time, they emphasized the role ofthe U.S. and France behind the scenes. Some tended to
reduce the war to Anglo-Saxon/Francophone rivalry to promote their
econornic, geopolitical, and cultural interests. It is true that there has
been an intense competition between the U.S. and France, the only two
major powers with considerable influence in Africa in the post-Cold
War era, and their divergence gave rise to some controversies and polemical exchanges between the officials of the two nations. In the Great
Lakes region conflicts they adopted different attitudes; France cannot
be happy with the way the situation evolved. The U.S. turned out to be
a great beneficiary whereas France is generally considered the loser.
Nevertheless, African leaders played the key role in the Zairean crisis or what many termed the "Zairean Revolution." Many observers,
journalists, and even some scholars tended to conclude that the Zairean
conflict was an "African Revolution." For instance, Julius Nyerere, a
senior African statesman, said, "the transfer of power in Zaire from the
beginning to the end was an African affair; the West was powerless"
(Le Monde 21 May 1997,3). Gerard Prunier arrived at the same conclusion when he stated: "The Great Lakes crisis and the Zairean civil
war into which it developed are perfect illustrations of the fact that, for
better or worse, Africa is now an independent historical actor. Recognizing this will have to be the first step in any attempt at conflict resolution in the future" (Prunier 1997, 199). Both French and Anglo-Saxon
The Rwandan Genocide and the Collapse of Mobutu's Kleptocracy
337
commentators agree. For instance, Africa Confidential wrote that, "the
overthrow of Mobutu was overwhelmingly organized and achieved by
a coalition of Africans not given to taking outside orders. Just as Africa
is trying to move on from the 1884 Berlin Conference; the West should
move on from the 1898 Fashoda incident" (Africa Confidential 38: 10,
1997,3; also Le Monde Diplomatique, juillet 1997, 12-13).
The question then becomes: which African states were involved in
the Zairean conflict? For what purpose? Those who took part can be
divided into two categories: keyactors and sympathizers. Their objective was to attain short-term and long-term objectives. The majors actors, perhaps with a varying degree of involvement, were Rwanda,
Uganda, Burundi, and Angola.
First, as analyzed earlier, the Rwandan government did not feel secure with the massive presence of Hutu refugees, estimated at 1.5 million if one includes those of Burundi, among whom were tens of
thousands of armed militia and the ex-FAR. These militias not only did
not renounee armed struggle, but made a number of incursions into
Rwanda, the western prefectures being the most affected. With the
genocidiaires not disarmed, the spectrum of another war and massacre
loomed over Rwanda. Internally, steps to open the government by including Hutu moderates into the Tutsi-dominated RPF government did
not work out when three of four ministers forced to resign were Hutu,
and the government became, or at least appeared to become, more and
more purely Tutsi than ever before.
Rwanda asked the international community to disarm the militia and
separate them from other refugees. Paul Kagame informed the U.S.
that if nothing was done, Rwanda would attack the camps in order to
ensure a secure border and buffer zone. In addition, the RPF felt that it
had a moral obligation to help and protect Tutsi minorities in Eastern
Zaire who had been denied citizenship by the Zairean govemment, been
mistreated by local authorities and were even threatened with expulsion from Zaire. The situation was aggravated by the arrival of the
former Rwandan army and militia who perpetrated ethnic cleansing
against the Banyamulenge.
Secondly, Uganda, an important ally of Rwanda, shared the same
strategic and political interests. One has to bear in mind that the Tutsi
fighters largely contributed to the success of the National Resistance
Movement-Army (NRM-A) ofUganda and Museveni's takeover of state
power in Uganda in January 1986. In return, Museveni helped the RPF,
a movement created by Tutsi exiles of 1959-1962, in the invasion of
338
The Path of a Genocide
Rwanda. The two regimes are not only allies but also interdependent.
Beyond this understandable solidarity with Rwanda, Uganda had its
own problem with Zaire because of guerrilla incursions from Zaire.
Although Museveni brought relative stability and prosperity to his country compared with his predecessors, the war staged by two guerrilla
movements (the West Bank Liberation Front and the Holy Spirit Movement) continued in the northern part of the country (Oloka-Onyango
1997,212-16). Thus, he decided to seal his barder from the west in
order to cut the fighters off from their base in Zaire.
Further, one should not forget that Museveni and Mobutu had always disliked and distrusted each other. This hatred was based on ideological and personal grounds. However, Museveni was accused, by the
Hutu politicians and their sympathizers of trying to build a Tutsi-Hima
Empire/hegemony in the Great Lakes region. Likewise, France accuses
him, since the invasion of the RPF and in the current crisis, of political
machination backed by Anglo-Saxon interests, and of being a coordinator of a grand American plan in the region (Schraeder 1997, 206-11
Leymarie 1997, 12-13). Whatever motives he may have had in the
Zairean crisis, Museveni, with Paul Kagame, played a key role in the
overthrow of Mobutu's dictatorship. Many states started to see Museveni
in the garb of a "kingmaker," and there were even comparisons to Otto
von Bismarck of Germany. Although this comparison is extravagant,
Museveni was an informalleader of the anti-Mobutu coalition regrouped
behind the ADLF.
Third, another actor, perhaps less involved compared to Rwanda and
Uganda, was
Burundi is a twin state of Rwanda and has
Tutsi
own version of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict. In July 1996,
ousted the president and brought to power Major Pierre Buyoya, a former
Tutsi leader who was defeated in
democratic e1ection of 1993. Since
the assassination of a Hutu democratically elected president, Melchoir
Ndadaye, in 1993, Burundi's troubles have grown deeper
deeper;
when the power sharing mechanism failed,
former Hutu interior
minister, Leonard Nyangoma went into exile and formed a political
organization called the National Council for the Defense of Democracy
and its armed branch, the Democratic Defense Front
(FDD). He went to South
where the Hutu guerrillas launched
their operations into Northern Burundi. The Tutsi-doIninated government in Burundi was condemned by the international community and
neighboring countries that imposed an embargo. But it joined the war
on the basis of security imperatives and to maintain Tutsi supremacy in
The Rwandan Genocide and the Collapse of Mobutu's
Kh~pt()Crl~cy
339
Burundi. Just as with Rwanda and Uganda, Burundi wanted to cut off
the Hutu warriors from their rear bases in order to have a secure border.
It is possible that it joined the two groups because of ethnic solidarity,
but Rwanda and Uganda refused to help Burundi against the Hutu
rebellion.
Finally, another important actor, but a relatively newcomer to the
conflict, was Angola. Angola, on the other side of Zaire, does not share
the same ethnic composition with BurundiIRwandalUganda, but it does
share political and strategic interests. During the Cold War, Mobutu
was the most important American ally in Africa in its policy of containment of Communism. After Angolan independence from Portugal, the
Soviet-supported Movimento Popular de Liberta<;ao de Angola (MPLA)
triumphed over J. Savimbi's Uniao National para independencia Total
de Angola (UNITA), supported by the West and South Africa. Zaire
was the major ally of Savimbi. Upon the departure of Cuba from Angola,
the end of the Cold War and the consequent democratization process in
that country, the West reconsidered its massive support to UNITA, progressively ending support since the reasons they helped both Mobutu
and Savimbi were no longer applicable. But Mobutu and Savimbi, the
two leftovers of the Cold War, continued to support each other; Zaire
allowed UNITA to illegally export diamonds amounting to $500 million a year (U.S.) in exchange for food, arms, and fuel to ensure its
survival, although UNITA was politically marginalized. From the point
of view of the Angolan govemment, peacemaking, and a power sharing
mechanism with UNITA, were not possible or potentially lasting unless UNITA could be completely disarmed and annihilated as a military organization. The dispersal of UNITA was only possible when
Mobutu was overthrown and Angola decided to join, relatively late in
February, the War of the ADLF orchestrated by Uganda and Rwanda.
The Katangese fighters, under the command of Ut:lllt:r,H r::.eI1Jhin
Mulanda, were shipped to the zone of the conflict, Bukavu,
contributed considerably to the victory of the Alliance. The victory of the
Alliance and the overthrow of Mobutu represents, therefore, a serious,
and perhaps a final, blow to UNITA, which lost a precious regional
political aIly. As Africa Confidential noted:
Jonas Savimbi must feel that the earth has moved; but not because he has any doser
to quenching his passion to become president of Angola. The trernors running from
northem Angola down to Savimbi highland redoubt in Bailundo are the aftershocks
of the political earthquakes in Central Africa and the fight of last significant foreign
ally, Mobutu Sese Seko. (Africa Confidential38:11, 1997,3-4)
340
The Path of Ii Genocide
Consequently, perhaps thousands of UNITA combatants joined, as
did the ex-FAR and Interahamwe before them, the ranks of Zairean
soldiers-not only as a way to pay tribute to the dictator for his past
unconditional support, but also to ensure their own survival:
The stiffest resistance Kabila confronted came not from the Zairean army but
from the Angolan rebel group, UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi, a cold war ally of
the U.S.'s and great friend of Mobutu's. One of the hardest-fought battles of the
civil war was two weeks aga in the southem town of Kenge between Kabila's
troops and UNITA rebels who have long depended on Zaire as pipelines for weapans and other supplies. UNITA fighters were also among the last defenders of
Kinshasa's international airport. (Time 26 May 1997,22)
In brief, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Angola came together against
Mobutu's Zaire to bring about stability in the region and ensure the
security of their respective govemments by cutting off their opponents
from their rear bases in Zaire. Incontestably, the overthrow of Mobutu
would settle a part of their problem since it would weaken their adversaries and possibly induce them to negotiate. From the point view of
these states and of the U.S., the current development,-the Alliance's
victory-will stabilize Central Africa, whereas France and its
Francophone allies maintain, a contrario, that it will destabilize the
whole region.
The transfer of power from Mobutu to the Alliance cannot solve the
underlying political problems in all these countries. The Angolan govemment needs to find a way to transform UNITA into a political party,
though futile attempts have been made in the past to share power. In
Angola, the fighting between MPLA and UNITA forces started with
the offensive of the govemment, although it is difficult to sense the
magnitude of this confrontation. In Rwanda and Burundi, there must
be a serious effort at reconciliation, power sharing and negotiation, as
weIl as institutional reforms to bring about lasting peace and harmonious co-habitation between and the Tutsi and Hutu (Adelman et al, 1997).
In Burundi, the Tutsi army and the Hutu rebels are at war and there is
no solution in sight. Likewise, the precarious peace and stability in
Rwanda may not last forever after the massive repatriation of refugees;
among the retumees there are militia, ex-FAR and many gangs. In
Uganda, there is renewed fighting in the northem provinces that might
force Museveni to find a political solution to his problem rather than a
military one. In other words, although the conditions for regional stability are united more than ever before, one should not underestimate
the dynamic of intemal conflicts of these states and the challenges
The Rwandan Genocide and the CoJlapse of Mobutu's Kleptocracy
341
ahead-the departure of Mobutu cannot in itself solve a decades-long
political problems in neighboring countries (cf. The Economist, 21 June
1997, 48-49). Thus, the belief in solving "five conflicts in one" is illusory unless there is a coherent and workable mechanism for conflict
resolution in each state mentioned above.
The members of the anti-Mobutu coalition achieved their immediate goal. With the change of the regime in Kinshasa (the removal of an
enemy-Mobutu-and rep1acing him by a friend-Kabila), Rwanda
achieved one of its long-term objectives. This vision was shared by
many leaders, particularly in English-speaking Africa (Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa) and other countries with strong ties with
the U.S., such as Ethiopia and Eritrea. The leaders of Ethiopia, Uganda,
Angola, Eritrea, and Rwanda formed, more or less, a contact group and
adopted the same political position vis-a-vis the conflict (Cf. Jeune
Afrique 1892,9-15 avril1997, 5). What all these regimes have in common is that they are the product of a coup d' etat or guerrilla warfare
and, as such, they are characterized by a special kind of leadership
described as "reconstructing autocracies": "These were states which
had been in an advanced condition of collapse, and where power had
been seized-usually by guerrilla warfare, sometimes by military coup
d'etat-by an efficiently organized though militaristic regime with a
commitment to construction, even at the cost of continuing autocracy"
(C1apham 1996,204-05).
It has to be noted that Museveni preached a "Zero-Party" political
system not only for his country but for the whole Africa, whereas other
victorious fronts in Ethiopia, Rwanda and Eritrea transformed themselves into a mono-party system/ruling party (Oloka-Onyango, 21216). As opposed to Museveni, who rejects liberal democracy as a western
concept non-transferable to pre-industrial societies,1O other "constructing autocrats" are not against multipartyism in principle, but they are
less committed to political pluralism and fair and free elections, in which
they may lose power. Until now, they easily resisted external pressure
for democratization and they argued that they were doing wel1 both in
economic and human rights terms as compared to the regimes they
ousted. They tend to give more priority to economic recovery and stability than democratic issues and strict respect for the rule of law. In
spite of this, they have enjoyed the full support of the U.S. and international financial institutions which seem to have been more interested in
efficient economic management and political stability than in political
pluralism. Throughout the conflict, the "reconstructing autocrats" gave
342
The Patb. of a Genocide
considerable support to the ADLF and Rwanda. They were also convinced that the liberation of Zaire from dictatorial rule, though not democrats themselves, would liberate Africa in general and Central Africa in
particular. To quote the Economist on this point:
Many other African countries, themselves hovering between relapse and recovery, depend on Congo future stability. If Laurent Kabila, the new ruler, can get his
huge country to function properly, the economy of the whole Central Africa would
be galvanized. If he fails, and the nation implodes, the disaster could suck the
neighbors into a black hole of chaos. (The Economist 24 May 1997,43)
It is true that the young generation of African leaders have always
disliked Mobutu for ideological reasons. For them, he embodied all
negative images of post-colonial Africa: corruption, inept, and irresponsible rule, patrimonial conception of authority, bad governance, and
above all embezzlement. During the Apartheid era, when the blacks in
South Africa and the "Front Lines states" suffered and the OAU fought
to the best of its capacity, Mobutu entertained good relations with the
diseriminatory regime. Secondly, many of these leaders were radical
socialists, Pan-Africanists, militants of the Third World and even Marxists, whereas Mobutu represented a conservative political spectrum
usually in the service of multinational companies and his own interests. They seem to share the point of view of a Zairean scholar, who
wrote: "Zaire was one of the first countries to experience the bitter
realities of the unresolved conflict between the demands of national
liberation-genuine independence and economic development-and the
strategic interests of the major powers in post-colonial Africa"
(Nzongola-Natlaja 1994,219; M'Bok010, 1997). For most ofthem the
model was Nyerere, a former Tanzanian president and highly respected
African political figure. Many of them met in Tanzania in the 1970s
and some, like Museveni, studied at Dar University. For his part, Kabila
spent many years of his life in Tanzania where he took Nyerere as his
political guru. Therefore, Kabila has a distinct advantage of obtaining
not only the support of a young generation of leaders, but also the sympathy and the blessing of senior statesmen like Mandela and Nyerere.
In different conferences and interviews, the latter clearly defended the
position of the Alliance and Kabila (Le Monde 21 May 1997).
The most important, but discrete support, for the Alliance and the countries supporting ii came from South Africa-Mandela. Before the beginning of the war in eastem Zaire, South Africa armed the RPF-arms
sales that were highly criticized as one of the contributing factors to the
escalation of the war; the arms sales were subsequently suspended. Dur-
The Rwandan Genocide and the ColIapse of Mobutu's Kleptocracy
343
ing the war and particularly during its last stage, Mandela attempted
mediation between Mobutu and Kabila. He worked hand in hand with
American diplomats, with Bill Richardson, special envoy of President
Clinton, as weIl as with the U.N. and OAU representative, Mohamed
Sahnoun. (The OAU did little except offer its best wishes in different
summits such as Nairobi I and Nairobi II.) The efforts were aimed at
avoiding bloodshed and a "soft landing" of the rebels in the Zairean capital or to facilitate an orderly transfer of power. South Africa, as all countries forming the anti-Mobutu coalition, believes that a well-governed
and managed Zaire will stimulate the economy of Central Mrica and lay
the basis for the creation of an African Free Market. South Africa and
Zaire have abundant human and material resources and, as such, a dynamic Zairean econorny is likely to stimulate the economie growth of
South Africa. Consequently, the two countries can be engines for the
development of the African economy for the century to come.
Although I stressed the important role played by African leaders and
states in the Zairean Revolution, one has to concede that without the
encouragement, understanding and accommodation of the U.S. in this
revolution engineered by Afrieans, Mobutu would not have been overthrown as easily. They U.S. favored the anti-Mobutu coalition. First
all, the U.S. abandoned Mobutu-the man the U.S. discovered, put into
power, and protected from his enernies on the way to helping him become one of the wealthiest people in the world (Kelly 1993). This was
mainly because, as one spokesman of Department of State was quoted
as saying, "the reason for being a friend with him came to an end with
the Cold War." Secondly, Mobutu embodied the opposite of what the
U.S. tries to promote in Africa or elsewhere in the world: a market
eeonomy, good governance and liberal demoeracy. The U.S. charaeterized Mobutu, their "useful tyrant," as a "caricature of history." Thirdly,
there is a renewed interest in Africa in the U.S., despite the Somalia
for
syndrome of 1993, as the remaining great potential
can capital, although the U.S.'s current imports from Africa are only
President Clinton was quoted as
1.9 percent of its total imports.
saying: "Our efforts to help Africa in order to deveIop itself will create
more opportunity to export American goods and services as well as
more jobs at home (U.S.). These efforts will reduce also in the future
the cost of American humanitarian aid of a great magnitude" (Roussin
1997, 17). America losing its "Afrophobia" began with a number of
initiatives which look like a seeond "Marshal Plan," and which concerns almost all sectors of development: economy, infrastructure, health,
.rUJ'lvll-
344
The Path of Il Genocide
education. and govemance. This economic and strategic interest is based
on an active and dynamic diplomatic role throughout Africa, including
Francophone countries, in this case Rwanda and Zaire. In addition, the
U.S. president plans to visit Africa in 1998 (The Economist 26 April
1997,23-24).
As far as the current crisis in Zaire is concemed, there are some
indications that the U.S. gave material and logistic support to Kabila's
forces (Newsweek 21 May 1997, 4D-42). However, its diplomatic and
political aid and understanding largely contributed to the success of the
Alliance; it did not condemn its allies (Rwanda and Uganda) for intervening in Zaire and helping the ADLF. It systematically opposed all
diplomatic initiatives calling for military-humanitarian operations, particularly coming from France, which would have altered the momentum and even blocked the Alliance's war. In fact, initially it supported,
though reluctantly, the Canadian initiative to rescue the refugees in
distress, but when most of the refugees returned the mission became
less relevant and lost its raison d' etre. Canada itself abandoned it, though
there were many refugees still to be rescued, because of lack of political will of many states, problems of logistics and, above all, because of
the opposition of regional states. Moreover, the U.S. was said to have
dissuaded the King of Morocco from sending his soldiers to help
Mobutu, whom it persuaded to step down. It also attempted, in collaboration with Mandela, to facilitate the non-violent transfer of power in
Kinshasa. After the takeover of state power by the ADLF, the U.S. administration provided a c1ear understanding and recognition for the victors, although many would have preferred the sharing of power between
the opposition parties and the Alliance which formed an exc1usive transitionai govemment for two years. As Bill Richardson, special envoy
of President Clinton, said: "The jury is still out on Kabila. But he has
potential; we should give him a chance" (Time 26 May 1997,22). The
American influence on the cultural, political, and economic agenda of
the new govemment, which tumed away from France and Belgium,
proved very strong. Thus, the American influence on Zaire, located in
the heart ofAfrica and endowed with a considerable material resources,
added to many other pro-American govemments of the region, including Eritrea, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Rwanda. This reinforces the supremacy of the U.S. in Africa more than ever before.
In contrast, this incontestable American diplomatic and political triumph represents a humiliating defeat for France, its only rival in Africa.
The French failure in Zaire was highly resented in Paris and, in light of
The Rwandan Genocide and the Collapse of Mobutu's Kleptocracy
345
this, many French commentators used various adjectives to characterize
the event: "desastre," "effacement," "isolement," "fiasco," and so on
(Leymarie 1997, 12-13). Many African regimes, which heavily depend
on France for protection and survival, cou1d say the same thing; they
doubt if they can still count upon France or if the 1atter will be in a position to protect them from foreign-supported insurgents like the Alliance
of Kabila. It is true that French influence is declining and shrinking from
year to year, due to several different factors and in the face of the rising
American influence, particu1arly after the end of the Co1d War paved the
way for competition between the two democracies. Even during the Co1d
War period, despite its Alliance with the U.S., France tried to have an
independent voice in international politics as a medium economic power
and as a nuc1ear one. The U.S. and other western powers recognize
France's special role and interest in French-speakingAfrica, perhaps with
the exception of Zaire, where America exercised a tremendous influence. This gave rise to the notion of la chasse gardee (exc1usive hunting
ground) of France. With the end of the Co1d War and hence of a bipo1ar
world, France and the U.S. are no longer partners but rivals. In effect, the
U.S. contests the notion of la chasse gardee as an outmoded concept,
whereas France is attached to its diplomatic, political, and cultural preeminence in Francophone countries; in other words, the status quo. Perhaps the following statement of Warren Christopher, the former U.S.
Secretary of State, in response to another polemica1 statement from a
French cooperation minister, Jacques Godfrain, summarizes the situation: "All nations must cooperate, not compete, if we are going to make
a positive difference in Africa's future. The time has passed when Africa
could be carved into spheres of influence, or when outside powers could
view who1e groups of states as their private domains."ll
Therefore, as far as France and the U.S. are concerned, the Co1d War
has been rep1aced in Africa by a "cold peace." If France blind1y supported the Habyarimana regime and the Hutu- dominated govemment, it
was because it thought that the RPF was supplied and supported by the
Anglo-Saxons and their "representative" in the region, Yoweri Museveni;
the whole project was perceived as a p10y to humiliate France. After the
genocide, France realized that it lost Rwanda and continued to treat the
Tutsi-dominated govemment as agents ofAng10-Saxons. Since Operation
Turquoise of the summer of 1994 in Rwanda, the French government
rehabilitated Mobutu, who was highly criticized and hated in France,
Be1gium and the U.S. since the speech at La Baule in 1990 by President
Mitterand. 12 When the war began in Eastern Zaire, France reacted much
346
The Path of a Genocide
the same way as it did in 1994; the war was launched by Washington
agents in the region. In the eyes of French policymakers, the
Banyamulenge, which referred to Kabila as well as Rwandan forces, were
all in the service of the U.S. which aimed to underrnine France's influence (pre carre) in Africa. By fixing its eyes on the external power, France
underestimated the local roots of the conflict.
Since France thought that the collapse of Mobutu and his replacement by pro-American rebels would jeopardize their pre carre in West
Africa, it decided to stand by the dictator. Militarily, France could do
little. In effect, as opposed to many other African countries, France did
not sign a defense agreement with Zaire. Even if it had a defense pact,
France did not have adequate soldiers to proteet the dictator against a
veritable war machine put in place by the ADLF and its supporters; the
old pattern of sending of hundreds of commandos to defend a government of a small country against its opponents/insurgents was irrelevant.
Moreover, French authorities could not convince the French public to
support an African engagement where French vital interests are not at
stake; French economic interest in Zaire is generally exaggerated and
less important compared to Congo, Gabon and Cameroon.
In the face its incapacity to do something alone, France launched its
diplomatic initiatives in favor of humanitarian-political intervention.
Its initiatives were rejected by Rwanda, Uganda and the U.S. However,
the U.S. agreed to send soldiers when Canada offered to lead an international military force to bring aid to starving refugees on 11 November 1996. Although Canada rallied world support on 12-13 November,
the massive return of refugees (more than 600,000 in a few days),
thwarted the plan; weeks later Canada abandoned its plan. But France
continued to call for military intervention that no one wanted. At the
same time, France proved to be the only supporter of Mobutu until the
end, along with its Francophone allies and some Anglophone countries
such as Nigeria, the Sudan and to some degree, Kenya. All the leaders
are dictators trying to rescue an autocrat hated at home and abroad.
What is striking, however, is that when Mobutu practicaIly lost the war
and power as weIl as whatever legitimacy and credibility he had in
March, French diplomats continued to play Mobutu's card and maintained that Mobutu was "incontournable," that is he cannot be ignored,
Minister, Herve de Charette (Leymarie
in the words of French
1997, 12-13). After everything was over,
authorities were trying to maneuver and find a place for Mobutu's men the transitionaI
government, perhaps as a means of retaining some influence. It was in
The Rwandan Gel10cide and the Collapse of Mobutu's Kleptocracy
347
the context of this vain attempt to save the face of Mobutu (la sortie
honorable), that the summit of Libreville took place and came up with
irrelevant resolutions. The irony embedded in the history of this political alignment is that the French ended up as the last defender of the
dictator created and maintained, but finally abandoned, by the VS,
whereas the latter allied itselfwith the "revolutionaries" ofyesteryeartheir principal enemy who had converted to the rhetorie of liberal democracy and a market economy.
In Zaire, the "seeond largest Franeophone country in the world" as it
used to be ealled, the Freneh lost diplomatically, politically and perhaps eulturally-English will now be an officiallanguage along with
French. This became evident on the occasion of the Francophonie summit in Hanoi, Vietnam, in November 1997; Zaire not only boycotted
the summit, but also announced its withdrawal from the organization.
This, combined with other conflicts where Freneh presenee was challenged, as in Central Africa, "small" Congo and elsewhere, will have
great repereussions on French politics in Africa. France not only needs
to rethink its policies towards Africa in light of the new reality in international relations, but it also must take aecount of the aspiration of
African peoples. There are some who even call for a "second round of
decolonization" in order to establish a more balanced and equal relationship instead of the paternalistic one instituted by de Gaulle and
continued by his successors of the fifth Republic, inc1uding the late
socialist president, Fran~ois
Mitterand. 13 In other words, traditional
French politics and ties vis-a-vis Francophone Africa have become more
and more untenable for a variety of reasons which Peter J. Schraeder
summarized in the following terms:
Most important, regardless of what special ties French policymakers ideally would
like to pursue, French freedom of action is increasingly constrained by a variety
of factors and developments: France's responsibilities and interests outside Africa; the evolving structure of the international system; declining military capabilities during a period of growing domestic constraints; and, most important, the
emergence of newelites in Francophone Africa less willing to accept the same
types of ties enjoyed and permitted by their predecessors. (Schraeder, 211)
The Rwandan tragedy of 1994 and the fall of Mobutu's kleptocracy
were intimately
Internai political, economic and social
cnses provide other explanatory factors. Whatever the final balance of
internai and externai forces might have been, Mobutu is now gone and
348
The Path of lA Genocide
a new era has begun in Zaire with the ADLF's takeover of state power.
Incontestably, the challenge ahead is tougher than was the sweeping
military victory: reconstructing the economy, the infrastructure, and a
state destroyed by a thirty-year-long dictatorial rule. The process of
democratization, strict respect for human rights and the rule of law as a
basis for a political system and culture are other substantial challenges.
In all these domains, the measures taken by Kabila so far are ambiguous and partial, leading many observers to pessimism as much as optimism with regard to the future of the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC). It is too early to make a reasonable politicaljudgment on whether
Kabila and his associates have the capacity and the will to accomplish
the enormous tasks that face them, but there are also few enough reasons to feel sanguine.
On the other hand, the overthrow of Mobutu will normalize the diplomatic relations between Zaire and its neighbors, a condition sine qua
non for the stability of the region. At the same time, it must be stressed
that the changes in Zaire cannot in themselves end decades-long
ethnonational and political conflicts in neighboring states--one can
mention the Hutu-Tutsi conflict as an example. The Tutsi and Hutu
have to flnd imaginative methods and mechanisms to resolve that conflict and build lasting peace. The major powers and the international
community must help in an attempt to achieve this goal which, is ultimately the only way regional stability, human security and harmony
can develop in the Great Lakes region.
Notes
l. At the height of power struggle between the opposition parties and the dietator,
Georges Nzogola-Ntalaja wrote: "Mobutu cannot negotiate giving up power, or
even sharing iL More than any other player in the Zairean political arena, he
understands that the present conflict between the forces of change and those of
the status quo is above all concerned with state power and access to the resources that the state controis. Since losing power is likely to diminish, if not
eliminate the access he and his entourage used to have to sueh resourees, he is
prepared to do everything possible to block peaeeful resolution of the eonfliet"
("Zaire I: Moving Beyond Mobutu," 93:583, May 1994, 193-97; see also Shawn
H. MeCormiek, "Zaire II: Mobutu, Master of the Game?" in ibid., 223-27).
2. During the Rwandan genocide and ethnic c1eansing, the Western media and the
majority of eommentators dismissed the dynamie of the eonflict as "tribalism,"
whereas they treated the same kind of eonfliet in the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia,
as nationalism. This is a refleetion of old views using "tribalism" in referenee to
Africa and "nationalism" when referring to Europe.
3. Prunier (1997) noted: "National eonferenee delegates from Kivu fought eaeh
other in Kinshasa according to eomplex and shirting patterns of ethnic rivalries,
The Rwandan Genocide and the Collapse of Mobutu's Kleptocracy
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
349
but they all agreed on one point: Kivu's Kinyarwanda speakers were to be politically eliminated and possibly forced back physically into Rwanda."
reivaX-sio~narF
Verschave also indicated that the anus confiscated from exFAR went to the benefit of Mobutu. The anus would be sold back to the ex-FAR
when they were ready to reconquer Rwanda or the arms could be used to reinforce UNITA in return for a financial payment to Mobutu.
Note that although the original estimates ofrefugees in Zaire totaled 1,200,000,
the total was now 900,000, and some contend that the figure of 300,000 who
fled into the bush was exaggerated (Eds.).
The controversy between the U.N. and the new authorities in Zaire about the
massacre of Hutu refugees by the Tutsi elements of the ADLF continues. One
has to wait for the result of the U.N. commission of inquiry. But some humanitarian organizations characterized this massacre as another genocide.
For the details see two issues of Africa Confidential, 28 March 1997,38:7 and
Africa Confidential, 9 May 1997, 38: 10.
Africa Confidential (28 March 1997, 38:7) provides the list of factions and individuals comprising the ADLF. Like the political parties, the anued opposition,
L' Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Lib6ration du Congo-Zaire (AFDLCZ), is far from homogeneous in ethnic origins and in political-ideological orientation. It includes the Parti de la Revolution Populaire (PRP) of Laurent Kabila;
the Alliance Democratique des Peuples (ADP); the Mouvement Revolutionnaire
pour la Lib6ration du Zaire (MLRZ) led by Masau Nindaga; the Conseil National de Resistance pour la Democratie (CNRD) led by Andre Kisase Ngandu,
who was killed in January under unknown circurnstances, and the Front de
Liberation National du Congo (FLNC).
Rosenblum 1997,203. He underiined, "Tshisekedi's impetuous and unpredictable behavior, including long period of silence during which he has refused to
meet with other political figures or foreign diplomats, has alienated much of the
intellectual class and most other opposition politicians. Although Tshisekedi
remains popular, the opposition itself is badly splintered and largely ineffectua1.
It rernains reactive and without creativity or depth, guided by old-generation
politicians who rarely leave the capita!."
For the debate about the relevance of liberal democracy in Africa, see Makinda,
1996,555-73.
Schraeder 1997, 210. For an extensive analysis of the international politics of
Francophonie see Clapharn 1996,88-103.
In his speech, the President of France made aid to Africa conditionaI on the
democratization process and respect for the rule of law. In fact, France did press
the poorest countries (Benin, Mali, Niger, etc.,) to democratize themselves,
whereas it maintained the status quo in Afrique utile, Le., where French interest
is considerable, such as Carneroon, Gabon, Togo, Cöte d'Ivoire. So, Paristroika
appeared more as a means of disengaging France from the poorest countries
than a commitment to democratization in all French speaking Africa. See
Toulabor, 1995, Ch. 8.
For various analyses, see, among others: Chipman 1989; Bayart 1983; and Bach
1986, Chapter 5.
Aideed, Mohamed Farah.
Former General in the Somali armed forces who became leader of the United
Somali Congress (USC) and, in alliance with other clan-based political
parties, led the overthrow of the Barre regime in January 1990 when Aideed
captured Mogadishu and took controi of the Ministry of Defense and the
Presidency ushering in two years of further civil war until Barre fled in
May 1992; it was Aideed's June-October 1993 confrontation with UNOSOM
II culminating in 18 dead and 78 wounded U.S. servicemen on 3 October
that led to the withdrawal of U.N. peacekeepers and the new resolve of the
U.S. to restrict hs support for U.N. peacekeeping in Africa, an action that
would have tragic consequences for Rwanda in general and the just-Iaunched
UNAMIR peacekeeping force.
Allen, Ron.
ABC correspondent.
Amin Dada, Idi.
Assumed power in a military coup in Uganda in January of 1971 and was
overthrown in 1979.
Amin, Mohamed.
Reuters bureau chief in Nairobi.
Annan, Kofi.
U.N. Under-Secretary General and head of DPKO during the creation of
UNAMIR and the genocide in Rwanda; appointed Secretary General of the
U.N. in 1997.
Anyidoho, Brigadier-General Henry.
The Deputy Commander of UNAMIR during the genocide.
Aurillac, Michel.
French Minister for Cooperation under Chirac from 1986-88 and part of
the French pro-Habyarimana and pro-Mobutu group.
Bagaza, Lt. Col. Jean-Baptiste.
Cousin of President Michel Micombero of the First Republic of Burundi
whom he overthrew on 1 November 1976; President of the Second Republic until 1987.
Banyingana, Major (Dr.) Peter.
A leader of the RPF and the invasion force who was killed alongside Major
General Fred Rwigyema on 2 October in suspicious circumstances.
Bagambiki, Emmanuel.
A Hutu extremist Pretet who called on the French to reconquer the RPF
held territory and "free" his fellow Hutus.
Bagaragaza, Thadde.
A Olle-time speaker of the National Assembly under Habyarimana who
joined the opposition MDR
351
352
The Path of a Genocide
Bagosora, Colonel TMoneste.
Director of Services in the Ministry of Defence under Habyarimana and
believed to be the coordinator of the 6 April coup and genocide; now under
indictment at Arusha.
Balladur, Edouard.
Prime Minister of France when the allied conservative parties came to power
in the March 1993 French e1ections and, therefore, during the genocide.
Bandi, Kaggwa.
Baganda commander of the National Resistance Army (NRA) allegedly
targetted by the NRA's death squad because of opposition to Museveni.
Barahinyura,
Jean Shyirambere.
Author of Le General-Major Habyarimana: Quinze ans de tyrannie et de
tartufferie au Rwanda (1988) attacking the President, of Rwanda: Trentedeux aux apres la revolution sociale le 1959 (1992) attacking the RPF, and
a founder of the CDR.
Barayagwiza, Jean-Bosco.
CDR founder and leader.
Baril, General Maurice.
Made head of the Canadian armed forces in 1997, but during the Rwandan
crisis and genocide, miiitary adviser to the UNSG in U.N. headquarters in
New York in the DPKO and the contact person for his fellow Canadian,
General Romeo Dallaire, Force Commander of UNAMIR.
Barre, Mohamed Siad.
Major General in Somali armed forces whose October 1969 coup ushered
in twenty-one years of authoritarian military dictatorship.
Barril, Captain Paul.
Head of the special antiterrorist unit in the Groupement d"Intervention de
la Gendarrnie Nationale (GlGN) in the Elysee Palace in Paris until 1983
when he resigned for tampering with evidence in an IRA court case; subsequently, he became a freelance rnilitary adviser, officially appointed by
Habyarimana's widow on 6 May 1994 to investigate her husband's assassination, and who reappeared on French television on 28 June 1994 accusing
the RPF of shooting down President Habyarimana's plane and attacking
the government, accusations based on his c1aimed possession of the voice
recorder of Habyarimana's plane, satellite photos, and the launchers of the
rocket; in the accusation, he alleged that the rockets had been fired from
Masaka hill, which, on 6 April, was held by the Presidential Guard and not
by the RPF.
Baudillon, Philippe.
French Prime Minister Balladur's Africa-man.
Bayingana, Dr. Peter.
A member of RANU who later became a 1eader in the RPA.
Beliard, Jean-Christophe.
French charge d' affaires in Tanzania and representative at the Arusha talks.
Bemeriki, Yalerie.
Member of the CDR and a broadcaster on RTLM.
Bernard-Meunier, Marie.
Assistant Deputy Minister for Global Issues in the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) who wrote the Foreward to Proceedings-Conflict Prevention: African Perspective for the International
Francophone Meeting, Ottawa, September 1995.
Glossary I
353
Berlusconi, Sylvio.
who originally agreed to participate and then backed
Prime Minister of It~ly
out of the French Operation Turquoise intervention in June of 1994.
Bertello, Msgr. Giuseppe.
Papal nuncio in Kigali after 1990 until the genocide, dean of the diplomatic
core in Rwanda.
Bicamumpaka, Jerome.
An extremist member of the MDR and the Foreign Minister in the genocidist
government of Rwanda that took power on 7 April 1994 who was invited
by the UNSG to address the U.N. General Assembly where he duly misinformed the assembled delegates about the situation in Rwanda; he then
went to Paris on 27 April to be received by Mitterand, Balladur and Juppe;
he with others failed to obtain Mobutu's backing for a govemrnent in exile
in Zaire after the genocidist government fled Rwanda.
Bihozagara, Dr. Jacques.
A Tutsi, the RPF European Representative who had grown up in Burundi
as a refugee and spoke perfect French and became Minister of Rehabilitation in the new RPF government of Rwanda in July 1994, and subsequently
became Minister for Youth and Sport.
Bizimana, Maj-Gen Augustin.
Defence Minister from August 1993 and part of the extremist plot.
Bizimungu, Casimir.
Foreign Minister in the Habyarimana regime and head of the minority northern Ruhengeri faction in rivalry with the majority Gisenyi faction; travelled to Paris in October 1990 to get French military intervention to assist
the Rwandese government to fight the RPF invasion; an alleged instigator
of the genocide.
Bizimungu, Pasteur.
A Hutu and prominent Rwandese businessman active against the MRND
who fled to Uganda in 1990 and told the RPF that the Rwandese government
was ready to collapse; he became President of Rwanda after the RPF victory.
Boisvineau, Mrs.
Direction des Affaires Africaines et Malgaches in the the Quai d'Orsay;
and Under-Director for Eastern Africa under President Mitterand.
Bolongo, General Likulia.
Prime Minister ofZaire appointed by Mobutu after Tishesekedei was removed.
Bon, Colonel Dominique.
French Military Attache at the Embassy in Kinshasa.
Bona, Seguya
Baganda. Commander of the National Resistance Army (NRA) allegedly
targetted by the NRA's death squad because of opposition to Museveni.
Booh-Booh, Jacques-Roger.
A Cameroon who served as the U.N. Special Representative to Rwanda after
the Arusha Accords were signed and who arrived in Kigali in November.
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros.
Secretary-General of the U.N. during the Rwanda genocide.
Broadbent, Ed.
Head of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development-a Canadian government funded organization in Montreal.
Bucyana, Martin.
Head of Papeterie de Zaza and a founder and secretary general of CDR;
assassinated in February of 1994.
354
The Path of a Genocide
Bunyenyezi, Major Chris.
A military leader in the RPF 1990 October invasion who took overall command when Major General Fred Rwigyema was killed on 2 October;
Bunyenyezi was himself killed in an ambush on 23 October.
Buyoya, Major Pierre.
Tutsi leader defeated in the 1993 Burundi election who later returned to
power after the June 1996 coup.
Bwanakweri, Chief Prosper.
A noble and a liberalleader of the Tutsi in the 1950s.
Byegyeka, Lieutenant.
A Tutsi Rwandese leader in the NRA.
Chalker, Lynda.
British Minister of Overseas Development.
Charette, Herve de.
French Foreign Minister.
Chirac, Jacques.
Secretary-General of the neo-Gaullist party in France, and the presidential
successor to Fran,Choffray, Capt.
Sector headquarters Belgian officer in UNAMIR.
Chollet, Lieutenant-Colonel.
Nominated on February 1992 to head the Detachement d' Assistance
Militaire et d'Instruction (DAMI) in Rwanda; he took on the role of advisor to both President Habyarimana and the Chief Commander of the
Rwandese Armed Forces, and was, de facto, in charge of counterinsurgency
operations.
Christopher, Warren.
U.S. Secretary of State during the Rwandan genocide.
Claes, Willy.
The Belgian Foreign Minister who made the decision to withdraw the Belgian contingent from UNAMIR after ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed.
Classe, Msgr. Uon.
A priest who arrived in Rwanda in 1907 and stayed untill945, eventually
rising to Bishop; he supported the Tutsi as the natural rulers of Rwanda.
Cohen, Herman (Hank).
Under Secretary of State for African Affairs under President George Bush,
and, after retirement, President of the Global Coalition, an African lobby
agency.
Cussac, Colonel.
Military attache and head of the French Military Assistance Mission in
Rwanda.
Dahinden, Philippe.
Reporter for Swiss Radio who founded Radio Muharo with support from
Reporters sans Frontieres and Rwandan human rights activists.
Dallaire, Brig. General Romeo.
Canadian general, the first Force Commander of UNAMIR who sent the
famous 11 January 1994 cable to U.N. headquarters detailing the planned
coup and genocide.
Debarge, Marcel.
French Cooperation Minister during the RPF offensive in February 1993.
Delaye, Bruno.
President Mitterand's Special Counsellor for African Affairs.
Glossary I
355
Dennis, Cecil.
Liberian Foreign Minister.
d'Estaing, Valery Giscard.
French President who pursued an aggressive policy in the former Belgian
territories and authprized the French military intervention in Shaba in
1978.
Destexhe, Alain.
Secretary-General of Medecins Sans Frontieres and a Belgian Senator
who has devoted considerable effort to the analysis of the Rwandan
genocide.
Dewez, Lt.-Col J.
Battalion commander of the 2nd Battalion of Belgian troops constituting
the KIBAT battalion of UNAMIR.
Diagne, Major I.
The UNAMIR officer responsible for taking notes for Dallaire.
Dijoud, Paul.
Director for Africa and the Maghreb in the Quai d' Orsay in the early nineties.
Diria, Ahmed.
Tanzanian Foreign Minister who attempted to mediate the delays in the
formation of a broad-based government in Rwanda in early 1994.
Dufourq, Bertrand.
Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Dumas, Roland.
French Foreign Minister in 1991.
Dussault, Bernard.
Named Canadian Ambassador for Central Africa in the Spring of 1994,
later High Commissioner to Kenya.
Edwards, Lucie.
Preceded Dussault as Canadian High Commissioner to Kenya.
Foccart, Jacques.
A secret service agent appointed by Jacques Chirac as special adviser on
Africa.
Foley, Mark.
ABC News assignment manager in London.
Fuller, Carol.
U.S. State Department's desk officer for Rwanda during the Arusha
negotiations.
Gaspard, Gihigi.
Member of the CDR and a journalist on RTLM.
Gatabazi, Felicien.
Secretary-General of the PSD who was assassinated in February 1994 and
succeeeded by F€licien Nagago.
Gatsinzi, Brigadier-General Marcel.
Moderate RPA officer in charge of negotiating a cease-fire after the coup
and who called for national reconciliation in the newly created French "safe
humanitarian zone."
Gaspard, Gihigi.
A member of CDR and broadcast journalist on RTLM.
Gerard, Yannick.
Former ambassador to Kampala who travelled to RPF headquarters in
Mulindi with Ambassador Marlaud to meet with Colonel Kanyarengwe
before Operation Turquoise was launched.
356
The Path of Il Genocide
Germanos, General Raymond.
Subordinate commander of Operation Turquoise and headquartered in
Bukavu/Cyangugu.
Gillet, Eric.
Belgian lawyer and human rights activist who, in 1991, reported involvement of the French in interrogating RPF prisoners and was part of the international human rights delegation in January 1993 that first labelled the
killings in Rwanda as genocide.
Gitera, Joseph.
A populist demagogue businessman, founder of APROSOMA in 1957 and
elected president of the Provinciai Council in 1960, dismissed from the
post in 1961, later became a member of PARMEHUTU and the delegate
from Butare.
Godfrain, Jacques.
French Cooperation Minister.
Gore,Al.
Vice President of the U.S. in the Clinton administration.
Habyarimana, Jean-Baptiste.
Tutsi prCfet of Butare who prevented genocide there until replaced by
Sy1vain Ndikumania on 20 April 1994.
Habyarimana, Juvenal.
An original member of the Committee of Nine who was made head of the
Ministry of the National Guard and Police in 1965, and became president
of Rwanda through a coup on 5 July 1973 on the basis of a new constitution
centralizing power in the Presidency and legalizing on1y his own MRND
party; he was elected President on 24 December 1978 beginning a succession of five year terms which ended when his plane was shot down on 6
April 1994 setting off the extremist coup, the genocide and the renewal of
the war with the RPF.
Hangimana, Frano;:ois-Xavier.
The founder of the Rwandese newspaper, Ijambo, who was arrested in May
of 1991 for insulting govemment ministers and military officers and released on 24 September of that same year.
Hansen, Peter.
Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs in the United Nations
(DRA) during the Rwandan genocide.
Herve, Ladsous.
Assistant French Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
Huchon, General.
In charge of the Mission Militaire de Cooperation and Assistant Commanderin-Chief to General Lanxade in the Elysee Palace.
Hunter, Dorothea.
Oxfam representative who reported on the Rwandese refugee situation in
Uganda in 1968.
Joxe, M. Pierre.
French Minister of Defense in the early 1990s.
Jennings, Peter.
ABC News network anchor.
Juppe, Alain.
Foreign Minister of France during the genocide.
Kabila, Laurent-Desire.
Led the Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-
Glossary I
357
Zaire (AFDL) in the civil war in zaire in 1996-97, overthrew Mobutu in
1997, became President and renamed the country the Democratic Republic
ofCongo.
Kabuga, F6licien.
Wealthy businessman, whose daughter was married to a son of President
Habyarimana, and a member of the President's inner circ1e, the AKAZU ,
who helped found the propaganda radio station RTLM.
Kagame, Maj.-General Paul.
Currently Vice-President and Minister of Defence of Rwanda; a Tutsi refugee raised in Uganda who fought for seven years with Museveni's guerillas, he became head of military intelligence for the Uganda National
Revolutionary Arrny (NRA) when Museveni became President of Uganda;
he was enrolled in the U.S. General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas at the time of the October 1990 invasion and became head of the
RPF when both Rwigyema and Bunyenyezi were killed in October 1990.
Kajuga, Robert.
A Tutsi who was the Commander of the Interahamwe who turned out to be
a notorious extremist killer targetting Tutsi.
Kaka, Sam Major.
Commanding Officer, Military Police in Uganda.
Kalimuzo, Frank.
ATutsi refugee highly placed in the Obote Ugandan government who joined
the Hutu in pressuring the Obote regime to damp down on the Tutsi refugee warriors in the sixties.
Kamutu, E.
Leading member of and minister in the "scientist" wing of Obote's Uganda
People's Congress who tried to protect the Banyankole in Ankole by distinguishing between them and Museveni's refugee warrior supporters.
Kanyabugori, Fidele.
The lawyer representing the Rwandese human rights organization, Kanyarwanda, who was arrested on 29 March 1992 for submitting a petition demanding an independent investigation of the Bagogwe massacre.
Kanyarengwe, Colonel Alexis.
A Hutu Rwandan Minister of Internai Affairs forced into exile in 1980 when
accused of plotting against President Habyarimana who joined the RPF
and became President and spokesperson in November of 1990.
Kanyarushoki, Pierre-Claver.
Rwandan Ambassador to Uganda in the Habyarimana regime and negotiator at Arusha.
Katano, Habimana.
A member of MRND(D) and extremist broadcaster on RTLM.
Kayibanda, Gregoire.
Founder of the Mouvement Social Mahutu, editor-in-chief of the Catholic
newspaper Kinyameteka in 1956 which documented Tutsi abuses, an original member of the Committee of Nine, leader of PARMEHUTU and
Rwanda's first President until overthrown by Habyarimana in 1973; he was
imprisoned and died in prison in 1976.
Kayira, Dr. A.
Leader of the Uganda Freedom Arrny (UFA), the Buganda insurrectionist
rival to Museveni's NRA in the early eighties.
Kazinga, Agathe.
Wife of President Habyarimana, a heir of a Hutu northem royallineage and
358
The Path of a Genocide
leader of the AKAZU; nicknamed Kanjogera after the terrible mother of
the king.
Kengo wa Dondo.
Prime Minister of Zaire and head of a crisis government appointed by
Mobutu when Kabila marched across zaire to overthrow the Mobutu regime.
Kennedy, Senator Edward.
U.S. Senator, advocated jamming the RTLM genocidal broadcasts.
Khan, Mohamed Shahryar.
U.N. Special Representative to Rwanda who succeeded Jacques Roger
Booh-Booh after the genocide.
Kigeri IV, King.
Unwarni (King) of Rwanda deposed after the elections in Rwanda in 1961.
Kigeri V, King.
Jean-Baptiste Ndahindurwa, younger brother and, at age twenty, successor
to King Mutara Rudahigwa III of Rwanda after the latter's mysterious death
in 1959; overthrown in the Hutu revolt of 1959.
Kigongo, Moses.
Vice-Chairman of the National Resistance Army (NRA) of Uganda.
Kitare, Captain.
A Tutsi leader in the NRA.
Kyaligonza, Tom.
A Tutsi Brigade Commander in the NRA.
Lafourcade, General Jean-Claude.
Head of Operation Turquoise and headquartered in Goma.
Lanxade, Admiral.
Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces during Operation Turquoise.
Lavigerie, Charles Martial.
French Catholic missionairy, founder of the Societe des Missionaires
d' Afrique, or the P~re
Blanc, the White Fathers, in Algiers in 1868; courted
traditional Rwandese officials to induce conversion.
Leotard, Fran~ois.
French Minister of Defense in Prime Minister Balladur's government.
Lemaire, Lt.
An officer in the Belgian unit of UNAMIR in charge of ETO ("Beverly
Hills").
Levesque, Georges Henri.
A Canadian Dorninican priest, Dean of the faculty of Econornic and Social
Sciences at Laval University in Quebec City, and founder and Rector from
1963 to 1971 of the National University of Rwanda at Butare.
Lizinde, Colonel Theoneste.
A Hutu and Security Chief from the northem district of Bugoyi, the rival to
Habyarimana's home base in Gisenyi, who had been used by Habyarimana
to kill dozens associated with the former Kayibanda regime, and with others
was arrested in 1980 for allegedly plotting a coup in April, but freed in 1991
by the RPF in the capture of Rihengeri; he became a member of the RPF.
Lotin, Lt.
Headed the Belgian platoon of UNAMIR sent to escort the Prime Minister,
Mme Agathe Uwilingiyimana, from her residence to the radio station on 7
April; he was murdered along with other members of his platoon.
Lumumba, Patrice.
The father of Congo's independence; arrested, tortured, and killed in 1961.
Glossary I
359
Lwabanji, Lwasi Ngabo.
Deputy Governor of South-Kivu who threatened to expel the estimated
300,000 Banyamulenge (Tutsi) whose citizenship had been cancelled in 1982.
Malecela, John.
Prime Minister of Tanzania who served as a mediator between the RPF and
the Government of Rwanda during the Arusha talks.
Mandela, Nelson.
After being imprisoned for decades, Mandela emerged from prison to lead
the ANC; he was elected President of South Africa in 1994 just as the genocide in Rwanda was getting underway; he tried to mediate the civil war in
Zaire.
Mapuranga, Dr. M. T.
OAU Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs appointed by the OAU
as Special Representative to Rwanda in 1993.
Marchal, Colonel Luc.
A Belgian, head of the Kigali sector of UNAMIR; court-martialed in Brussels in 1996 for failing to protect his men, a military trial which ended in
acquittal.
Marlaud, Jean-Michel.
French ambassador to Kigali and successor to Georges Martre.
Martre, Georges.
French ambassador in Kigali at the time of the RPF invasion in 1990.
Maurin, Lieutenant-Colonel.
Assistant to the military attacM, Lieut.-Col. Chollet, and took over his functions when news broke in France concerning Chollet's activist role in
Rwandan anti-RPF military operations.
Mayjambere, Silas.
Founder of the UPR in 1990 and fled to exile in Belgium that same year.
Mayuya, Colonel Stanislas.
A elose associate of President Habyarimana who was allegedly killed by the
AKAZU because he threatened their monopoly controI over Habyarimana.
Mercier, General.
French officer in overall charge of Operation Turquoise.
Michaux-Chevry, Lucette.
French Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs.
Micombero, Michel.
A Tutsi-Hima, a Captain in Burundi who led the defeat of the Hutu army
mutineers on 19 October 1965, became Prime Minister and Minister of
Defense and then, as Head of the National Revolutionary Council, was
President when the First Burundi Republic was proelaimed on 28 November 1966; he was President until1976 when he was overthrown on l
November.
Miller, Reid G.
Nairobi bureau chief for the Associated Press.
Mkapa, Benjamin.
Prime Minister of Tanzania; Tanzanian Minister for Higher Education during the Rwandan genocide.
Mobutu, Sese Seko (Joseph-Desire).
Chief of staff under Lumumba in the Congo, staged a coup when the government party split into two factions led by Lumumba and Kasavubu, and
formerly deelared himself President in 1965, renaming the Congo Zaire in
360
The Path of a Genocide
1970; overthrown in a Rwanda-backed rebellion led by Laurent Kabila in
1997.
Moi, Daniel Arap.
President of Kenya.
de Montferrand, Bernard.
Prime Minister Balladur's Diplomatic Counsellor.
Mortehan, Monsieur.
CathoHc missionary in Rwanda associated with divisive colonial church
politics.
MoussaH, Michel.
UNHCR special envoy to Rwanda in 1994 who argued that Rwanda wou1d
experience "a bloodbath of unparalleled proportions" if efforts were not
made to salvage the peace process.
Mubarak, Hosni.
President of Egypt.
Mugambage, Colonel Frank.
The RPF's second ranked officer after Paul Kagame and its prime diplomat
who negotiated with Colonel Marcel Gatzinzi of the FAR on a ceasefire
following the coup, and with the French over Operation Turquoise.
Mugenzi, Justin.
Leader of the PL.
Mugesera, Leon.
A graduate of Rwandan and Canadian universities, ideologue of extremism
of considerable repute, vice-president of the MRND(D) in Gisenyi, who, in
his famous speech of 22 November 1992 at an MRND meeting in Gisenyi,
not only declared all other political parties, other than MRND and CDR,
accomplices of the enemies of Rwanda, but advocated extennination of the
ibyitso; he obtained refugee status in Canada; the Canadian government is
currently attempting to extradict him to Arusha.
Mukeshimana, Agnes.
A seventeen-year old Tutsi survivor of the genocide at Mugombwa in
Muganza.
Mulanda, General Delphin.
Commander of the Kantangese fighters in the Zairian alliance against
Mobutu.
Mulroney, Brian.
Canadian Prime Minister in the early nineties.
Muntu, Mugisha, Maj. Gen.
Rwandan Anny Commander.
Mussa, Amr.
Foreign Minister of Egypt; 1993 Chainnan of the OAU Council of Ministers.
Museveni, Yoweri.
Ugandan Minister of Defense, the leader of the anti-Obote guerilla movement, who became President on 29 January 1986 following his victory and
the defeat of the Okello regime that had replaced Obote in 1985.
Mulele, Pierre.
Co-leader with Kabila of the 1965 anti-Mobutu opposition in Zaire
Mutesa, Kabaka (King) E.
King and President of Buganda in 1961 during the overthrow of the
Rwandese monarchy.
Mwinyi, AH Hassan.
President of Tanzania who convened a regional summit of the leaders of
Glossary I
361
Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda in Dar-es-Salaam on that fateful day,
6 April 1994, to obtain an agreement on a broad-based govemment for
Rwanda.
Nahimana, Ferdinand.
Head of ORNIFOR, and a founder of CDR, held to be responsible for the 3
March 1992 broadcast which led to the Bugesera massacre and the displacement of 15,000 Tutsis; he was transferred to become first counsellor
in the Rwandese embassy in Bonn.
Ndadaye, Melchior.
Elected president of Burundi on l June 1993 by almost a two-thirds majority; he was assinated in October of that year.
Ndayamaje, Innocent.
Founder of the Front national de resistance, the National Resistance Front, in
1986; he was sentenced to five years in prison for organizing an illegal party.
Ndayambaje, Emmanuel.
Bourgmestre in Muganza, now in prison in Belgium charged with genocide.
Ndikumania, Sylvain.
Made prefet of Butare on 20 April 1994 when the genocide commenced there.
Ndugate, Major Stephen.
A Tutsi leader in the Ugandan NRA.
Nepomuscen, Nayinzira.
Leader of the PDC.
Ngabolwabanji, Lwagi.
Deputy Govemor of South Kivu during the Zaire civil war.
Ngango, Felicien.
Successor of Felicien Gatabazi as leader of the PSD; his entire family was
slaughtered on 7 April when the Belgian UNAMIR protectors were forcefully separated from them.
Ngendahayo, Jean-Marie.
FRODEBU Foreign Minister in Burundi who refused France the right of
transit in Operation Turquoise.
Ngeze, Hassan.
Editor of Kangura, an anti-Tutsi and antimoderate newspaper founded in
1990; arrested in June of 1991 with many other editors as a demonstration
of balance and released on 12 September 1991; arrested after the genocide
and put on trial hefore the ICTR in Arusha in 1997.
NguIinzira, Boniface.
Rwandese Defense Minister under Habyarimana who signed the MiIitary
Defense Agreement with France.
Nsabimana, Co!. Deogratius.
Chief of Staff at Byumba in 1993 and advocate of extremism.
Nsambimanc, Sylvain Georges.
Prefeet of Butare during the genocide and put on trial for crimes against
humanity hefore the ICTR in Arusha in 1997.
Nsamwambaho, Fredrick.
Leader of the PSD founded in 1991.
Nsanzuwera, Franc;;ois-Xavier.
Public prosecutor in Kigali.
Nsanzimana, Sylvestre.
Member of the MRND and Minister of Justice in 1991 when he was appointed Prime Minister on 10 October 1991, but his appointment to head
the new transitionai government was rejected by the opposition parties.
362
The Path of a Genocide
Nsengiyaremye, Dismas.
A veterinarian who became Prime Minister of the Rwandan coalition government in 1992.
Nsengiyumva, Thad6e
A liberal Catholic priest who became Primate of Kigali and urged the Church
to distance itself from the Habyarimana regime; he was weIl known for his
December 1991 manifesto, died alongside Archbishop Vincent
Nsengiyumva on 3 June 1994 in Kabgayi.
Nsengiyumva, Vincent.
Catholic Archbishop in Rwanda and a prominent member of the Central
Commiuee of the MRND until ordered to resign by the Pope in 1989; was
aIlegedly murdered by RPF soldiers on 3 June 1994 in Kabgayi.
Nsthamihigo, Bishop.
Anglican Bishop of Kigali during the genocide, now living in exile in Nairobi
and widely suspected of being involved in the genocide.
Ntabakuze, Aloys.
FAR battallion commander put on trial before the ICTR in Arusha in 1997.
Ntabonvura, Emmanuel.
A Tutsi fourteen-year-old genocide survivor at Mugombwa in Muganza.
Ntaryamira, Cyprien.
The President of Burundi, killed in the plane crash with President
Habyarimana on 6 April 1994.
Nyangoma, Leonard.
Hutu Burundi leader who went into exile in Zaire in July of 1993 and founded
the guerilla movement in opposition to the Tutsi military regime in Burundi.
Nyerere, Julius.
Former President of Tanzania and mediator in the Rwanda conflict and
subsequently in the Burundi conflict.
Nyiramutarambira, F61ecula.
An opposition member of Parliament from Butare kiIled in 1989 in a suspicious accident just after she accused the government of corruption in road
contracts.
Nzirorera, Joseph.
Secretary General of MRND, Public Works Minister under Habyarimana,
who, with Casimir Bizimungu, represented the minority Rihengeri faction
of northerners in rivalry with Habyarimana's wife's Gisenyi faction.
Obote, Milton.
President of Uganda in 1966 after overthrowing the Kabaka govemment;
overthrown in tum by Idi Amin in January 1971, but overthrew Amin in
1980 in a Tanzanian-backed war, but ousted on 27 July 1985 in a coup by
Brigadier General Basillio Okello.
Oduho, J. H.
Leader of the Sudanese African National Union (SANU).
Ogata, Sadako.
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.
Okello, Brigadier General Tito Basilio.
Overthrew Obote in a 27 July1985 coup and became President until
overhtrown by Museveni in 1986.
Rawson, David.
American Ambassador to Rwanda before and during the genocide.
Riza, Iqbal.
Assistant U.N. Secretary-General reporting to Kofi Annan in DPKO.
Glossary I
363
Rudahigwa m, Mutara.
King of Rwanda, whose mysterious and abrupt death in Burundi in July of
1959 triggered the Tutsi attempt at independence and the Belgian-backed
revolt of the Hutu in November against the Tutsi and the new King, King
Kigeri V.
Rurangaranga, Major Edward.
A prominent Banyankole minister and close associate of Obote who exerted
pressure on the Banyankole to denounce Museveni's NRA as a "foreign" or
Tutsi operation and advocated the eviction of the Tutsi refugees from Ankole.
Rucogoza, Faustin.
A Hutu leader of the MDR founded in 1991 who, as information minister,
had threatened to close down Radio Television Libre Mille Collines and
who also became one of the fint victims of the genocide.
Rudasingwa, Theogene.
General-Secretary of the RPF during the Arusha negotiations; met officials
in the Ministry of Defense in Paris to discuss Operation Turquoise; the
Rwandan Ambassador to the U.S.
Rutasira, General Leonidas.
FAR moderate officer; called for national reconciliation during the genocide.
Rwabukwisi, Vincent.
Editor of the periodical Kanguka arrested in June 1991 for publishing seditious material and released on 12 September 1991.
Rwakasisi, Chris.
A prominent Banyankole minister and close associate of Obote who exerted pressure on the Banyankole to denounce Museveni's NRA as a "foreign" or Tutsi operation and advocated the eviction of the Tutsi refugees
from Ankole.
Rwanyarare, Dr. E.
Leading member of and minister in the "scientist" wing of Obote's Uganda
People's Congress who tried to protect the Banyankole in Ankole by distinguishing between them and Museveni's refugee warrior supporters.
Rwema, Bisengimana.
Opponent of the frrst President of Rwanda and cabinet director of the Mobutu
govemment in Zaire from 1970-1980.
Rwigmana, A.
RPF contact when the U.N. attempted to arrange a ceasefire after the
Rwandan April 1994 coup; currently "Chef du Cabinet" of the Minister of
Defence.
Rwigyema, Major General Fred.
Fought in Museveni's rebel movement and was appointed deputy army
commander and deputy minister of defence when Museveni took power;
became head of the RPF and leader of the l October 1990 RPF invasion; he
was killed on 2 October.
Sabliere, Rochereau de la.
DAM Director.
Sagatwa, Colonel Elie.
A cousin of Habyarimana's wife and married to one of his sisters, a prominent member of AKAZU, Habyarimana's principal private secretary and
co-owner of the rabid anti-Tutsi newspapaer Kangura.
Sahnoun, Mohamed.
International diplomat and mediator; former Algerian representative to the
U.N. who had served as assistant secretary-general of the OAU.
364
The Path of aGenodde
Salim, Salim A.
OAU Secretary-General.
Savimbi, Jonas.
Leader of UNITA in Angola.
Sendashonga, Seth.
A Hutu, Minister of the Interior in the flrst RPF cabinet in 1994; currently
in exile in Kenya.
Serubuga, Colonel Laurent.
A prominent member ofAKAZU, Habyarimana's brother-in-law, army chief
of staff and co-owner of the rabid anti-Tutsi newspapaer Kangura.
Silberzahn, Claude.
A former DGSE high-ranking official who implied that his intelligence service had foreseen the genocide (Au coeur du secret, Paris: Fayard, 1995).
Simard, Father.
Canadian Catholic missionary to Rwanda who was murdered in October
1994.
Simpson, O.J.
The American football player and television personality who was aceused
of murdering his wife and her friend; television eoverage of the story and
the trial far surpassed the time devoted to eoverage of Rwanda and the
genocide.
Sindambiwe, Father Silvio.
A journalist eritical of government corruption in the Habyarimana regime
who was killed in 1989 in a very suspicious road accident.
Sindikubwabo, Theodore.
Member of the MRND(D) from Butare, Speaker of the Assembly in the
coalition govemment, and President of the interim government of Rwanda
from 9 April to July 1994; allegedly instigated the genocide in Butare after
replacing Jean-Baptiste Habyarimana as prefet by Sylvain Ndikumania.
Soumaillo, Gaston.
Leader of a Lumumbist insurrection in 1963 in which Kabila took part.
Streiker, Gary.
CNN correspondent in Nairobi.
Swinnen, Johan.
Belgian ambassador in Kigali before the genocide; one of the last diplomats to be evaeuated.
Tiberonda, Dr. Adonia.
Leading member of and minister in the "scientist" wing of Obote's Uganda
People's Congress who tried to protect the Banyankole in Ankole by distinguishing between them and Museveni's refugee warrior supporters.
Tishesekedi, Etienne.
Opposition politician surprisingly appointed by Mobutu as Prime Minister
after Kengo was removed, but was himself removed after three days in
office.
Twagiramungu, Faustin.
Rwandan Prime Minister designate according to the Arusha Agreement who
condemned Operation Turquoise from Montreal, but met the French delegation in Kigali in July.
Uwilingiyimana, Agathe.
A Hutu, member of the MDR, Minister of Education in the flrst genuine
coalition government in April 1992, Vice President and Prime Minister of
Rwanda in the 17 July 1993 cabinet authorized to sign a peace agreement,
Glossary I
365
and, with members of her family (excepting her five children, who were
flown out on a French plane), murdered on 7 April 1994.
Valerie, Bemeriki.
A member of CRD and extremist broadcaster on RTLM.
Vandriessche, Capt.
An officer in the Belgian unit of UNAMIR.
Wasswa, Lt. Col. Adam.
Second-in-command of the RPF; killed in a car crash in Uganda in July
1991.
Xavier, Fran~ois.
Editor of [jambo, founded in 1990; detained in May 1991 and charged with
siandering military officers and demoralizing the army.
Glossary
Foreign and Technical Words and Phrases
Abadehemuka.
The name of the political party of Unwami (King) Kigeri IV of Rwanda
during the fight for independence.
Abakutsi.
Traditional work obligations, usuaIIy of Hutu farmers to local Tutsi nobles,
which later referred to any work obligations of Rwandese citizens to the
state.
Akazi.
An evolved form of abakutsi, but as forced labor done for the colonial
authorities.
AKAZU or akazu.
"Small housen-the phrase, taken from the reference to the inner court of
the King in pre-colonial Rwanda, but herein referring to the inner group
c10se to President Habyarimana with the connotation of abuse of power
and privileges; since the group was made up largely of family members of
Habyarimana's wife who controlled most of the big enterprises in the country
and influenced internai and externai policy; it was also nicknamed Clan de
Madame.
Amasasu.
See isusu.
Amahoro.
Both the name of a modest hotel in Kigali, which was made into UNAMIR's
HQ, and the name of a large stadium nearby where many of the Tutsis who
were saved fled where they were protected by the Bangladeshi battalion.
Amwizero.
LiteraIIy "hopen; the name of a radio station in Burundi funded by the E.U.
in 1996.
Anglo-Belgian ProtocoI.
Dated 14 February 1914, it brought part of the Mufumbiro region and
Kigeatuczi district in what is now Uganda together in what was caIIed
Kabale.
Arusha Accords.
The peace agreement signed on 4 August 1993 between the RPF and the
Rwandese government establishing the demobilization of parts of both
armies and the integration of the rest, the provision for the return of the
Tutsi refugees who left in 1959-1962, and, most importantly, the powersharing agreement among the various parties within Rwanda and the RPF.
Assemblee nationale de transition.
TransitionaI National Assembly, the official name for the renarned parliament provided for in the Arusha Accords.
367
368
The Path of a Genocide
ATS Don Boseo.
Technieal school run by Franciscan monks in the center of Kigali and used
to house a platoon of UNAMIR soldiers.
Authochtones.
Those considered to be the indigenous population of an area and in contrast
to migrants who may have lived in an area for two eenturies or even more.
Bafumbira.
A subgroup of the Banyarwanda living in Uganda, Rwanda, and the Congo.
Bagogwe.
Sub-group of traditionally nomadic Tutsi living in the northwest of Rwanda.
Bahutu Manifesto.
The full title was the Notes on the Social Aspect of the Racial Native Problem in Rwanda, a document signed by the Group of Nine in March 1957 to
present to the U.N. trusteeship mission documenting the economie, social,
and political oppression of the Hutu under exc1usive Tutsi rule within the
Belgian trusteeship.
Bairu.
See Hiru.
Banyamulenge.
A Tutsi ethnic group in Zaire.
Banyarwanda.
The Hutu, Tutsi and Twa inhabitants of Rwanda; used also to refer to the
approximately 17 million inhabitants of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Zaire,
and Tanzania who speak Kinyarwanda.
Bourgmeistre.
The mayor of a town or city, or head of a commune who replaced the traditional chiefs in the municipal eleetions in Rwanda in 1960.
Bugesera Massacre.
The pogrom and massacre of approximately 300 Tutsis on 4 March 1992
following a Radio Rwanda broadcast that members of the Parti Liberal
planned to kilI twenty prominent Hutus seen in retrospeet as a trial run for
the eventual genocide; it produced about 15,000 homeless, some of them
becoming refugees in Burundi; Bugesera is a provinee in southeastern
Rwanda with the 1argest percentage of Tutsis
Caisse, Centrale de.
A banking facility of the Ministry of Cooperation in Paris through which
low cooperation interest loans are administered to favored nations in the
developing world.
Chiga.
NumericalIy the dominant group in Kigezi, most of the present day Kaba1e
district of Uganda, who put up a determined and protracted resistance against
centralized autocracy and foreign trusteeship under the League of Nations.
Cellule.
Division of a commune, the lowest echelon in the Rwandan administrative
structure.
Constitution.
Refers to the 24 November 1962 first constitution of Rwanda, first proc1aimed in the coup d'etat de Gitarama, 28 January 1961.
Corvee.
Customary work obligations of Hum for Tutsi nobility (see abakutsi).
Coup d'etat.
Overthrow of a government-in Rwanda: (1) 1961 Gitarama-a peaceful
Glossary II
369
meeting of local Hutu politicalleaders voted to abolish the monarchy, create a republic and elect a president-recognized by the Belgium government on l February 1961; (2) 5 July 1973 military but non-violent northern
Hutu coup led by Major General Juvenal Habyarimana against the previous regime dominated by Hutu from the central and southem regions; (3)
6-7 April 1994 Hutu extremist violent overthrow of the Hanyarimana transitionai coalition government.
Committee of Nine.
The signatories to the Bahutu Manifesto (cf. Manifeste des Bahutu) of 1957,
and included J. Habyarimana, G. Kayibanda, C. Mulindahabi, S.
Munyambonera, C. Ndahoyo, M. Niyonzima, I. Nzeyimana, G. Sentama,
J. Sibomana.
Commune.
A division of a subprefecture itself divided into cellules.
December Massacre.
The 1963 massacre of an estimated 10,000 Tutsi following the abortive
attempt of Tutsi rebels invading from Burundi to overthrow the Hutu
government.
Garde Republicaine.
Mobutu's Republican Guard.
Fashoda Syndrorne.
Named after a minor confrontation in southern Sudan in 1898 that almost
caused a Franco-British war; used to explain French reactions in Rwanda
in terms of the historical Franco-British rivalry.
Frodebu.
The party of Melchior Ndadaye, elected president of Burundi on 1 June
1993; the party itself won 65 of 81 parliamentary seats in the 29 June 1993
elections.
Fronasa.
Front for National Salvation, Museveni-led rebels against the Amin regime.
Genocidiaire.
A genocidist, someone who comrnits genocide.
Hima.
A group akin to the Tutsi living in northern Rwanda and southem Uganda
(Ankole).
Riru.
A group living in Ankole, Uganda, also called the Bairu, allied with
Rwandese Hutu.
Hutu.
Abahutu and Bahutu, the singular and plural terms respectively for the
majority (85 percent) of the Rwandese who are largely farmers, though
some raise cattle.
Ibyitso.
"Accomplice" referring to Tutsi within Rwanda accused of supporting the
RPF.
Igihinahiro.
Literally "the time of uncertainty," the period between the signing of the
Arusha Accords on 4 August 1993 and the date when the BBTG would be
installed, an event aborted by the 6 April 1994 coup.
Ijambo.
The name of a Rwandese newspaper founded in 1991 by Franyois-Xavier
Hangimana in the new spirit of press freedom.
370
The Path of a Genocide
Imprimerie Nationale du Rwanda.
Govemment-owned and Habyarimana-controlled publishing house.
Impuzamugambi.
"Those with a single purpose," the CDR youth wing and militia.
Interahamwe.
Literally "those who work together," the name of a militant publication of
the MRNDD as weil as the youth wing and militia of the MRNDD established in 1992 who were given paramilitary training and armed with the
sole aim of dealing a blow (in whatever manner) to anyone opposed to the
regime; later used to identify all the militias that were the main perpetrators
of the genocide.
Inkotanyi.
A Kinyarwandan word meaning the "indefatigable ones" referring to the
RPF invaders of 1990 onwards and their tenacity.
Inyangarwanda.
"Those who hate Rwanda," applied first to the Hutu who rebelled against
the monarchy, then to the Tutsi rebels against the Hutu government, and
finally referring to anyone who disagreed with the Habyarimana regime.
Inyenzi.
Literally cockroaches in Kinyarwanda, the name initially intended as an
insult for the Tutsi invaders in the early 1960s because cockroaches were
seen as dirty and attacked at night, but was adopted by those same invaders
and then applied to the 1990 invaders, and finally to all Tutsis targeted by
the genocide.
Isusu.
"Bullet," the name of a secret extremist organization in the Rwandese army
which supplied arms to the militias.
Kbaka Yekka.
KabakaAlone, Kabaka (King) Mutesa's political party in Buganda, Uganda
at then end of the colonial period.
Kanguka.
A periodical founded in 1991 by Vincent Rwabukwisi.
Kangura.
"The voice which seeks to awaken and defend the majority," a newspaper
founded in 1990 to counter the influence of the other newspapers in the
opening towards freedom of speech and became notorious for its venom
directed against the Tutsi; the editor was Hassan Ngeze and it was owned
by Habyarimana's principal private secretary, Co!. Segatwa, and the army
chief of staff, Co!. Serubuga.
Kanyarwanda.
A human rights organization in Rwanda founded by Fidele Kanyabugori.
King Faisal Hospital.
Hospital in Kigali which became a sanctuary for Rwandese protected by
UNAMIR.
Kinyarwanda.
A Bantu language spoken by the Rwandese.
Mandate.
The placement of Rwanda and Burundi under Belgium jurisdiction by the
League of Nations and confirmed in 1946 as a United Nations Trustee
Territory.
Manifeste des Bahutu.
Bahutu Manifesto issued by the Committee of Nine on 24 March 1957.
Glossary II
371
Meridian Hotel.
A hotel in Kigali that served as a sanctuary for foreigners after the 6 April
1994.
Midaille Nyiramachibiri.
An extremist newspaper.
Minimi.
Semi-autornatic gun.
Ministere de la Coop6ration.
French Ministry for foreign aid, but a1so used to support Francophone countries in Africa and as a conduit for military assistance.
Mouvance presidentielle.
The designation for Mobutu's supporters.
Mpororo.
A centralized state from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries inhabited
main1y by the Bahororo, and encompassing most of the counties of Western Anko1e and most of Kigezi district in contemporary Uganda and a portion of northern Rwanda.
Muluba.
An ethnic group which lives in the Shaba and Kasai regions of the DRC or
Zaire and which joined the Alliance to overthrow Mobutu.
Mukungo.
An ethnic group in the Shaba region of the DRC or Zaire and whichjoined
Kabila's Alliance to overthrow Mobutu.
Munyamulenge.
An ethnic group in South Kivu in the DRC (Zaire) which joined Kabila's
Alliance.
Network Zero.
Death squads linked to Habyarimana and purportedly responsible for many
assassinations and killings between 1992-1994.
Operation Hope.
Launched in December 1994 by humanitarian organizations, UNHCR,
UNAMIR and the Rwandese government to empty the internally displaced
persons camps.
Operation Noroit.
Name of military operation sent to Rwanda by France following the 1 October 1990 RPF invasion, officially to proteet the French expatriates present
in Rwanda; the original force consisted of 150 soldiers drawn from the
French forces stationed in the Central African Republic; increased to 350
in November and to 700 in February of 1993 following the RPF offensive.
Operation Retour.
The name given to the concerted effort to empty the refugee camps in Zaire
and Tanzania.
Operation Silver Back.
The name of the Belgian military operation which landed in Kigali on 10
April 1994 to rescue Belgian citizens and other ex-patriots from the renewed war in Rwanda.
Operation Turquoise.
The French-Iaunched humanitarian military mission sent to Rwanda in June
1994 perceived by the RPF as an attempt to create a haven for the FAR or,
at the least, cover the escape of the killers.
Paraehute journalist.
Generalist reporter or anchor parachuted into a story who is usually unfa-
372
The Path of a GeD()dde
miliar with the history and culture of the area to which he or she has been
assigned.
Parti Revolutionaire du Peuple.
A revolutionary party founded by Laurent Kabila in Zaire in 1967, and
which, with four other small parties, on 18 October 1996 at Memera, South
Kivu, combined to form the ADFL, otherwise known as the Alliance.
Pays du champ.
"Field countries"-states considered part of the family in which the who1e
relationship between Paris and these states is special entitling such states
to speciallow-interest loans from the Caisse Centrale de Cooperation and
military assistance through the Ministry of Cooperation.
Pegasus.
A Belgian UNAMlR post in Kigali.
Pre carre.
The term for French influence in Africa.
Prefecture.
The major administrative sub-unit of the state in Rwanda.
Presidentiai Guard.
The elite battalion of the Rwandan armed forces (FAR).
Quai d'Orsay.
French Foreign Affairs Ministry.
Radiodiffusion de la Republique Rwandaise.
State-owned radio in Rwanda.
Radio Muhabura.
Literally "leading the way," the RPF radio founded in mid-1992 and ended
when the RPF-Ied govemment took power in July 1994.
Reconnaissance Batallion.
Constituted the Presidentiai Guard of the FAR.
La sortie honorable.
Honorable departure, term for Mobutu to save face, resign and go into exile.
Sous prefecture.
A subprefecture, a division of a prefecture, the major political administrative unit in Rwanda.
Ten Commandments.
Commandments published in 1990 in the rabid anti-Tutsi paper, Kangura,
which were intended to appeal to and guide the supporters of the Habyarimana regime in how to deal with their "enerny," the Tutsi, as weIl as
provide a philosophy justifying exclusive power for the Habyarimana
regime.
Tusagusazisha.
Literally, "we can make you old" or we can eliminate you.
Tutsi.
Abatutsi and Batutsi, the singular and plural forms respectively of an identifiable group in Rwanda related to the Hima and from whom the ruling
class in Rwanda was drawn until the Hutu revolution in 1959-1962.
Twa.
Abatwa and Batwa, the singular and plural forms respectively of the original indigenous population of Rwanda currently constituting 1 percent of
the population, said to be pygmies, but their size was likely a result of their
hunter-gatherer diet.
Glossary II
373
Ubuhake.
Derived from guhakwa meaning to pay one's respect to a superior in his
court; abolished by the Belgians in April 1954, the term referred to a contractual service in traditional Rwandese society which in later interpretations became either a happy cohesion or a form of slavery; a powerful person
provided protection and the client would work for the patron---eut lumber,
take care of him in old age, etc.
Umubyeyi.
LiteralIy means the parent, the provider and the one above everything; titie
bestowed on Habyarimana by his followers.
Umurangi.
A newspaper published by MDR extremists.
Umurwanashyaka.
Another extremist paper.
Umuzungu.
Abazungu is the plural, the name for Caucasians.
University National du Rwanda.
Canadian Dominican Catholic Order founded this university in the 1960s
at Butare; Habyarimana created a branch in the north in Ruhengeri in the
1980s.
Usumbura.
The former name of Bujumbura.
Viking.
Code name for Lt. Lotin's Belgian UNAMIR unit in Kigali, located in the
Kimihurura district of Kigali, which first reported the systematic "cleansing" of opposition figures by the Presidential Guard and gendarmes.
Glossary III
Abbreviations and Acronyms
ACP.
Group des sept pour la cooperation du secteur prive European avec l' Afrique,
les Caribes et le Pacific, the Group of Seven for European Private Cooperation with Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific formed in 1975; on 20 Febmary 1992 ACP passed a resolution urging the RPF and Rwandese
govemment to negotiate and sign a cease fire, the Rwandese govemment
to respect human rights, and France to withdraw its troops from Rwanda.
AFDL (ADFL English).
Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire, the
rebel forces led by Laurent-Desire Kabila that overthrew the Mobutu regime in 1996-97.
AFP.
Agence France-Presse-a French press bureau with an office located in
Kigali.
AGCD.
Administration General de la Cooperation au Developpement-the Belgian overseas aid agency primarily assisting former colonies of Belgium.
AHG.
OAU Assembly of States and Governments.
AL
Amnesty International; international human rights organization headquartered in London.
AICF.
Action Internationale Contre la Faim, International Action Against Famine, an international humanitarian agency.
AML.
Armored ear.
APC.
Armored personnel carrier.
APROSOMA.
Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse (Association for the Social
Promotion of the Masses)-primarily Hutu political party started in the
November 1957 by Joseph Gitera.
ARP.
Agence Rwandaise de Presse-a Rwandese press agency.
ARD.
Alliance pour le Renforcement de la Democratie-Alliance to Strengthen
Democracy, a conservative coalition developed in 1993 which included the
dominant political party, the MRNDD, the extremist Hutu nationalist party,
the CDR, and three other minor parties (PDR, PARERWA and PECO), or-
375
376
The Path of a Genocide
ganized on 11 November to oppose the Arusha Accords and the devolution
or sharing of power with other groups; believed by many to be responsible
for coordinating the violence which undermined the Arusha Accords, but
by others (Prunier) to be only apaper organization.
BBC.
British Broadcasting Corporation, Britain's state-owned broadcasting
company.
BBTG.
Broad-Based Transitionai Government as provided for in the Arusha
Accords.
BUYBAT.
The name of the Ghanaian unit in UNAMIR.
CARE.
International NGO providing humanitarian assistance to Rwandese refugees.
CAP.
Centre d'analyse et de Prevision, a French intelligence agency.
CBC.
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the Canadian state-owned broadcasting company.
CDR.
Coalition pour la defense de la republique, Coalition for the Defense of the
Republic, the most extreme Hutu party formed in 1992 and adamantly opposed to the Arusha Accords.
CEPGL.
Communaute Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs, the Great Lakes Economic Community, a transnationai economic group which includes Burundi,
Rwanda and Zaire (also called CPGL).
ClDA.
Canadian International DevelopmentAgency, Canada's overseas aid agency.
CND.
Conseil National de Developpement (also NCD), the National Council for
Development, the parliament from 1978 until August 1993 made up of 70
representatives elected for five year terms by universal suffrage from 140
candidates nominated by the MRND.
CNDD.
Conseil National pour le defense de la democratic, National Council for
the Defense of Democracy, a political organization formed by Leonard
Nyangoma in 1993 when he fled Burundi after the murder of its first Hutu
elected President, Melchoir Ndadaye; the guerilla group and militant arm
of CNDD was called the FDD, the Democratic Defense Front.
CPGL.
SeeCEPGL.
CSLG.
Civilian Security Liason Group, the organization to coordinate the protection (and evacuation) of employees of international organizations and agencies and their families from Rwanda; subsequently, the same name was
given to the 45 international Liaison Officers first deployed in Goma on 23
February 1995 to help train the ZCSC.
DAM.
Direction des Affaires Africaines et Malgaches, a unit in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
DAM!.
Detachment d' assistance militaire et d'instruction, the French military mis-
Glossary HI
377
sion to Rwanda which was accused of helping train FAR soldiers and
Interahamwe rnilitia members.
DART.
Disaster Assistance Response Team of the Canadian military capable of
rapid deployment for humanitarian emergencies.
DAS.
Delegation aux affaires strategiques created in 1992 by Pierre Joxe, Minister of Defense.
DFAIT.
Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
DGSE.
Direction Generale des Services Exterieurs, President of France's Secret
Service.
DHA.
U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs (recently renarned the Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs-OCHA).
DMZ.
Demilitarized zone between the RPF and the FAR determined by the
ceasefire agreement.
DPA.
U.N. Department of Political Affairs.
DPKO.
V.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
DRC.
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the new name of Zaire under Kabila.
ESM.
Ecole Superieure Militaire, headquarters of the FAR located 200 meters
from Camp Kigali.
ESO.
Externai Security Organization.
ETO.
A technical school in Kigali housing Belgian peacekeepers and code-named
Beverly Hills.
FAR.
Forces Armees Rwandaises-Rwandese Armed Forces under the
Habyarimana regime.
FAZ.
Forces Arrnees Zaire-Zairean Arrned Forces under Mobutu.
FIDH.
Federation International des Droits des Homrnes which produced areport
in 1993 which linked the Rwandese slaughters to the V.N. Convention on
Genocide.
FDC.
Force Democratique du Changement, the Democratic Force for Change,
the coalition of MDR, PSD and the PL forrned in January 1993 in opposition to the ARD and in support of a cease fire, political inclusion, compromise, and peace.
FDD.
The Democratic Defense Front, the Burundi Hutu guerilla group and militant arm of CNDD forrned by Leonard Nyangoma in Zaire after he went
into exile in 1993.
FRODEBU.
The ruling Tutsi party in Burundi at the time of the Rwandese genocide.
378
The Path of a Genocide
FNC.
An automatic rifle.
FNR.
Front national de resistance, the National Resistance Front organized by
Innocent Ndayamaje in 1986 who was sentenced to five years in prison,
since the ruling MRND was the only legal party permitted at that time under President Habyarimana.
GDP.
Gross Domestic Product.
GOMN.
Groupement des Observateurs Militaires Neutres, the OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (also NMOG) set up in 1993 to observe the cease fire
signed between the RPF and the Rwandese government and the border between Uganda and Rwanda, and to report on any supply of logistics to the
RPF; subsequently became part of UNAMIR.
GOR.
Government of Rwanda.
GP.
Garde Presidentielle-Presidential Guard.
HRWAP.
Human Rights Watch Arms Project.
ICHRDD.
International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development-a
Canadian government funded agency located in Montreal which helped
organize the international commission on human rights which visited
Rwanda in January 1993 and first reported that the vio1ence in Rwanda
was planned, systematically organized and, in legal terms, constituted
genocide.
ICRC.
International Comrnittee of the Red Cross, an international, Geneva-based
humanitarian organization dedicated to the protection of and assistance to
civilian victims of armed conflict, political and military prisoners; ICRC
serviced the food and health needs of the almost one million Rwandese
displaced by the civil war until the signing of the Arusha Accords, and was
one of the two organizations to continue to operate in Rwanda when the
civil war was resumed and the genocide was perpetrated.
ICTR.
International Court Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania to try perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda.
IDC.
International Christian Democrats.
IDP.
Internally Displaced Person.
IFRC.
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
IMF.
International Monetary Fund.
INF.
International Neutral Force, original phrase for what eventually became
UNAMIR.
ISO.
International Security Organization.
Glossary III
379
JPMC.
Joint Political Military Commission, a mechanism established under the
Arusha peace negotiations to which GOMN or NMOG reported on
violations.
KIBAT.
The Belgian battalion of UNAMIR stationed in Kigali; ten soldiers of this
battalion were brutally murdered by the FAR on 7 April 1994.
KWSA.
UNAMIR's Kigali Weapon Secure Area located within ten km. radius of
the center of Kigali.
MDR.
Mouvement democratique republicain, Democratic Republican Movement,
founded in 1991 as the successor to the flrst President, Gregoire Kayibanda's
MDR-PARMAHUTU; it became the main opposition party under Faustin
Rucogoza.
Mi.5.
Semi-automatic weapon.
MIGS.
Montreal Institute for Genocide Studies.
MP.
Member of Parliament (Canada).
MPLA.
de Angola in Angola, originally supMovimento Popular de Liberta~o
ported by the Soviet Union and which defeated J. Savimbi's Vniao National para Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) in an election.
MRND.
Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement, National
Revolutionary Movement for Development, President Habyarimana's party,
founded in 1975, which became the MRNDD in 1991.
MRNDD (formerly MRND).
Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement et la
Democratie, the new name of MRND in July 1991.
MSF.
Medicins Sans Frontieres, Doctors Without Borders, a medical humanitarian agency initially founded in France, and, along with the leRC, the only
humanitarian agency to stay in Rwanda after the 6 April 1994 coup and
instigation of genocide.
MSF-H.
Medicins Sans Frontieres, Doctors Without Borders from Holland.
MSM.
Mouvement Social Mahutu, a Hutu party created in 1957 founded by
Gregoire Kayibanda, Rwanda's flrst president.
NASA.
National Security Agency in Uganda under Obote.
NGO.
Non-Governmental Organization.
NMOG.
Neutral Military Observer Group (see GOMN).
NRA.
National Resistance Army (Uganda), the rebel group founded in February
1981 and led by Museveni untill986 when victory was achieved; approximately one third of the force was made up of Rwandese refugees.
380
The Path of Il Genocide
NRC.
National Resistance Council, the political wing of the NRA.
NRM.
National Resistance Movement (see NRA and NRC above).
OAU.
Organization of African Unity.
OECD.
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, an agency of
nineteen donor countries.
ORC.
Open Relief Centres where accornrnodation, food and protection would be
provided for returning IDPs and refugees.
ORINFOR.
Rwanda Office of Information, aparastatal organization created by
Habyarimana in 1974 to controi the media, inc1uding Rwandan television,
radio and two government newspapers.
PADE.
Parti Democratique, Democratic party, a creation of the MRND.
PALIPEHUTU.
The principle Hutu Burundi opposition party.
PAPERWA.
Parti Revolutionnaire Rwandais, Rwandan Revolutionary Party, a creation
of the MRND.
PARMEHUTU.
Parti du Mouvement de I'Emancipation de Bahutu, the party of Gregoire
Kayibanda, the flrst President of independent Rwanda.
PDC.
Parti mimocrate Chretien-the Christian Democratic Party, the smallest of
four opposition parties to the Habyarimana regime founded in 1991 and led
by Nayinzira Nepomuscen.
PDD 25.
Presidential Decision Directive (U.S.) issued by President Clinton on May
1994 restricting U.S. financial and logistic support and the use of the U.S.
military for humanitarian interventions.
PDI.
Parti Democratique Islamique, initially an MRND organized party representing the Rwandese Muslim cornrnunity which joined the 1994 RPF-led
coalition governrnent.
PECO.
Parti Ecologiste, a MRND-created party and part of the genocidai government in Rwanda.
PL.
Parti Liberal, the Liberal Party in Rwanda, led by Justin Mugenzi, the third
largest opposition party with many Tutsi and business-minded members.
PRA.
Popular Resistance
which became the NRA.
PSD.
Parti Social Democrate, the Social Democratic Party, the second largest
opposition party, one which entered the 1994 RPF-led coalition.
PSR.
Parti Socialiste Rwandais, the Rwandan Socialist Party, a very minor party,
but one which entered the 1994 RPF led government.
Glossary III
381
RADER.
La Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais, the Rwandese Democratic
Union, created in September 1959 by Chief Bwanakweri and supported by
moderate Tutsi and Belgium.
RANU.
Rwandese Alliance for National Unity, the successor to the RRWF in 1980
and precurser to the RPF formed in 1988.
RGF.
Rwandese Government Forces (see FAR).
RoE.
Rules of Engagement interpreting the mandate of a peacekeeping force;
draft rules written by the Force Commander, General Dallaire were never
formally approved by New York.
RlF.
Reduction-in-Force.
RPA.
Rwandese Patriotic Army, the army of the RPF.
RPF.
Rwandese Patriotic Front, the political arm of the RPA, and the dominant
coalition partner after the RPF victory in 1994.
RRWF.
Rwandese Refugee Welfare Foundation, created in June of 1979 and replaced by the more political RANU in 1980.
RTLM or RTLMC.
Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines, One Thousand Hills Free Radio,
the private radio station of the extremist founded in mid-1993 that broadcast
hate propaganda against the Arusha Accords and the Thtsi population.
RUTBAT.
The Rutongo Battalion, the poorly equipped and inexperienced Bangladeshi
battalion named after ils place of deployment just outside Kigali; it included
a logistics unit and was assigned UNAMIR's armored vehicles.
RWANDEX.
A large state agency that operated three depulping mills to process coffee;
the Kigali warehouse was used as the logistical base for UNAMIR.
SAP.
Structural Adjustment Program (World BankJIMF), a liberal trade economie
policy imposed on Rwanda at the end of the eighties.
SANU.
Sudanese African National Union.
SPLA.
Sudan People's Liberation Army.
SRSG.
Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the U.N.
TGE.
Transitionai Government of Ethiopia.
TMAA.
Technical Military Assistance Agreement between France and Francophone
African states.
TNA.
Transitionai National Assembly.
UDPR.
Union Democratique du Peuple Rwandais, the Democratic Union of the
382
The Path of a Genocide
Rwandese People, set up by the MRND but which went over to the opposition and joined the coalition government formed by the RPF after their
victory.
UFA.
Baganda Uganda Freedom Army, an insurgency group in Buganda, Uganda
against Obote.
UNAMIR.
United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda, a U.N. peacekeeping mission launched in October 1993 as part of the Arusha Accords.
UNAR.
Union nationale rwandaise, National Rwandese Union, a pro-monarchist
anti-Belgian political party which emerged in 1959 largely supported by
Tutsi to promote independence.
UNDP.
United Nations Development Program.
UNESCO.
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.
UNHCR.
United Nations High Commission for Refugees.
UNICEF.
United Nations Children's Fund.
UNITA.
Uniao National para Independencia Total de Angola organized by Jonas
Savimbi in Angola.
UNITAF.
United Nations International Task Force.
UNOC.
United Nations Operation in the Congo.
UNOMUR.
United Nations Military Observer Force for Uganda and Rwanda; worked
alongside NMOG untillatter disbanded; then UNOMUR was folded into
UNAMIR.
UNOSOM.
United Nations Operation in Somalia.
UNREO.
United Nations Rwanda Emergency Operation under DHA and responsible
for coordinating humanitarian aid in the Rwandese crisis.
UNLA.
Ugandan National Liberation Army.
UNSG.
United Nations Secretary General.
Upc.
Uganda People's Congress.
UPR.
Union du Peuple Rwandais, the Rwandan People's Union, a political party
established on 9 November 1990 by Silas Mayjambere.
UPRONA.
Tutsi opposition party in Burundi.
USAID.
United States Agency for International Development.
USlA.
United States Information Agency.
Glossary III
383
VOA.
Voice of America, the U.S. international broadcasting organization
WFP.
World Food Program which supplied food and other humanitarian supplies
to refugees.
YMCA.
Young Men's Christian Association.
ZCSC.
Zairian Camp Security Contingent set up to provide security for the refugee camps in Zaire.
Howard Adelman, a Professor of Philosophy at York University in
Toronto since 1966, was the founder and Director of the Centre for
Refugee Studies and editor of Canada's periodicalon refugees, Refuge
until1993. He has authored and edited eighteen monographs and edited
volumes, as well as numerous chapters in edited books and refereed
journals. He has written extensively on the Middle East, humanitarian
intervention, membership rights, ethics, refugee policy, and early warning. Recent books inc1ude Immigration and Refugee Policy: Australia
and Canada Compared (University of Melbourne and University of
Toronto 1997) and Afdcan Refugees (Westview 1994) and, with Astri
Suhrke, Early Warning and Conflict Management: the Genocide in
Rwanda (1996).
Agnes Callamard currently is the Research Policy Coordinator in the
International Secretariat of Amnesty International in London, United
Kingdom. Bom in France, she holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from
the New School for Social Research in New York. She has been a postdoctorai fel10w at the Centre for Refugee Studies in Toronto where she
conducted research on refugees with a particular focus on those in Africa. She has also been a consultant to the U.N. and has done field work
in eastern and South Africa. She is the author of many articles on refugees and is currently preparing her manuscript, Mozambique Refugees
in Malawi for publication.
Frank Chalk is a Professor of history at Concordia University and
Chair of the Montreal Institute for Genocide Studies. He is co-author
of The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analysis and Case Studies (1990) and has published numerous other articles and book chapters on genocide.
Jacques Castonguay holds a doctorate in psychology from the Univerite
de Montreal. He is a member of the Order of Canada, was Head of the
385
386
The Path of a Genocide
Department of Military Psychology and Management at the College
Militaire Royal de Saint Jean, and has taught at the Dominican University College in Ottawa and at York University in Toronto. Author of
several books and numerous papers, his most recent book, Green Berets in Rwanda, was published in Paris in 1998.
Todd Eachus graduated in Political Communication from George Washington University and is currently Community Affairs Director at
Adelphia Communications. He has researched and authored a number
of articles on the effects of modem television news media on US foreign policy and, in particular, the role of the news media on the US
involvement in Rwanda.
Shally B. Gachuruzi currently teaches in the Department of Sociology
and Anthropology at the University of Ottawa. Bom in North Kivu,
Zaire/Congo, he received his Ph.D. in sociology from Laval University, Quebec. He has specialized and published on forced migration,
environmental, and development issues. He was a Post-Doctoral Visiting Fellow at the York University (1994-1997), where he coordinated
two international symposia on Rwanda and Zaire.
Abbas Haji Gnamo is currently a Research Associate at the Centre for
International and Security Studies in York University. Bom in Ethiopia, he received his Ph. D. in Anthropology from the University of Paris,
where he also eamed his DEA (diplome d'Etudes apporfondies) in political science/African Studies. In addition to his book, La Etate et les
Crises d'Integration Nationale en Ethiopie Contmporaine (CEAN-IEP
1993), he has published many articles and chapters in books. He is
currently working on ethnicity in relation to current conflicts in Africa.
Kate Halvorsen graduated in sociology from the University of Bergen
(Norway) and worked for UNHCR in Thailand and Mozambique from
1991-94. She has been a researcher at the Chr. Michelsen Institute in
Bergen and is currently Director for the Vietnam Project of Norwegian
Church Aid in Hanoi. She has published articles on human rights, gender issues, and refugees.
Bruce Jones is currently Hamburg Fellow on Conflict Prevention at the
Centre for International Security and Arms Controi at Stanford University, and Associate, Conflict Analysis and Development Unit at the
Contributors
387
London School of Economics. He has also been a consultant to U.N.,
European, and African humanitarian, development, and conflict resolution organizations. He has written a number of book chapters, artieles, and reports on Rwanda, Somalia, complex emergencies, and
conflict management, ineluding, most recently, a report to the U.N.
Standing Committee on Strategic Coordination on the Great Lakes region of Africa.
Joan Kakwenzire, originally from Rwanda, has taught history at
Makerere University in Kampala and has been a human rights activist.
She was a contributor to the report on the Genocide in Rwanda by the
U.S. Committee for Refugees and currently works as a consultant in
Uganda to aid and development agencies.
Dixon Kamukama, bom in Uganda, currently teaches at Makerere University in Kampala and has been involved in the study of the social
relations between the Bairu and Bahima of Ankole, who are elosely
related to the Bahutu and Batutsi of Rwanda, respectively. He is the
author of The Rwanda conflict: Its Roots and Regional Implications.
Turid Laegreid has agraduate degree in political science from the University of Bergen and was a research feIlow at the Norwegian Institute of
International relations (NUPI). From 1996 she worked for the Norwegian Refugee Council as Head of the Latin American section, and since
1998 has been the Council's resident Representative in Colombia.
Steven Livingston received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Washington and joined the Political Communication faculty
at George Washington University in 1991. His research focuses on
media, international affairs, and U.S. foreign policy. In 1992-93, he
was a Social Science Council Senior Research fellow in Foreign Policy
Studies and in 1996 was a feIlow at the Joan Shorenstein Center on
Press, Politics, and Public Policy at Harvard University. He is author of
The Terrorism Spectade (Westview 1994) as weIl as numerous artieles
focused on the media effects on defense and foreign policy processes,
particularly in regard to humanitarian emergencies.
Ogenga Otunnu, educated at Makerere University, Dalhousie University, St. Mary's University, and the Technical University of Nova Scotia,
received his Ph.D. in History from York University. He was a research
388
The Path of a Genocide
scholar at the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University (1991-1996)
and is currently a Visiting Professor in Third World Politics in the Department ofPolitics and School of Public Administration, Ryerson Polytechnic University, Toronto and a Research Associate of The Larnarsh
Centre for Research on Violence and Conflict Resolution at York University. He has published on refugees and environmental issues in Africa and is currently preparing a manuscript, Political Violence in
Uganda, 1890-1997 for publication.
Gerard Prunier, after receiving degrees in Political Science and Sociology, eamed a Ph.D. in African History. He spent several years in East
Africa in the 1970s (Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia) and joined the French
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in 1984 as a
Researcher in Modem and Contemporary African History. His latest
book was The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (Columbia UP
1995) and is presently completing a work on Rwanda in Zaire: from
Genocide to Continental War (Hurst & Co 1998).
Astri Suhrke has a Ph.D. in international relations and has published
widely on social conflict and population movements. She is a co-author of Escapefrom Violence (OUP 1989) and, with Howard Adelman,
co-author of Vol. 2 of the Joint Evaluation ofEmergency Assistance to
Rwanda entitled Early Waming and Conjlict Management (1996) as
wel1 as a number of other articles related to the issue. She is currently a
Senior Fellow at the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Bergen and Research
Associate at the Camegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington,
Amare Tekle eamed a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Denver in 1966 and has served
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in Ethiopia. He was the Commissioner for the national referendum in
Eritrea in 1993, which confirrned that country's independence.
Tekle
has taught the U.S. and has written widely on conflict and conflict
resolution in the Horn of Africa.
Books
Adelrnan, H., H.A. Onarno, and B.S. Oachuruzi (eds.). A Frameworkfor Conflict Resolution: Peace-Building and National Reconciliation in the Great
Lakes Region of Africa. (Toronto: Centre for International and Security
Studies, York University: 1997).
Africa Rights. Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance. (London: Africa
Rights:1994).
Africa Watch. Beyond the Rhetoric: Continuing Human Rights Abuses in
Rwanda. (New York: Africa Watch: 1993).
Ajala, A. Pan-Africanism. (London: Andre Deutsch: 1974).
Allard, Kenneth. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. (Washington: National Defence University Press: 1995).
Aldritch, Robert and John Connell. France in World Politics. (London:
Routledge: 1989).
Alexandre, Laurien. The Voice ofAmerica: From Detente to the Reagan Doctrine. (Norwood: Ablex Publishing: 1988).
Andereggen, Anton. France 's Relation with Sub-Saharan Africa. (Westport,
CT: Praeger: 1994).
Bayart, Jean Fran~ois.
La Politique Africaine de Franfois Mitterand. (Paris:
Karthala: 1984).
Bayart, J. F. Vetat en Afrique. (Paris: Fayard: 1989).
Boutros-Ohali, Boutros. An Agenda for Peace. (New York: United Nations:1992).
Braeckman, Colette. Le Dinosaure: le Zaire du Mobutu. (Paris: Fayard: 1992).
Braeckrnan, Colette. Rwanda, histoire d'un genocide. (Paris: Fayard: 1994).
Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook:1994-1995. (Washington:
Brassey's: 1994).
Chretien, Jean-Pierre, Jean-Fraw;:ois Dupaquier, Marcel Kabanda, and Joseph
Ngararnbe with Reporters sans frontieres. Rwanda: Les medias du genocide.
(Paris: Editions Karthala: 1995).
Cervenka, Z. The Unfinished Questfor Unity: Africa and the OAU. (London:
J. Friedrnan: 1977).
Chalk, Frank and Jonassohn, Kurt. The History and Sociology of Genocide:
Analyses and Case Studies. (New Haven: Yale University Press: 1990).
389
390
The Puth of u Genocide
Chipman, John. French Power in Africa. (London: BlackweIl: 1989).
Clarke, John F. and David E. Gardiner (eds.). Political Refonn in Francophone
Africa. (Boulder: Westview Press: 1996).
Clapham, C. Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1996).
Clay, Jason W. "The Eviction of Banyarwanda: The Story Behind the Refugee Crisis in Southwest Uganda." (Cambridge University M. A.: no date).
Cohen, Samy. La defaite des generaux. (Paris: Fayard: 1994).
Destexhe, Alain. Rwanda: Essai sur le genocide. (Bruxelles: Editions
Complexe: 1994).
Edel, M.M. The Chiga ofWestern Uganda. (London: Oxford University Press:
1957).
Essack, Karrim. Civil War in Rwanda. (Dar es Salaam: Forem Utho Printers:
1993).
Glaser, Antoine and Stephen Smith, Ces Messieurs Afrique. (Paris: Fayard:
1995).
Goffin, Alexandre Rwanda, 7 avril1994: dix commandos vont mourir. (Brussels: ASBL 1995).
Guichaoua, Andre (ed.). Les Crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda. (Lille:
Universite des Sciences et Technologies: 1995).
Guisnel, Jean. Les Generaux: enquete sur le pouvoir militaire en France.
(Paris: La Decouverte: 1990).
Hazoume, Alain and Edgar Hazoume. Afrique, un avenir en sursis. (Paris:
l'Harmattan: 1988).
Helle-valle, Jo. Banyarwanda in Uganda: Ethnic Identity, Refugees Status,
and Social Stigma, Masters Thesis. (University of Oslo: 1989).
Hempstone, S. Mercenaries and Dividends: The Katanga Story. (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger: 1962)
Himmelstrand, Ulf, Kinyanjui Kibiru, and Edward Mburanga (eds.). African
Perspectives on Development. (London: James Currey Ltd.: 1994).
Joyaux, Franc;:ois and Patrick Wajsman. Pour une nouvelle politique etrangere.
(Paris: Hachette Collection Pluriel: 1989).
Kanogo, T. Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau. (London: James Currey:
1987).
Karugire, A. A Political History of Uganda. (London: James Currey: 1993).
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Houston Chronic!e, November 9, 1996.
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International Herald Tribune, 12 June 1995.
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The Path of a Genocide
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Films
Les oublies de Kigali produced for the Belgian French-Ianguage television
corporation (RTBF) by Frederic Fran90is.
Forsaken Cries: The Story of Rwanda, Amnesty International.
Arusha Peace Agreement, 124, 127,
131, 144, 147, 149, 231, 232, 234,
275,288,301
Arusha Peace Process, 120, 132, 136,
146-149,151,152,284
Arusha Peace Talks, 79, 88
Arusha Treaty, 80
assassination, 14, 124
Assembly of Heads of State and Governrnent, 112, 114, 115, 117, 118
Associated Press, 214, 223
Abadehemuka, 12
AJBC,214,216,218,220,223
ABC News, 209, 218, 220
ABC World News, 210, 211, 216
ADC, 294
Addis Ababa Dec1aration... , 114
ADLF, 331, 334, 335, 338, 339, 342,
344,346,348
ADLF-CZ, 331, 332, 333
AFDL (ADFL English), ix
Africa Confidential, 323, 337, 339
African Free Market, 343
"African Revolution", 336
"Afrophobia", 343
AHG,112
AI,288
AICF,100
Aideed, Mohamed Farah, 94
AKAZU, 73, 76, 89, 96, 99,145, 168
Allen, Ron, 218, 219
Amahoro Stadium, 237, 263, 265, 267,
268, 279
Amin, ldi Amin, 3, 14, 15, 16, 19
Amin, Mohamed, 214, 215, 223
An Agenda for Peace, 1992,248
Anglo-Belgian Protocol, 4
Angolan government, 339
Ankole, 3-8, 13, 16, 18-20,24,33,34,
38,41,89
Annan, Kofi, 102,196,239,240
Anti-Smuggling Unit, 14
Anyidoho, Brigadier-General Henry,
278
apartheid, ix, 15, 128, 342
APC,232,238,256,268
APROMOSA, 62, 63
Army General Staff, 287
Arusha Peace Accords, xii, 84, 96, 123,
131, 143, 145, 150, 152, 153, 161,
162,170,174,187,192, 197,211,
231,240,264,268,272
Baamba,5
Baamba-Bakonjo territories, 14
Bafumbira, 4
Bagambiki, Emmanuel, 293
Baganda, 13, 17, 18,24,33
Bagaza, Lt Co1. Jean-Baptiste, 51
Bagosora, Co1. Theoneste, 80, 148,261
Bahororo, 3
Bahunde, 53, 57
Bahutu, 70, 71, 73-75, 77, 87
Bairu, xiv, 4, 13
Bakiga,16
Bakonjo,5
Balladur, Edouard, 157, 163, 165,216,
284-286,288,291,295,300
Bamwisho, 55
Bangladesh, Government of, 239
Banyabwisha, 52, 53, 54
Banyamulenge, xviii, 323, 326, 327,
329-333,337,346
Banyankole, 13, 16, 18,20
Banyarwanda, ix, 3, 4, 16, 21, 22, 44,
47, 52-55, 57, 65, 71, 88, 89, 202,
285,323,325-327,329
Banyingana, Major Dr. Peter, 16,22,32,
33-37,89
Badl, General Maurice, 196,277
Barre, Mohamed Siad, 94
Batutsi, 6, 71, 73-75, 79, 87, 88
405
406
The Path of Il Genocide
Baudillon, Philippe, 285
BBC, 97, 101,214
BBC World Television, 214
BBTG, 138-140, 143-146, 149
Belgian Government, 7, 132,263,275
Bembe, 52
Berlin Wall, xiv
Berlusconi, Sylvio, 291
Bihozagara, Dr. Jacques, 289-291, 300
Bismarck, Otto von, 338
Bivuma "power trees", 52
Bizimungu, Gen., 135, 279
"Black Bombers", 17
"black Khmers", 173
Boisvineau, Mrs., 289, 299
Bolongo, General Likulia, 335
Bon, Colonel Dominique, 288
Bongo, Omav, 302
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 102, 125, 234,
239,243-245,277,296
Braeckman, Colette, 335
British Minister of Overseas Development, 41
Broadbent, Ed, 192, 194, 195
Bucyana, Martin, 69, 70,145,233
Bufumbira, 4, 47
Buganda, 5, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 24, 33,
34,38,47
Bugishu,5
Bugoyi,64
Bukedi, 5
Bunyagabu county, 8
Bunyenyezi, Major Chris, 16, 22, 33,
34,38,47
Bunyoro, 5, 8
Burundi, 5, 63, 64
Burundi, President of, 79
Busenyi, 16
Busoga,5
Butare, 64, 65
BUYBAT,259
Buyoya, Major Pierre, 338
Bwanakweri, Chief Prosper, 62, 63
Byegyeka, Lieutenant, 34
Cairo Summit, 117
Caisse, Centrale de, 282
Camp Kigali, 260, 261
Canada, Government of, 104, 186, 187,
195
Canadian Ambassador for Central Africa, 190
Canadian embassy, 190
Canadian National Defence Headquarters, 103
Canadian Prime Minister, 191, 194
CAP, 165
Cardinal, Father, 186
CARE,309
Carnegie Commission on Preventing
Deadly Conflict, 269
Cary, Archbishop, 86
Catholic Archbishop, 89
Catholic Church, 85
Catholic missionaries, 82
cattle disease, 5, 6
CBC, 186, 223
CBS, 213, 214, 216, 218
CBS Evening News, 211
CD,174
CDR, 69, 70, 76-78, 97, 98, 127, 139141, 145, 149, 150, 161
Central African Republic, 159, 283
"CentralOrgan", 115, 118, 123, 124
Chad crisis, 112
Chalker, Lynda, 41
Charette, Herve de, 346
"Chicken Noodle News", 213
Chiga, 4
Chirac, Jacques, 284, 285, 286
Choffray, Capt., 265
Chollet, Lieutenant-Colonel, 166
CHRDD,195
Christian Science Monitor, 213
Christine, 80
Christopher, Warren, 242, 345
CIDA, xi, 187-191, 194,200
Claes, Willy, 234, 242
Clinton administration, 103, 210, 224,
226, 242
Clinton, President Bill, 343
CND, 138, 271
CNDD,338
CNN, 211-214, 216, 218, 220, 223,
226,227
Cohen, Herman, 135, 136, 197
"cold peace", 345
Cold War, xiv, 12, 111,283,321,324,
336, 339, 343, 345
Commission of Inquiry, 295
Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration, 111, 112, 129
Committee for the Protection of Journalists, 223
Index
Common Man's Charter, 14
Communism, 339
"concentration camps", 33
Conference on Genocide, 88
conflict management, vxii
Congo, 5, 7
Congo Crisis, 12
Congolese settlements, 9
Constituent Assembly, 47
Controi Alien Refugee Act, 19
Council of Ministers, 112
CPGL,57
Crisis Committee, 261
Crisis Unit, 285
CSLG, 318, 320
Cussac, Colonel, 168
Cyanika,67
CZSC, 334
Dahinden, Phillipe, 106
Dakar Council of Ministers and Summit Sessions, 115
Dallaire, Brigo General Romeo, 101,
144, 196-198, 200, 232, 234, 236,
238,245,261,262,264,269,271274,276,277,280,288
DAM,289
DAMI, 166, 168
Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on
Rwandese Refugees Problem, 133,
142
Darnton, John, 82
DART, 201
Dar University, 342
DAS, 164
death squads, 14
Debarge, Marcel, 161
Declaration on the Political.. o, 118
Defense University, 216
Delaye, Bruno, 100, 285
Demilitarized Zone, 168
Democratic Party (DP), 13, 38, 40, 46
Democratic Republic of Rwanda, 63
Destexhe, Alain, 298
Dewez, Lt.-Co!. Jo, 254, 260, 265-268
DFAIT,187
DGSE, 286, 302
DHA,308
Diagne, Major L, 274
Dijoud, Paul, 135, 136
Director of Refugees, 12
Diria, Ahmed, 124
407
DMZ,231,233,235,237,273
Dominique, 288
Dono, Kengo wa, 335
DPKO, 232, 234, 236, 239-241, 246,
255,316,317
DRC, ix, x, xiv, 14,40,348
Dufourq, Bertrand, 299
Dussault, Bernard, 190
East Acoli, 15
echo des Milles Collines, 76
Ecole Superiore Militaire, 261
economic crisis, 13, 14
Economist, 342
Edwards, Lucie, 102, 190, 199
Elysee Africa Bureau, 161, 163, 165,
171, 172
equlibre ethnique et retional, 64, 73
"Equlibrium Policy", 35
ESO, 38
Ethiopian famine, 215
ETO,256,258,265,266,267,269
ExtemalAffairs Minister, 192, 194,200
Faisal Hospital, 237, 265, 279
FAR/ex-FAR, ix, xvi, 100, 134, 142,
150,160,202,257-263,288,292294, 299, 302, 323-325, 327-331,
334,335,337,340
Fashoda Syndrome, xiv, 173, 282
FAZ, 327, 331, 332,334
FDD,338
FIDH, 169, 171
First Amendment, 105
First World War, 5, 52
Foley, Mark, 220
Foreign Minister of Zaire, 192
FPR,54,58,147,275
Francophone Africa, 82, 158
Francophone Summit, 191
French government, 263
French Legionnaire, 83
French Military, 83
French Military Policy, 167
French Revolution, 325
Frodebu, 287
Fronasa, 16
Fulera, 52
Fuller, Carol, 135
Gabiro,22
Garong, John, 40
408
The Path of a Genocide
Garong, John, 40
Gartner, Michael, 213
Gaspard, Gihigi, 76
Gatabazi, Felicien, 145, 233
Gatsinzi, Brigadier-General Marcel,
274,292
General Electric, 213
General Peace Agreement, 122, 123,
124, 126
genocide, ix, xii, xiii, xv-xviii, 57, 58,
78-81, 83, 84, 86--90, 94, 97, 99102, 104, 105, 117, 125, 126, 131,
146, 151, 157, 163-165, 168, 169,
171, 173-176, 186, 187, 195, 199202, 209, 226, 243, 247-249, 253255, 260, 262, 263, 269, 277, 281,
283-286,288,295,296,298,301303,316,321-328,330,332,345
Genocide Convention, 224
Gerard, Yannick, 293
Germanos, General Raymond, 291, 299
Gillet, Eric, 166
Giscard d'Estaing, Valery, 158,281
Gisenyi, 64, 65, 73, 77
Gitarama, 64
Gitera, Joseph, 62
Godfrain, Jacques, 345
Gombya, H., 17
GOR, 23, 45, 96, 102, 118, 119, 120,
121, 127, 128, 134-136, 142, 146,
148, 161, 162, 247, 271, 275, 314,
323, 337
Gore, Al, 125
Guevera, Che, 333
Guirangand, Louis de, 165
Habyarimana, Agathe, 168
Habyarimana, Jean-Baptiste, 98
Habyarimana, Jean Pierre, 83
Habyarimana, Juvenal, 22, 35-37, 39,
42, 44, 51, 58, 61, 64-70, 72-75,
78-80, 82-86, 88-90, 95-97, 99,
101, 102, 119, 124, 127, 131-133,
136, 138-140, 142, 143, 146--152,
157, 160-163, 166--169, 173-175,
185, 188-191, 194, 195, 197-200,
210, 215, 216, 218, 219, 235, 253,
271,272,273,275,281,284,286,
293,296,297, 302, 303, 311, 322,
323, 345
Hansen, Peter, 244
Hauw,52
Herodotus, 171
Hicks,134
Hima, 3, 4, 13
Hintze, Otto, 321
Hiru,4
Hitler, 76
Holy Rosary primary school, 33
Holy Sprint Movement, 338
Hotel Amahoro, 278
Hotel des Milles Collines, 265, 279
HRWAP, 42-44, 46, 78,100,166,168,
212,312
Huchon, General, 163, 164, 172, 176
Human Rights Commission, 195
Hunde, 52, 53,54,57
Hunter, Dorothea, 10
Hutu, x, xiv, xv, xvii, xviii, 4, 5, 12, 13,
15, 22, 52, 57, 61-65, 68, 69, 71,
73, 75, 77, 78, 80, 81, 85, 89, 94,
95,97-104,106,144,147,148,165,
167, 170-176, 188, 192, 197-199,
215, 218-221, 223, 226, 234, 235,
259, 261, 271, 272, 279, 286, 292,
293, 296, 298-300, 309, 314, 319,
320, 322-328, 330-335, 337-340,
345, 348
Ibuga, 7,8
Ibunga Refugee Settlement, 8, 9, 10
ICHRDD, 187, 192, 194,200
ICRC, 191, 197,308
IDP,247,248,308,314
Ijambo, 67, 76
IMF, 35, 41,66, 185
Impuzamugambi, 78, 79, 145
Independent International Commission,
248
INF, 122
Interahamwe, ix, 57, 76, 78, 79, 95,145,
167, 198, 277-279, 288,292, 294,
325,327-330,334,340
International Commission of Jurists, 95
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 105
International Humanitarian Conference,
126
International Tribunal, 126
International University Exchange
Fund, 15
Inyenzi, 7, 62, 73, 98
Ishingiro County, 8
Index
Islamic Fundamentalism, 41
ISO, 38, 43
Jehl, Douglas, 224
Jennings, Peter, 218
Joint Commission on Repatriation of
Rwandese Refugees, 128
Joxe, M. Pierre, 165
JPMC, 118, 119
Juppe, Alain, 163, 165,285,287,290,
301
Kabaka Alone, 12
Kabaka Yekka, 12
Kabale, 4, 23, 43, 44, 46
Kabamba Arrny Training School, 16
Kabanda, Charles, 34
Kabila, Laurent-Desire, 40, 232, 324,
332,333,335,340-346,348
Kabuga, Felicien, 96
Kagame, Major-General Paul, 16, 22,
33, 35, 36, 46, 135, 165,202,277,
293, 294, 297, 299, 300, 329, 337,
338
Kaggwa Bandi, 17
Kahunge settlement, 8, 9, 10
Kajuga, Robert, 79
Kaka, Sam, 16, 22, 34
Kalimuzo, Frank, 12
Kalumbo,55
Kalule-Settala, L., 8
Kampala, 17,36,42,43,44,46
Kamutu, E., 18
Kamwezi,7
Kanguka,67
Kangura, 95, 96, 99
Kangura International, 76
Kaniga,67
Kanyarengwe, Colonel Alexis, 120,
192, 197,293
Kanyarushoki, Pierre-Claver, 135, 148
Kanyarwanda, 53,55,57
Katangese fighters, 339
Katyusha mutliple rocket system, 43
Kawanda,16
Kayibanda, Gregoire, 61-64, 67, 82
Kayibanda regime, 63, 64, 71, 72
Kayira, Dr. A., 18
Kengo government, 334
Kennedy, Senator Edward, 103
Kenya, 5
Khan, Mohamed Shahryar, 102
409
KIBAT, 253-260, 262, 263, 266-268
Kiga, 16
Kigali Airport, 235, 236
Kigali Battalion, 268, 269
Kigali, Government of, 316
Kiganda, 16
Kigeatuczi, 4
Kigeri, 12
Kigezi, 3-8, 38, 47
Kigongo,Moses,45
Kikosi Maalum, 16
Kinigi,67
Kinyara,lO
Kiruhura, Alfred, 99
Kisoro, 4, 47, 48
Kitare, Captain, 34
Kizinga,7
Kouchner, Bernard, 106
Kuwait-Iraq war, 164
Kyaka 1,24
Kyaka II, 24
Kyaka settlement, 8, 9, 10,41
Kyaligonza, Tom, 33
Kyangwali Refugee settlement, 8, 10
La Bau1e, 160
Lafourcade, General Jean-Claude, 291,
293,295
La Midaille Nyiramachibiri, 76
Lancaster House, 147
Lands Commission, 126
Lanxade, Admiral, 294, 299
Lavigerie, Charles Martial, 85, 87
League of Nations, 5
Le Chene, Gerard, 106
Legislative Council, 6, 7
Lemaire, Lt., 258, 265-268
Lemarchand, Rene, 147, 148, 149, 173,
322
Le Monde, 159
Leonard, Terry, 223
Leotard, Francois, 286, 287, 292, 300,
301
Le Point, 186
Levesque, Georges Henri, 188
Liberation, 283
Libreville Summit, 116, 347
Linden, Ian, 85
Lizinde, Colonel Theoneste, 64
Lorch, Donatella, 223
Los Angeles Times, 214
Lost Counties referendum, 12
410
The Path of aGenodde
Lotin, Corp., 259, 260, 267, 268
Lubiri, 18
Lumumba, Patrice, 333
Luwero, 17, 19
Luwero Triang1e, 17
Lwabanji, Lwasi Ngabo, 330
MacCul1um, Hugh, 86
Madi Opei, 15
Makere University, 34, 44
Ma1ecela, John, 120
Mandela, Nelson, ix, 125, 214, 220,
284,342,343,344
Mapuranga, Dr. M.T., 118
Marchal, Colonel Luc, 254, 255, 258,
259,261,263,265-267
Marema Hill, 20
"Marchal Plan", 343
Mar1and, Jean-Philippe, 169, 170
Mar1aud, Jean-Michel, 293
Martre, Georges, 159, 169, 170
Masaka, 20, 47
massacre, xviii, 15
Mau Mau, 5
Maurin, Lieutenant-Colonel, 166
Mawogola, 41
Mayjambere, Silas, 67
Mayuya, Colonel Stanislas, 65
Mbarara, 20, 42, 43, 44
Mbarara District Council, 19
MDR, 67, 69, 70, 100, 139, 140, 144
"Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management, and Resolution", 250
Mercier, General, 287, 290, 291, 293
Meridian Hotel, 237, 265, 266, 274,
279
Michaux-Chevry, Lucette, 289, 292
Micombero, Michel, 51
Military Mission of Cooperation, 163,
164,167,172
Military Police Anti-Corruption Unit,
14
Military Training Program, 283
Miller, Reid G., 223
Minister of Defense, 15, 165, 193,297,
300,301
Ministry of Cooperation, 164, 170-172,
282, 301
Ministry of Defense, 171,285,286,
289,290,293,295
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 165, 170,
171, 172, 289, 295
Mitterand, Francois, 83, 85, 157, 159,
160, 162-165, 283-287, 294, 301,
302,346,347
Mitterand, Jean Christophe, 83, 84
Mkapa, Benjamin, 120
Mluluba, 332
Mobutu, Sese Seko, xviii, 40, 51, 58,
59, 133, 135, 146, 192, 296, 309,
316, 321, 322-324, 326, 328, 329,
332-343, 346-348
Moi, Daniel Arap, 113
de Montferrand, Bernard, 285
Morocco, King of, 344
Mortehan, Monsieur, 85
Mouvement Democratique Rwandis, 5
Moussali, Michel, 145
Mowogola, 38
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 223
Moyo, 8
Mpigi, 17,47
MPLA, 339, 340
Mpororo, 3, 4
MRND, 61, 64,65, 67,69, 70, 73, 74,
76-79,86, 127, 139, 140,141, 145,
147, 150, 151,271,300
MRNDD, 67-69, 75, 77, 98, 297
MSF,316
MSF-H,309
MSM, 61, 62
Mubarak, Hosni, 125
Mucwini,15
Mufumbiro, 4
Mugambage, Colonel Frank, 291
Mugesera, Uon, 77, 186
Muhutu, 73, 75
Mujawamariya, Monique, 97
Mukeshimana, Agnes, 81
Mukono,17
Mukungo, 333
Mulanda, General Delphin, 339
Mulele, Pierre, 333
Mulroney, Brian, 191, 192, 194
Muluba,333
Muniyi, 119, 124
Muntu, Major-General Mugisha, 44
Munyamulenge, 333
Munyarwanda,47
Museveni, Yoweri, 3,16-19,31,32,33,
36-42,44,45,47,48,133,136,190,
193, 194, 285, 290, 323, 337, 338,
340, 341, 345
Muslims, 16
Index
Mussa, Amr, 117
Mutesa, Kabaka, 11, 12, 14
Mututsi,73
Muvunyi, Tarcisse, 98
Muwanga, Lance-Sera, 17
Mwanza Communique, 133
Mwinyi,AHHassan, 125, 133, 146, 151
Nabuguzi, 21
Nahimana, Ferdinand, 76, 95
Nairobi l, 343
Nairobi II, 343
Nakivale, 7,8,9,20
Nakivale Refugee Settlement, 8, 10
NAM,243
Nande, 52, 53,56
NASA, 20
National Assemby, 67, 231, 233
National Endowment for Democracy,
106
National Liberation, 88
"National News", 93
National Security Council, 226
National University of Rwanda, 188
Nazi Holocaust, xviii
NBC, 213, 214, 218
NBC News, 213
NBC Nightly News, 211
Ndayambaje, Emmanuel, 81
Ndadaye, Melchior, 144,214, 338
Ndeyahoze, Rose, 106
Ndugate, Major Stephen, 34
Nekyon,11
Nepomuscen, Nayinzira, 67
Neutral Force,150
New Democratic Party (NDP), 192
Newsweek, 332
New York Times, 82, 213, 215, 216
Ngango, Felicien, 267
Ngango house, 268
Ngendahayo, Jean-Marie, 287
Ngeze, Hassan, 68, 95, 99
NGO, xi, 24, 101, 105, 106, 125, 126,
157, 186, 201, 284, 286, 299, 309,
312,315,316,318,320,328
Ngulinzira, Boniface, 138, 148, 159
NIF, 123, 170
Nigeria, President of, 193
NMOG, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 133,
134, 137, 166, 196
NMOGII,123
NRA, 17-19,22,24,31-39,41-46,48
411
NRAJNPA,43
NRAJNRM,39
NRAINRP,42
NRJ\n{pA,35,36,42
NRC,38
NRM,39,45,65
NRM-A,337
Nsabimana, Co!. Deogratias, 42, 79
Nsambimanc, Sylvain Georges, 98
Nsamwambaho, Frederick, 70
Nsanzimana, Sylvestre, 96
N'sele Cease-fireAgreement, 118, 120,
134, 137, 160, 161, 162
Nsengiyumva, Thadee, 86
Nsengiyumva, Vincent, 86
Nsthamihigo, Bishop, 86
Ntabonvura, Emmanuel, 81, 86
Ntariyamana, 146
Ntaryamira, Cyprien, 124, 210, 218,
235
Nuglinzira, Boniface, 120
Nyamga, 52, 53, 57
Nyanga-Hunde, 54
Nyangoma, Leonard, 324, 338
Nyerere, Julius, 336, 342
Nyiramutarambira, F61ecula, 65
Nzirorera, Joseph, 79
OAU, xi, xii, 11, 12,38,39, 111-129,
132-134, 142, 147, 161, 162, 193,
197, 243, 246, 250, 284, 285, 288,
291, 314, 342, 343
OAU Assistant Secretary General, 118
OAU Convention on Refugees, 315
OAU Humanitarian Mission, 126
OAU Liberation Committee, 13
OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution,
113,114,115,116, 117, 123
OAU Mediator, 133
OAU Peace Fund, 117
OAU Secretary General, 114-128,276,
288
Obote, Milton, 3, 6, 7, 14-16, 18, 19,
23,40
Oduhu, J.H., 8
Ogata, Sadako, 128
Okello, Brigadier General Tito BasiIio,
40
Operation Hope, 247
Operation Lance, 199
Operation Noroit, 159, 160
412
The Path oh Genocide
Operation Retour, 247
Operation Silver Back, 263, 273
Operation Turquoise, 83, 84, 99, 281,
284,290-303,345
ORC, 247
ORINFOR, 76, 95
Oruchinga Relief Camp, 8
Oruchinga Valley Refugee Settlement,
8,9,10
Oxfam, 10, 11, 14,309
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief,
11
Paper Tiger, xv
PARMEHUTU, 5, 62, 63, 73, 87
Parti Liberal, 67, 95
Parti Social Democrate, 67
Pays du champ, 282
PDC, 67, 68, 139
PDD 25, 209, 224, 242, 245
Peace Agreement, 118, 122
Pedanou, Macaire, 196
Pentagon, 103, 227
PL,69, 139, 140, 144, 145
Plan of Action and Program of Assistance... , 128
Pol Pot, 76
Pope Paul, 66
PRA,17
PresidentiaI Guard, 78, 145, 167, 257,
259,261,262,267
Prime Time News, 186
Prisoners of War (POWs), 42
Protestants, 13
Protocal on the Rule of Law, 120
Proxmire Act, 105
Prunier, Gerard, 336
PSD, 67, 68, 70, 139, 140, 144, 145,
267
Public Safety Unit, 14
Quai d'Orsay, 161, 163, 165, 171, 172,
282,289,295,302
RADER, 62, 63
Radio Agatashya, 106
Radio Amwizero, 106
Radio Democracy, 106
Radio Deutschewelle, 106
Radio Minuar, 106
Radio Mogadishu, 94
Radio Muhabura, 96
Radio Muraho, 106
Radio Rwanda, 76, 95-98, 100-102,
259,267
RAP, 159
Rakai,20
RANU, 16,22,34,39
RAP, 48
Rawson, David, 101
Red Cross, 11, 14,98,197,237,299
Rega,52
repatriation, xvii
Repatriation of Rwandese refugees, 142
Republican Guard, 333, 334, 345
Reuters, 214, 223, 312
"Revocation of the Batutsi Immigrants
Rule",6
RGF, 237, 272-280
Richardson, Bill, 343, 344
RlF, 37
Riza, Iqbal, 240, 277
Robero Hotel, 79
Rondoval Plan, 125
Rosenblum, Peter, 332
ItPA,16,31-39,42,43,45-48,65,66,
80,83,88,247,248,258,263,297
ItP~RA,35,36,38,39,41
ItPAJRPF, 34-36, 39, 41, 42, 46, 48, 61
RPF, xiv, xviii, 34-36,41-44, 46, 47,
52, 56, 58, 64-68, 71, 77-81, 8689,95-102,104,118-121,124,126,
127,131-141,143-151,153,159163, 165-168, 17~
171, 173, 176,
187, 191-194, 196-199, 211, 212,
215, 216, 220, 223, 235-237, 241,
247, 272-279, 282-291, 293-297,
299-301, 303, 314, 322, 324, 328,
331,337,338,343,345
ItPFnRP)\,34-36, 71, 73,76,82-84,88,
89
R11LM, 76,96-104,145,168,198,295
R11LMC,292
Rucogoza, Faustin, 70, 100
Rudahigwa III, Mutara, 62
Rudasingwa, Theogene, 290
Ruhengiri, 64
Rukiga county, 7
Rules of Engagement, 236, 238, 239,
245,249,255,260,264,269
Rurangaranga, Major Edward, 18
Rutasira, General Leonidas, 292
Rutayisire, Wilson, 8
RUTBAT, 2567
Index
Rwabukwisi, Vincent, 67
Rwakasisi, Chris, 18
Rwampara county, 7
Rwamwanja settlement, 8, 9, 10
Rwanda-Uganda ministerial committee,
23
Rwanda National Bank, 65
Rwanda,Presidentof,45,95,159,169,
196
Rwanda Review, 83
Rwandese Armed Forces, 166
Rwandese conflict, 118
Rwandese Crisis, 286
Rwandese Death Squads, 288
Rwandese nationals, 23
Rwandese settlements, 9
RWANDEX, 256
Rwangabo, Pierre-Claver, 99
Rwanyarare, Dr. E., 18
Rwema, Bisengimana, 51, 54
Rwempasha,67
Rwigmana, Andrew, 278
Rwigyema, Major General Fred, 16,22,
31,33-36,38,39,42,89
Sabliere, Rochereau de la, 289
Sagatwa, Colonel Elie, 75
Sahnoun, Mohamed, 343
Salim, SalimAhmed,114, 126, 128,288
SANU, 8
SAP, 41,66
Save the Children Fund, 11
Savimbi, Jonas, 339, 340
Schindler's List, xviii
Schraeder, Peter, 347
Search for Common Ground, 106
Second World War, 6
Seguya Bona, 17
Sendashonga, Seth, 300
Serubuga, Colonel Laurent, 75
Shi,52
Simard, Father, 186
Simpson, O.J., 218
Sindambiwe, Father Silvio, 65
Sindikubwabo, Theodore, 84, 98, 271,
272
slim (HIV), 32
"Somalia Syndrome", 209, 343
Soumaillo, Gaston, 333
Special Fund for Voluntary Repatriation, 10
SPLA,40
413
SRSG, 118, 119, 121,274, 276
Ssemogerere, 136
State Department, 226
State Research Bureau, 14
St. Cyr, 216
Streicker, Gary, 211, 214
Studio Ijambo, 106
Sudan, 7
Sudanese refugees, 14, 15
Sudanese settlements, 9
Swinnen, Johan, 263
Tanzania, 5
Tanzanian Prime Minister, 276
Television senegalaise, 106
"Ten Commandments", 75, 77
TGE,93
Thibault, CoJ., 294
Thucydides, 171
Tiberonda, Dr. Adonia, 18
Tishesekedi, Etienne, 335, 336
TMAA,158, 159
TNA, 127, 138-141
Toro, 5, 8, 14
Transitionai Government of National
Unity, 124
Turner, Thomas, 326
Tusagusazisha, 89
Tutsi, x, xiv, xviii, 3-7, 11-14, 16-18,
22,38-41,47,48,52-57,61-64,67,
68, 70, 72, 73, 75, 77-81, 85, 87,
88,95-99,101,104,106,120,141,
142, 144-146, 148, 150, 175, 176,
186, 188-190, 193, 197-199, 215,
219-221, 223, 226, 234,235, 259,
272, 279, 287,292, 294, 296-298,
300, 303, 304, 309, 322-332, 334,
337-340,345,348
"Tutsi confederacy", 47
Tutsi-Hima, 76
TV5 Afrique, 106
1\va,73
1\vagiramungu, Faustin, 84, 144, 268,
288,298,299
UFA,I8
Uganda Federal Army, 32
Uganda, Govemment of, 6,23,45, 196
Uganda Investment Code, 34
Uganda National Army, 88, 89
Uganda Patriotic Movement, 16
Uganda, President of, 45
414
The Path of a Genocide
Uganda Proteetorate, 7, 8
Ugandan nationals, 23
Umubyeyi,74
Umurangi, 76
Umurwanashyaka, 76
Umwami (King) Kigeri IV, 11, 12, 14
UN, xvi, xvii, xviii, 102-106, 112, 116,
122, 123, 125-128, 132, 140, 142161, 162, 170, 175, 185,
145, ~51
186, 196-198,200,211,224,231239, 241, 242, 244, 246, 248-250,
253-265, 267-270, 272-274, 275,
277,279,281,284,288,295,296,
299,300,315-317,328,332,343
UNAR, 61, 62, 63
UNAMIR, 97,101-103,106,123-125,
127, 131, 144-146, 152, 197, 198,
200, 231-249, 253-255, 257-269,
271, 273-275, 277-279, 288, 300,
315, 316
UNAMIR II, 125, 199,231
UN/AOU, 196
UN Charter, 245, 249, 291
UNESCO,287
UN Genocide Convention, 104
UNHCR, xvii, 10-14,21-23,121,122,
126, 128, 133, 145, 307-320, 328,
334
UNICEF, 197,309
UN International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 105
UNIRIN, vxi
UNITA, 323, 334, 335, 339, 340
UNITAF,94
Unitarian-Universalist Association, 106
UNLA, 15, 16,34
UNMO, 196,237
UNOMUR, 197,231
UNOSOM, 94
UN Reconnaissance Mission, 170, 232
UNREO, 308, 309
UN Secretariat, 263
UN Security Council, xii, 102, 113,
123-125, 162, 170, 197,231,233,
234, 236, 238-245, 248, 254, 257,
264,266,275,291,316
UNSG, xii, 122, 123, 125, 145, 162,
196, 197,249,275-277,312,314,
316,317
UN Trusteeship Commission Report, 63
UN Under-Secretary for Peace-keeping
Operations, 102
United States Institute for Peace, xii
UPC, 12-14, 17-20,40
UPM,18
UPR,67
UPRONA,287
USAID,196
US Committee for Refugees and Cultural Survival (USCR), 21-23, 100,
101,314
US Department of State, 96
US Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 97
US Information Agency (USlA), 97, 103
US Secretary of State, 345
USSR,333
Uwilingiyimana, Agatha, 80, 88, 102,
235,259,267,271,272
Valerie, Bemeriki, 76
Vandriessche, Capt., 258
Vira, 52
VOA, 101, 103
Washington Post, 98
Wasswa, Lt. Co!. Adam, 34, 35
West Bank Liberation Front, 338
WFP, 175, 309
Winston Foundation, 106
Wooten, Jim, 209
World Bank, 35, 41, 66, 189, 190,286
Xavier, Francois, 67
YMCA, 10, 11, 14
Yoweri, Museveni, 15
"Zairean Revolution", 336, 343
Zaire, Government of, 311,315, 317,
318, 323, 327, 328, 337
zanzibar Communique, 133, 134
ZCSC, 318, 319
Zionists, 15
