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CONFIDENTIAL
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ACTION AF-01
UNCLASSIFIED
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RELEASED IN PART
1.4(D)
INFO LOG-00
EUR-01
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PA-01
SP-00
PMB-00
AID-01 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 OASY-00 DODE-00 EB-01
OIGO-01 H-01
TEDE-00 INR-00 10-16
JUSE-00
L-01
ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01
PM-00
PRS-01 P-01
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USIE-00
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/054W
59E1EF 071527Z /38
0 071528Z JUL 94
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8143
INFO ALLEU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 07513
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C AND EUR/NE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PREF, BE, FR, RW
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RAWSON'S JUNE 7 MEETING IN BRUSSELS
WITH FAUSTIN TWAGIRAMUNGU
1.
CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
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BRUSSE 07513 01 OF 03 071526Z
SUMMARY
2. AMBASSADOR RAWSON MET JUNE 7 IN BRUSSELS WITH FAUSTIN
TWAGIRAMUNGU, PM-DESIGNATE UNDER THE RWANDAN ARUSHA
ACCORDS. TWAGIRAMUNGU SAID HE HOPED TO TRAVEL TO KIGALI
THE WEEK OF JULY 11 TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RPF ON
MODALITIES FOR ESTABLISHING A NEW GOVERNMENT OF
RECONCILIATION. TWAGIRAMUNGU IDENTIFIED THE EVENTUAL ROLE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARMON E KIRBY
DATE/CASE ID: 01 MAY 2007 200103014
Y2
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
OF MRND MEMBERS, INTEGRATION OF THE TWO ARMIES, AND BROAD
ACCEPTANCE IN RWANDA OF RPF PROPOSALS AS THE MAIN ISSUES
TO BE RESOLVED. TWAGIRAMUNGU SAID THE ARUSHA ACCORDS HAD
TO BE GIVEN A CHANCE TO BE IMPLEMENTED.
3. IN RESPONSE TO AMB. RAWSON'S REMINDER THAT THE USG
WANTED A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE BEFORE A GOVERNMENT WERE
FORMED, TWAGIRAMUNGU SAID THE RPF WOULD BE ANNOUNCING AN
UNILATERAL CEASEFIRE. HE ASKED THAT WE TRY TO CONVINCE
THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ARMY TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE.
IACKNOWLEDGED HE HAD FEW CONTACTS
WITH THE UN, AND ASKED FOR NAMES OF UN OFFICIALS WITH WHOM
HE SHOULD MEET. TWAGIRAMUNGU URGED THE US TO USE ITS
"WORLD LEADERSHIP" ROLE TO GET CANADIANS, AUSTRALIANS,
DUTCH, AND OTHER WESTERN NATIONS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE
SETTING UP OF UNAMIR II
.
TWAGIRAMUNGU EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE POSSIBILITY OF
FLYING INTO KIGALI ON A UN FLIGHT ORIGINATING IN NAIROBI.
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END SUMMARY.
4. EMBASSY BRUSSELS MADE AN APPOINTMENT FOR AMBASSADOR
RAWSON TO MEET WITH FAUSTIN TWAGIRAMUNGU BEFORE THE
BRUSSELS THAT TWAGIRAMUNGU HAD BEEN ASKED
ANNOUNCEMENT
BY THE RPF TO HEAD A NEW GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY.
AMBASSADOR RAWSON KEPT THE APPOINTMENT TO GAIN INFORMATION
ABOUT TWAGIRAMUNGU'S PLANS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN KIGALI. HE
MET WITH TWAGIRAMUNGU AT EMBASSY BRUSSELS MORNING JUNE 7.
IN
5. PM DESIGNATE TWAGIRAMUNGU EXPLAINED HE HAD BEEN
CONTACTED BY THE RPF ON JULY 6 ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF
HEADING A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. HE DID NOT WANT TO
SERVE UNDER RPF AEGIS BUT TO UNDERTAKE HIS
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ALL RWANDANS OF ALL PARTIES UNDER THE
ARUSHA ACCORDS. NO DATE HAD YET BEEN FIXED FOR HIS
DEPARTURE BUT TWAGIRAMUNGU EXPECTED TO LEAVE FOR RWANDA
SOMETIME DURING THE WEEK OF JULY 11. DISCUSSIONS WITH THE
RPF WOULD HAVE TO COMMENCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE
MODALITIES FOR ESTABLISHING A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT.
6. TWAGIRAMUNGU IDENTIFIED THREE PROBLEMS THAT HAD TO BE
RESOLVED. THE FIRST WAS HOW TO DEAL WITH THE MRND. UNDER
THE ARUSHA ACCORDS, FIVE POLITICAL PARTIES WERE TO BE
UNCLASSIFIED
1.4(D)
1.4(D)
UNCLASSIFIED
REPRESENTED IN THE GOVERNMENT. THE MRND, ONE OF THE FIVE,
HAD NEVER ISSUED ANY STATEMENTS DENOUNCING THE MASSACRES
NOR HAD IT EVER DISSOCIATED ITSELF FROM THE MILITIAS,
WHICH WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE MASSACRES.
THEREFORE, AS AN INSTITUTION, THE MRND COULD NOT BE
INVOLVED IN THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. NONETHELESS, NOT
ALL MRND MEMBERS WERE TAINTED. SOME PROMINENT FIGURES
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SUCH AS NSANZIMANA AND THE SON OF FORMER MINISTER OF
DEFENSE GASANA HAD HAD NO INVOLVEMENT IN THE KILLINGS. IF
A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION WERE TO BE FORMED, SOME WAY
HAD TO BE FOUND TO INCLUDE THESE PEOPLE.
7. A SECOND PROBLEM WAS THE QUESTION OF INTEGRATING THE
TWO ARMIES. UNDER THE ACCORDS, PROPORTIONS HAD BEEN
ESTABLISHED GIVING THE RWANDAN ARMY SIXTY PERCENT AND THE
RPF FORTY PERCENT OF THE SLOTS.
I
I
1.4(D)
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SP-00.
PMB-00
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OIGO-01 H-01
TEDE-00 INR-00 10-16
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ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 01C-02 OMB-01
PM-00
PRS-01 P-01
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UNCLASSIFIED
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8144
INFO ALLEU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 03 BRUSSELS 07513
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C AND EUR/NE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PREF, BE, FR, RW
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RAWSON'S JUNE 7 MEETING IN BRUSSELS
WITH FAUSTIN TWAGIRAMUNGU
1.4(D)
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BRUSSE 07513 02 OF 03 071527Z
B. FINALLY, THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT COULD NOT
MEAN TOTALLY ACCEPTING THE RPF'S DICTATES. ANY PROPOSALS
WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE
COUNTRY. TWAGIRAMUNGU SAID HE INTENDED TO FULFILL HIS
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ARUSHA ACCORDS.
9. IN RESPONSE TO AMB. RAWSON'S QUESTION WHETHER
TWAGIRAMUNGU HAD FOUND CONSENSUS ON A GENERAL APPROACH TO
THE NEGOTIATIONS, TWAGIRAMUNGU ANSWERED THAT ALL HIS
INTERLOCUTORS SO FAR AGREED THE ARUSHA ACCORDS SHOULD
"HAVE THE CHANCE" OF BEING IMPLEMENTED. THE PROVISIONS
FOR POWER SHARING, INTEGRATION OF THE TWO ARMIES, AND
EVENTUAL PREPARATIONS FOR A RETURN TO A RULE OF LAW WERE
THE BEST MEANS TO REACH CONFLICT RESOLUTION. THE PROBLEM,
HE SAID, WAS THAT RWANDANS HAD A DIFFICULT TIME MAKING
DECISIONS.
10. AMB. RAWSON SAID THE DEPARTMENT STILL CONSIDERED THE
ACCORDS PROVIDED A USEFUL FRAMEWORK AND SPIRIT FOR
REBUILDING RWANDA. THE ARUSHA DOCUMENT WAS NOT PERFECT
BUT IT WAS THE BASIS FOR MOVING ALONG. IT WAS IMPORTANT
TO THE USG THAT THE GOVERNMENT THAT IS FORMED BE THE
RESULT OF A NEW DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. OUR
UNCLASSIFIED
UN
POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED: WE WANTED AN END TO THE
MASSACRES, THE IMPOSITION OF A CEASEFIRE, AND THE
BEGINNING OF DISCUSSIONS. WE BELIEVED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO
HAVE A CEASEFIRE ON THE GROUND BEFORE PROCEEDING TO
DISCUSSIONS. OTHERWISE, ONE RISKED HAVING A TRANSITIONAL
GOVERNMENT ON EACH SIDE OF BATTLE LINES.
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11. TWAGIRAMUNGU NOTED OUR PREFERENCE FOR THE SEQUENCE OF
EVENTS AND SAID HE BELIEVED THE RPF MIGHT BE READY TO
DECLARE AN UNILATERAL CEASEFIRE. HE ASKED THAT WE SUPPORT
SUCH A DECLARATION, IF IT WERE MADE. HE ALSO REQUESTED
THAT WE ASK THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ARMY TO ACCEPT A
CEASEFIRE. AMB. RAWSON ASSURED TWAGIRAMUNGU THAT WE
SUPPORTED CALLS FOR A CEASEFIRE. THE DEPARTMENT ALSO
CONTINUED TO SEE A ROLE FOR THE UN IN RWANDA ONCE THE
FRENCH TROOPS LEFT. UNAMIR WOULD BE NEEDED TO PROTECT
THREATENED CIVILIANS AND HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS AS WELL AS
MONITOR THE PEACE PROCESS. FURTHERMORE, THE WORK OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS RAPPORTEUR WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO DETERMINE
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE KILLINGS.
12. TWAGIRAMUNGU SAID HE HAD FEW CONTACTS WITH UN
OFFICIALS.
1.4(D)
TWAGIRAMUNGU ASKED FOR ADVICE ON WHOM HE SHOULD
TALK TO AT THE UN. AMBASSADOR RAWSON NOTED THAT THE NEW
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, AMBASSADOR KHAN,
WAS A GOOD STARTING POINT.
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UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
13. TWAGIRAMUNGU WRAPPED UP HIS PRESENTATION BY MAKING AN
APPEAL FOR USG LEADERSHIP. HE SAID HE HAD THE IMPRESSION
RWANDA WAS BEING NEGLECTED, ESPECIALLY WHEN IT CAME TO
SETTING UP UNAMIR II.
1.4(D)
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LOG-00
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SMEC-00 OASY-00 DODE-00
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G-00
/054W
59E217 071527Z /38
0 071528Z JUL 94
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8145
INFO ALLEU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 03 BRUSSELS 07513
DEPARTMENT FOR
Ar/c AND EUR/NE
UNCLASSIFIED
EB-01
JUSE-00
OMB-01
SNP-00
USIE-00
UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PREF, BE, FR, RW
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RAWSON'S JUNE 7 MEETING IN BRUSSELS
WITH FAUSTIN TWAGIRAMUNGU
THE USG SHOULD TALK TO THE CANADIANS,
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1.4(D)
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AUSTRALIANS, DUTCH, ETC., TO GET THEM TO CONTRIBUTE
LOGISTICAL AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
FURTHERMORE, UNAMIR II MUST BECOME A CHAPTER 7 OPERATION.
14. AMB. RAWSON EXPLAINED HE HAD COME TO BRUSSELS TO
DISCUSS RWANDA WITH THE EU PARTNERS. HE WOULD BE PUSHING
THEM TO SUPPORT UNAMIR. WE WERE PROVIDING 50 APC'S, AS
WELL AS MATERIEL FOR THE GHANAIAN BATTALION. THE EXPANDED
UNAMIR WOULD NOT BE EXCLUSIVELY AFRICAN THOUGH AFRICANS
SHOULD HAVE A DOMINANT ROLE. WE HOPED IT WOULD BE
EQUIPPED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
15. AMB. RAWSON RECOMMENDED THAT TWAGIRAMUNGU TRAVEL TO
KIGALI VIA NAIROBI AND SEEK TO GET A UN FLIGHT THERE
RATHER THAN COME TO KIGALI THROUGH KAMPALA. PM
TWAGIRAMUNGU SAID HE HAD ALREADY CHECKED VARIOUS ROUTES.
IT WAS DIFFICULT TO TRAVEL TO KIGALI AND HE WANTED TO
AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS COMING TO RWANDA
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF ONE SIDE OR ANOTHER. HE EXPRESSED
INTEREST IN FLYING IN WITH THE UN, IF POSSIBLE.
16.
BUJUMBURA MINIMIZED CONSIDERED.
BLINKEN
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