Citation
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FM UKMIS NEW YORK AN
TO DESKBY 120830Z FCO € GC
TELNO 1295 Opy
OF 120113Z APRIL 94 |
INFO DESKBY 1207307 PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALA 4 |
INFO DESKBY 121400Z WASHINGTON TS
INFO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, ADDIS ABABA | PER arr es
INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS, ACTOR | Tree.
TE LUE
MY TELNO 1285: RWANDA
SUMMARY.
1. Further Secretariat report on situation. UNAMIR Force
Commander has been trying to establish a truce. RPF and
Rwandese army co-operating in evacuation of foreign nationals.
UNAMIR troops escorting convoys from Kigali to aîrport. Force
Commander preparing an assessment of prospects for UNAMIR.
Recommendations will be put to the Security Council within the
next couple of days.
DETAIL
2. AS foreshadowed in TUR, further informal consultations on
Rwanda were held on 11 April. They began with a briefing from
Riza (Assistant Secretary-General, DPKO). He said the
situation in Kigali was unchanged. - There was fighting in the _
streets, clashes between the RPE and the Presidential Guard, AE
Small arms fire, mortar and artillery shelling. As had been
reported in the press, a hospital had been hit by a shell:
thirty were dead and many wounded. The Eorce Commander Was
still trying to establish 8 truce. The RPE would not agree to
à Ceasefire unless -tt-wus-pertof wider political discussions.
The Force Commander had therefore decided to attempt a truce,
at least as long as the evacuations were underway, This was
Supposed to come into force at 6em on 11 April but had not
held. The new plan was for the truce to begin at 6am on
12 April,
3. Rîiza said killing and Looting continued. However, the army
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seemed to be taking a more active role in seeking to restore
order. They had announced that ail those caught Looting would
be shot. This was probably connected to the fact that the
Minister of Defence in the previous government who had been
outside the country when the crisis began, having decided at
the Last minute not to travel on the President's plane, had now
returned. The RPF and the army were co-operating with the
evacuation, as they had promised. Most UN civilian staff and
non-essential UNAMIR staff had Left the country either by Land
or by air. Some had Left in UN chartered planes, others as
part of the Franco-Belgian operation. A good proportion of the
foreign nationals resident in Kigali had now Left. French and
Belgian forces were în control of the airport. However they
did not have the capability to escort convoys from Kigali to
the airport. They had asked whether UNAMIR could help, It had
been agreed that this fell within UNAMIR'Ss broad hümanitarian
mandate.
&. The interim Government which had been formed was still în
place but it was unclear what authority it had. The return of
the Minister of Defence might have an impact on it. The RPF
remaîned opposed to the interim Government but the SGSR was
still trying to foster dialogue. The UNAMIR contingent was
still in place in the demilitarised zone. The RPF commander
had asked them to withdraw rather than risk getting caught in
clashes between the RPF and the Rwandan army. However it had
been decided that UNAMIR should remain since patroiling the DMZ
was one of the key tasks in its mandate. Large numbers of RPF
troops had already moved across the DMZ and had reached the
outskirts of Kigali. They had not yet engaged in the fighting.
The principal task being carried out by UNAMIR at present was
the escort of Land convoys leaving Rwanda and convoys to the
airport, and guarding areas where Large numbers of civilians
had taken refuge. It was undertaking some patrolling in
Kigali. There had been no serious UNAMIR casualties but there
was always the danger that they would get caught in cross-fire.
5. Riza said DPKO had requested an assessment of the long-term
prospects for UNAMIR from the Force Commander and the Special
Representative. This was expected on eîther 11 or 12 April.
Once it had been received the Secretariat would be în a
position to make recommendations to the Security Council.
There were two alternative scenarios. The first was that some
agreement at political Level might be reached. Tder returned
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and the beginning of a return to the implementation of the
Arusha Peace Accords. In this case UNAMIR could stay in place
with its current mandate. But if no political settlement of
any Kind could be reached thé Council woutd have 1% Covk-both
“at the mandate and at the presence of the force.
ve : :
6. Merimee (France) said that France was in the final phase of
‘Îts evacuation. About 600 French nationals had been evacuated.
Only about 20 remained. They had proven difficult to contact.
France had co-operated in evacuating persons of other
nationalities.
7. There was a brief discussion after Riza's statement.
Sardenberg (Brazil) asked what UNAMIR was doing to protect
Rwandan civilians. Riza said that UNAMIR were essentially
acting as intermediaries, Its first duty was to protect its
Own and other UN personnel. Protection of the civilian
populätion was not strictly within its mandate but UNAMIR was
helping în so far as it could, for example with 8000 refugees
at the Anahorou Stadium and another 8000 at one of the |
hospitals in Kigali Cnot the one that had been hit over the
weekend). Keating (New Zealand, Council President) said the
Council would awaît the recommendations of the Secretariat
before discussing further the future of UNAMIR. Further
consultations would be held on 12 April.
8. The Belgians here have told us separately that, according
to theïr Latest information (1118002), 465 people had been
evacuated by Belgian means so far. Of these 355 were Belgian,
20 Swiss, 12 Swedes, 24 US, 5 Canadian, 5 Italians, 4
Portuguese, 3 British, 3 Danes, 4 Germans, 3 French, the rest
“miscellaneous". They expected the evacuation of the 1000 or
s0o Belgians resident ïîn Kigali to be relatively simple. The
greater problem was the 500 or so scattered across the country.
Our Belgian colleagues said Brussels would be reluctant to take
their assets away from Rwanda before a decision was taken on
the future of UNAMIR. While their position remained that their
UNAMIR contingent would stay under UN command (paragraph 21 of
TUR refers), they would not wish to Leave it behind if the
security situation remained as at present, with considerable
anti-Belgian sentiment. Their hope seems to be that the Force
Commander will decide to evacuate the bulk or all of his force
sooner rather than later.
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