Citation
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FM UKMIS NEW YORK
T0 DESKBY 090900Z FCO
TELNO 1284
OF D090316Z APRIL 94
INFO DESKBY 090900Z PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALA
INFO DESKBY 091500Z WASHINGTON 3 FE
INFO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, ADDIS ABABA A
INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS
CT —
MY TELNO 1263: RWANDA ne enloin see
Samoa eme sm dt emnn “On 0
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SUMMARY
1. Secretariat brief Council on developments in Rwanda. Situation
still precarious. Large numbers killed, mostly Rwandans. No more
UNAMIR fatalities but two Belgian and two French civilians killed,.
Force Commander and Special Representative still trying to
negotiate cease-fîre and agreement on some form of interim
authority. Force Commander says he needs 24 hours to continue
negotiations with the parties before taking any decisions on
possible changes to UNAMIR's mandate or evacuations.
Secretary-General also writes to Council President confirming that
UNAMIR's current mandate would not allow ît to help with an
evacuation of UN civilian staff and foreign nationals. Agreement
that, if the situation deteriorates overnight and further Council
action is required, a meeting will be held on 9 April.
2. French, Belgian and Americans inform us separately that plans
are underway for the possible evacuation of their nationals via
national channels. DPKO content for this to go ahead if necessary
but want UNAMIR to be included if an evacuation takes place. Some
disagreement between them on the need for Security Council action
to enable an evacuation to take place. Council meeting on 9 April
likely.
DETAIL
3. Iqbal Riza (Assistant Secretary-General, DPKO) gave a briefing
on Latest developments în Rwanda during informal consultations of
the Security Council on 8 April. The situation remained very
precarious. Large numbers of people had been killed, mostly
Rwandans. There had been no more UNAMIR fatalities atthough four
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had been injured, two seriously Cone of the seriously inijured was
Uruguayan but there are no details on the others). In-addition-to
this two Belgian civilians had been killed. The Force Commander
was trying to get the factions to agree to a cease-fire. There
were a number of armed groups active in Kigali: the Gendarmerie,
the Presidential Guard, the Rwandan Army and various other
militisas. The Gendarmerie were the most positive about the idea of
a cease-fire end the Presidential Guard the most negative. The
Force Commander believed that a cease-fire was a possibility. The
RPF had (as reported în TUR) Left theïr barracks in Kigali and
engaged the Presidential Guard. The RPF now had control of the
approach to the airport. UNAMIR had 50 far been able to prevent
the RPF from moving across the DMZ. The DMZ remained tense but the
rest of the country was calm.
&. The Secretary-General's Special Representative Booh-Booh (SGSR)
was trying to set up some kind of interim authority involving
military and political elements to take charge of the country. He
was hampered by the chaotic situation îin Kigali and the fact that
the phone system had broken down. The RPF were inclined to enter
an interim authority. The Gendarmerie and the Rwandan army were
not opposed. Negotiations continued.
5. Keating (New Zealand, Council President) briefed Council
members on a meeting he had just had with 8 representative of the
RPF. “He had renounced agaih RPF responsibility for the attack on
the President's aeroplane. The RPF had shown restraint and
maïintained their positions. They would prefer any evacuation of
foreign nationals to be undertaken by UNAMIR but any evacuation
plan should be discussed with RPF through UNAMIR to avoid any
inadvertent hostile action. If an evacuation force remained in
Rwanda Longer than necessary it would be considered by the RPF a
hostile force. The RPF were totatly opposed to any change in
UNAMIR's mandate which gave ît a combat role (although they
accepted the use of force in self-defence). Furthermore, any
intervention by UNAMIR in RPF movements would be considered
hostile.
6. Merîimee (France) said that the main objective was to establish
some kind of political authority since there was now a vacuum.
UNAMIR was playing a positive role. The SGSR and Force Commander
were working towards the beginnings of some kind of political
authority. This was a positive move. On the question of
evacuation, it was difficult to forecast what would happen. Two
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French civilians had been killed. If the situation got worse then
an evacuation would have to be considered.
7. Gambari (Nigeria) said the African group would meet soon to
discuss the issue. They saw some disturbing parallels with events
în Congo in the sixties. Unless something was done quickly, the
situation might get worse. Gambari asked about the plans of some
Member States to intervene unilaterally to protect their civilians.
What would the UN think about such a move? Riza said the
Secretariat had received no information on bilateral plans for
evacuation. The SGSR and Force Commander were trying to keep in
touch not only with the UN but also with civilians. The Force
Commander had asked for clarification of UNAMIR's mandate and
Headquarters had clarified that evacuation was not within the
mandate and in any case it did not have the assets to accomplish an
evacuation. The SGSR confirmed that if a cease-fire could be
negotiated then the first thing after that would be get permission
for an organised evacuation of UN and other civilians.
8. Keating (New Zealand, Council President) said that he was being
asked by the press about the rules of engagement for the Force.
While the rules of engagement were within the purview of the
Secretary-General, the Council did have an interest. Riza said
that current rules of engagement permitted the use of force only in
self-defence or if forced to protect Rwanda dignitaries whom they
were guarding. The Force Commander had also recently authorised
use of deterrent fîre (îe firing in the air). Riza added that the
Prime Minister designate was safe in UNAMIR headquarters.
9. Riza then handed a Letter from the Secretary-General to the
Council President which had just arrived (text by fax to AD(CE)).
The Letter gave a brief update of UNAMIR's efforts to secure a
cease-fire (which added nothing to Riza's briefing). Boutros-Ghali
noted the Security Council's concern expressed in its statement
about safety and security of foreign communities in Rwanda and of
UNAMIR and other UN personnel. It was quite possible that the
evacuation of UN civilian staff as well as other foreign nationals
might become unavoidable. UNAMIR's mandate and rules of engagement
would not allow it to help. He also said that if UNAMIR were
required to effect an evacuation an additional two to three
battalions would be needed.
10. Merimee (France) said that the letter from the
Secretsary-General gave an outline of what the Council might do. If
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there were no deterioration in the situation and some kind of
political authority were installed there would be no need for a
change în the mandate or rules of engagement. If the situation
deteriorated and an evacuation became a real possibility then the
Council needed to Look at UNAMIR's mandate. He added that the
first duty of. Member States was to ensure the safety of their
nationals. If under an emergency situation France had to send a
battalion to Rwanda this would be exclusively to evacuate its
citizens and would be done în full cooperation with the UN.
11. Walker (CUS) said the situation in Rwanda was very grave.
According to American information, any evacuation under current
circumstances would be complex military operation which could not
be done at short notice unless done nationally. Marker (Pakistan)
said that if evacuation of UNAMIR personnel Looked as if it might
be necessary then the Council could amend the mandate or the rules
of engagement straïightaway. Rize saîd that contingency planning
was underway. But the Force Commander head said he wanted another
24 hours to determine whether he needed reinforcement or a
strengthened mandate,
12. Walker (US) said that SCR 872 gave a mandate to UNAMIR to
contribute to safety and security in Kigali and to help with
humanitarian relief operations. As far as the US were concerned,
this could be interpreted to mean UNAMIR already had a mandate for
helping with an evacuation. Sardenberg (Brazil) said that the
Secretary-General's Letter ‘should be seen as a warning. Riza had
saïd that the Force Commander needed 24 hours. It would be best to
give him 24 hours and t6 confine any Council reaction to
encouraging and supporting UNAMIR's efforts to achieve a
cease-fire. Keating saiïid he was willing to speak to the press
along those Lines. He also asked the Secretariat to brief him on 9
April on developments. If the situation warranted then he would
call a Council meeting that day.
CONTACTS WITH THE FRENCH, BELGIANS AND AMERICANS
13, We have had a number of contacts during the day with our
French, Belgian and US colleagues about possible evacuation. The
strong implication was that all three had taken or were near to
taking the decision to evacuate, and that they would wish to do 50
nationally rather than as part of a UN operation but - as the
French and US interventions in the Security Council implied - in
close cooperation with the UN.
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14. The three Missions met with Annan (Under-Secretary-General for
Peace-keeping) during the course of the afternoon: According to
our French colleäques, Annan said that UNAMIR were under great
pressure and had supplies only for another four days. They might
need early help. The UN could not evacuate the Force with the
airport closed and would need the assistance of national forces.
They had not yet reached the poînt of requesting evacuation. But
if foreign communities were evacuated, UNAMIR must be evacuated
too. UNAMIR would be ready to cooperate in the evacuation if the
airport was open.
15, Our French colleagues said that Annan informed them that the
Secretary-General was insistent that the Security Council should be
consulted before an evacuation involving UNAMIR. He was concerned
at the precedent which would be created if this were not done. His
preferred scenario was one which he received a Letter from the
Member States concerned (ie the US, France and Belgium) informing
him of their intention to act. He would then transmit this to the
Security Council and inform ît additionally that UNAMIR was not
able to perform its mandate, The final step in this procedure, our
French colleagues thought, might be a Chapter VII Security Council
resolution authorising Member States acting nationally îin
cooperation with the Secretary-General to take all necessary steps
to evacuate the foreign communities and UNAMIR. (The French
thought there would be sufficient votes for such a resolution,
CD - nicht cause difficulties among the non-aligned: the Chinese
woutd. probably abstain.) Our French collesgues saïd that the US
mission were taking 8 “"legalistie" Line and favoured the îides of a
prior Security Council resolution. The Belgians thought it madness
to give prior notice, which would only make ît easier for mutineers
in Kigali to disrupt things if they wished to. No final decision
had been reached. The French Ministry of Defence were inclined to
the Belgian view. One way out might be to seize the Council of the
issue as the operation was getting underwsy. The Belgians would
prefer to inform the Council after their forces were successfully
in place.
16. Our French colleagues told us that they were working on the
assumption that there were 3/4000 foreigners îin Rwanda excluding
the 2500 plus belonging to UNAMIR.
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COMMENT
17. It is not entirely clear what the purpose of an SCR would be.
We would presumably not wish to imply that Council authorisation is
Legally necessary for the evacuation of nationals (or indeed for
Member States to assist în the evscuation of UN personnel).
18. ALL this may now be overtaken. The New Zealand Mission
informed us Late on 8 April that the French have already gone in,
with 3 planes and 150 troops (with more to follow to secure the
airport. They said that a Council meeting on 9 April is very
likely:
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