Titre
[Belgium recommends to pull out UNAMIR completely. French troops left on 15 April. Ghanaian troops of UNAMIR control the airport. CZ delegation established contacts with RPF. A alernatives for UNAMIR. 1. Let it continue without the Begians. 2. Pull out every one except technical ans security support staff of the SRSG]
Citation
2546 – 16-04
A great part of the discussion of 15 April was devoted to the
alternatives of UNAMIR’s operation. The Bel MFA wrote to the SC
President that he intends to withdraw Bel units by the end of the
week. He recommended that the SC pull out UNAMIR completely, until a
cease-fire is arranged. He also informed about his readiness to hand
over the materiel and equipment of the Belgian blue helmets to UNAMIR
if the SC decides not to withdraw it.
(Note: This was just a small segment of the extensive and intensive
Belgian diplomatic offensive directed toward the end of the week at
withdrawing UNAMIR. Some important delegations evaluated this as a
Belgian effort not to look stupid or irresponsible once they decided
to pull out. However, they decided to pull out rather for
understandable domestic political reasons caused by their 10 soldiers
having been massacred than for objective reasons following from the
Rwanda situation. Judged by its results in the SC, this diplomatic
offensive failed. It is true of course that the population – the Hutu
– have a thing against the Belgians, though not against foreigners as
such.)
According to the Secretariat, the French contingent left Kigali on 15
April and the Belgian contingent, including their UNAMIR unit, was to
leave by the weekend.
The situation in the country continues to be fluid. However, UNAMIR
controls the airport (where the Belgians are passing the baton to the
Ghanaians) which both belligerent parties respect. The postponed
informal meeting of RPF representatives and the interim government
took place, under UNAMIR’s auspices. The RPF’s key partner will be the
defense minister who maintains at least some control over the
(disintegrating) army and even over the Presidential Guard. The
Secretariat confirmed once again that both parties are interested in
UNAMIR’s presence and agree with the mediating role of the SRSG.
The CZ delegation has established contact at the working level with
the RPF representative in New York who emphasized that the RPF also
considers the Arusha agreements as the only possible framework of
further peace talks. The RPF’s attitude to the new govt is influenced
by the lack of clarity on the other side. It is unclear who one should
negotiate with (remnants of the original, pre-‐coalition dictatorial
govt of Pres Habiyarimana and the decimated interim government which,
however, was never constitutionally ratified have varying degrees of
influence).
The Secretariat repeated the SG’s earlier position on UNAMIR: one
alternative – let it continue even without the Belgians (i.e., with
the strength of some 2000 men); the other – pull out everyone except
technical and security support staff of the SRSG who would also stay
in place (all told some 200 people). Both alternatives assume a
cease-fire; the discussion, however, clarified that a cease-fire
is needed not (only) for UNAMIR to be able to operate but (also) to
allow the withdrawal of its possible surplus units. The Secretariat
repeated that the SG prefers the first alternative and that he doesn’t
consider it practicable, desirable or wise to pull out UNAMIR
completely and immediately (as minister Claes would want).
Nigeria, on behalf of NAM, supported the first alternative. The US
stated that if the SC were to decide today (i.e., on 15 April), the US
would insist on completely pulling out the military component of
UNAMIR but that they completely understand the complexity and
changeability of the situation and won’t have a problem with waiting
for two or three days more. The UK preferred the second alternative.
The Secretariat underscored that even if the second alternative were
adopted it would not be possible to withdraw the units
immediately. Positions of delegations with different views did,
however, not converge. Amb Kovanda helped sort out the situation by
pointing out that if the SC doesn’t decide otherwise, the first
alternative will turn into the default position, albeit without making
an actual decision and without a change of the mandate. (NAM of course
anticipated this result all along. They pulled the rug out from under
the feet of the notoriously poorly prepared US.) Even though this
decision-non‐decision is not ideal (the world might have been
expecting a decisive reaction from the SC), it gives the SRSG and Gen.
Dallaire the chance to continue their discussions with the parties
about a cease-fire.
The UK pointed out that we agree on 90% of the draft resolution and
disagree only on what next with UNAMIR. He recommended adding a
general para to the draft stating that “the SC carefully and
continuously monitors the most suitable size and functions of
UNAMIR”. Not even this formulation was acceptable of Friday; but since
in the end we’ll have to say something, this formulation may well
become the starting point for something further.
The SC President prepared his speaking points for the press which with
minor changes were adopted without major problems as a reflection of
the discussion. The SC will return to the matter on Monday 18 April.
