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FROM: NEW YORK C04652/NYK 2i-Jun-1994
TO: WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC Immediate
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Subject
SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA
Your U52265.
ummar
= French have amended draft resolution to secure
Support/acquiescence ©f enough Council members to adopt
the resolution and will push it to a vote as a French
text tomorrow, 22 June
- France objects to our request for a report from the Force
Commander and for consultations with troop contributors
_ Nigeria, China, Pakistan and Brazil continue to have
serious reservations and Missions are recommending
abstentions to their capitals
_ Humanitarian NGOs are targeting us with calls and faxes
urging that we oppose the resolution
Lu Secretariat, UNAMIR Force Commander, non-Councili members,
and OAU continue to have grave reservations about the
French initiative and privately commend the stand we have
taken
- The RPF remain implacably opposed to the initiative, have
withdrawn consent for UNAMIR's presence and insist that
UNAMIR withdraw to avoid getting caught up in French-RPF
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fignting
- Secretariat report that French initiative is already
having negative impact on contributions for expanded
_UNAMIR (though Canadian Cabinet agreed today to
deployment of 300 person signals detachment to UNAMIR)
- We recommend that New Zealand withhold support from the
French resolution
Action
Voting instructions
Report
Informal consultations this afternoon were devoted to further
consideration of the French resolution. Merimee circulated a
revised text which incorporated a number of amendments
following various consultations the French had had with the
US, Brazil, Spain, the Czech Rep, and the NAM Caucus.
Despite these changes, the only enthusiastic support came
from the Russians who, as Moscow has commented, clearly see
value in the initiative for their own purposes.
2 Spain and the UK played their part as loyal EÉuropeans and
helpeä the French out with drafting suggestions, and the US
indicated support, subject to establishing clearly in the
text that financial responsibility for the venture lies with
the participating states and any others that choose to heip
them. The Argentines, who had told us beforehand they were
uncomfortable with their overnight instructions to support
the text, secured, at our suggestion, clarifying words at the
end of what is now PPF that the French force shall not be an
interpositional force between the parties.
3 We spoke early in the discussion to repeat our basic
reservations with the proposal which wouid require UNAMIR to
operate alongside a separately constituted and differently
empowered force, and urged the French to reconsider the
option of putting their troops under blue helmets and giving
UNAMIR Chapter VII authority. We also said that before the
Council took a decision it should have a detailed report from
the Force Commander on the likely implications for UNAMIR of
the introduction of the French force and that there should be
consultations with actual and potential troop contributors to
UNAMIR.
4 In response, Merimee said that while France would have
preferred to have been äble to participate in a UN-commanded
operation, circumstances made that impossible: the RPF's
attitude towards France meant that French participation in
UNAMIR would have compromised the neutrality of the UN
Force. Moreover, Che French force had a different and
dangerous task to fulfill and needed the protection offered
by a unified national command. He dismissed the request for
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a repo. - from Dallaire by noting that the SecGen would not
have supported the idea if he had been concerned for the
safety of his personnel.
5 The Chinese said they remained concerned about the
attitude of the parties and that of the OAU. When Merimee
offered satisfaction on neither, Brazil repeated the request,
but to no greater effect. (Despite their lobbying efforts,
the French have made little headway with the RPF or the OAU -
see below). Nigeria (Ayewah) made a convoluted intervention,
the upshot of which seemed to be that the latest French
draft, while an improvement, exacerbated their concerns, and
that the resolution could have a negative impact on those
countries that had already signalled their willingness to
contribute to UNAMIR. They urged the French to make haste
slowlvy.
6 NS other Council member spoke in the general discussion.
À member of the Pakistani delegation made à point of telling
us privately that he fully agreed with everything we said and
was very concerned at the implications of the resolution for
Russian intervention in Georgia, Tajikistan and even
Afghanistan. Although the French had ha some success in
persuading Marker to maintain silence, on the basis that any
Pakistani profile could complicate the task of the Khan {the
former head of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry and
newly-appointed Special Representative for Rwanda), the
delegation were going to recommend an abstention. He also
noted that they had had strong representations from the
Malaysians and the Sri Lankans urging opposition to the
proposal.
7 At French urging, the President took the Council through
a paragraph by paragraph review of the text. Merimee said he
would be happy to consider all proposals but, turning to us,
said he coulä not accommodate suggestions that were counter
to the tChrust of the French initiative. We agreed to this
procedure on the understanding that the text would remain a
French draft and that there could be no question of the text
being turned into a Presidential text or of any delegation
being committed to the outcome, A number of further changes
were made to the text, though none were of much
significance. The French said that will put the text under
their name in blue tonight (see accompanying fax) for a vote
Comorrow. Merimee pressed very hard for adoption in the
morning, but was resisted by the Nigerians and the Pakistanis
who said their instructions may not arrive until later in the
day.
8 There is manifest concern among the NGO community at the
French initiative. We received phone calls this morning fron
Britain from Oxfam UK and from Africa Rights urging us to
maintain our opposition to the proposal and telling us that
their concerns are widely held among NGOs operating in
Rwanda, including, they said, Medecines sans frontieres
(France). This afternoon, we were the subject of a fax
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attack ':rom humanitarian NGOS and Rwandans living in America
pleading with us to oppose the proposal. They äre deeply
concerne“ at the implications that the French force, coupled
with RPF opposition to it, will have on the humanitarian
relief situation and on the morale of Rwandans in general.
Africa Rights, which has just had one of their principles
return from à lengthy visit to the country insisted that the
introduction of a French force would be of major concern to
ordinary Hutu as well as to the Tutsi.
9 It has also been plain from various conversations we have
had today with the Secretariat and with non-Council members
that the vwidely-helé apprehensions about the motivation for
the French initiative and its implications for UNAMIR and the
wWider UN continue. None of the Secretariat we spoke to on
the political and military sides bothered to hide their
profound disagreement with their CEO's judgment.
10 Speculation as to the bona fides of the French initiative
is rife. One interesting piece of information we learned
from the Secretariat this afternoon is that the RPF claims
that French military advisers have remained in the country
and have been training some of the Hutu militias are
correct. Some are out in the countryside but some are in
Kigali. It was interesting therefore that the French told us
that one reason for the urgency was that they consider that
Kigali could fall to the RPF at any time.
: He NE Dheal te HER SALE AMAR 0) ë
ne. themselves, ASG Riza, whe
às of the Force Commander noted that
Dallaire was bound by the SecGen's decision and had been
instructed to implement the necessary coordination with the
French force, However, he went on to note that Dallaire had
advised that there would be no problems with the French force
if the RPF were to change their position to support the
French initiative. But if they remained opposed, there could
be very Serious complications for UNAMIR, whose headquarters
are located in an RPF-held sector of Kigali and which is
dependent on resupply either through the RPF-held airport or
through the RPF-held territory to the North-east.
11 Riza noted that there had already been some signs of a
hardening of RPF attitudes; the APCs coming from Somalia had
béen held up for three days on the border. AS if to
underscore his own reservations, when the French declined to
answer China on the OAU position Riza took the initiative to
Show us and the Nigerians the OAU e where it is
Stated clearly that the CâGrhedeasrAnt FhreVentioemmuEst
Withinrthesfranerorke À
12 The RPF opposition to the French force remains obdurate.
Today, they have taken the next step and have advised that if
the Council approves the French force it should also
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author:.e the withdrawal, perhaps temporarily, of UNAMIR
since they are concerned that their personnel will not be
able to distinguish clearly between UNAMIR and French
personnel. Text of RPF letter is in accompanying fax. Even
allowing for the element of bluff, the threat to UNAMIR is
unmistakeable. The Secretariat have told us that they are
already evacuating out the Senegalese and Congolese members
Of UNAMIR and at this afternoon!'s consultations Riza
confirmed that Dalieirerie-dramine-upmeontingencysptanst
sobakewithäransl.aof.the-forces-aMeanvhile, flighte
Kigali are subject to individual approvai by the RPF who have
taken steps to render the airport unusable to any attempt by
the French to land there.
13 Non-Council members such as the Canadians, the
Australians, the Ghanaians and the Zimbabweans have told us
Of their reservations about the French proposal. The
Australians consider that that proposal could well delay a
decision by Canberra on Australian participation in UNAMIR.
The Nigerians told us that a number of the Africans who had
committed themselves to participate in the expanded force are
now reconsidering. Even the Ghanaians, the remainder of
whose mechanised battalion were to be deployed on Friday, 24
June, is now reconsidering. This confirms the Secretariat's
Worst fears about the SecGen's decision to endorse the French
initiative. (On the positive side, however, the Canadians
tell us that their Cabinet gave formal approval this morning
to a 300 strong signals detachment to join UNAMIR. AÀ
réconnaisance team is already on the way to Rwanda.)
Voting positions
14 À vote on the resolution tomorrow i
S almost a
Qur quess is that the ER ONEST
certaint
ShinamemPalkistansinNigert
LDBEe ASYE tainrmeTherbraz
Reécommendation
15 We recommend thatÆNewerzeahendzrets ii
ctesolntion"# The evidence continues to mount that this is a
PR nr
Te.
bädly conceived operation with questionable motivation. The
NGO community is copposed and recognises that it is unlikely
to save lives. It is inconsistent with the principles ve
have consistently espoused regarding the deployment of UN
forces. Even if is able to do some immediate good, it
threatens to leave the UN with a bigger mess to clean up
afterwards,.
16
“HaéntiEied 6 HÉARNSNAR It
would do With other Council members, the
Wider UN membership or with NGOs were we to compromise our
HenCrCreEn
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