Fiche du document numéro 16623

Num
16623
Date
Monday July 18, 1994
Amj
Auteur
Fichier
Taille
120753
Pages
3
Urlorg
Titre
Security Council: Rwanda [Situation on the ground]
Mot-clé
GIR
Source
Fonds d'archives
Type
Document diplomatique, TD
Langue
EN
Citation
CONFIDENTIAL nf le 7 / Z 7







Your { le: Our file: 3/88/1

20:05 (5892) 706/NYK/00000/00060 $508.30

FROM: NEW VORK C04791/NYK 18-Tul-1994

TO: WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC Immediate

CC: BEIJING BONN Routine
BRUSSELS CANBERRA Routine
GENEVA HARARE Routine
LONDON MADRID Routine
MOSCOW OTTAWA Routine
PARIS SANTIAGO Routine
TOKYO WASHTNGTON Routine
DEFENCE Routine

MFAT (MEA,UNC,ISAC,HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3,DSP1,EAB)

P/S MFA

DEFENCE HONZDF (DSTA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

_ hüumanitarian situation in Rwanda and Zaire is
catastrophic

— France ïäinforms the Council that the members of the
“interim government" sighted in the humanitarian zone
have now fled to Zaire

- the RPF intend that the new government will be sworn in
tomorrow

Action
For information

Report

AE informals this afternoon, the Secretariat (Gharekhan)
briefed the Council on the situation in Rwanda.

2 The humanitarian situation is catastrophic. Gharekhan
distributed a note (by fax to Wgtn only) which noted that as
of Sunday 17 July, one million refugees had crossed the
border into Zaire while there were approx 2.5-3 million
people in the French protected zone. Many of them were in a
desperate state. Although the UN humanitarian agencies had
increased their numbers, means available at present were



CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

C04791/NYK

Le
wWho1iy inadequate to meet the needs in Goma. The shelling of
Goma airport on Sunday had meant its closure to all but
French military aircraft.

3 Gharekhan said that the capture of Gisenyi by the REF
meant that the war, for all practical purposes, was over.
The SRSG had met with the PM-designate. They discussed the
establishment of a broad-based government of national unity,
which according to Twagirimungu would be sworn in tomorrow,
19 July at 2 pm local time. Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, would
be appointed President and General Kagame would be appointed
Vice-President (the latter was à new position not
foreshadowed in the Arusha Accords).

4 Twagirimungu had assured the SRSG that the RPF had not
been responsible for the shelling of Goma airport on Sunday,
nor was the RPF seeking à confrontation with the French in
the southwest of the country. Twagirimungu had reiterated
that any Rwandese who had not committed atrocities was
velcome to return home.

5 On the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR, Gharekhan said
that the 50 APCs leased from the US were now on their way to
Kigali and would be used by the Ghanaians already there.

6 The President then read out a letter he had received from
the RPF representative in New York which claimed that a
ceasefire was now in place and that the new government would
be sworn in the next day. (Gharekhan had noted, however,
that the SRSG had not been formally advised of the
ceasefire). À copy of the letter follows by fax for Wgtn.

7 The Council also had before it two letters from the
French delegation. The French Charge (Ladsous) informed the
Council that the first letter, informing the Council that
five members of the "interim government" were in the French
humanitarian zone, had been overtaken by events. The persons
in question had now fled to Zaire.

8 The second letter advised that the aïirport at Goma had
been bombarded the previous day, "very likely" by the RPF,
causing 60 deaths. At the same time there had been an
Mencounter" between French forces and RPF when the latter
tried to enter the humanitarian zone while they were armed.
Both letters follow by fax to Wgtn.

9 The French Charge stressed that their concern was
humanitarian. There were 1.5 million displaced people in the
humanitarian zone. If something were not done for them

quickly, they would flee to Zaire and compound the problem.
In light of the situation, the priorities were: to confirm
the ceasefire; to create a new government; to strengthen
UNAMIR asap: and to assist all those suffering including the
internally displaced.

10 The US (Allbright} announced that President Clinton had

Page _2



CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

CO04791/NYK
$ :

derecognised the government of Rwanda. She also noted that
the President had expressed the hope that the UN would move
quickly to establish a war crimes tribunal. The US supported
efforts to respond to the humanitarian crisis and had sent
the head of its aid department to Zaire to assess the
situation.

11 We urged the rapid deployment of UNAMIR, especially in
view of the much improved security situation which should
mean that UNAMIR troops- or at least many of them- do not
need quite the same level of protective equipment. We also
proposed that UNAMIR should rapidly deploy üäin the
humanitarian zone. A UN presence would help secure support
for the humanitarian efforts taking place there. It would
aiso have the merit, 1f blue berets were present, of
demonstrating that the country was not divided into two
artificially Separate zones. We suggested that the French
might want to accelerate this process in the new environment
by placing Cperation Turquoise forces under UNAMIR control.
(Ladsous told us privately later that this would be unlikely
because the French were now very keen to get out of Rwanda as
quickly as possible. Joining UNAMIR might give rise to
expectations that they would be prepared to stay on.)

12 In conclusion, the President said that he woul& convey to
the media the Council's concern at the humanitarian
situation, its anticipation of the establishment of a new
government and a definitive announcement of a ceasefire. He
would also lay emphasis on the importance of the Arusha Peace
Agreement.

End Message

Page _3



CONFIDENTIAL
Haut

fgtquery v.1.9, 9 février 2024