Citation
Reyntjens pdf26 :
Without the support of the French army, and Operation Noroit, the regime would
probably have been defeated militarily well before the signature of the Arusha Accords.33
Belliard pdf 26 :
Il aurait mieux valu intégrer la CDR dans le GTBE.
I do not know who shot down the plane. I have my thoughts on that, there was a logical chain of events.
Dallaire pdf 42 :
Déogratias Nsabimana was not what I call a moderate.
I do not think that the President had a grip on the Army
Védrine pdf 65
I also heard him explain his rationale, which was never based on ethnic reasons.
We should have had a better appreciation of Kagame's determination to obtain complete power at whatever cost. pdf 67
Dallaire pdf 76 :
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: The first question, I never understood who was leading the French
intervention in Rwanda. We had the office of the President [Mitterrand] which issued
various statements. Then we had visits by the former French health minister and unofficial
government envoy, Bernard Kouchner. Then there was an ambassador [Jean-Michel
Marlaud], who had his own position on what was happening. For instance, when I did my
reconnaissance mission in August 1993, he appreciated the need for a significant UN force
of 4,000-5,000 peacekeepers to be deployed, even though he had only recently arrived in
Kigali.82 And then there were the French soldiers, defense ministry officials, who were
saying, "No, we just need about 500 military observers and everything will be fine." And of
course we know that France had officers who were completely integrated into the
headquarters of the Rwandan army and Gendarmerie. So I would like to ask, what was the
real position of France in all of this?
Dallaire pdf 77 :
I never understood why [switches from French to English] Kouchner appeared in
my headquarters on June 17 to say that he was not offering me Operation Turquoise, he
wanted me to go under the command of Turquoise. We actually ended up with a UN
authorized Chapter VII mission with a representation of Franco-African countries that
undermined, for the second time, my own mission. I had to get rid of all the Franco-Africans
because they were suspected of cooperating with the enemy by the RPF. I found myself
between a belligerent [the RPF] and a Chapter VII mission [Operation Turquoise], while I
am a Chapter VI mission. I am supposed to be the "blue beret" between these two characters
on the ground.
[Switches back to French] My last question is this: I directly asked the commanders
of the Belgian and French evacuation operations if they would modify their orders to let me
establish a force that would stop the massacres of threatened people, particularly in Kigali.
The answer was a categorical "No." Quite the contrary, far from cooperating, they even stole
my vehicles, which put me in a difficult position because we were accused of focusing our
attention on evacuating Westerners. So my main question is: who was running the show in
France?
pdf 80 :
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: Kouchner came as a representative of your President.
HUBERT VÉDRINE: Yes, but the government was headed by Balladur and Juppé [two right-
wing politicians]. Perhaps Kouchner invented a mission for himself, I don't know.
ROMÉO DALLAIRE: In that case, I would have kicked him out of my office.
HUBERT VÉDRINE: He certainly came with good intentions.
pdf81 :
TOM BLANTON: Mr. Kagamé?
FAUSTIN KAGAMÉ: Thank you for giving me the floor. It seems to me that the French
parliamentary commission analyzed the role of France in Rwanda differently to Minister
Védrine. In the concluding part of its report, the French parliamentary commission chaired
by Paul Quilès wrote: "France could have questioned its policy, which consisted of
encouraging the Habyarimana regime to respect human rights, which it did not do, and the
violations continued." Given the slow progress on the path of democratization, France could
have wondered about the consistency of its policy to encourage President Habyarimana to
democratize a regime that practiced repeated violations of human rights, "while assuring
our unwavering military and diplomatic support."
pdf 87 :
Védrine sur St Exupéry :
I can understand him because he was there and witnessed terrible things.
He nearly weeps when he speaks about them. From a human
point of view, I respect that, but what he writes has nothing to do with the truth. Nothing.
pdf90 :
Colette Braeckman sur la livraison d'armes du 9 avril selon Luc Marchal et sur le rapport Rwabalinda
pdf 91 :
Védrine : But I have no idea what happened as a result of this meeting with Huchon.
La version du rapport Rwabalida est celle que j'ai retapée :
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1392375-footnote-95-rwabalinda-document.html
JEAN-MARC ROCHEREAU DE LA SABLIERE: I just wanted to say a word about the arms
embargo. After the attack, there were requests from the interim Rwandan government for
arms and ammunition, which France absolutely refused because of the embargo. The policy,
at that time, was to support a ceasefire, so there was no question of giving arms to anybody.
We needed a ceasefire, and we needed to get back to Arusha. That was the policy.
pdf 92 :
JD Bizimana cite les TD de Martres et Galinié d'octobre 1990
sur la menace de génocide des Tutsi
pdf99
Don Webster the context of fax JeanPierre
pdf103
Riza le fax de Dallaire n'est pas transmis au SC
