Résumé
In an effort to spread the responsibility between both belligerent parties, the Amb of France suggested introducing into the original text an observation that the RPF also participates in massacres. He wanted to achieve this by inserting a mention of the RPF in a sentence (which was eventually deleted) about information which we have been receiving to this effect from NGOs. However, when directly asked by Amb Kovanda which NGOs have reported about RPF massacres, he didn’t respond (and judging from all we know about Rwanda, he couldn’t respond.)
Citation
Presidential Statement
Informal consultations on 29.04 led to a dramatic conclusion. As late as midnight [28.04] it was still unclear whether the CZ initiative of the previous day would result in adopting a (unanimous) PRST on Rwanda or whether on account of the resistance of some members to pointing a finger at the genocide perpetrators the draft might not be transformed into a resolution.
Only after midnight was a generally acceptable language found allowing the adoption of the PRST. The original CZ draft, however, mutated in the course of the discussions beyond recognition, inasmuch as the NZ President had overnight prepared a draft resolution containing all the elements from the preceding discussion. This discussion, as mentioned in the previous report dealt both with the CZ draft and with Nigeria’s information on the plans of the African group. The NZ draft resolution was thus substantively broader. It was actually not too difficult to agree on those parts of the text that followed from Nigeria’s presentation.
Some people, however, found some elements of the CZ draft problematic:
a. Is only the government party, or also Tutsis and RPF responsible for the massacres? According to our information, there are no indications that the RPF would be massacring inhabitants of the areas under its control. To point a finger specifically at the government party was one of the intentions of the CZ text. A number of delegations, however, found this “unbalanced” and the issue was a matter of contention to the very end. Even after midnight when agreement prevailed over every other point, Amb Kovanda blocked a whitewashing formulation of the critical second para of the PRST, to wit that [merely] “many” attacks against civilian population took place in areas controlled by the government. Finally, an acceptable formulation was found stating that these attacks are taking place “especially” in these areas.
b. In an effort to spread the responsibility between both belligerent parties, the Amb of France suggested introducing into the original text an observation that the RPF also participates in massacres. He wanted to achieve this by inserting a mention of the RPF in a sentence (which was eventually deleted) about information which we have been receiving to this effect from NGOs. However, when directly asked by Amb Kovanda which NGOs have reported about RPF massacres, he didn’t respond (and judging from all we know about Rwanda, he couldn’t respond.)
c. The mention of NGOs was in and of itself a delicate one and we didn’t expect it to survive for long. Eventually it indeed was deleted because some delegations (China and Oman, among others) didn’t want to introduce a new precedent, namely that the SC would respond not to information of the Secretariat but also of NGOs.
d. We anticipated difficulties with the term “genocide”. China had one problem: the NZ formulation was very cautious, pointing out that these and these acts amount to the crime of genocide. It was, however, precisely this cautious, non-specific formulation that China minded: not referring specifically to Rwanda, “someone could quote it out of context and misuse it”.
e. Whilst China had a problem of formulation when it came to genocide, NAM had a problem of content. NAM had altogether a problem will allowing that only one party was responsible for the massacres; let alone that this responsibility be qualified as genocide. It is a pity that the Secretariat itself has never employed the word and that it is only the ICRC and HRW that use it. Finally (as we had anticipated) the term as such didn’t survive – though international humanitarian law which the PRST finally refers to does include the Genocide Convention.
Discussion
Two camps crystallized during the discussion. One was interested – more or less actively – in as strong a text as possible. Apart from CZ who started it all it included (coincidentally) the other “Non-‐Nons”: Argentina, NZ, vehemently Spain and (less vehemently) Brazil, as well as the US (strong support) and Russia. Holding back or opposing this were all NAM countries (including Pakistan whose Amb supported us on Thursday but was absent on Friday and his No.2 had a different view) and very clearly France. The UK meandered, in essence supporting us but didn’t really care much.
However, precisely the formulation abilities of the UK which managed in the critical moment to bring the final version of the PRST to fruition, just as it seemed that the negotiations might collapse and that we would be voting the following day on a draft resolution which was based on the draft PRST. (Truth to tell, exhausted as we were, we had been looking forward to such a vote which would have forced various countries to show their true colors.)
Even though our formulations are now completely submerged and fogged up in the text, we took a significant part in working it through. This was the first time that CZ presented anything and we scored on various sides. On the last day of its presidency, though, NZ truly sparkled. Also the support and assistance of the very precise and careful SP and of the US delegation were significant.
The situation in Rwanda
The situation in Rwanda is an ever greater catastrophe. As the PRST was being debated, the SG sent the SC another letter in which he drew attention to preparations of further blood-‐letting and presented some ideas as to how the SC might react. The SC just managed to take note of the letter; it will react to it only early next week. Human Rights Watch, however (with which we maintain intensive contacts) has terrible fears of further developments – an incendiary radio station in Kigali is apparently calling for completing the cleansing – i.e., for the final extermination of all Tutsi – by May 5 when the funeral of President Habiyarimana should apparently take place. (“Final solution”?) SG’s letter also mentions “preparations” for further bloodshed. However, the new SC President – Nigeria for this month – usually devotes the first two days of the month to bilateral consultations with other members.
Next steps
We intend to mention the danger of further bloodshed during informal consultations at any rate. We would however prefer to have an actual instruction from HQ to do so.
We would also like to know whether the Arusha agreement is still sacred for us, considering that according to the SG, 200 000 people have been murdered in the course of three weeks. (Nobody has been questioning Arusha as yet; but the NAM uses the argument of jeopardizing Arusha as a reason for not castigating the so-called interim government.)
Finally, there is the question of the mandate of the current Rwanda representative. He was dispatched here by a government which disintegrated after the plane crash, inasmuch as the partisans of the late president killed off members of the former opposition who precisely on account of Arusha had been invited to join the government – starting with the prime minister. The legitimacy of the current so-called interim government – which was at one point underscored by our African Dept – is not at all clear and many people here consider it a bunch of self-selected people. It would help us to have the freedom to question Bizimana’s mandate if the right moment arises. (The US are apparently considering the same. France, by contrast, is receiving members of the interim government in Paris.)
